Summary
In Yale University v. Benneson, 147 Conn. 254, 159 A.2d 169 (1960), which upheld the denial of an injunction sought by Yale University against the use of "Yale" in Yale Motor, Inc., a motel operator at Wallingford, Connecticut, the court stated at 257, 159 A.2d at 171 that: "The confusion of which a court takes cognizance must be something more than the result of carelessness or ignorance upon the part of the uninformed."
Summary of this case from Goodyear Tire Rubber Co. v. Topps of Hartford, Inc.Opinion
If the effect of the appropriation by one corporation of a distinctive portion of the name of another is to cause confusion and uncertainty in the latter's business, injure it pecuniarily or otherwise, and deceive and mislead the public, relief will be afforded It is not sufficient, however, that some person may possibly be misled. The similarity must be such that any person, with such reasonable care and observation as the public generally are capable of using and may be expected to exercise, would be likely to mistake one for the other. Whether the use of the name would be likely to deceive or produce confusion is a question of fact The trier's conclusion that the evidence failed to show that the use of the name "Yale" in the operation by the defendants of the Yale Motor Inn, Inc., in the Yalesville section of Wallingford would be likely to deceive the public or cause confusion in the public mind could not be disturbed. An injunction sought by Yale University against the use of the name was therefore properly denied.
Argued February 3, 1960
Decided March 15, 1960
Action for an injunction restraining the defendants from using the name "Yale" in the conduct of their motel business, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in New Haven County and tried to the court, Past ore, J.; judgment for the defendants and appeal by the plaintiff. No error.
Frederick H. Wiggin and Robert F. Cavanagh, for the appellant (plaintiff).
William L. Hadden, with whom was William L. Hadden, Jr., for the appellees (defendants).
The plaintiff has appealed from a judgment of the Superior Court denying it an injunction to restrain the defendants from using the name "Yale" in the operation of the Yale Motor Inn near the Wilbur Cross parkway in the Yalesville section of the town of Wallingford. The plaintiff assigns error in one finding of fact, seven of the twelve conclusions of law, the overruling of its twenty claims of law, and the rendering of judgment for the defendants. In its brief, the plaintiff makes specific reference only to three of the assignments of error, relating to the conclusions reached. The others are treated as abandoned. State v. Ferraiuolo, 145 Conn. 458, 459, 144 A.2d 41. As a result, none of the subordinate facts are attacked. The conclusions which the court has reached are to be tested by the facts as found and must stand unless they are legally or logically inconsistent with those facts or unless they involve the application of some erroneous rule of law material to the case. Monick v. Greenwich, 144 Conn. 608, 611, 136 A.2d 501.
The leading case in this state on unfair competition in the use of names is Middle town Trust Co. v. Middletown National Bank, 110 Conn. 13, 147 A. 22. In it (p. 20), we held that whether or not the defendants' conduct constituted unfair competition was a question of fact for the trier. We said: "No inflexible rule can be laid down as to what use of names will constitute unfair competition; this is a question of fact. The question to be determined is whether or not, as a matter of fact, the name is such as to cause confusion in the public mind as between the plaintiff's business and that of the defendant, resulting in injury to the plaintiff. The test is whether the public is likely to be deceived. . `Whether the court will interfere in a particular case must depend upon circumstances; the identity or similarity of the names; the identity of the business of the respective corporations; . . . the extent of the confusion which may be created or apprehended, and other circumstances which might justly influence the judgment of the judge in granting or withholding the remedy.' Chas. S. Higgins Co. v. Higgins Soap Co., 144 N.Y. 462, 469, 39 N.E. 490, 27 L.R.A 42. . . . If the court finds that the effect of appropriation by one corporation of a distinctive portion of the name of another is to cause confusion and uncertainty in the latter's business, injure [it] pecuniarily and otherwise, and deceive and mislead the public, relief will be afforded. . . . It is not sufficient that some person may possibly be misled but the similarity must be such that any person, with such reasonable care and observation as the public generally are capable of using and may be expected to exercise, would be likely to mistake one for the other."
This principle has been reiterated in Yale Towne Mfg. Co. v. Rose, 120 Conn. 373, 382, 181 A. 8; Yale Cooperative Corporation v. Rogin, 133 Conn. 563, 571, 53 A.2d 383, and Transparent Ruler Co. v. C-Thru Ruler Co., 135 Conn. 181, 185, 62 A.2d 668. It has been followed by Judge Frank on a petition for a rehearing in Eastern Wine Corporation v. Winslow-Warren, Ltd., 137 F.2d 955, 960, cert. denied, 320 U.S. 758, 64 S.Ct. 65, 88 L.Ed. 452; by Chief Judge Clark in Federal Glass Co. v. Loshin, 224 F.2d 100, 101; and in Vermont Motor Co. v. Monk, 116 Vt. 309, 312, 75 A.2d 671. Whether a corporate name is so similar as to be likely to deceive or produce confusion is a question of fact. Metal Craft Co. v. Grand Rapids Metalcraft Corporation, 255 Mich. 638, 640, 239 N.W. 363. The confusion of which a court takes cognizance must be something more than the result of carelessness or ignorance upon the part of the uninformed. Central Mutual Auto Ins. Co. v. Central Mutual Ins. Co., 275 Mich. 554, 560, 267 N.W. 733.
Upon the subordinate facts found by the trial court, its conclusion that the evidence failed to show that the use of the name "Yale" in "Yale Motor Inn, Inc." would be likely to deceive the public or cause confusion in the public mind cannot be disturbed.