Opinion
No. COA10-1271
Filed 5 April 2011 This case not for publication
Appeal by plaintiffs from orders entered 3 May 2010 and 10 May 2010 by Judge Theodore S. Royster, Jr. in Rowan County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 7 March 2011.
Phillip Emanuel Wright, Jr., pro se, for plaintiffs-appellants. Kluttz, Reamer, Hayes, Randolph, Adkins Carter, L.L.P., by James L. Carter, Jr. and Emily R. Hunter, for defendants-appellees.
Rowan County, No. 08 CVS 4035.
On 12 December 2008, plaintiffs Della Mae Wright and Phillip Emanuel Wright, Jr. filed a complaint alleging at least seven claims for relief against defendants Gary Oakley and Nina Oakley. Defendants filed their answer by and through counsel James L. Carter, Jr. and Emily R. Hunter, members of the firm Kluttz, Reamer, Hayes, Randolph, Adkins Carter, L.L.P. ("the Firm"). On 15 April 2010, plaintiffs filed motions in Rowan County Superior Court seeking to disqualify the Firm from representing defendants in the above-entitled action and requesting sanctions against the Firm. On 23 April 2010, at the request of plaintiff Phillip Emanuel Wright, Jr., a subpoena was served upon Ms. Hunter, counsel of record for defendants. On the same day, on behalf of defendants, Ms. Hunter filed a response to plaintiffs' motions for sanctions and for disqualification, and filed a separate motion to quash the subpoena served upon her in relation to this action. On 3 May 2010, the trial court entered an order granting Ms. Hunter's motion to quash the subpoena. On 10 May 2010, the trial court entered an order denying plaintiffs' motions for sanctions and for disqualification of the Firm. On 2 June 2010, plaintiffs appealed from the trial court's 3 May 2010 and 10 May 2010 orders.
Plaintiffs concede that the orders from which they appeal are interlocutory. See Veazey v. City of Durham, 231 N.C. 357, 362, 57 S.E.2d 377, 381 ("An interlocutory order is one made during the pendency of an action, which does not dispose of the case, but leaves it for further action by the trial court in order to settle and determine the entire controversy."), reh'g denied, 232 N.C. 744, 59 S.E.2d 429 (1950). The trial court did not certify this matter for immediate appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 54(b), nor do plaintiffs claim that these orders affect a substantial right recognized by our courts or assert that they will suffer some injury "if not corrected before an appeal from the final judgment." See Veazey, 231 N.C. at 362, 57 S.E.2d at 381. Additionally, according to plaintiffs' brief, filed with this Court on 1 December 2010, the action arising from plaintiffs' complaint was heard in Rowan County Superior Court in August 2010, and the trial court entered a final judgment in the matter in favor of defendants on 6 October 2010. Plaintiffs further assert that they "are in the process of appealing" from this final judgment.
"There is no more effective way to procrastinate the administration of justice than that of bringing cases to an appellate court piecemeal through the medium of successive appeals from intermediate orders." Id. at 363, 57 S.E.2d at 382. "The rules regulating appeals . . . are designed to forestall the useless delay inseparable from unlimited fragmentary appeals, and to enable courts to perform their real function, i.e., to administer `right and justice . . . without [favor], denial, or delay.'" Id. at 363-64, 57 S.E.2d at 382 (quoting N.C. Const. art. I, § 18). "These rules are designed to prevent fragmentary and premature appeals that unnecessarily delay the administration of justice and to ensure that the trial divisions fully and finally dispose of the case before an appeal can be heard." Bailey v. Gooding, 301 N.C. 205, 209, 270 S.E.2d 431, 434 (1980).
Because plaintiffs acknowledge that the underlying matter has been finally disposed of by the trial court, we see no reason to consider an appeal from these interlocutory orders separately from any appeal plaintiffs might take from the court's final judgment. Therefore, if plaintiffs choose to appeal from the court's final judgment and from the court's 3 May 2010 and 10 May 2010 orders in accordance with the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure, we will consider all issues properly brought forward by plaintiffs at that time. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal ex mero motu.
Dismissed.
Judges McGEE and McCULLOUGH concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).