Opinion
No. 48053-7-I.
Filed: July 29, 2002. DO NOT CITE. SEE RAP 10.4(h). UNPUBLISHED OPINION.
Appeal from Superior Court of King County Docket No: 99-2-18294-4 Judgment or order under review Date filed: 01/19/2001.
Counsel for Appellant(s), Lembhard G. Howell, Law Offices Lembhard G. Howell P S, 720 3rd Ave Ste 2105, Seattle, WA 98104-1825.
Counsel for Respondent(s), Mark G. Honeywell, Gordon Thomas Honeywell etal, One Union Square, 600 University, Ste. 2101, Seattle, WA 98101-1129.
Steven M. Sitek, 600 University St. #2100, Seattle, WA 98101.
Washington resident Marie Wylde was injured by an uninsured Canadian motorist while she was driving an automobile in Quebec, Canada. Quebec law immunizes motorists from civil liability. Wylde's insurance policy covers damages that she is legally entitled to recover from uninsured motorists (UIM). Because Wylde is not legally entitled to recover from the motorist who injured her, there is no UIM coverage under her policy. Accordingly, we affirm.
FACTS
Marie Wylde was born in Quebec, Canada and lived in Canada until 1997. That year, she moved to Seattle, Washington. At all times relevant to this case, she was licensed to drive a car in Canada. In 1997, Wylde was added as a named insured on an automobile insurance policy issued by Safeco's General Insurance Company of America (Safeco).
The Safeco insurance policy includes coverage for Personal Injury Protection (PIP). It also covers damages that the insured is `legally entitled to recover' from uninsured and underinsured motorists (UIM). This is the UIM coverage that is required by Washington law. RCW 48.22.030. By contrast, Quebec's `Automobile Insurance Act' immunizes drivers involved in car accidents from civil liability. Rev. Stat. of Quebec, A-25 § 83.57 (1989). Instead, those drivers are entitled to receive medical benefits, wage loss, and disability benefits from `Societe de l'assurance automobile du Quebec' (SAAQ). Rev. Stat. of Quebec, A-25 § 83.57 (1989).
The Wisconsin Supreme Court recently addressed the issue of whether a Wisconsin resident was entitled to noneconomic damages under UIM coverage following an automobile accident in Manitoba, Canada. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Gillette, 641 N.W.2d 662 (Wis. 2002). The Wisconsin Supreme Court stated that Manitoba law `provides that a tortfeasor is liable for some damages but not for other damages.' Gillette, 641 N.W.2d at 666 n. 6. It therefore declined to address the issue of immunity. Gillette, 641 N.W.2d at 666 n. 6. By contrast, in the present case, Wylde does not dispute that the Quebec law immunizes drivers involved in automobile accidents from civil liability. Rather, her argument is that Quebec's law does not immunize the tortfeasor in this case from liability arising out of a lawsuit filed in the United States. For the purposes of this opinion, we therefore assume without deciding that Quebec law immunizes drivers involved in automobile accidents from civil liability.
In 1998, Wylde planned a trip to Montreal, Quebec. According to Wylde, she called the phone number on the Safeco policy to ask about her automobile insurance coverage in Quebec. Wylde maintains that the person she spoke to said she would be `covered fully.' On August 30, 1998, while she was visiting Quebec, Wylde's rented automobile was struck by an uninsured motorist. Wylde, who was not at fault, maintains that she suffered serious injuries. The nature and extent of these injuries are, however, in dispute. After the accident, Wylde received medical benefits and wage loss payments from SAAQ. She also received wage loss payments from Safeco under her PIP coverage. Wylde filed a claim with Safeco for damages under her UIM policy. Safeco denied that claim on February 11, 1999, explaining as follows:
The reason there is no coverage under Safeco's UIM coverage is because you have no claim against the driver of the vehicle who was at fault in the accident due to Quebec's statutory immunity for operators of motor vehicles involved in automobile accidents within the province. . . .
On August 30, 1999, Wylde filed a complaint in King County Superior Court, seeking a judgment declaring that there is coverage under the UIM portion of the policy to compensate her for injuries sustained in the August 30, 1998 accident. Safeco moved for summary judgment dismissal of her complaint. The trial court granted that motion. Wylde appeals.
Wylde filed this complaint on behalf of her husband, her son, and herself. Wylde's appeal, however, is only on behalf of herself.
ANALYSIS
Wylde contends that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment dismissal of her complaint. That complaint sought UIM coverage for an automobile accident that occurred in Quebec, Canada. Summary judgment is appropriate if, considering all evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, `the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.' CR 56(c); see Van Dinter v. City of Kennewick, 121 Wn.2d 38, 47, 846 P.2d 522 (1993). When reviewing summary judgment orders, this court engages in the same inquiry as the trial court. Folsom v. Burger King, 135 Wn.2d 658, 663, 958 P.2d 301 (1998).
I. Choice of Law
Wylde and Safeco both contend that Washington law governs the contract issues in this case. Wylde resided in Seattle, Washington and entered into the insurance contract in Seattle with a Seattle-based company. The parties disagree, however, on whether Washington or Quebec law applies to the substantive tort issues.
In personal injury actions, the general rule is that the local law where the injury occurred determines the rights and liabilities of the parties. Bush v. O'Connor, 58 Wn. App. 138, 143-44, 791 P.2d 915 (1990). There is an exception, however, when another state has a more significant relationship than the local state. Bush, 58 Wn. App. at 143-44. To determine if that exception applies, we apply the significant relationship test set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, §§ 6, 145-46 (1971). Bush, 58 Wn. App. at 143. The relevant factors include:
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, (b) the relevant policies of the forum, (c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue, (d) the protection of justified expectations, (e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law, (f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and (g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 6 (1971).
In this case, Wylde's injuries occurred in Quebec following a car accident with a Quebec resident. Wylde was born in Quebec and lived in Canada until one year before the accident. At the time of the accident, she was licensed to drive a car there. These factors support the application of Quebec law to protect Wylde's presumed expectations and predictability of result.
In addition, the policy in Quebec is to guarantee compensation to persons injured in car accidents. Rev. Stat. of Quebec, A-25 § 83.57 (1989). `Through enactment of the no-fault scheme, Quebec `seeks to expedite compensation to victims of automobile accidents, reduce the amount of tort litigation in Quebec courts, and guarantee relatively low automobile insurance rates." Myers v. Langlois, 721 A.2d 129, 131-32 (Vt., 1998) (quoting Miller v. White, 702 A.2d 395 (Vt., 1997)). Wylde nonetheless contends that Washington has a more significant relationship because of its `policy of affixing liability to negligent drivers who cause bodily injury.' Indeed, it is true that Washington tort law permits an injured person to recover from negligent drivers involved in car accidents. See, e.g., Hunsley v. Giard, 87 Wn.2d 424, 435, 553 P.2d 1096 (1976) (explaining that `very concept of negligence provides the primary boundaries' of liability). In addition, Washington tort law favors full recovery for injured persons. See, e.g., Sultani v. Leuthy, 86 Wn. App. 753, 759, 943 P.2d 1122 (1997). We also note that Wylde was a Washington resident and a named insured on an automobile insurance policy issued in Washington by a Washington company.
Even so, considering all the above factors, we decline to hold that Washington has a more significant relationship than Quebec. Quebec law therefore determines the substantive tort rights and liabilities of the parties.
II. UIM Coverage
`[T]he purpose of UIM coverage is to place the insured in the same position as if a tortfeasor carried adequate liability insurance.' Wood v. Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co., 97 Wn. App. 721, 726, 986 P.2d 833 (1999); see RCW 48.22.030. Indeed, `[t]he injured party is not entitled to be put in a better position by having been struck by an uninsured motorist as opposed to an insured motorist.' Dayton v. Farmers Ins. Group, 124 Wn.2d 277, 281, 876 P.2d 896 (1994). `Accordingly, UIM carriers are not compelled to pay when the same recovery could not have been obtained from the uninsured tortfeasor.' Dayton, 124 Wn.2d at 281.
Quebec law immunizes drivers involved in automobile accidents from civil liability. Rev. Stat. of Quebec, A-25 § 83.57 (1989). In two cases, this court has addressed similar facts under other statutory schemes providing immunity to tortfeasors. The first is Sayan v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 43 Wn. App. 148, 716 P.2d 895 (1986). And the second is Romanick v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 59 Wn. App. 53, 795 P.2d 728 (1990).
In Sayan, this court held that there was no UIM coverage where the tortfeasor was immune under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § § 1346(b), 2671-2680 (1976). Sayan, 43 Wn. App. at 150, 160. Likewise, this court held in Romanick that there was no UIM coverage where the tortfeasor was immune under the Industrial Insurance Act, RCW 51.04. Romanick, 59 Wn. App. at 57.
Wylde attempts to distinguish Quebec's Automobile Insurance Act from the Federal Tort Claims Act and the Industrial Insurance Act, because Quebec law `encourage[s] private insurance claims[.]' Wylde relies upon a section of the Quebec Act that expressly allows Quebec residents to recover under it as well as other jurisdictions' laws. Rev. Stat. of Quebec, A-25 § 83.59 (1989). But that section applies `only when an accident occurs outside Quebec and the lawsuit is brought in a court outside the province.' Myers v. Langlois, 721 A.2d 129, 131-32 (Vt., 1998) (citing Szeto v. Federation (La) Cie d'Assurances du Canada, 1986 R.J.Q. 218, 220 (translated from French)). Where, as here, the accident occurs inside Quebec, the injured party's recovery against the tortfeasor is limited to that available under Quebec law. Wylde's attempt to distinguish the Quebec Act from the other statutory schemes that provide immunity is therefore unpersuasive.
Next, Wylde argues that recovery from the motorist who injured her is `not impossible' in jurisdictions outside of Quebec. Although she acknowledges that the uninsured driver who caused her damages is immune from civil liability under Quebec law, she presents unlikely scenarios under which Safeco could obtain personal jurisdiction over the uninsured driver. We reject this argument. The accident occurred in Quebec and involved two drivers with Canadian driver's licenses. Even if Safeco could file a complaint against the uninsured driver in another jurisdiction, that does not end the inquiry. The UIM policy covers damages that the insured is `legally entitled to recover.' The ability to file a lawsuit against someone is not the equivalent of a right to recover damages from that person. Wylde presented no basis for her assertions that recovery from the uninsured driver is possible. We therefore conclude that there is no UIM coverage available to Wylde for the accident that took place in Quebec because the uninsured driver is immune under Quebec law. See Romanick, 59 Wn. App. at 57; Sayan, 43 Wn. App. at 160.
III. Equitable Estoppel
Wylde contends that under the doctrine of equitable estoppel, Safeco is equitably estopped from denying UIM coverage. The elements of equitable estoppel are:
(1) an act or admission by the first party that is inconsistent with a later assertion; (2) an act by another party in reliance upon the first party's act or assertion; and (3) an injury that would result to the relying party if the first party were not estopped from repudiating the original act.
Tumwater Police Officers Guild v. Employment Sec. Dept., 102 Wn. App. 317, 326, 9 P.3d 225 (2000).
Wylde maintains that these elements are satisfied in the present case. First, she alleges that Safeco assured her that she was `covered fully' before the accident and then after the accident denied her claim for UIM benefits. Second, she contends that she acted in reliance on Safeco's initial representation. And third, she asserts that she would recover less if Safeco is allowed to repudiate its initial representation.
We disagree. Safeco did not repudiate its initial representation that Wylde was `covered fully' while driving in Quebec. The UIM policy at issue in this case provides coverage for damages that the insured is `legally entitled to recover' from uninsured and underinsured motorists. While she was driving in Quebec, Wylde was entitled to the full benefit of her UIM policy. Likewise, she was also subject to the conditions set forth in that policy. One of those conditions is that her recovery be limited to damages that she was `legally entitled to recover[.]' Wylde therefore has not established the elements of equitable estoppel.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's summary judgment order and deny Wylde's request for attorney fees.
WE CONCUR: AGID, J., COX, J.