Opinion
C.A. No. 2:18-3529-HMH-MGB
07-29-2019
Troy M. Wright, Petitioner, v. Warden of Manning Correctional Institution, Respondent.
OPINION & ORDER
This matter is before the court for review of the Report and Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge Mary Gordon Baker, made in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 73.02 for the District of South Carolina. Troy M. Wright ("Wright"), a state prisoner proceeding pro se, is seeking habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In her Report and Recommendation, Magistrate Judge Baker recommends granting the Respondent's motion for summary judgment and dismissing Wright's petition with prejudice.
The recommendation has no presumptive weight, and the responsibility for making a final determination remains with the United States District Court. See Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270 (1976). The court is charged with making a de novo determination of those portions of the Report and Recommendation to which specific objection is made. The court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation made by the magistrate judge or recommit the matter with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Wright is currently incarcerated at Fairfield County Detention Center. In 2013, Wright was charged with first-degree assault and battery after he attacked his former girlfriend at her place of employment. (Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. Attach. 1 (App. 9-12), ECF No. 8-1.) The state offered to allow Wright to plead guilty to first-degree assault and battery on the condition that the state would recommend the maximum prison term of ten years. (Id. Attach. 1 (App. 50-52), ECF No. 8-1.) Wright refused the plea deal. (Id. Attach. 1 (App. 52), ECF No. 8-1.) After Wright refused this deal and after the prosecutor learned about the extent of the victim's injuries, Wright was indicted for assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature ("ABHAN") on December 1, 2014. (Id. Attach. 1 (App. 59-60, 79), ECF No. 8-1.)
Wright pled guilty to ABHAN pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). According to Wright, the prosecutor allegedly promised not to make a recommendation at sentencing regarding the length of Wright's sentence. (Id. Attach. 1 (App. 7-9, 53-54), ECF No. 8-1.) However, at sentencing, the prosecutor asked the court to impose the maximum sentence of twenty years' imprisonment. (Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. Attach. 1 (App. 13), ECF No. 8-1.) On January 7, 2015, Wright was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment, suspended to eight years' imprisonment upon good behavior. (Id. Attach. 1 (App. 19), ECF No. 8-1.) Wright did not file a direct appeal.
On March 27, 2015, Wright filed an application for post-conviction relief ("PCR") and raised three grounds for relief: (1) his attorney coerced him into pleading guilty, (2) ineffective assistance of plea counsel, and (3) the state prosecutor violated the plea agreement. (Id. Attach. 1 (App. 21, 23, 44-45), ECF No. 8-1.) An evidentiary hearing was held on August 2, 2016. (Id. Attach. 1 (App. 47), ECF No. 8-1.) On August 15, 2016, the PCR court denied Wright's PCR application. (Id. Attach. 1 (App. 76), ECF No. 8-1.) However, in its opinion, the PCR court did not address Wright's second and third grounds for relief. The PCR court addressed Wright's first ground for relief, which the court interpreted as a claim that plea counsel exposed Wright to "a possible twenty[-]year, violent, and serious offense of Assault and Battery of a High and Aggravated Nature (ABHAN), by not informing him of the statute's collateral consequences associated with ABHAN." (Mem. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. Attach. 1 (App. 75-76), ECF No. 8-1.) Wright's PCR counsel did not make a motion to alter or amend the PCR court's order.
Wright appealed the PCR court's decision, and filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the South Carolina Supreme Court on December 9, 2016, raising the following grounds:
1. Whether Petitioner's guilty plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made where he pled guilty pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 200 U.S. 25 (1970)[,] based on plea counsel's assurance that the state would not make a sentence recommendation during the hearing and where instead the assistant solicitor asked the court to sentence Petitioner to the maximum twenty years' imprisonment?(Id. Attach. 2 (Pet. Writ Cert.), ECF No. 8-2.) The South Carolina Supreme Court transferred the petition to the South Carolina Court of Appeals, and on October 24, 2018, the Court of Appeals denied the petition. (Id. Attach. 4 (Oct. 24, 2018 Order) ECF No. 8-4.)
2. Did the PCR court err by failing to rule on Petitioner's claim that his guilty plea was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made based on plea counsel's ineffective assistance of counsel since Petitioner properly raised the claim in his amended application, presented extensive evidence related to the claim at the evidentiary hearing, and the PCR court accepted oral argument from counsel on the claim at the conclusion of the hearing?
Wright filed the instant § 2254 petition on December 11, 2018, alleging the following three grounds for relief: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel based on Wright's assertion that his attorney coerced him to plead to a greater offense ("ground 1"), (2) breach of plea agreement ("ground 2"), and (3) ineffective assistance of counsel based on Wright's assertion that his attorney was inexperienced and unfamiliar with sentencing guidelines ("ground 3"). (§ 2254 Pet., ECF No. 1.) On February 22, 2019, Respondent filed a motion for summary judgment. (Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 9.) Wright filed a response on March 29, 2019. (Resp. Opp'n Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 13.) Respondent filed a reply on April 8, 2019. (Reply, ECF No. 14.) On June 3, 2019, Magistrate Judge Baker issued a Report and Recommendation. (R&R, ECF No. 15.) Magistrate Judge Baker recommends granting Respondent's motion for summary judgment and dismissing Wright's petition with prejudice because all grounds for relief are procedurally defaulted. (Id., ECF No. 15.) Wright filed objections to the Report and Recommendation on July 15, 2019. (Objs., ECF No. 19.) This matter is now ripe for review.
Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988).
Id.
Id. --------
II. DISCUSSION OF THE LAW
A. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate only "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In deciding whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the evidence of the non-moving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in his favor. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, "[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Id. at 248.
A litigant "cannot create a genuine issue of material fact through mere speculation or the building of one inference upon another." Beale v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213, 214 (4th Cir. 1985). "[W]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, disposition by summary judgment is appropriate." Monahan v. Cty. of Chesterfield, Va., 95 F.3d 1263, 1265 (4th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Ballenger v. N.C. Agric. Extension Serv., 815 F.2d 1001, 1005 (4th Cir. 1987) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
B. Standard of Review in a § 2254 Petition
In addition to the standard that the court must employ in considering motions for summary judgment, the court must also consider the petition under the requirements set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Under § 2254(d),
[a]n application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in the State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim - (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.As "a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct," the petitioner has "the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). With respect to reviewing the state court's application of federal law, "'a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.'" Humphries v. Ozmint, 397 F.3d 206, 216 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000)). Further, "an 'unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law,' because an incorrect application of federal law is not, in all instances, objectively unreasonable." Id. (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 410). "Thus, to grant [a petitioner's] habeas petition, [the court] must conclude that the state court's adjudication of his claims was not only incorrect, but that it was objectively unreasonable." McHone v. Polk, 392 F.3d 691, 719 (4th Cir. 2004).
C. Objections
Objections to the Report and Recommendation must be specific. Failure to file specific objections constitutes a waiver of a party's right to further judicial review, including appellate review, if the recommendation is accepted by the district judge. See United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91, 94 & n.4 (4th Cir. 1984). In the absence of specific objections to the Report and Recommendation of the magistrate judge, this court is not required to give any explanation for adopting the recommendation. See Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 199 (4th Cir. 1983).
Upon review, many of Wright's objections are nonspecific, unrelated to the dispositive portions of the Report, or merely restate his claims. However, the court was able to glean one specific objection. Wright objects to the magistrate judge's conclusion that ground 2 is procedurally defaulted. (Objs. 1-2, ECF No. 19.) Wright submits that the procedural default of ground 2 should be excused pursuant to Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012), because his PCR counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel and caused the default. (Id., ECF No. 19.)
Procedural default may be excused only if the petitioner "can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice." Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991). "An attorney error does not qualify as 'cause' to excuse a procedural default unless the error amounted to constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel." Davila v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 2058, 2062 (2017). Constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel occurs in proceedings in which a criminal defendant has the constitutional right to counsel. Id. at 2065. A prisoner does not have a constitutional right to counsel in state postconviction proceedings. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987) (holding that the constitutional right to appointed counsel extends only to a prisoner's first appeal of right and does not apply to postconviction collateral proceedings). However, "[i]nadequate assistance of counsel at initial-review collateral proceedings may establish cause for a prisoner's procedural default of a claim of ineffective assistance at trial" when the prisoner's first opportunity to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel is during the state's collateral review proceedings. Martinez, 566 U.S. at 9, 17.
Wright alleges that the court should excuse the procedural default for ground 2 because he received ineffective assistance of counsel during his PCR proceedings, which he argues constitutes cause for the procedural default. (Objs., generally, ECF No. 19.) Wright further argues that ground 2 is a substantial claim that has merit. (Id., ECF No. 19.) However, Wright is unable to establish cause for the procedural default under Martinez because ground 2 does not raise the issue of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. See Martinez, 566 U.S. at 9. Instead, Wright alleges in ground 2 that the state breached his plea agreement. (§ 2254 Pet. 8, ECF No. 1.) Because ground 2 does not raise the issue of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, the alleged ineffective assistance rendered by Wright's PCR attorney does not constitute cause to excuse the procedural default. See Davila, 137 S. Ct. at 2062-63 (recognizing that ineffective assistance by a prisoner's state postconviction counsel may constitute cause "to overcome the default of a single claim-ineffective assistance of trial counsel"). Accordingly, Wright's objection is without merit.
Therefore, after a thorough review of the Report and Recommendation and the record in this case, the court adopts Magistrate Judge Baker's Report and Recommendation and incorporates it herein. Based on the foregoing, the court grants Respondent's motion for summary judgment and dismisses Wright's habeas petition with prejudice.
It is therefore
ORDERED that Respondent's motion for summary judgment, docket number 9, is granted and Wright's habeas petition, docket number 1, is dismissed with prejudice. It is further
ORDERED that a certificate of appealability is denied because Wright has failed to make "a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Henry M. Herlong, Jr.
Senior United States District Judge Greenville, South Carolina
July 29, 2019
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL
The Petitioner is hereby notified that he has the right to appeal this order within thirty (30) days from the date hereof, pursuant to Rules 3 and 4 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.