Opinion
Case No. 1:15-cv-166 Erie
12-13-2019
RALPH LEE YENDELL, Petitioner v. SUPERINTENDENT SCI-FOREST, et al., Respondents
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON RESPONDENTS' MOTION TO DISMISS [ECF NO. 16] MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Recommendation
It is respectfully recommended that Respondents' Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 16] be denied.
II. Report
A. Background
Petitioner Ralph Lee Yendell, an inmate incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Forest (SCI-Forest), initiated this action on July 10, 2015, by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"). ECF No. 3. Petitioner is challenging the judgment of sentenced imposed upon him by the Court of Common Pleas of Crawford County on March 30, 2010. Id. Petitioner's original petition contained ten grounds for relief, loosely characterized as follows:
1. Bad faith/sufficiency of the evidence based on an allegedly inadequate arrest warrant;Id.
2. Ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) based on first trial counsel's failure to challenge the arrest warrant;
3. IAC based on second trial counsel's failure to challenge the arrest warrant;
4. IAC based on third trial counsel's failure to challenge the arrest warrant;
5. Due process violations stemming from a constitutionally defective waiver of his right to counsel;
6. IAC based on appellate counsel's failure to raise Ground 5;
7. IAC based on trial counsel's failure to object to the inadequate Ground 5;
8. IAC based on trial counsel's failure to adequately investigate;
9. IAC based on trial counsel's failure to adequately advise him prior to his withdrawal of his guilty plea; and
10. Prosecutorial misconduct.
On July 20, 2015, the Court issued an order staying this action so that Petitioner could exhaust his remedies in state court. ECF No. 5. The Court administratively closed the case and directed Petitioner to file a motion to lift the stay within thirty days of the completion of his pending state proceedings. Id. On February 11, 2019, Petitioner informed the Court that his state proceedings had concluded and moved to lift the stay. ECF No. 7. The Court granted the motion and instructed Petitioner to file an amended petition on or before March 26, 2019. ECF No. 8.
On March 18, 2019, Petitioner filed his amended petition. ECF No. 9. Petitioner pared his claims down to the following four grounds for relief:
1. IAC based on trial counsel's failure to adequately inform him of the consequences of withdrawing his guilty plea prior to trial (original Ground 9);
2. IAC based on trial counsel's failure to object to the constitutional defects associated with Petitioner's waiver of his right to counsel (original Ground 7);Id.
3. IAC based on trial counsel's failure to conduct an adequate factual investigation (original Ground 8); and
4. IAC based on appellate counsel's failure to raise the voluntariness of Petitioner's waiver of his right to counsel on direct appeal (original Ground 6).
On April 23, 2019, Respondents filed the instant motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer. ECF No. 16. Respondents raise two defenses: that the petition is untimely, and that each of the four grounds for relief raised in the amended petition has been procedurally defaulted. Id. Petitioner filed a response to the motion to dismiss on June 14, 2019. ECF No. 20. This matter is ripe for disposition.
B. Analysis
Respondents first contend that the amended petition is untimely under AEDPA, which generally requires a state prisoner to file his or her federal petition within one year after his or her conviction becomes final. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d); Thompson v. Adm'r N.J. State Prison, 701 Fed. Appx. 118, 121 (3d Cir. 2017). A state-court criminal judgment becomes "final" within the meaning of § 2244(d)(1) at the conclusion of direct review or at the expiration of time for seeking such review. See Swartz v. Meyers, 204 F.3d 417, 419 (3d Cir. 2000); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). However, the filing of a post-conviction relief petition may statutorily toll (i.e., suspend) the running of the one-year habeas limitations period. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) ("The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection."). Thus, in analyzing whether a petition for writ of habeas corpus has been timely filed under the one-year limitations period, a federal court must undertake a three-part inquiry. First, the court must determine the "trigger date" for the one-year limitations period pursuant to section 2244(d)(1). See Caldwell v. Mahally, et al., 5741706, *5 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 5, 2019). Second, the court must determine whether any "properly filed" applications for post-conviction or collateral relief were pending during the limitations period that would toll the statute pursuant to section 2244(d)(2). Id. Third, the court must determine whether any of the other statutory exceptions or equitable tolling should be applied on the facts presented. Id.
Here, the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed Petitioner's conviction and sentence on June 7, 2011. ECF No. 16-4. Petitioner had thirty days to file a Petition for Allowance of Appeal with the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania but did not do so. See Pa. R. App. P. 1113(a). Therefore, his judgment of sentence became final on July 7, 2011, and the one-year AEDPA clock began to run the next day.
On May 14, 2012, Petitioner filed a petition pursuant to the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa. C. S. A. § 9545, et seq. ("PCRA petition"). As of that date, 311 days of the AEDPA clock had expired. As noted above, Section 2244(d)(2) provides that the one-year limitations period is tolled during the pendency of a "properly filed" state post-conviction proceeding. Because Petitioner's PCRA petition was "properly filed," the statute of limitations was tolled until May 15, 2015, when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Petitioner's Petitioner for Allowance of Appeal. ECF No. 16-7. At that point, Petitioner had 54 days remaining (365 days - 311 days = 54 days) in which to file a timely habeas petition, or until July 8, 2015. His petition, placed in the prison mailing system on July 6, 2015, was timely by two days. ECF No. 3 at 15. Consequently, Respondents' motion to dismiss as untimely should be denied.
Respondents' argument with respect to timeliness appears to be based on a mistaken belief that Petitioner initiated this action on March 18, 2018, when he filed the amended petition. However, as recounted above, Petitioner initiated this action on July 6, 2015, when he filed his original petition. --------
Respondents alternatively (and very briefly) contend that each of Petitioner's four grounds for relief has been procedurally defaulted due to his failure to raise those claims in an available state court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) (requiring a habeas corpus applicant to first exhaust his available state court remedies); Rolan v. Coleman, 680 F.3d 317 (3d Cir. 2012) (explaining that an unexhausted claim which can no longer be presented to the state courts has been procedurally defaulted). In response, Petitioner essentially concedes that his claims have been procedurally defaulted but maintains that he can establish cause for the default based on the ineffectiveness of his PCRA counsel. See Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309, 1315 (2012) (holding that "[i]nadequate assistance of counsel at initial-review collateral proceedings may establish cause for a prisoner's default of a claim of ineffective assistance at trial"). Respondents have not responded to this contention. Moreover, because Petitioner must ultimately demonstrate that his underlying claims have merit in order to establish cause and prejudice under Martinez, the Court cannot address this issue without reviewing the entire state court record. Consequently, Respondents' motion to dismiss on this basis should be denied. The Court will revisit the issue of procedural default once Respondents have submitted a full answer to the petition and supplied the entire state court record.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, it is respectfully recommended that Respondents' motion to dismiss [ECF No. 16] be DENIED. Respondents should be ordered to file a full answer in accordance with the Court's prior order [ECF No. 11] within 30 days of the adoption of this Report and Recommendation. Petitioner should be directed to submit a response, if so desired, within 30 days thereafter.
IV. Notice
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72, the parties may seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of Objections to respond thereto. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections may constitute a waiver of appellate rights. See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 194 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007).
/s/ Richard A. Lanzillo
RICHARD A. LANZILLO
United States Magistrate Judge Dated: December 13, 2019