Opinion
1:22-CV-288-HAB-SLC
02-28-2024
GAGE O'NEAL WORKMAN, Plaintiff, v. DETECTIVE JEFFERY MARSEE, OFFICER ROESLER, JOHN DOE OFFICERS, and THE CITY OF FORT WAYNE, Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
HOLLY A. BRADY CHIEF JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
After charges of attempted murder and aggravated battery with a deadly weapon were dismissed against Plaintiff, Gage O. Workman (“Plaintiff”), he filed suit against the City of Fort Wayne (“the City”) and Defendant police officers under 42 U.S.C. §1983 asserting claims of false arrest and unlawful detainment in violation of the Fourth Amendment. He also asserts a supplemental state law claim for malicious prosecution. (Am. Compl., ECF No. 4). Defendants moved for summary judgment asserting that: (1) no Fourth Amendment violation occurred and even if it did, Defendant Detective Jeffery Marsee (“Det. Marsee”) has qualified immunity; (2) Plaintiff's claims against Officer Roesler and John Doe Officers fail because they lack personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violations; (3) the City cannot be held liable on a respondeat superior basis; and (4) the Indiana Tort Claims Act forecloses Plaintiff's state law claim. (ECF No. 24). The time for Plaintiff to respond has come and gone with no response. Because the Court agrees with Defendants that no genuine issues of material fact exist and summary judgment is appropriate, the Defendants' motion will be GRANTED.
DISCUSSION
1. Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute as to any of the material facts, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.; Pack v. Middlebury Comm. Schs., 990 F.3d 1013, 1017 (7th Cir. 2021). A “genuine dispute” exists when a reasonable factfinder could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “Material facts” are those that might affect the outcome of the suit. Id.
When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the record and draws all reasonable inferences from it in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Khungar v. Access Cmty. Health Network, 985 F.3d 565, 572-73 (7th Cir. 2021). It cannot weigh evidence or make credibility determinations on summary judgment because those tasks are left to the factfinder. Miller v. Gonzalez, 761 F.3d 822, 827 (7th Cir. 2014). The Court is only required to consider the materials cited by the parties, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(3); it is not required to “scour every inch of the record” for evidence that is potentially relevant. Grant v. Tr. of Ind. Univ., 870 F.3d 562, 573-74 (7th Cir. 2017).
“[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). “[T]he burden on the moving party may be discharged by ‘showing'-that is, pointing out to the district court-that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.” Id. at 325.
The Defendants met that burden through their unopposed motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff failed to respond. Accordingly, the Court may consider the facts alleged in the motion “undisputed for purposes of the motion” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(2); see N.D. Ind. L.R. 56-1(b) (party opposing judgment must file response brief and identify disputed facts). “Even where a nonmovant fails to respond to a motion for summary judgment, the movant still has to show that summary judgment is proper given the undisputed facts.” Robinson v. Waterman, 1 F.4th 480, 483 (7th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up).
2. Factual Background
Detectives Marsee and Matthew Cline (“Det. Cline”) are longtime police officers with the Fort Wayne Police Department (“FWPD”). At the time of the events surrounding this case, both Det. Marsee and Det. Cline held positions as Homicide Detectives with the FWPD. (Detective Jeffery Marsee Aff., ECF No. 24-1, ¶ 2) (“Marsee Aff. ¶); (Detective Matthew Cline Aff., ECF No. 24-2 ¶2) (“Cline Aff. ¶).
After an attempted murder of an individual named Jordan Chin (“Chin”) on November 7, 2021, both Det. Marsee and Det. Cline became involved in investigations related to the shooting. As part of this investigation, Det. Marsee interviewed Plaintiff, reviewed Det. Cline's interview of Chin, interviewed other witnesses, gathered evidence, inspected the area where the shooting occurred and reviewed officers' narrative reports, and photographs.
From his investigation, Det. Marsee learned that on November 7 at 11:48 p.m. FWPD patrol officers heard gunshots in the area of State Boulevard and Beacon Street. Three minutes later, a Parkview Hospital Randalia (“Parkview Randalia”) employee called the City of Fort Wayne communications to advise that a shooting victim had arrived at the hospital. Parkview Randalia is located in close proximity to the area where the officers heard gunshots. Chin, suffering from multiple gunshot wounds, had driven to the emergency room at Parkview Randalia. Chin's initial condition was life-threatening and she was transported to Parkview Regional Medical Center (“Parkview Regional”) where she underwent multiple surgeries. (Marsee Aff. ¶¶ 4-7).
On November 19, 2021, Det. Marsee interviewed Plaintiff at the FWPD. Plaintiff stated that on November 7, 2021, he and Chin were at Blackhawk Apartments. Plaintiff told Det. Marsee he was mad because he had lost his phone charger. He also stated that he took a gun from Chin while at the apartment. A voice stress test was administered to Plaintiff during the interview. The voice stress test indicated that Plaintiff did not respond truthfully to the questions during the interview. (Marsee Aff. ¶ 10).
Det. Marsee conducted a second interview with Plaintiff. During that interview, Plaintiff stated that he and Chin got into an argument at the Blackhawk Apartments. Chin tried to leave the apartment with a handgun and Plaintiff told Det. Marsee he stopped her from leaving and took the gun from her. Once he took the gun, he pushed Chin out of the apartment and closed the door. Plaintiff did not know where Chin went but stated that when he left the apartment, 15 minutes later, her car was not in the parking lot.
On November 30, 2021, Det. Cline interviewed Chin at Parkview Regional. (Det. Cline Aff. ¶¶s 4-5; Interview, ECF No. 22). During the recorded interview, Chin stated that on November 7, 2021, she and Plaintiff were at her friend's apartment in Blackhawk Apartments. Chin and Plaintiff were friends and Chin stated that she had stayed at his house from time to time. Plaintiff was mad about a cube for his cell phone that he could not find. Chin left the apartment and was driving westbound on State Boulevard and noticed a silver Ford following her. When she got to the CVS near State and Beacon Street, the silver Ford pulled up along the right side of her vehicle. Plaintiff was driving the vehicle and Chin did not see any other occupants. Chin told Det. Cline that Plaintiff pulled out a handgun and began shooting at her. The gunshots hit Chin and she drove to Parkview Randalia.
Information obtained from Chin's cell phone records confirmed her locations at Blackhawk Apartments, her location at State Boulevard and Beacon Street, and then at Parkview Randalia. Security video from a business on East State and Beacon shows Chin's vehicle and a silver car approaching her at the intersection.
Plaintiff was arrested on December 1, 2021, and charged with attempted murder and aggravated battery with a deadly weapon. Det. Marsee swore out a probable cause affidavit and an Allen County Superior Court judge found probable cause and signed the Affidavit for Probable Cause on December 6, 2021.
Allen Superior Court case no. 02D06-2112-F1-000024.
On February 21, 2022, Chin was found deceased at her home on Fairfield Avenue. The charges against Plaintiff were dismissed on May 16, 2022.
3. Analysis
a. 42 U.S.C. §1983 Claims for a Fourth Amendment Violation (False Arrest)
i. Det. Marsee
Plaintiff challenges the lawfulness of his arrest and subsequent pretrial detention. Plaintiff's claim for false arrest arises under the Fourth Amendment, “which prohibits government officials from detaining a person in the absence of probable cause.” Manuel v. City of Joliet, 580 U.S. 357, 367 (2017). Claims for false arrest or unlawful pretrial detention, whether before or after the initiation of legal process, sound in that Fourth Amendment prohibition. Lewis v. City of Chicago, 914 F.3d 472, 479 (7th Cir. 2019). If probable cause existed, in the ordinary case it is an “absolute defense to claims under section 1983 against police officers for an allegedly unreasonable seizure, whether a false arrest or a wrongful pretrial detention.” Norris v. Serrato, 761 Fed.Appx. 612, 615 (7th Cir. 2019); see also Farnik v. City of Chicago, 1 F.4th 535, 545 (7th Cir. 2021).
Whether an officer has probable cause to arrest depends on the underlying state criminal law. Pourghoraishi v. Flying J., Inc., 449 F.3d 751, 761 (7th Cir. 2006). Probable cause exists when, objectively, the “totality of the facts and circumstances known to the officer ... would warrant a reasonable, prudent person” in believing that the detainee had committed a crime. Abbott v. Sangamon County, 705 F.3d 706, 714 (7th Cir. 2013).
When a magistrate finds that probable cause exists in ordering an arrest or detention, that finding is accorded substantial deference and the existence of probable cause is presumed. Johnson v. Myers, 53 F.4th 1063, 1068-69 (7th Cir. 2022); Lewis, 914 F.3d at 477. This presumption can be defeated, however, by showing either that (1) the information before the magistrate was “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence unreasonable,” or that (2) material facts were intentionally or recklessly withheld from the magistrate. Johnson, 53 F.4th at 1069 (cleaned up).
Defendants concede that Plaintiff was “seized” when he was arrested and detained but contend that officers had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff and a judge found probable cause to justify his continued detention. The Court agrees that the existence of probable cause forecloses Plaintiff's claim here. For his initial arrest, Chin identified the Plaintiff as the individual that shot her. A single eyewitness's report is sufficient to support a finding of probable cause. Gramenos v. Jewel Companies, Inc., 797 F.2d 432, 440 (7th Cir. 1986); Tangwall v. Stuckey, 135 F.3d 510, 519-20 (7th Cir. 1998). Indeed, “[a]s long as a reasonably credible witness or victim informs the police that someone has committed ... a crime, the officers have probable cause to place the alleged culprit under arrest.....” Spiegel v. Cortese, 196 F.3d 717, 723 (7th Cir. 1999) (cleaned up). Chin's identification thus established probable cause for all the offenses with which Plaintiff was arrested and charged. See Lee v. Harris, 2023 WL 8701081, at *3 (N.D. Ill.Dec. 15, 2023).
Whether an arrest is supported by probable cause is usually a question of fact decided by the jury. Abbott v. Sangamon Cnty., 705 F.3d 706, 714 (7th Cir. 2013). However, if the underlying facts are undisputed, the Court can make that decision on summary judgment. Id.
As for Plaintiff's continued detention, his failure to provide any evidence to call into question the deference afforded a judicial determination of probable cause dooms any argument that the judicial finding was problematic. The Court finds no Fourth Amendment violation occurred.
ii. Officers Roesler and John Doe Officers
Officer Roesler and John Doe Officers move for summary judgment on any claims against them. With respect to Officer Roesler, Defendants provide an affidavit from Sergeant Howard Johnson wherein he states that he has reviewed the personnel information maintained by the FWPD and there are no records that an Officer Roesler was, at the time of the events in this lawsuit, or now is employed by the FWPD. (Sergeant Howard Johnson Aff., ECF No. 24-3, ¶ 3). In the absence of information from Plaintiff disputing this evidence, summary judgment is GRANTED as to any claims against the non-existent Officer Roesler.
As for John Doe Officers, Defendants argue that claims against unnamed parties are improper in federal court and there is no evidence of personal involvement by any other officer not identified in the Amended Complaint. Snowden v. Ill. Dep't of Hum. Servs., 75 F.4th 789, 796 (7th Cir. 2023) (§1983 liability requires personal involvement).
According to the Seventh Circuit, “it is pointless to include lists of anonymous defendants in federal court; this type of placeholder does not open the door to relation back under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 15, nor can it otherwise help the plaintiff.” Wudtke v. Davel, 128 F.3d 1057, 1060 (7th Cir. 1997) (internal citations omitted). Discovery has now closed in this matter and plaintiff has still not attempted to name or serve any of the John Doe Officers. Therefore, the court will grant summary judgment in favor of the John Doe Officers.
b. Qualified Immunity
Although the Court could resolve the case based on its earlier determination that found no Fourth Amendment violation, Defendants also assert the affirmative defense as an alternative basis for granting summary judgment. For completeness, the Court addresses Defendant's qualified immunity argument and finds that even if the Court found a genuine issue of fact existed as to the Plaintiff's arrest, Plaintiff would not be any better off because Det. Marsee is entitled to qualified immunity.
Qualified immunity “protects government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Smith v. Finkley, 10 F.4th 725, 737 (7th Cir. 2021). In evaluating qualified immunity, the Court asks two questions: (1) whether the facts, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, make out a violation of a constitutional right, and (2) whether that constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the violation. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232. “A party seeking to defeat qualified immunity must show both elements; on the other hand, the defendant obtains qualified immunity by blocking either part.” Holloway v. City of Milwaukee, 43 F.4th 760, 767 (7th Cir. 2022); Jewett v. Anders, 521 F.3d 818, 823 (7th Cir. 2008)) (“[O]nce the defense [of qualified immunity] is raised, it becomes the plaintiff's burden to defeat it.”). To do so, plaintiff must either “identify ] a closely analogous case” or “persuad[e] the court that the conduct is so egregious and unreasonable that, notwithstanding the lack of an analogous decision, no reasonable officer could have thought he was acting lawfully.” Abbott, 705 F.3d at 723-24; see also Brokaw v. Mercer Cnty., 235 F.3d 1000, 1022 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that a plaintiff need not identify a closely analogous case if he can establish “that the violation was so obvious that a reasonable person would have known of the unconstitutionality of the conduct at issue”).
The Seventh Circuit has recognized that an officer who lacks probable cause to arrest is still entitled to qualified immunity if “a reasonable officer could have mistakenly believed that probable cause existed.” Fleming v. Livingston County, 674 F.3d 874, 878 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Humphrey v. Staszak, 148 F.3d 719, 725 (7th Cir. 1998)). An officer who mistakenly believed there was probable cause may be shielded from liability “if a reasonable officer could have believed the [arrest] to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information the [arresting] officers possessed.” Abbott, 705 F.3d at 714. Known as “arguable-probable cause,” the “inquiry is separate from the probable-cause inquiry”; “whereas an arrest not supported by probable cause is a constitutional violation, an arrest not supported by arguable probable cause is a violation of a ‘clearly established' constitutional right.” Abbott, 705 F.3d at 715 (internal citations omitted). “Arguable probable cause constitutes a bar to liability for unlawful pretrial detention claims.” Mack v. City of Chicago, 2023 WL 4744791, at *10 (N.D. Ill. July 25, 2023)
Here, even if the Court overlooked its determination that probable cause existed, a reasonable officer in Det. Marsee's position could have mistakenly believed that probable cause existed, thereby establishing arguable probable cause. As the Seventh Circuit holds, an arrest supported by arguable probable cause bars Det. Marsee from §1983 liability for the arrest and detention.
Simultaneously, Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of demonstrating a clearly established right violated by defendants. Plaintiff hasn't identified any clearly established precedent that would have made it clear to reasonable officers confronted with these particular circumstances that Plaintiff's arrest and detention violated the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity is warranted.
c. Pendent State Law Claims
For the reasons stated above, the Court grants Defendants' summary judgment motion as to the claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Because that disposition results in the dismissal of all claims over which the Court has original jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), the Court must address whether to retain jurisdiction over any state law claims asserted by Plaintiff.
As the Seventh Circuit consistently has stated, “it is the well-established law of this circuit that the usual practice is to dismiss without prejudice state supplemental claims whenever all federal claims have been dismissed prior to trial.” Groce v. Eli Lilly & Co., 193 F.3d 496, 501 (7th Cir. 1999); see also Williams v. Rodriguez, 509 F.3d 392, 404 (7th Cir. 2007) (“As a general matter, when all federal claims have been dismissed prior to trial, the federal court should relinquish jurisdiction over the remaining pendant state claims”); Wright v. Associated Ins. Cos., 29 F.3d 1244, 1251 (7th Cir. 1994) (“the general rule is that, when all federal claims are dismissed before trial, the district court should relinquish jurisdiction over pendant state-law claims rather than resolving them on the merits”). Yet the court of appeals has discussed “three well-recognized exceptions” to the general rule that “when all federal-law claims are dismissed before trial, the pendent claims should be left to the state courts.” Wright, 29 F.3d at 1252. As the court has explained, occasionally there are “unusual cases in which the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine - judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity - will point to a federal decision of the state-law claims on the merits.” Id.
A review of the Amended Complaint reveals Plaintiff is bringing a state law claim for malicious prosecution and for respondeat superior against the City. Defendants take the position that any state law claims are jurisdictionally barred under Indiana's Tort Claims Act, Ind. Code § 34-13-3-8. While it is likely Defendants' position is well-taken, the Court declines supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims Plaintiff is asserting as none of the factors identified by the Seventh Circuit for the Court to retain jurisdiction are present here.
Accordingly, the Court denies Defendants' motion for summary judgment on the state law claims without prejudice and dismisses the state law claims with leave to refile in state court.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 24) is GRANTED as to all claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983 and DENIED in part. Judgment is hereby entered in favor of all Defendants on the claims arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. Defendants' Motion is denied as to Plaintiff's state law claims; those claims are dismissed without prejudice to refiling in state court.
SO ORDERED