Opinion
No. 53A01-1104-CR-216
12-30-2011
JEFFREY L. WRIGHT, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE OF INDIANA, Appellee-Plaintiff.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT : JILL M. ACKLIN Acklin Law Office, LLC Westfield, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE : GREGORY F. ZOELLER Attorney General of Indiana KARL M. SCHARNBERG Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
JILL M. ACKLIN
Acklin Law Office, LLC
Westfield, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Attorney General of Indiana
KARL M. SCHARNBERG
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
APPEAL FROM THE MONROE CIRCUIT COURT
The Honorable Michael A. Robbins, Special Judge
Cause No. 53C05-0701-FD-75
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
SHARPNACK , Senior Judge
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant-Appellant Jeffrey L. Wright appeals the revocation of his probation. We affirm.
ISSUE
Wright raises one issue, which we restate as: whether the trial court abused its discretion by revoking Wright's probation.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On May 25, 2007, Wright pleaded guilty to the offense of failure to register as a sex offender. The trial court sentenced him to three years imprisonment, with two years suspended to probation. His term of probation ended on May 17, 2010.
On July 28, 2010, the State filed a petition to revoke Wright's probation. The State alleged, among other claims, that Wright had violated the terms of his probation by failing to register as a sex offender in Monroe County, the county where he worked. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court determined that Wright had violated the terms of his probation and ordered him to serve his previously suspended sentence of two years. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
Probation is a matter of grace left to trial court discretion, not a right to which a criminal defendant is entitled. Runyon v. State, 939 N.E.2d 613, 618 (Ind. 2010). A person's probation may be revoked if the person has violated a condition of probation during the probationary period. Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(a)(1) (2008). The decision to revoke probation is within the sole discretion of the trial court, and its decision is reviewed on appeal for abuse of that discretion. Woods v. State, 892 N.E.2d 637, 639 (Ind. 2008). On review, we consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment without reweighing that evidence or judging the credibility of the witnesses. Id. If there is substantial evidence of probative value to support the trial court's decision that a defendant has violated any terms of probation, the reviewing court will affirm. Id. at 639-40.
In this case, the following requirement was included in the conditions of Wright's probation: "You shall not commit a criminal offense . . . ." Appellant's App. p. 40. By statute, a sex or violent offender shall register with local law enforcement in each county where the offender is or intends to be employed or carry on a vocation, full time or part time, for a period exceeding seven consecutive days or for a total period exceeding fourteen days in any calendar year. See Ind. Code § 11-8-8-7 (2008). Furthermore, "A sex or violent offender who knowingly or intentionally . . . fails to register in every location where the sex or violent offender is required to register under this chapter . . . commits a Class D felony." Ind. Code § 11-8-8-17 (2007). The offense is elevated to a Class C felony if the sex or violent offender has a prior unrelated conviction for failure to register as a sex or violent offender. See id.
Wright contends that the State failed to prove that he worked in Monroe County. Thus, Wright concludes that he was not obligated to register in that county and did not violate the terms of his probation.
When Wright began his probation, he reviewed the terms of his probation with his probation officer in his county of residence, Morgan County, and signed a document indicating that he had received and understood the requirements. Among other requirements stated in that document, Wright was advised that an offender was required to register with local law enforcement in each county where the offender worked.
In March 2010, Wright called his probation officer. Wright asked the officer if he had to disclose on a sex offender registry that he owned an auto detailing business at which he did not intend to work. Wright told the officer he intended to be "like a silent partner." Tr. p. 72. The officer told Wright that he would have to register the business if he was personally involved in the business's operations.
During the same month, Wright met Matthew Carter. Carter owned a building in Monroe County, and Wright asked to lease the building to operate an automobile detailing business. Wright personally handled the lease negotiations with Carter. On March 15, 2010, Wright, using the name Jeff Lewis, signed a lease to rent the building as president of "Justin's A-1 Auto Detailing." State's Ex. 2. Wright brought in furniture and other equipment to set up his business. Over the course of the lease, Carter came to the building on a weekly basis, and on each occasion he saw Wright there. Around "the middle part of May," Carter saw Wright at the business washing a vehicle. In addition, Brandon Williams worked at a trucking company next to Wright's business. Williams hired Wright's business to clean some of his company's vehicles and paid for the work by check. A check dated May 11, 2010, for the cleaning of a truck, was made payable to "J.L. Wright." Defendant's Ex. A. Williams saw Wright at the property "normally at the end of the day." Tr. p. 57. Williams also had telephone conversations with Wright "from time to time" about business matters. Id. at 63. During this time period, Wright did not register as a sex offender in Monroe County.
The foregoing evidence is sufficient to establish that Wright worked at his Monroe County auto detailing business before his term of probation expired and failed to register with Monroe County law enforcement. Rather than acting as a "silent partner," Wright took an active role in the management of the business and frequently came to the business during that time period. Furthermore, checks were made payable to him for the business's work. We conclude that there is substantial evidence of probative value to support the trial court's decision that Wright violated the terms of his probation. Therefore, we find no abuse of discretion.
The State also alleges that Wright had violated the conditions of his probation by using an alias in his business dealings in Monroe County without disclosing that alias to his probation officer. A trial court need only determine that a probationer has violated one condition of probation in order to revoke probation. Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(g). Stated another way, revocation is appropriate if the State proves any violation. Menifee v. State, 600 N.E.2d 967, 970 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992), clarified on reh'g, 605 N.E.2d 1207 (1993). Having concluded that the trial court did not err by determining that Wright violated the terms of his probation by failing to register as a sex offender in Monroe County, we need not address the allegation that Wright failed to disclose an alias.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
ROBB, C.J., and CRONE, J., concur.