Opinion
CIVIL ACTION No. 04-0079, SECTION `T'(1).
July 29, 2004
Before this Court is the Defendant's, James McCleland, Motion for Reconsideration of this Court's Order of June 30, 2004 Granting Plaintiff's, Ray Worthy and Dock Loaders and Unloaders Union, Motion to Remand The Court, having heard the arguments of counsel, and having studied the legal memoranda, the record, and the applicable law, is fully advised on the premises and ready to rule.
ORDER AND REASONS
BACKGROUND:
The original suit was filed in the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana, Action No. 03-17643 Div. I-14. On January 12, 2004, the Defendant, James McCleland, filed a notice of removal with this Court, alleging that this Court has exclusive jurisdiction, and is therefore subject to removal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Plaintiff filed a Motion to Remand on February 11, 2004.
Allegedly on or about October 31, 2003, the Defendant, with cooperation of New Orleans Police Department officers took possession and control of the premises located at 4204 Marigny Street in New Orleans, Louisiana.
Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants took possession and control of his confidential personal business records, telephones, office equipment, file cabinets, chairs, tables and other belongings located in and on the premises, changed the locks on the premises herein, and deprived the Plaintiff the use of the property indefinitely and/or permanently. The Plaintiff filed suit in the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans November 25, 2003, for the Defendant's wrongful and illegal exercise of authority of the Plaintiff's property without notice and/or due process and without lawful court order or adherence to social or public policy and constituted a violation of Louisiana tort law pertaining to conversion and Art. 2315.
On June 30, 2004 this Court ruled the claims set forth by the Plaintiff does not "inextricably intertwine" with the terms of the CBA and state law is not preempted. The Defendant here filed this motion for reconsideration seeking review of said decision.
LAW AND ANALYSIS:
The Law on Motions for Reconsideration:
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that any party may file a motion to alter or amend a judgment within ten business days after its entry. See FED. R. Civ. P. 59. Under Rule 59, a district court enjoys considerable discretion in granting or denying such a motion. Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 173 (5th Cir. 1990); First Commonwealth Corp. v. Hibernia Nat. Bank of New Orleans, 891 F. Supp. 290 (E.D.La. 1995), amended 896 F. Supp. 634, affirmed 85 F.3d 622. There are certain grounds upon which a Court may grant a Rule 59 motion for reconsideration or to alter or amend the judgment. These grounds include the following: (1) an intervening change in the controlling law has occurred, (2) evidence not previously available becomes available, or (3) it is necessary to correct clear error of law or to prevent manifest injustice. Database America, Inc. v. Bellsouth Advertising Pub. Corp. 825 F. Supp. 1216 (D.N.J. 1993). It is important to note that reconsideration is an "extraordinary remedy which should be used sparingly and should not be used to relitigate old matters, raise new arguments, or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment." Lafargue v. Jefferson Parish, No. 98-3185, 2000 WL 174899, *1 (E.D.L.A. Feb. 11, 2000).
Discussion and Analysis:
McCleland advances two arguments as to why this Court should reconsider its original ruling. First, McCleland argues that the Court's Orders and Reasons inadvertently addresses the issue of collective bargaining where none exists. Secondly, McCleland argues that the state claims should be preempted and recast as federal claims.
On first hearing, this Court made a determination that the Plaintiff's allegations that a violation of Louisiana tort law pertaining to conversion and Art. 2315 does not require an interpretation of the CBA presented by the Defendant. The claim set forth by the Plaintiff does not "inextricably intertwine" with the terms of the CBA because the Plaintiff alleges an area not covered in the CBA.
McCleland asserts that this finding was incorrect because there is no collective bargaining agreement at issue. He claims that this case is governed by the ILA Constitution, which is a contract between the International Union and the local union affiliates. Defendant asserts that for Worthy and the local union to prove that trespass occurred, they must prove that they were in lawful possession of the property and in order to do so they must demonstrate that McCleland did not have the legal right to property under the terms of the ILA Constitution. Because the Court found that an interpretation of the CBA was unnecessary, it should not matter whether or not there was a CBA at issue. Therefore Defendant's first argument is without merit.
McCleland's second argument, is also without merit. Defendant argues that the Fifth Circuit has recognized that the doctrine of complete preemption "converts an ordinary state common law complaint into one stating a federal claim for purposes of the well pleaded complaint rule." McClelland v. Gronwaldt, 155 F.3d 506, 512 (5th Cir. 1998). Defendant asserts that claims are then recast as federal claims and state law claims that are completely preempted give rise to "federal question" jurisdiction and may provide a basis for removal. Id. Furthermore, complete preemption under the LMRA applies when the resolution of the state claim is "substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made between parties to a labor contract."Id. at 513. Defendant asserts the Court has to look at the Constitution to determine the ownership of property and this is the type of issue that should be completely preempted under LMRA because conflicts in state law could result in inconsistent interpretation of contracts and inconsistent resolutions of labor relations disputes. This argument is without merit because inRoadway Express the Fifth Circuit ruled that the plaintiff was basing their claim on a state rule, the state law was not pre-empted because the "resolution of the issue [does] not require an interpretation of the CBA" Jones v. Roadway Express 931 F.2d 1086, 1090 (5th Cir. 1991). In this case the Court has determined that the resolution does not require an interpretation of the CBA, therefore the state law is not preempted.
McCleland has provided the above arguments in support of his motion for reconsideration. Under F.R.C.P. Rule 59(e) he must show either: (1) an intervening change in the controlling law has occurred, (2) evidence not previously available has become available or (3) it is necessary to correct clear error of law or to prevent manifest injustice. For the reasons state above, Defendant has failed to meet any of these requirements.
CONCLUSION:
McCleland has not successfully pleaded any of the requirements necessary under F.R.C.P. Rule 59(e) and has basically used this Motion as an attempt to relitigate issues already decided by this Court. For the reasons stated above, this Court finds that none of the McCleland's arguments fall within any of the circumstances set forth above that justify reconsideration. They have failed to show any changes in the factual circumstances or controlling law to support the notion that this Court's Order of June 30, 2004 was erroneous. Furthermore, McCleland has failed to prove that this Court's prior Order contained a clear error of law warranting reconsideration. Finally, the Defendant failed to show that a failure to reconsider the Order of June 30, 2004 would work an injustice upon the parties. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration be, and the same is hereby DENIED.