Opinion
13040-13041-13042N-13042NA Index No. 100988/14 Case No. 2019-03417(3)
02-04-2021
Anastasia XENIAS, as Administrator of the Estate of Mike S. Xenias, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. CITY OF NEW YORK et al., Defendants–Respondents.
Anastasia Xenias, PhD, appellant pro se. James E. Johnson, Corporation Counsel, New York (Daniel Matza–Brown of counsel), for respondents.
Anastasia Xenias, PhD, appellant pro se.
James E. Johnson, Corporation Counsel, New York (Daniel Matza–Brown of counsel), for respondents.
Gische, J.P., Kapnick, Mazzarelli, Moulton, JJ.
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Alexander M. Tisch, J.), entered December 21, 2018, which, insofar as appealed from as limited by the briefs, granted defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, and the motion denied. Order, same court and Justice, entered January 29, 2019, which denied plaintiff's motion to strike defendants' answer as moot, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, and the motion remanded for determination on the merits. Order, same court and Justice, entered June 3, 2019, which, insofar as appealed from as limited by the briefs, denied the branch of plaintiff's motion seeking to renew the motion to dismiss, granted, in effect, the branch of the motion seeking to reargue, and, upon reargument, adhered to the prior determination, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, and the order vacated. Order, same court and Justice, entered February 5, 2020, which denied plaintiff's second motion to renew the motion to dismiss, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, and the order vacated.
Plaintiff's allegations are sufficient to establish a special relationship between the City and the decedent that brings her claim within the exception to the general rule that a municipality may not be held liable to a person injured by the breach of a duty that it owes to the general public – such as the duty to provide ambulance service (see Cuffy v. City of New York, 69 N.Y.2d 255, 260, 513 N.Y.S.2d 372, 505 N.E.2d 937 [1987] ). The allegation that the 911 operator told plaintiff that "we are on our way" is sufficient to establish defendants' assumption of an affirmative duty to act on the decedent's behalf (see De Long v. County of Erie, 60 N.Y.2d 296, 305, 469 N.Y.S.2d 611, 457 N.E.2d 717 [1983] ; Grieshaber v. City of Albany, 279 A.D.2d 232, 235, 720 N.Y.S.2d 214 [3d Dept. 2001], lv denied 96 N.Y.2d 719, 733 N.Y.S.2d 371, 759 N.E.2d 370 [2001] ). Plaintiff sufficiently alleged justifiable reliance on the call operator's statement through an affidavit submitted in opposition to defendants' motion in which she listed several additional actions she would have taken to secure help but for the operator's assurance (see Applewhite v. Accuhealth, Inc., 21 N.Y.3d 420, 431, 972 N.Y.S.2d 169, 995 N.E.2d 131 [2013] ; see also Leon v. Martinez, 84 N.Y.2d 83, 88, 614 N.Y.S.2d 972, 638 N.E.2d 511 [1994] ). The remaining elements are not at issue (see Cuffy, 69 N.Y.2d at 260, 513 N.Y.S.2d 372, 505 N.E.2d 937 ).
Dismissal is also not appropriate at this stage pursuant to the doctrine of governmental function immunity, which shields public entities from liability for "discretionary" actions taken during the performance of "governmental functions" ( Valdez v. City of New York, 18 N.Y.3d 69, 75–76, 936 N.Y.S.2d 587, 960 N.E.2d 356 [2011] ). It is undisputed that the provision of emergency care by FDNY EMTs constitutes a governmental function (see Applewhite, 21 N.Y.3d at 427–30, 972 N.Y.S.2d 169, 995 N.E.2d 131 ). It is also clear that determinations of whether and when to dispatch an ambulance, the type of ambulance to dispatch and from where, and the route the ambulance should take are discretionary in nature (see Sherpa v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 90 A.D.3d 738, 740, 934 N.Y.S.2d 463 [2d Dept. 2011] ; Dixon v. City of New York, 120 A.D.3d 751, 753, 991 N.Y.S.2d 463 [2d Dept. 2014], lv denied 26 N.Y.3d 913, 22 N.Y.S.3d 165, 43 N.E.3d 375 [2015] ). However, it is not clear that the delay at issue here was due to an affirmative exercise of this discretion, rather than an unintentional failure to timely dispatch an ambulance (see generally Valdez, 18 N.Y.3d at 79–80, 936 N.Y.S.2d 587, 960 N.E.2d 356 ). To the extent plaintiff's claims relate to FDNY's actions after arriving on the scene, they are not properly considered, as this theory of liability was not disclosed in plaintiff's notice of claim, which specifically alleged that FDNY never arrived, let alone treated the decedent (see General Municipal Law §§ 50–e ; 50–i[1][a]; Pratts v. Campolo, 150 A.D.3d 549, 55 N.Y.S.3d 192 [1st Dept. 2017] ).