Opinion
Nos. 05-03-01331-CR, 05-03-01332-CR, 05-03-01333-CR
Opinion Filed July 1, 2004. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47.
On Appeal from the 336th Judicial District Court Grayson County, Texas, Trial Court Cause Nos. 49554, 50006, and 50007. Affirmed.
Before Justices MORRIS, FITZGERALD, and FRANCIS.
OPINION
Danny Joe Yarbrough appeals the revocation of his probation. In each case, appellant waived a jury trial and entered negotiated pleas of guilty to possession of methamphetamine in an amount of four grams or more but less than 200 grams and two possession of methamphetamine in an amount of less than one gram offenses. See Tex. Health Safety Code Ann. § 481.115(a), (b), (d) (Vernon 2003). Pursuant to the plea bargain agreements, the trial court assessed punishment at ten years confinement, probated for eight years, and a $1000 fine in the first case, and two years in a state jail facility, probated for four years, and $500 fines in the other two cases. Subsequently, the State moved to revoke appellant's probation, alleging appellant violated the conditions of probation. Appellant pleaded not true to the allegations. The trial court found the allegations true, revoked appellant's probation in each case, and sentenced appellant to five years confinement in the first case, and two years in a state jail facility in the second and third cases. In a single point of error, appellant contends the evidence is insufficient to support the revocations. We affirm the trial court's judgments. Appellate review of a probation revocation is limited to a determination of whether the trial court abused its discretion. We examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's findings. Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493-94 (Tex.Crim.App. 1984); Lee v. State, 952 S.W.2d 894, 897 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1997, no pet.) (en banc). The State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the probationer violated the conditions of his probation. Cobb v. State, 851 S.W.2d 871, 874 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993); Lee, 952 S.W.2d at 901. In its amended petition to revoke probation, the State alleged appellant violated condition (1) by committing a new offense of possession of a controlled substance, and condition (3) by failing to avoid persons and places of disreputable and harmful character. Appellant argues the evidence is insufficient to support the revocations of his probation because he did not exercise care, custody, or control over the drugs found hidden in the ceiling of a motel room and did not know two people he met with the day he was placed on probation had a criminal record. During the revocation hearing, Grayson County probation officer Jason Kirk, testified that on May 8, 2003, appellant was placed on probation for three drug offenses and received the terms and conditions of his probation. Kirk went over the conditions with appellant at that time. Kirk testified appellant left the probation office at approximately 11:15 a.m. At 2:00 p.m. that same day, Kirk received information that appellant had been arrested for committing a new offense. Grayson County Sheriff's deputy Jeremy Householder testified he was conducting surveillance on Jason Reddick as part of an ongoing investigation for drug activity. On May 8, 2003, Householder saw Reddick talking to appellant in the parking lot of a motel in Denison. After a few minutes, Reddick left in his vehicle. Householder spoke to Reddick and Reddick told Householder he briefly saw appellant in the parking lot of the motel and that appellant gave him a beer and asked if Reddick knew anyone who was "looking for anything" because appellant needed to "make some money." Reddick was not detained. Householder testified he had outstanding warrants for Mayla Spencer, a known drug user, and he knew Spencer ran around with Reddick. Householder and a Denison narcotics officer discovered that Spencer had registered for a room at the motel. When they knocked on the door to Spencer's room, appellant opened the door. Appellant was wearing only a towel wrapped around his waist, and Spencer was in bed naked. Appellant told the officers he and Spencer were having sex. Householder arrested Spencer on the outstanding warrants, and officers searched the room. The Denison officer observed a baggy containing a "white crystal substance" later determined to be methamphetamine, in a gap in the ceiling tile. Householder arrested appellant, and officers searched appellant's vehicle, where they found a set of digital scales. On May 8, 2003, after appellant was placed on probation, the conditions of probation were explained to him and he testified he understood them. At about 1:00 p.m. when appellant left the probation department, Spencer called him on his cell phone and told appellant to meet her at the motel. "She said that — you want to finish what you started this morning? Then she said meet her at the motel." Appellant stopped to buy beer on his way to the motel and when appellant got there, he saw Reddick in the parking lot. After Reddick asked appellant for a beer, appellant gave him one and talked to him briefly. Appellant testified he had known Reddick for about five months, but he did not know if Reddick was involved with drugs or know anything about Reddick's criminal history. Appellant testified he and Spencer were in bed for about fifteen minutes before officers knocked on the door. The officers said they had a warrant for Spencer. They allowed Spencer to get dressed before they arrested her and searched the room. Appellant testified that when the officers found the drugs hidden in the ceiling, Spencer told them the drugs belonged to her. Appellant testified he had bought the digital scales and a satellite dish from a garage sale the previous day and had not unpacked them from his vehicle. Appellant testified he was not aware there were drugs in the room, he only went to the room to have sex, and he did not know Spencer had a criminal history. Appellant told the court he knew Mayla Spencer used drugs, and testified, "I shouldn't have been around them people, but I just went up there to have sex." Reviewing the record as a whole, we conclude the evidence is sufficient to show appellant violated condition (3) of his probation by failing to avoid persons and places of disreputable and harmful character. Proof of one violation is sufficient to support revocation. See Lee, 952 S.W.2d at 897. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking appellant's probation. See Lee, 952 S.W.2d at 901; see also Mendietta v. State, 476 S.W.2d 682, 684 (Tex.Crim.App. 1972). We overrule appellant's sole point of error. We affirm the trial court's judgment in each case.