Opinion
CIVIL ACTION No. 02-2277-GTV
February 7, 2003
ORDER
Plaintiff Yericho Yisrael brings this action, claiming that numerous parties violated his civil rights throughout the course of his divorce proceedings in the District Court of Johnson County, Kansas. He asks the court to award him monetary damages, declaratory judgment, and injunctive relief. The case is before the court on motions to strike or dismiss Plaintiff's amended complaint by each Defendant (Docs. 83, 85, 87, 89, 90, and 91), motions to dismiss Plaintiff's original complaint (Docs. 12, 19, 23, 25, 45, and 55), and Plaintiff's motion for class certification (Doc. 2). For the reasons stated below, the motions to strike or dismiss Plaintiff's amended complaint (Docs. 83, 85, 87, 89, 90, and 91) are granted. All other motions (Docs. 2, 12, 19, 23, 25, 45, and 55) are denied as moot.
Motions to Strike or Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (Docs. 83. 85. 87. 89., 90, and 91)
Plaintiff has attempted to amend his original complaint with a document that consists of a 71-page list of changes and cross-references to his original complaint. The amended complaint cannot stand alone and does not conform to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. While the court would normally strike such a document, it declines to do so in this instance. Because Plaintiff proceeds pro se, the court construes the document liberally and reads it in conjunction with Plaintiff's original complaint. Even allowing the amended complaint to stand, however, the court grants Defendants' motions to dismiss.
The court dismisses Plaintiff's amended complaint for several reasons. First, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's case. Plaintiff is essentially asking the court to review state court divorce and child custody rulings; one type of relief Plaintiff requests is that the court declare the rulings of Judges James Franklin Davis and Janice D. Russell null and void. Under the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine, federal courts lack jurisdiction to review decisions of a state court or any claim "inextricably intertwined" with claims decided by a state court. Mounkes v. Conklin, 922 F. Supp. 1501, 1508-10 (D. Kan. 1996) (explaining the doctrine, which stems from the holdings in District of Columbia Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983) and Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923)). Only the United States Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review such decisions. 28 U.S.C. § 1257; Facio v. Jones, 929 F.2d 541, 543 (10th Cir. 1991).
Moreover, most Defendants in this case are entitled to immunity from suit. Plaintiff has sued the following parties: Judges Janice D. Russell, James Franklin Davis, Patrick D. McAnany, and Steve Leben ("Judge Defendants"); Kathleen Sloan, Court Trustee for the District Court of Johnson County, Kansas; the United States of America; Kansas Department of Social and Rehabilitation Services, Doug Nolan, and Kaye A. Long ("SRS Defendants"); Howard Coatney, clinical social worker; National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws; and Ellen Aisenbrey, attorney.
Judge Defendants are entitled to judicial immunity. Van Sickle v. Holloway, 791 F.2d 1431, 1434-35 (10th Cir. 1986). The Court Trustee is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. Bush v. Rauch, 38 F.3d 842, 847-48 (6th Cir. 1994); Valdez v. Denver, 878 F.2d 1285, 1286-88 (10th Cir. 1989); The United States is entitled to sovereign immunity. United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941); Bryan v. Office of Personnel Mgmt., 165 F.3d 1315, 1318 (10th Cir. 1999). SRS Defendants, Judge Defendants, and the Court Trustee are entitled to Eleventh Amendment Immunity. Seminole Tribe of Fl. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72, 73, 76 (1996); Pennhurst State Sch. Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 120-21 (1984) (holding that Eleventh Amendment bars claims based on state law); Russ v. Uppah, 972 F.2d 300, 303 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that Eleventh Amendment bars suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). All government officials sued in their individual capacities ate entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 1985. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); Butler v. City of Prairie Village, 172 F.3d 736, 745 (10th Cir. 1999); Bisbee v. Bey, 39 F.3d 1096, 1101-02 (10th Cir. 1994); Redpath v. City of Overland Park, 857 F. Supp. 1448, 1465 (D. Kan. 1994). Any allegations of constitutional violations are merely conclusory allegations, which are insufficient to establish a violation of a constitutional right when the defense of qualified immunity is raised. Tonkovich v. Kan. Bd. of Regents, 159 F.3d 504, 532 (10th Cir. 1998).
Plaintiff requests that the court grant him declaratory and/or injunctive relief in numerous forms. For example, he requests that the court change statutory language and require that "presiding judges monitor judges as to their capacity to perceive civil liberties issues and to preserve the constitutional rights of all parties, and that as necessary there be instruction in guarding constitutional rights." The court declines to entertain such requests, as they are nonjusticiable and/or involve political questions. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1937); Schroder v. Bush, 263 F.3d 1169, 1171-76 (10th Cir. 2001).
Plaintiff also cites alleged violations of federal criminal laws as a basis for his complaint. Generally, private citizens lack standing to prosecute alleged violation of criminal laws. Martinez v. Ensor, 958 F. Supp. 515, 518 (D. Colo. 1997). To the extent that Plaintiff is making claims under the civil provisions of the federal racketeering statutes, the court dismisses those claims. The court's research has not revealed any other court that has allowed a claim such as Plaintiff's to proceed under the Racketeer Influenced and Corruption Organization Act ("RICO").
Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants conspired against him in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (3). A conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (3) requires that Plaintiff allege that Defendants' actions were motivated by class-based animus. Bisbee, 39 F.3d at 1102. Plaintiff alleges a conspiracy against "non-custodial parents." Non-custodial parents are not a members of a class protected by federal law. Because Plaintiff's § 1985 claims fail, his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1986, which are derivative of his § 1985 claims, also fail. Santistevan v. Loveridge, 732 F.2d 116, 120 (10th Cir. 1984).
The remainder of Plaintiff's allegations are conclusory allegations that cannot withstand a motion to dismiss, Hill v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 14 F. Supp.2d 1235, 1237 (D. Kan. 1998), claims that Plaintiff lacks standing to assert, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992), and claims that are barred by statutes of limitation, e.g., K.S.A. § 60-514. For all of these reasons, the court dismisses Plaintiff's case.
Remaining Motions
The remaining motions before the court, Plaintiff's motion for class certification (Doc. 2), and Defendants' motions to dismiss Plaintiff's original complaint (Docs. 12, 19, 23, 25, 45, and 55), are denied as moot.
IT IS, THEREFORE, BY THE COURT ORDERED that the motions to strike or dismiss Plaintiff's amended complaint (Docs. 83, 85, 87, 89, 90, and 91) are granted. Plaintiff's motion for class certification (Doc. 2) and Defendants' motions to dismiss Plaintiff's original complaint (Docs. 12, 19, 23, 25, 45, and 55) are denied as moot.
Copies of this order shall be transmitted to counsel of record and pro se Plaintiff.
The case is closed.