Opinion
7:23-CV-882-FL
06-05-2023
WILLIAM D. WOOLENS, Plaintiff, v. CHARLENE DENISE RUCKLE, Defendant.
ORDER AND MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION
Ro6ert B. Jones, Jr. United States Magistrate Judge
This matter is before the court on Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis, [DE-2], and for frivolity review of the complaint, [DE-1], pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Plaintiff has also filed several documents in support of his claims. [DE-4, -5, -7], Plaintiff has demonstrated appropriate evidence of inability to pay the required court costs, and the application to proceed in forma pauperis is allowed. However, it is recommended that the complaint be dismissed.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court shall dismiss the complaint if it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks money damages from a defendant immune from such recovery. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i-iii); see Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 74 (4th Cir. 1994) (explaining Congress enacted predecessor statute 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) “to prevent abuse of the judicial system by parties who bear none of the ordinary financial disincentives to filing meritless claims”). A case is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); McLean v. United States, 566 F.3d 391, 399 (4th Cir. 2009) (“Examples of frivolous claims include those whose factual allegations are ‘so nutty,' ‘delusional,' or ‘wholly fanciful' as to be simply ‘unbelievable.'”). A claim lacks an arguable basis in law when it is “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. A claim lacks an arguable basis in fact when it describes “fantastic or delusional scenarios.” Id. at 327-28.
In determining whether a complaint is frivolous, “a court is not bound, as it usually is when making a determination based solely on the pleadings, to accept without question the truth of the Plaintiff's allegations.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992). Rather, the court may find a complaint factually frivolous “when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them.” Id. “The word ‘frivolous' is inherently elastic and not susceptible to categorical definition .... The term's capaciousness directs lower courts to conduct a flexible analysis, in light of the totality of the circumstances, of all factors bearing upon the frivolity of a claim.” Nagy v. Fed Med Ctr. Butner, 376 F.3d 252, 256-57 (4th Cir. 2004) (some internal quotation marks omitted). In making its frivolity determination, the court may “apply common sense.” Nasim v. Warden., Md House o/Correction, 64 F.3d 951, 954 (4th Cir. 1995).
In order to state a claim on which relief may be granted, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting BellAtl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, the plaintiff must allege more than labels and conclusions. Id.
In the present case, Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, and pleadings drafted by a pro se litigant are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by an attorney. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). This court is charged with liberally construing a pleading fded by a pro se litigant to allow for the development of a potentially meritorious claim. See id; Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Noble v. Barnett, 24 F.3d 582, 587 n.6 (4th Cir. 1994). However, the principles requiring generous construction of pro se complaints are not without limits; the district courts are not required “to conjure up questions never squarely presented to them.” Beaudett v City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
II. ANALYSIS
A. Background
Plaintiff, William D. Woolens, alleges Defendant, Charlene Ruckle, initiated an illegal child support case against him; committed paternity, social security, and child support fraud; and engaged in racketeering, all related to the August 2011 child support proceeding in which support was awarded against Woolens to Ruckle. CompL [DE-1] at 2-3. Plaintiff specifically alleges that Ruckle committed local, state, and federal paternity and social security fraud in two states: first, in West Virginia by submitting a birth certificate showing Plaintiff as the father of her child without DNA testing on August 5, 2002, and obtaining a fraudulent temporary order for child support; and second, in North Carolina by obtaining an illegal child support obligation against Plaintiff in New Hanover County from January 1,2011 to August 31,2011, reopening a closed child support case for Defendant's and her ex-husband's daughter, and involving a collection agency to obtain illegal garnishments from November 2011 to the present. Compl. Suppl. [DE-1-1] at 9. Plaintiff seeks $250,000.00 for his homelessness, pain, and suffering. Compl. [DE-1] at 3. Woolens has also filed several documents in support of his claims, including Wikipedia entries defining racketeering and paternity fraud, court documents from a paternity petition involving Woolens and Rucker in West Virginia, copies of birth certificates, child support payment records, child support orders from West Virginia and from North Carolina, documentation regarding Woolens' homelessness, documents regarding garnishments for child support, correspondence between Woolens and counsel regarding a child support related contempt hearing, information regarding reporting social security fraud, and an order of this court and documents pertaining to an unrelated case. [DE-1-1, -4, -5, -7].
B. Discussion
Plaintiff filed a substantially similar case in this court in December 2021, against Ruckle that was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. See Woolens v. Ruckle/Cliborne, No. 7:21-CV-216-M, 2022 WL 1105670, at *1 (E.D. N.C. Apr. 13, 2022). In February 2023, Plaintiff filed another case against Ruckle, and two other defendants, asserting the same claims and based on the same set of facts alleged in this case. See No. 7:23-cv-125-D, [DE-1-1] at 4. The claims in the February 2023 case, which Plaintiff now attempts to reassert, were ultimately dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and, alternatively, for failure to state a claim. Woolens v. Ruckle, No. 7:23-CV-125-D, 2023 WL 2959149, at *1 (E.D. N.C. Apr. 14, 2023).
Plaintiffs claims here should be dismissed as barred by res judicata. “Claim preclusion, characterized as ‘res judicata' in North Carolina, applies when ‘a prior adjudication on the merits in a prior suit bars a subsequent, identical cause of action between the same parties or their privies,' and also ‘prevents relitigation of claims that ‘in the exercise of reasonable diligence, could have been presented for determination in the prior action.'” Mendible v. Special Proc. Div. of Wake Cnty. Clerk, No. 5:21-CV-00087-M, 2022 WL 433311, at *6 (E.D. N.C. Feb. 11, 2022) (quoting Orlando Residence, Ltd. v. All. Hosp. Mgmt., LLC, 375 N.C. 140, 150-51, reh 'g denied, 376 N.C. 532 (2020) (citations omitted)), affd sub nom. Mendible v. Special Proceeding Dep't of the Wake Cnty. Ct., No. 22-1259, 2022 WL 2303964 (4th Cir. June 27, 2022), cert, denied sub nom. Mendible v. Special Proc. Dep't of Wake Cnty. Ct., 214 L.Ed.2d 278 (2022). “The essential elements of res judicata are: (1) a final judgment on the merits in an earlier suit, (2) an identity of the cause of action in both the earlier and the later suit, and (3) an identity of parties or their privies in the two suits.” Id. (quoting Orlando Residence, Ltd., 375 N.C. at 151).
Plaintiff here asserts the same causes of action against the same defendant based on the same facts as in the prior action. Compare, No. 7:23-cv-125-D, [DE-1] at 2, [DE-1-1] at 4, with No. 7:23-cv-882-FL, [DE-1] at 2, [DE-1-1] at 9. The court in the prior action determined that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims and that Plaintiff failed to state a claim, dismissed all claims, and entered a final judgment in favor of defendant. Woolens, 2023 WL 2959149, adopting mem. and rec. 2023 WL 2960326, at *1 (E.D. N.C. Mar. 28, 2023). Plaintiff may not now relitigate the same claims against defendant where the court previously dismissed those claims on the merits. See Witham v. Boyle, No. 5:19-CV-260-BR, 2019 WL 5483723, at *5 (E.D. N.C. July 30, 2019) (citing Williams v. Christenson, No. 5:14-CT-3089-F, 2014 WL 11497953, at *1 (E.D. N.C. Nov. 7, 2014) (holding that the doctrine of res judicata bars the plaintiffs claims because the “allegations have already been the subject of a prior complaint in this court”), aff'd, 593 Fed.Appx. 231 (4th Cir. 2015); Burgess v. Hamm, No. 5:11-CT-3229-F, 2012 WL 3704688, at *3 (E.D. N.C. Aug. 27, 2012) (holding that a claim was barred by res judicata when the court dismissed a prior complaint filed by the plaintiff and “both of his actions are predicated on the same facts”); Cannon v. Swindell, No. 7:01-CV-82-BR, 2001 WL 34704474, at *4 (E.D. N.C. Dec. 17, 2001) (dismissing case because “the Plaintiffs claims are essentially identical to those litigated in his prior case”), aff'd, 34 Fed.Appx. 905 (4th Cir. 2002)), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 5444793 (E.D. N.C. Oct. 23, 2019). Accordingly, it is recommended that this action be dismissed.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the motion to proceed in forma pauperis is allowed, and it is recommended that the complaint be dismissed.
IT IS DIRECTED that a copy of this Memorandum and Recommendation be served on Plaintiff. You shall have until June 19, 2023, to file written objections to the Memorandum and Recommendation. The presiding district judge must conduct his or her own review (that is, make a de novo determination) of those portions of the Memorandum and Recommendation to which objection is properly made and may accept, reject, or modify the determinations in the Memorandum and Recommendation; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. See, e.g, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(3); Local Civ. R. 1.1 (permitting modification of deadlines specified in local rules), 72.4(b), E.D. N.C.
If you do not file written objections to the Memorandum and Recommendation by the foregoing deadline, you will be giving up the right to review of the Memorandum and Recommendation by the presiding district judge as described above, and the presiding district judge may enter an order or judgment based on the Memorandum and Recommendation without such review. In addition, your failure to file written objections by the foregoing deadline will bar you from appealing to the Court of Appeals from an order or judgment of the presiding district judge based on the Memorandum and Recommendation. See Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 846-47 (4th Cir. 1985).