Opinion
A-12991
10-20-2021
MAJOR SCOTT WORKMAN, Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.
Renee McFarland, Assistant Public Defender, and Samantha Cherot, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Patricia L. Haines, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Kevin G. Clarkson, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
UNPUBLISHED See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d)
Appeal from the Superior Court, Fourth Judicial District, Fairbanks, Trial Court No. 4FA-15-01105 CR Jane F. Kauvar, Judge.
Renee McFarland, Assistant Public Defender, and Samantha Cherot, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant.
Patricia L. Haines, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Kevin G. Clarkson, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Allard, Chief Judge, and Wollenberg and Terrell, Judges.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
WOLLENBERG, JUDGE
Major Scott Workman was charged with first-degree murder after he shot and killed James Goj dies. He proceeded to trial on a theory of self-defense, and the jury was instructed on the lesser included offenses of second-degree murder and manslaughter. The jury acquitted Workman of first- and second-degree murder but convicted him of manslaughter.
AS 11.41.100(a)(1)(A).
AS 11.41.110(a)(1) and AS 11.41.120(a)(1), respectively.
On appeal, Workman raises three challenges to the jury instructions on the law of self-defense. First, he argues that the superior court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the use of nondeadly force - a necessary precursor to determining whether the use of deadly force was justified. Second, Workman claims that two typographical errors in the jury instruction on the use of deadly force prevented the jury from properly applying the law. Third, Workman argues that the court failed to provide a specific instruction clarifying that the jury should consider Workman's claim of self-defense with respect to the lesser included charges if it found him not guilty of first-degree murder.
Because Workman did not raise any of these objections during trial, we review them only for plain error. For the reasons provided in this opinion, we decline to find plain error and affirm Workman's manslaughter conviction.
See Adams v. State, 261 P.3d 758, 764 (Alaska 2011) (defining plain error as "an error that (1) was not the result of intelligent waiver or a tactical decision not to object; (2) was obvious; (3) affected substantial rights; and (4) was prejudicial").
Factual and procedural background
In early 2015, Major Scott Workman began dating Mary Ella Davis and started spending weekends at her cabin. Davis rented the cabin from James Gojdics, whom she had known for several years. Gojdics lived in a cabin across from Davis's; the two cabins were separated by a creek that ran through Gojdics's property.
Workman got a "weird vibe" from Gojdics: He noticed that Gojdics would loiter at the end of Davis's driveway, for instance, and he heard Gojdics yelling at Davis over the phone at odd hours. After asking around town about Gojdics, Workman decided that Davis should move out of the cabin, and he lined up another place for her to live.
On May 3, 2015, Davis and Workman learned that Goj dies had used pepper spray on Davis's dog while it was chained up outside her cabin. The spray lingered in the cabin. Davis decided that she would leave the cabin that day; she packed some of her belongings and informed Gojdics that she would be moving out. She then left the property with Workman.
Later that day, Workman returned to Davis's cabin to gather the rest of her belongings. He later testified that he brought a gun with him for protection because at least two people had told him that Gojdics carried one. As he walked to Davis's front door, Workman saw Gojdics on the other side of the creek that divided the property, pacing and waving his hands. According to Workman, Gojdics kept repeating that they were going to "settle this," and he then yelled at Workman to come closer. At some point, Workman testified, he observed Gojdics take a step back and jam his hand in his pocket.
Workman reached for his gun and fired repeatedly toward Gojdics, emptying the magazine. He admitted that he did not see Gojdics with a gun, but he testified that he thought Gojdics was about to shoot him. Emergency responders later found Gojdics lying across the creek, dead with numerous gunshot wounds. Workman turned himself in to the Alaska State Troopers later that day.
A grand jury indicted Workman on one count of first-degree murder. Workman filed a notice of his intent to argue a theory of self-defense, and the case proceeded to trial. The jury was instructed on the law of self-defense, as well as on the lesser included offenses of second-degree murder and manslaughter. Ultimately, the jury acquitted Workman of first- and second-degree murder, but convicted him of manslaughter.
This appeal followed.
The failure to instruct the jury on the use of nondeadly force did not constitute plain error
Workman first argues that the court committed plain error when it failed to instruct the jury on the law governing the use of nondeadly force. To explain this argument, and why we find it unpersuasive, we must first explain Alaska's statutory scheme governing the use of force in self-defense.
Alaska law divides the type of force a person may use in self-defense into two categories - nondeadly force and deadly force. The statute governing the use of nondeadly force, AS 11.81.330, provides that a person is justified in using nondeadly force "when and to the extent the person reasonably believes it is necessary for self-defense against what the person reasonably believes to be the use of unlawful force by the other person." The statute also provides a series of exceptions to this rule. For example, a person is not justified in using nondeadly force when the person claiming self-defense was the initial aggressor.
AS 11.81.330(a)(3).
The statute governing the use of deadly force, AS 11.81.335, states that a person is justified in using deadly force in self-defense when the person would have been justified in using nondeadly force under AS 11.81.330, and when and to the extent the person reasonably believed that the use of deadly force was necessary to prevent, inter alia, death or serious physical injury.
Thus, the law defines the circumstances under which a person may use deadly force in part by reference to when a person may use nondeadly force. More specifically, the deadly force statute incorporates the requirement from AS 11.81.330 that a person claiming self-defense reasonably believe that the other person's use of force is "unlawful," as well as AS 11.81.330's list of exceptions.
In Workman's case, the jury was provided with an instruction that tracked the language of AS 11.81.335 - the statute governing the use of deadly force. But the jury did not receive an instruction on AS 11.81.330 - the statute governing the use of nondeadly force. Thus, the jury was not instructed that Workman had to reasonably believe that Gojdics's use of force was unlawful, and the jury was not provided with the list of exceptions to the use of force in self-defense. Workman argues that this omission constitutes plain error requiring the reversal of his conviction because, he contends, the jury was left to speculate on when the use of nondeadly force was justified.
We agree with Workman that the superior court should have instructed the jury on the use of nondeadly force. As we have explained, a person is justified in using deadly force when they would have been justified in using nondeadly force and when, and to the extent, the person reasonably believed that the use of deadly force was necessary to defend against death or serious physical injury. Thus, when a defendant claims that they used deadly force in self-defense, a court should instruct the jury on both the use of nondeadly force and the use of deadly force.
Indeed, the use note for the pattern instruction on the use of deadly force in self-defense advises that "[t]his instruction must be given together with instruction 11.81.330 (use of nondeadly force in self defense)." Alaska Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction 11.81.335 (2014).
We conclude, however, that the jury instructions in this case, read as a whole and in conjunction with the parties' arguments, were sufficient to properly inform the jury of the relevant law governing Workman's claim of self-defense. As the parties emphasized in closing arguments, the central factual questions for the jury to resolve were those presented by Workman's testimony-whether Gojdics was known to carry a gun and whether he made a sudden movement that placed Workman in fear of being shot. The jury then needed to evaluate whether, in light of those factual issues, Workman reasonably believed that the use of deadly force was necessary for self-defense against death or serious physical injury (or more precisely, whether the State had disproved this assertion beyond a reasonable doubt).
See Guertin v. State, 854 P.2d 1130, 1133 (Alaska App. 1993) (noting that jury instructions should be "read as a whole and in a common-sense manner"); Norris v. State, 857 P.2d 349, 355 (Alaska App. 1993) (explaining that "[t]he parties' arguments can cure defects or omissions injury instructions").
The superior court's instructions to the jury were sufficient to allow the jury to intelligently address those central questions. The court instructed the jury that Workman was justified in using deadly force if he reasonably believed it was necessary for self-defense against death or serious physical injury. And the court's instructions further defined "reasonable belief," explaining that the defendant must have had a subjective belief that the amount of force used was necessary and that belief must have been objectively reasonable.
The additional aspects of AS 11.81.330 on which the jury was not instructed - the requirement that Workman reasonably believe that Gojdics's use of force was unlawful, and the list of exceptions for when a person is not justified in using force in self-defense-were not disputed issues in this case. The State never suggested that the use of force by Gojdics would have been lawful, nor did it argue that any of the exceptions contained in AS 11.81.330 applied to Workman's claim of self-defense.
Under these circumstances, we conclude that the failure to instruct the jury on the law governing the use of nondeadly force in self-defense did not prejudice Workman's trial and thus did not constitute plain error.
The typographical errors in the jury instructions were not plainly erroneous
Workman next argues that the instruction on the use of deadly force contained two typographical errors that confused and conflated the statutory language such that the jury was improperly instructed on the law.
First, Workman notes that the instruction omitted the word "or" between "death" and "serious physical injury." Workman claims that this might have caused the jury to conclude that the defendant must reasonably fear both death and serious physical injury in order to be justified in using deadly force.
We decline to find reversible error. The very next jury instruction elaborated on the "reasonable belief requirement and stated: "In order to use deadly force in self-defense, the defendant must also actually believe that he is in imminent danger of death or serious physical injury." Thus, read as a whole, the jury instructions correctly told the jury that Workman's use of deadly force was justified if he reasonably believed that he was in imminent danger of death or serious physical injury.
See Guertin, 854 P.2d at 1133.
Second, Workman points out that the jury instruction on the use of deadly force in self-defense contained imprecise punctuation in the third paragraph - the paragraph discussing when a defendant does not have a duty to retreat - and he argues that this imprecision meant that the jury was not properly instructed on when a defendant does or does not have a duty to retreat.
But, as the State correctly points out, the duty to retreat was not at issue in this case. The prosecutor's argument at trial was that Gojdies did not threaten Workman at all; thus, there was nothing from which Workman might need to retreat. Moreover, the portion of the jury instruction about the duty to retreat expressly instructed the jury that a person does not have a duty to retreat when they are in a place where they have a right to be. That exception to the duty to retreat undisputedly applied to Workman's case, so there is no reason to believe that the jury might have rejected Workman's claim of self-defense based on an incorrect view of when a defendant has a duty to retreat.
For these reasons, we conclude that the typographical errors in the jury instruction on the use of deadly force in self-defense were not plainly erroneous.
A natural reading of the jury instructions supports the conclusion that the jury deliberated on Workman's claim of self-defense with respect to all charges
Workman's final claim on appeal is that the jury instructions improperly precluded the jury from considering the doctrine of self-defense with respect to the lesser included offenses, including manslaughter - the charge for which Workman was ultimately convicted. Specifically, Workman challenges the language in Instruction No. 18:
If the jury unanimously finds that the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self-defense and the jury unanimously finds the defendant not guilty of Murder in the First Degree on that basis, then the jury should not consider the lesser included offenses.Workman argues that, while an accurate statement of law, this instruction prevented jurors from considering the doctrine of self-defense as to the lesser included offenses if they found him not guilty of first-degree murder on a basis other than self- defense (i.e., that the State had not met its burden on the statutory elements of the offense). The State responds that this claim has no merit and that, in any event, Workman invited the error by proposing the challenged jury instruction.
We need not decide whether Workman's claim should be reviewed for invited error, because we conclude that he has failed to show plain error in the superior court's self-defense instructions. While a hyper-technical reading of the jury instructions could imply what Workman suggests, jury instructions should not be excised of all context on appeal. Rather, they should be evaluated in light of how they were understood in the courtroom at the time. Here, a practical reading of the jury instruction, together with the parties' arguments, would have indicated to the jurors that the law of self-defense applied to their consideration of the lesser included offenses.
See Williams v. State, 440 P.3d 391, 397-98 (Alaska App. 2019) (explaining that we reverse invited errors only in "exceptional situation[s]" and that the showing required to obtain relief in an instance of invited error is more exacting than under plain error review).
See State v. Blaine, 221 A.3d 798, 804-05 (Conn. 2019) ("To determine whether the trial court committed plain error in instructing the jury... we must examine the trial court's jury instructions, mindful that, '[i]n determining whether a jury instruction is improper, the charge ... is not to be critically dissected for the purpose of discovering possible inaccuracies of statement, but it is to be considered rather as to its probable effect [on] the jury in guiding [it] to a correct verdict in the case.'" (alterations in original) (quoting State v. Carrion, 100 A.3d 361, 375 (Conn. 2014))).
Instruction No. 18 encouraged the jury to deliberate on the issue of self-defense at the outset and explained that, if they concluded that the State did not meet its burden of disproving Workman's theory of defense, they should not even consider the lesser included offenses. It is difficult to imagine that, with this instruction, a jury would return a guilty verdict on any offense if they were persuaded by Workman's claim of self-defense. Workman's argument to the contrary-that this instruction precluded the jury's consideration of self-defense as applied to the lesser included offense of manslaughter - is a strained reading of the instruction.
Instruction No. 17 further reiterated to the jury: "Unless the state has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self-defense, you shall find the defendant not guilty." And the verdict form for first-degree murder reminded the jury that it should not consider any lesser included offenses if it found Workman not guilty on the basis of self-defense. Thus the jury was instructed to acquit Workman entirely if the State failed to disprove his claim that he acted in self-defense. Nothing in the court's instructions precluded the jury's consideration of self-defense for all charges.
Verdict Form No. I stated: "If your verdict above is 'not guilty', date and sign this form. If your verdict is 'not guilty' based on self-defense, do not consider the lesser included offenses. Otherwise, continue to Verdict Form No. II, which deals with the lesser included offense of Murder in the Second Degree."
Moreover, neither party argued to the jury that self-defense was inapplicable to the lesser included offenses of second-degree murder and manslaughter. In fact, the record makes clear that the trial court and the parties correctly understood that, in this case, if the jury found Workman not guilty on the basis of self-defense, then it could not convict him of any of the charges. As the superior court stated during the discussion of proposed jury instructions, "[Workman]' s only charged with the killing of Mr. Gojdics. Either he did it in self-defense or he didn't."
Accordingly, to the extent there was an error in Instruction No. 18 with respect to how the jury should apply the law of self-defense to the lesser included charges in Workman's case, we conclude that it does not constitute plain error requiring reversal of Workman's conviction.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM the judgment of the superior court.