Opinion
2:22-cv-04175-BHH-MGB
03-27-2023
Benjamin Marler Yerby, IV, Plaintiff, v. Summerville Police Department; PFC Andrew Myers 134; and Dorchester County Sheriff's Office, Defendants.
MARY GORDON BAKER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Benjamin Marler Yerby, IV (“Plaintiff”), a state pretrial detainee proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, has filed this civil action challenging a recent arrest pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and other South Carolina state law. (See Dkt. Nos. 1, 1-1.) Under Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review this case and submit findings and recommendations to the assigned United States District Judge. For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned recommends that this action be summarily dismissed.
BACKGROUND
The undersigned notes at the outset that the rambling, incoherent nature of Plaintiff's allegations makes it very difficult to ascertain the true facts underlying the claims here. Indeed, the Complaint is primarily comprised of handwritten copies and photocopies of law enforcement records detailing Plaintiff's arrest at a Sunoco gas station in Summerville, South Carolina on June 25, 2022. (See Dkt. No. 1-1.) The records are marked with what appear to be Plaintiff's handwritten notations contesting the accuracy of the officer reports and the events accounted therein. According to these law enforcement records, Plaintiff was apparently intoxicated at the Sunoco and refused to leave the store at the cashier's request, until he was eventually escorted outside by an officer with the Summerville Police Department. (See id. at 23-24.) The records suggest that once in the parking lot, Plaintiff brandished a knife and threatened law enforcement, after which he was taken into custody on charges of public intoxication and resisting arrest with a deadly weapon. (See id. at 23-27.)
The crux of Plaintiff's Complaint appears to be that the police reports surrounding his arrest on June 25th were “fabricated” and contain various inconsistencies, including, among other things, the time/date of the incident, the names of the officers involved, Plaintiff's purported behavior during the arrest, and the nature of the criminal charges. (See Dkt. No. 1 at 4-5; Dkt. No. 1-1 at 26, 29-31, 34-36.) In addition to the purported falsified paperwork, Plaintiff claims that certain officers also withheld and/or spoliated body camera footage and other relevant evidence in relation to his arrest. (See Dkt. No. 1-1 at 7-8, 22, 40.) Finally, Plaintiff claims that the arresting officer used excessive force in effecting the arrest. (Id. at 33.) Based on the above, Plaintiff alleges “fabrication, spoliation of records, excessive force, perjury, defamation, malicious/false arrest” (Dkt. No. 1 at 2) and violations of the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments (Dkt. No. 1-1 at 37). Plaintiff seeks $200,000 in “punitive” damages. (Id. at 33.)
Upon reviewing the initial filings in this matter, the undersigned issued an order notifying Plaintiff that his Complaint was largely unintelligible and therefore failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. (Dkt. No. 4 at 2.) In light of Plaintiff's pro se status, however, the undersigned granted him twenty-one days, plus three days for mail time, to file an amended complaint that cured the identified pleading deficiencies. (Id. at 5.) In addition to the amended complaint, the undersigned also directed Plaintiff to file a completed set of proposed service documents for each of the defendants named in the amended pleading as required under General Order In Re: Procedures in Civil Actions Filed by Prisoner Pro Se Litigants, No. 3:07-mc-5 014 JFA (D.S.C. Sept. 18, 2007).(Id. at 6.) The undersigned emphasized that if Plaintiff did not follow the instructions above within the time permitted by the order, his case would be summarily dismissed. (Id.) To date, Plaintiff has not filed an amended complaint or any proposed service documents, and the time to do so has lapsed.
The undersigned's order noted that while the caption of the Complaint named only the Summerville Police Department, Officer Myers, and the Dorchester County Sheriff's Office as Defendants, Plaintiff referenced other individuals elsewhere in the pleading. (Dkt. No. 4 at 3 n.3.) Plaintiff did not, however, provide a completed set of proposed service documents when he filed his initial Complaint, making it difficult to determine the universe of defendants. Plaintiff was therefore instructed to complete and submit as many summons forms as necessary to capture all of the parties he wished to name as defendants in this action. (Id. at 6.)
LEGAL STANDARD
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Complaint pursuant to the procedural provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996). The Complaint has been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit, and is also governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires the court to review a complaint filed by a prisoner that seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.
To protect against possible abuses, the court must dismiss any prisoner complaints, or portions of complaints, that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also § 1915A(b). A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). A claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte “at any time” under § 1915(e)(2)(B). Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989). The United States Supreme Court has explained that the statute “is designed largely to discourage the filing of, and waste of judicial and private resources upon, baseless lawsuits.” Id. at 326.
As to failure to state a claim, a complaint filed in federal court must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” as required under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. To satisfy this standard, a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that the court need not accept as true a complaint's legal conclusions). Rather, the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” See id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). This plausibility determination is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. When “it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations,” Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), the complaint fails to state a claim.
Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is therefore charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a Pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure to allege facts that set forth a cognizable claim under Rule 8(a)(2). See Weller v. Dep t of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 39091 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684 (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8, Fed. R. Civ. P., for “all civil actions”). The Fourth Circuit has explained that “though pro se litigants cannot, of course, be expected to frame legal issues with the clarity and precision ideally evident in the work of those trained in law, neither can district courts be required to conjure up and decide issues never fairly presented to them.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1276 (4th Cir. 1985).
DISCUSSION
Despite the undersigned's express warning, Plaintiff failed to file an amended pleading or any proposed service documents. The undersigned therefore finds that this action is subject to summary dismissal under Rule 41(b), Fed. R. Civ. P., for failure to prosecute and comply with an order of this Court. See Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962). Moreover, for the reasons discussed below, the undersigned also finds that Plaintiff's Complaint remains subject to summary dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
“Although a Pro se plaintiff is general[ly] given more leeway than a party represented by counsel . . . a district court is not obligated to ferret through a [c]omplaint . . . that is so confused, ambiguous, vague or otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is well disguised.” Bell v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 1:13-cv-478-RDB, 2013 WL 6528966, at *1 (D. Md. Dec. 11, 2013) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Nor is the court “required to scour through [a] [p]laintiff's attachments in an attempt to cobble together the facts” on the plaintiff's behalf. Campbell v. StoneMor Partners, LP, No. 3:17-cv-407, 2018 WL 3451390, at *4 (E.D. Va. July 17, 2018), aff'd, 752 Fed.Appx. 166 (4th Cir. 2019); see also Beaudett, 775 F.2d at 1278 (explaining that federal courts are not required to serve as “mind readers” or advocates for pro se litigants when construing Pro se pleadings).
Rather, a Pro se plaintiff “must meet certain minimum standards of rationality and specificity” in filing a complaint. See Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 74 (4th Cir. 1994). When a pleading is “so incomprehensible and filled with what could only be considered by a reasonable person as unconnected, conclusory, and unsupported comments or gibberish, that it is unclear what is to be made of them,” summary dismissal is appropriate. Witherspoon v. Berry, No. 9:13-cv-2942-MGL, 2015 WL 1790222, at *3 (D.S.C. Apr. 15, 2015); see also Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-37 (1974) (noting that federal courts lack the power to entertain claims that are “so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit”); Holloway v. Pagan River Dockside Seafood, Inc., 669 F.3d 448, 452-53 (4th Cir. 2012) (noting that a federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a complaint raising claims “so insubstantial, implausible . . . or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Here, the incoherent, vague series of attachments and allegations upon which this case rests fall well short of the minimum pleading standard, and Plaintiff's claims are therefore subject to summary dismissal.
Notwithstanding the unintelligible nature of the pleading, the undersigned combed through Plaintiff's Pro se filings in a serious effort to consider any potential claims. As noted in the preceding proper form order, the only federal claims that are expressly referenced within the Complaint-although minimally and without any coherent factual support-are excessive force and false arrest, which fall under the purview of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Dkt. No. 4 at 2-3.) See Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012) (explaining that § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States”). To state a claim to relief under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Plaintiff's claims fail to meet this criteria for several reasons.
As the undersigned previously explained to Plaintiff, the Summerville Police Department and Dorchester County Sheriff's Office do not qualify as “persons” for purposes of § 1983, regardless of whether Plaintiff refers to the physical buildings or the staff and collection of officials they house. (See Dkt. No. 4 at 3.) See, e.g., Madison v. Shell, No. 7:22-cv-3549-TMC-JDA, 2022 WL 17156885, at *3 (D.S.C. Nov. 3, 2022) (noting that a police department “is a facility, building, or group of people,” and therefore is “not subject to suit because it cannot be sued as a ‘person' in a § 1983 lawsuit”), adopted, 2022 WL 17128451 (D.S.C. Nov. 22, 2022); Brooks v. Borghi, No. 5:21-cv-3282-BHH-MHC, 2022 WL 17543121, at *2 (D.S.C. Nov. 18, 2022) (explaining that the sheriff's office, as an “arm of the state,” is not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983), adopted, 2022 WL 17542998 (D.S.C. Dec. 8, 2022). Accordingly, any such claims against these Defendants are subject to summary dismissal.
With respect to Defendant Myers, a person acting under color of state law can be held liable under § 1983 only if he or she was personally involved in the deprivation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights. Wilcox v. Brown, 877 F.3d 161, 170 (4th Cir. 2017); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (noting that “a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution”). However, the Complaint remains unclear as to Defendant Myers' personal involvement in the arrest, or in any alleged deprivation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights for that matter. Without more, such claims are subject to summary dismissal. See Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 405 (4th Cir. 2001) (noting that while the “liberal pleading requirements” of Rule 8(a), Fed. R. Civ. P., require only a “short and plain” statement of the claim, the plaintiff must “offer more detail . . . than the bald statement that he has a valid claim of some type against the defendant”) (internal citations omitted).
For that same reason, Plaintiff's isolated, contextless references to other officers similarly fail to demonstrate the requisite personal involvement under § 1983-to the extent Plaintiff intended to name such individuals as defendants.
It is worth noting that even if Plaintiff had raised a coherent challenge to law enforcement's actions with respect to the June 25th arrest, such claims are likely barred under the Younger abstention doctrine in any event. Indeed, in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the United States Supreme Court explained that absent extraordinary circumstances, federal courts are not authorized to interfere with a state's pending criminal proceedings. See Younger, 401 U.S. at 4344; see also Gilliam v. Foster, 75 F.3d 881, 903 (4th Cir. 1996). “What lies behind Younger is the premise that state courts are capable of adequately protecting constitutional rights.” Victoria v. Bodiford, No. 8:21-cv-1836-JMC, 2021 WL 3726707, at *2 (D.S.C. Aug. 20, 2021). Thus, federal district courts should abstain from hearing constitutional challenges, no matter how meritorious, if the federal claims have been or could be presented in an ongoing state judicial proceeding. Cinema Blue of Charlotte, Inc. v. Gilchrist, 887 F.2d 49, 52 (4th Cir. 1989); see also Victoria, 2021 WL 3726707, at *2 (“If Petitioner has the opportunity to raise his constitutional arguments within the state court proceedings and appeal adverse determinations within the state court system, this court is bound by Younger to abstain from granting Petitioner the relief he requests.”). Because Plaintiff's criminal proceedings for the public intoxication charge appear to be ongoing, he plainly has the ability to raise his claims regarding his arrest and the accuracy of the related police reports before the state court handling those proceedings.Consequently, as the undersigned previously warned Plaintiff, further consideration of his claims would be inappropriate at this time. (See Dkt. No. 4 at 4-5.)
The undersigned takes judicial notice of Plaintiff's underlying state court proceedings, Case No. 20222690270884. See https://publicindex.sccourts.org/dorchester/publicindex/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2023); see also Aloe Creme Labs., Inc. v. Francine Co., 425 F.2d 1295, 1296 (5th Cir. 1970) (explaining that a federal court may take
judicial notice of the contents of its own records, as well as those
records of other courts); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887
F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (same).
Turning finally to Plaintiff's state law claims, a federal court generally cannot exercise supplemental jurisdiction over such allegations without original jurisdiction over related federal causes of action. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (stating that the district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims if it has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (stating that “if the federal claims are dismissed . . ., the state claims should be dismissed as well”); see also Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 655 (4th Cir. 1999). Because the current Complaint fails to allege any actionable federal claims, the undersigned cannot exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims here.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff's action is subject to summary dismissal for failure to comply with an order of this Court pursuant to Rule 41(b), Fed. R. Civ. P., and failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The undersigned therefore RECOMMENDS that this action be DISMISSED without prejudice and without further leave to amend or bring this case into proper form, as Plaintiff has already had an opportunity to do so. See Britt v. DeJoy, 45 F.4th 790, 798 (4th Cir. 2022); see also Workman v. Morrison Healthcare, 724 F. App'x. 280, 281 (4th Cir. June 4, 2018).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties' attention is directed to an important notice on the following page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).