Opinion
Civil Action. No. 2:05-cv-03578-LDD.
December 12, 2005
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently before the Court are defendant's motion for summary judgment and for dismissal of plaintiff's complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) (Doc. No. 6), plaintiff's briefs in opposition to defendant's motion (Doc. No. 8, 14), and defendant's reply thereto (Doc. No. 16).
For the following reasons, this Court grants defendant's motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's federal claims, and dismisses plaintiff's state law claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff Elizabeth Woolston ("plaintiff") alleges that she suffered intentional gender discrimination while serving as a legal secretary/paralegal at the law firm of defendant Harding, Early, Follmer Frailey ("defendant") from October 1, 2002 until October 10, 2003. (See Compl., at ¶¶ 14-19). The complaint asserts five causes of action, including claims for gender discrimination/retaliation (Count I), harassment (Count III), and negligence (Count V) under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et seq.; and claims for gender discrimination/retaliation (Count II) and harassment (Count IV) under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act ("PHRA"), 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 951 et seq. Plaintiff avers that federal subject matter jurisdiction over the Title VII claims exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 1341; and that supplemental jurisdiction exists over the state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. (See Am. Compl., at ¶ 2).
On September 20, 2005, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment and for dismissal of plaintiff's complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (Doc. No. 6). Defendant argues that plaintiff's Title VII claims fail as a matter of law, by virtue of defendant's failure to meet the statutory definition of "employer" under Title VII, and that this Court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's state law claims. (See Def. September 20, 2005 Br., at 2-3). In response, plaintiff requested an enlargement of time to respond to defendant's motion, asking the Court for a discovery period to ascertain the validity of defendant's "employer" argument. (See Doc. No. 8).
The Court granted plaintiff's request on October 7, 2005, and gave plaintiff until November 16, 2005 to conduct discovery on the narrow issue of whether defendant is an "employer" within the meaning of Title VII. (Doc. No. 10). During the discovery period, plaintiff served defendant with interrogatories and a request for production of documents. (See Pl. Discovery Requests, attached as Ex. B and C to Def. Br.). Defendant responded to plaintiff's discovery requests in a timely manner, in part producing annual summary statements from its payroll service, Automated Data Processing, Inc. ("ADP"), that listed the names of defendant's employees for 2001 through 2005. Plaintiff also served a subpoena on ADP, which, pursuant to this Court's November 18, 2005 Order, was ultimately required to provide plaintiff with copies of all quarterly payroll reports and W-2 forms for every person employed by defendant from 2001 through 2004, with all payroll and financial information redacted. (Doc. No. 13).
This Order also gave plaintiff until November 25, 2005 to file a response to defendant's motion. (Id.).
Plaintiff filed its response to defendant's motion to dismiss on November 23, 2005, two days prior to the Court's November 25, 2005 deadline. (Doc. No. 14). Plaintiff never requested additional time to conduct further discovery, to file additional discovery motions, and/or to receive and process the documents from ADP. Defendant filed its reply on December 5, 2005. (Doc. No. 16). On December 6, 2005, the Court received the W-2 forms and quarterly taxable wage reports from ADP.
II. Summary Judgment Motion
Defendant's motion was filed in response to plaintiff's complaint, and is therefore appropriately styled a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. However, because both parties have introduced evidence beyond the pleadings, this Court treats defendant's Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss plaintiff's Title VII claims as a motion for summary judgment. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b) (transforming Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss into summary judgment motion when "matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court").
Plaintiff introduces her own affidavit, and defendant introduces payroll documentation, interrogatory requests, and the affidavit of John Early II, a partner at defendant's law firm. (See Pl. Br., at Ex. A; Def. Sept. 20, 2005 Br., at Ex. B; Def. Br., at Ex. B-D).
In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must determine whether "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986); Arnold Pontiac-GMC, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 786 F.2d 564, 568 (3d Cir. 1986). Only facts that may affect the outcome of a case are "material." Anderson, 477 U.S. 248. All reasonable inferences from the record are drawn in favor of the non-movant. See id. at 256.
The movant has the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of genuine issues of material fact. This "burden . . . may be discharged by `showing' that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case." Celotex Corp. v. Catreet, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once this burden is discharged, the non-movant must then establish the existence of each element on which it bears the burden of proof. See J.F. Feeser, Inc. v. Serv-A-Portion, Inc., 909 F.2d 1524, 1531 (3d Cir. 1990). A plaintiff cannot avert summary judgment with speculation or by resting on the allegations in his pleadings, but rather must present competent evidence from which a jury could reasonably find in her favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E. for M.E., 172 F.3d 238, 252 (3d Cir. 1999);Williams v. Borough of West Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 460 (3d Cir. 1989); Woods v. Bentsen, 889 F. Supp. 179, 184 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
1. Federal Claims
Defendant's motion for summary judgment is limited to the narrow issue of whether defendant qualifies as an "employer" under Title VII. (See Def. Br., at 2-4). Title VII permits an employment discrimination suit to be brought against an "employer." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a); Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Co., 100 F.3d 1061, 1077-1078 (3d Cir. 1996) (individual employees not liable under Title VII). An "employer" is statutorily defined as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees . . . and any agent of such a person." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). The Third Circuit has characterized this 15-person threshold to the definition of "employer" as a merits-related issue, a substantive component of a Title VII claim, rather than as a jurisdictional prerequisite. See, e.g., Nesbit v. Gears Unlimited, Inc., 347 F.3d 72, 82-84 (3d Cir. 2003) (summary judgment motion is appropriate mechanism to decide question of whether defendant is "employer").
This Court finds that plaintiff has failed to carry its burden of raising a genuine issue of material fact that defendant qualifies as an "employer" under Title VII. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). For instance, despite this Court's authorization of a six-week discovery period, plaintiff fails to provide any payroll documentation suggesting that defendant employed more than 15 people during the alleged period of discrimination or thereafter.See, e.g., Nesbit, 347 F.3d at 88-89 (granting summary judgment to defendant when plaintiff fails to provide evidence in Title VII case that defendant employed more than 15 employees). Nor does plaintiff provide deposition or affidavit testimony from defendant's principals on this issue. In fact, plaintiff relies entirely on her own affidavit, in which she "recalls," without any supported documentation or any explanation as to the origin of this conclusion, that defendant employed seventeen employees during her tenure. (See Woolston Aff., at ¶ 6). Plaintiff's affidavit, standing alone, fails to satisfy plaintiff's burden of showing that defendant is an "employer" subject to Title VII.See, e.g., Drake v. Steamfitters Local Union No. 420, 1998 WL 564486, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 3, 1998) (plaintiff's reliance on personal affidavit to support claim fails to demonstrate dispute of material fact sufficient to defeat summary judgment motion in Title VII case).
In addition to plaintiff's failure to provide evidence to satisfy its burden on a summary judgment motion, defendant provides documentation indicating that it does not qualify as an "employer" under Title VII. Defendant provides the affidavit of John Early II, the managing attorney at defendant's law firm, stating that between 2001 and 2005, defendant employed less than fifteen employees on all occasions. (See Earley Aff., attached as Ex. B to Def. September 20, 2005 Motion, at ¶¶ 3-4). Defendant also attaches to its reply brief copies of alleged annual payroll summaries, which, although heavily redacted and somewhat difficult to decipher, indicate that defendant never employed fifteen or more persons annually between 2001 and 2005. (See Annual Payroll Summaries, attached as Ex. F to Def. Br.). Furthermore, pursuant to this Court's November 18, 2005 Order, ADP has produced defendant's W-2 forms and quarterly wage reports for all employees at defendant's law firm from the years 2001 through 2004; this documentation indicates that defendant employed at most eight employees in 2001, at most twelve employees in 2002, and at most nine employees in 2003 and 2004 respectively. (See W-2 Forms and Quarterly Wage Reports).
This four-year interval is longer than the one-year period of time plaintiff allegedly worked at defendant's law firm. (See Compl., at ¶ 14).
The Court received a copy of ADP's response to the November 18, 2005 Order on December 6, 2005.
Plaintiff also seems to suggest that this Court should deny defendant's motion on the basis of alleged discovery violations. (See Pl. Br., at 6-8). This Court disagrees with plaintiff's position, finding that plaintiff evinces no evidence of discovery violations. For instance, although plaintiff challenges the credibility of defendant's yearly summaries of its payroll records, suggesting that these summaries are arbitrary, not reflective of the entire calendar year, and ultimately non-descriptive, plaintiff never filed a motion to compel the disclosure of the unredacted versions of these documents. Nor did plaintiff file a motion to compel the production of additional documents or of more thorough interrogatory responses. In fact, plaintiff never sought to verify the authenticity of defendant's interrogatory responses, in which defendant allegedly identified the name of each employee on defendant's payroll from 2001 through 2005, by taking the deposition of defendant's corporate designee on this issue. Finally, regardless of plaintiff's assertions of discovery obstructionism, the Court notes that the W-2 forms and quarterly wage reports produced by ADP conclusively resolve the question of whether defendant is an "employer" under Title VII in the negative.
In summary, this Court finds that plaintiff has failed to meet its burden of raising a genuine issue of material fact as to whether defendant employed — or continues to employee — fifteen employees and, hence, qualifies as an "employer" within the meaning of Title VII. Nor has plaintiff requested additional time to conduct more discovery, let alone indicated what additional discovery would be necessary. Accordingly, without any evidence to suggest that defendant is an "employer" subject to Title VII, this Court grants summary judgment in favor of defendant on plaintiff's Tile VII claims.
These claims consist of Count I, III, and V of the complaint.
B. State Law Claims
Defendant also moves this Court to dismiss plaintiff's state law claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (See Def. Br., at 4-5). In response, plaintiff contends that the Court should exercise its discretion and exert supplemental jurisdiction over its state law claims. (See Pl. Br., at 10-11).
This Court finds the absence of any factor that justifies the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's PHRA claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction when court has dismissed "all claims over which it had original jurisdiction"); Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 123 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting that "where the claim over which the district court has original jurisdiction is dismissed before trial, the district court must decline to decide the pendent state law claims unless considerations of judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the parties provide an affirmative justification for doing so") (internal citations omitted); Markowitz v. Northeast Land Co., 906 F.2d 100, 106 (3d Cir. 1990) ("rule within this Circuit is that once all claims with an independent basis of federal jurisdiction have been dismissed the case no longer belongs in federal court"); Tully v. Mott Supermarkets, Inc., 540 F.2d 187, 196 (3d Cir. 1976) (when federal claim is dismissed, "court should ordinarily refrain from exercising [supplemental] jurisdiction in the absence of extraordinary circumstances"). In fact, plaintiff presents no specific argument as to why this Court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. Accordingly, this Court dismisses plaintiff's state law claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Henglein v. Informal Plan for Plant Shutdown Benefits for Salaried Employees, 974 F.2d 391, 398 (3d Cir. 1992) ("it is well settled that, after disposal of a federal claim, the district court has discretion to hear, dismiss, or remand a supplemental claim for which there is no independent basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction").
C. Conclusion
For the preceding reasons, this Court grants defendant's motion for summary judgment on the Title VII claims; and dismisses plaintiff's remaining state law claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. An appropriate Order follows.
ORDER
AND NOW, this 12th day of December 2005, upon consideration of defendant's motion for summary judgment and for dismissal of plaintiff's complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) (Doc. No. 6), plaintiff's briefs in opposition to defendant's motion (Doc. No. 8, 14), and defendant's reply thereto (Doc. No. 16), it is hereby ORDERED as follows:1. Defendant's motion (Doc. No. 6) is GRANTED.
2. Judgment is entered for defendant and against plaintiff on plaintiff's Title VII claims (Counts I, III, and V of the complaint).
3. Plaintiff's state law claims are dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
4. The Clerk of Court is directed to close this matter for statistical purposes.