Summary
holding that appellant's claim fits squarely within the declaratory judgment scheme where appellant has a present right to have the trial court determine the validity of appellee's attempt to rezone appellant's property
Summary of this case from Heisel v. City of DeltonaOpinion
No. 3D19-1495
06-24-2020
YACHT CLUB BY LUXCOM, LLC, Appellant, v. VILLAGE OF PALMETTO BAY, Florida, Appellee.
Holland & Knight LLP, and Ilene L. Pabian, Eduardo A. Ramos and Daniel P. Hanlon, for appellant. Lehtinen Schultz, PLLC, and Dexter Lehtinen, Claudio Riedi and Amanda Quirke Hand, for appellee.
Holland & Knight LLP, and Ilene L. Pabian, Eduardo A. Ramos and Daniel P. Hanlon, for appellant.
Lehtinen Schultz, PLLC, and Dexter Lehtinen, Claudio Riedi and Amanda Quirke Hand, for appellee.
Before SCALES, MILLER and GORDO, JJ.
SCALES, J.
Appellant, plaintiff below, Yacht Club by Luxcom, LLC ("Yacht Club") appeals the trial court's July 1, 2019 final order that dismissed, with prejudice, its complaint for declaratory relief. We reverse the challenged order because Yacht Club's complaint states a cause of action for declaratory relief under Florida's Declaratory Judgment Act, codified in chapter 86 of the Florida Statutes.
The facts derive from the allegations in Yacht Club's complaint. In reviewing an order granting a motion to dismiss, we assume the truth of the allegations. Xavier v. Leviev Boymelgreen Marquis Developers, LLC, 117 So. 3d 773, 775 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012) ("In ruling on a motion to dismiss, all well-pled facts in the complaint are accepted as true [.]").
In late 2018, Yacht Club purchased a 71-acre parcel located in the Village of Palmetto Bay, Florida ("the Village"). Yacht Club's intent was to develop a large-scale hospital campus on the property. At the time of purchase, the property had a land use designation of "Institutional Use" and a zoning designation of "Interim," the latter a temporary zoning classification that allows any use so long as it is substantiated by the surrounding trend of development. Yacht Club understood its hospital project would comply with the existing land use and zoning designations.
Upon hearing of Yacht Club's plans to develop its property into a large-scale hospital campus, the Village's vice mayor sought to avert the development by proposing legislative changes to the Village's comprehensive plan and zoning map. He sponsored two ordinances that would change the property's land use designation from "Institutional Use" to "Estate Density Residential," and change the property's zoning designation from "Interim" to "Estate Single Family." If approved, only single-family homes built on at least one-acre lots could be developed on the property. As advertised by a Notice of Public Hearing for Proposed Amendment to the Village Comprehensive Plan Future Land Use Map and Zoning Map, the proposed ordinances were scheduled for first reading on April 22, 2019. On April 17, 2019, Yacht Club submitted to the Village an application for site plan approval of the hospital project.
Sections 30-30.7 and 30-30.8 of the Village's Code of Ordinances provide, respectively, the mechanisms for changing a property's zoning designation and for amending the Village's comprehensive plan. Pursuant to both provisions, a private party seeking a zoning change or plan amendment must submit an application to the Village that contains certain specified information. Subsection (a) of each ordinance, however, exempts the Village from having to file an application to initiate an amendment. Subsection (b) of each ordinance describes the process for review of proposed amendments and applies irrespective of whether the change is proposed by a private party or the Village.
Section 30.30-7 pertains to amendments to either the Village's zoning map or land use ordinances. Generally, a private party's application must provide basic information about the proposed amendment, explanations of existing zoning map and comprehensive plan designations, as well as an explanation of and justification for the change. Section 30.30-8 pertains to amendments to the Village's comprehensive plan. A private party's application to amend the comprehensive plan also must provide basic information about the amendment, an explanation of and justification for the change, along with an analysis of how the amendment meets the requirements of the state's comprehensive planning laws.
On the same day it submitted its application for site plan approval and in anticipation of the Village considering the vice mayor's proposed ordinances, Yacht Club filed the instant, single-count complaint against the Village. The complaint seeks a declaration that the provisions of sections 30-30.7(a) and 30-30.8(a), exempting the Village from the application requirements applicable to private parties, run afoul of the mandate of section 163.3181 of the Florida Statutes, which provides that all comprehensive planning procedures adopted by any Florida municipality must "provide effective public participation."
In pertinent part, the allegedly relevant section 163.3181 reads as follows:
It is the intent of the Legislature that the public participate in the comprehensive planning process to the fullest extent possible. Towards this end, local planning agencies and local governmental units are directed to adopt procedures designed to provide effective public participation in the comprehensive planning process and to provide real property owners with notice of all official actions which will regulate the use of their property.
§ 163.3181(1), Fla. Stat. (2019).
The Village filed a motion to dismiss Yacht Club's complaint with prejudice, alleging several grounds for dismissal. In its motion, the Village asserted, among other grounds, that: (1) Yacht Club's action is not ripe because the proposed ordinances have not yet been adopted; (2) Yacht Club lacks standing because it has alleged no special injury; and (3) the exclusive remedy to challenge a comprehensive plan amendment is via a petition to Florida's Division of Administrative Hearings and the exclusive remedy to challenge an amendment to the Village zoning map is via a petition for certiorari filed in the circuit court.
On June 20, 2019, the trial court conducted a hearing and, on July 1, 2019, rendered the challenged order dismissing Yacht Club's complaint with prejudice, concluding: "[Yacht Club] is fully able to raise all of the claims asserted in this Complaint, after final agency action, through a Petition for Writ of Certiorari on a zoning map amendment, or through a Petition to the Division of Administrative Hearings on a comprehensive plan amendment." Yacht Club timely appealed this final order.
We review the trial court's dismissal order de novo . Bloch v. Del Rey, 208 So. 3d 189, 192 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016) ("As to the declaratory judgment action, we ordinarily review an order dismissing such a claim under an abuse of discretion standard. However, to the extent that the dismissal is based upon a legal determination, our review is de novo.") (citations omitted).
At the outset, we note the Village's concession that the rationale articulated by the trial court in its dismissal order – that is, dismissal is warranted because Yacht Club has other remedies – is not supported by the relevant provision of chapter 86. The Village's concession is well taken because section 86.111 expressly states that "[t]he existence of another adequate remedy does not preclude judgment for declaratory relief." § 86.111, Fla. Stat. (2019).
The Village argues, though, that we should nevertheless affirm the trial court's dismissal order on grounds other than those relied upon by the trial court, citing the "tipsy coachman" rule. See e.g., Dade Cty. Sch. Bd. v. Radio Station WQBA, 731 So. 2d 638, 644 (Fla. 1999) ("If a trial court reaches the right result, but for the wrong reasons, it will be upheld if there is any basis which would support the judgment in the record."). Specifically, the Village argues that we should affirm the dismissal order both because (i) Yacht Club's claim is not ripe, and (ii) Yacht Club lacks standing because it has suffered no special injury so as to warrant redress under chapter 86. We disagree on both counts.
The Village asserts its ripeness and standing challenges as if Yacht Club's complaint challenged the proposed ordinances sponsored by the Village's vice mayor. But Yacht Club's complaint does not challenge the proposed ordinances. Rather, Yacht Club's complaint alleges that those portions of Village code sections 30-30.7(a) and 30-30.8(a) that exempt the Village from having to file an application are invalid because those code provisions violate the public participation requirements of section 163.3181.
While we express no opinion on the merits of Yacht Club's claim, we have little difficulty concluding that the claim, as pled by Yacht Club, is cognizable under chapter 86. Section 86.021, in particular, provides in relevant part as follows: "Any person ... whose rights ... are affected by a statute, ... or by municipal ordinance ... may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under such statute ... [or] municipal ordinance." § 86.021, Fla. Stat. (2019).
The Village argues that, because both sections 30-30.7(b) and 30-30.8(b) require the same review process of a proposed amendment, irrespective of how that amendment might be initiated, we should reach the merits of Yacht Club's claim and affirm. We decline the Village's invitation to reach the merits based on this or any other argument advanced by the Village at this stage. See Smith v. City of Fort Myers, 898 So. 2d 1177, 1178 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) ("In determining the sufficiency of a complaint for declaratory judgment, the question is whether the plaintiff is entitled to a declaration of rights, not whether the plaintiff will prevail in obtaining the decree he or she seeks.").
The proposed ordinances – essentially initiated by an agenda notice rather than an application – would change the allowed uses of property owned by Yacht Club. If the challenged provisions of sections 30-30.7(a) and 30-30.8(a) are invalid, as alleged, because they run afoul of the requirements of section 163.3181, then presumably the Village's proposed ordinances would need to be initiated by application. Because Yacht Club's rights are affected by the process that the Village is currently employing to initiate land use changes to Yacht Club's property, Yacht Club's claim – alleging an injury sufficient to warrant redress – is ripe for adjudication and fits squarely within the declaratory judgment scheme prescribed in chapter 86. See S. Riverwalk Invs., LLC v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 934 So. 2d 620, 622-23 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (holding that a developer's declaratory judgment action was ripe for consideration when there was a present, practical need to determine the status of the developer's site plan application in light of the municipality's intention to de-activate the application); see also Dade Cty. v. Benenson, 326 So. 2d 74, 76 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976) (holding that, after the County preliminarily authorized an airport runway expansion that would affect the property owners' development, the property owners, through a declaratory judgment action, had "a right to have determined the present status of their property as regards the legal effect of the actions already taken by the County"). In sum, Yacht Club has a present right under chapter 86 to have the trial court determine the validity of the Village's attempt to amend its comprehensive plan and rezone Yacht Club's property without the Village having to prepare and submit applications.
Conclusion
Yacht Club's complaint, seeking a declaration as to the validity of two provisions of the Village's code, states a cause of action for declaratory relief under chapter 86. Therefore, we reverse the trial court's dismissal order and remand for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.