Opinion
1:20-cv-288
10-28-2021
STEVEN W. WOODSON, Jr., Plaintiff v. C. CRISSMAN, et al., Defendants
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
DISMISS [ECF No. 34]
MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
RICHARD A. LANZILLO UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. Recommendation
It is respectfully recommended that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 34] be granted in part and denied in part. Defendant's motion should be granted as to Plaintiff s equal protection claim and any claim based on medical negligence. Defendant's motion should be denied as to Woodson's Eighth Amendment claim and his negligence claim based on a complete denial of care.
This matter has been referred to the undersigned for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
II. Report
A. Background
Plaintiff Steven W. Woodson, Jr., an inmate incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Forest (SCI-Forest), initiated this pro se civil rights action on September 28, 2020. See ECF No. 1. In his Amended Complaint - the operative pleading in this action - Woodson alleges that prison officials violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by deliberately ignoring his frequent threats to commit acts of self-harm. See ECF No. 27 at ¶¶ 12-39. Woodson also asserts a state law negligence claim. Id. In addition to the moving Defendant, Nurse Practitioner (CRNP) Angel Gressel, Woodson asserts claims against Charles Crissman, Jodi Sheesly, Scott C. Smith, and Buck Hetrick, each of whom is employed by the Department of Corrections (DOC). Id. ¶¶ 2-6. Invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Forsythe seeks declaratory relief and compensatory and punitive damages. Id. ¶¶ 52-59.
The DOC Defendants have filed a separate motion to dismiss. ECF No. 31.
In his pleading, Woodson alleges that on January 10, 2020, he informed Gressel that a voice in his head was urging him to harm himself and that he was having visions of his arm “all cut up.” Id. ¶¶ 14-17, 21-23. Woodson maintains that he had previously engaged in acts of selfharm on December 12, 2019 and December 23, 2019. Id. ¶ 24. Gressel instructed him to “try not to hurt [him]self' and to “find something to occupy [his] mind.” Id. ¶¶ 18-19. Later that day, Woodson “seriously” cut himself while in his cell. Id. ¶¶ 26-27.
Presently pending is Gressel's motion to dismiss. ECF No. 34. Woodson filed a brief in opposition, ECF No. 39, and Gressel filed a reply. ECF No. 40. This matter is ripe for disposition.
B. Standard of Review
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). In deciding a motion to dismiss, the court is not opining on whether the plaintiff will be likely to prevail on the merits; rather, the plaintiff must only present factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216, pp. 235-236 (3d ed. 2004)). See also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)). A complaint should only be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12 (b)(6) if it fails to allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (rejecting the traditional 12 (b)(6) standard established in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)). In making this determination, the court must accept as true all well-pled factual allegations in the complaint and views them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. U.S. Express Lines Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir. 2002).
While a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations to survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must provide more than labels and conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Moreover, a court need not accept inferences drawn by a plaintiff if they are unsupported by the facts as set forth in the complaint. See California Pub. Employee Ret. Sys. v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)). Nor must the Court accept legal conclusions disguised as factual allegations. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing Papasan, 478 U.S. at 286). See also McTernan v. City of York, Pennsylvania 577 F.3d 521, 531 (3d Cir. 2009) (“The tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.”).
Expounding on the Twombly/Iqbal line of cases, the Third Circuit has articulated the following three-step approach:
First, the court must ‘tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.' Second, the court should identify allegations that, ‘because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.' Finally, ‘where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief. 'Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 221 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010)). This determination is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
Finally, because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the allegations in the complaint must be held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-521 (1972). If the court can reasonably read a pro se litigant's pleadings to state a valid claim upon which relief could be granted, it should do so despite the litigant's failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax and sentence construction, or unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982); United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Bierley, 141 F.2d 552, 555 (3d Cir. 1969) (petition prepared by a prisoner may be inartfully drawn and should be read “with a measure of tolerance”).
C. Analysis
1. Deliberate indifference to medical needs
Woodson first contends that Gressel violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment by displaying deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (stating that “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain proscribed by the Eighth Amendment”) (internal quotation omitted). To establish a violation of his constitutional right to adequate medical care, a plaintiff is required to allege facts that demonstrate: (1) a serious medical need, and (2) acts or omissions by prison officials that indicate deliberate indifference to that need. Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999). Such indifference is manifested by an intentional refusal to provide care, delayed medical treatment for non-medical reasons, denial of prescribed medical treatment, a denial of reasonable requests for treatment that results in suffering or risk of injury, Durmer v. O 'Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 68 (3d Cir. 1993), or “persistent conduct in the face of resultant pain and risk of permanent injury.” White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 109 (3d Cir. 1990).
Applying this standard to Woodson's allegations, the Court is unable to determine whether Gressel's perfunctory response to Woodson's self-injurious inclinations represented an exercise of medical judgment or a refusal to provide care. Woodson states that the only treatment Gressel offered for his condition was the suggestion that he should “find something to occupy [his] mind.” Gressel characterizes this recommendation as a medically appropriate coping mechanism; Woodson dismisses it as a complete failure to provide any meaningful assistance. Each of these characterizations is plausible. Ultimately, a more fully developed record - including, but not limited to, Woodson's medical records and Gressel's treatment notes - may tilt the scales in either direction. At this preliminary stage, however, the Court must draw all inferences in Woodson's favor. Accordingly, Gressel's motion to dismiss should be denied as to this claim.
2. Equal protection
Turning to his equal protection claim, Woodson maintains that Gressel's “failure to take into account [his] past and very recent instances of self-harm and protect [him] from [him] self, as they have others in a similar position and are supposed to protect everyone, amounts to denial of equal protection.” ECF No. 27 ¶¶ 47, 49. To establish a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, a plaintiff must ordinarily allege “that he was treated differently than other similarly situated inmates, and that this different treatment was the result of intentional discrimination based on his membership in a protected class.” Mack v. Warden Loretto FCI, 839 F.3d 286 (3d Cir 2016) (citing Hassan v. City of New York, 804 F.3d 277, 294 (3d Cir. 2015)). Although Woodson alleges, in conclusory fashion, that he was treated differently than unidentified “others” in the prison, he has not pleaded any facts suggesting that this difference in treatment resulted from his race, religion, or other prohibited consideration. This deficiency is fatal to his claim.
To the extent that Woodson may be attempting to proceed under a “class of one” equal protection theory, he must establish that: “he was treated differently than others similarly situated as a result of intentional or purposeful discrimination .. . [and] that his treatment was not ‘reasonably related to [any] legitimate penological interests.'” Brayboy v. Johnson, 2018 WL 6018863, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 16, 2018) (quoting Holland v. Taylor, 604 F.Supp.2d 692, 701 (D. Del. 2009)). In the specific context of prison discipline, this means that he must “demonstrate disparities in [treatment] that are not reasonable related to legitimate state interests.” Rhodes v. Robinson, 612 F.2d 766, 775 (3d Cir. 1979). Woodson has made no attempt to meet this burden and, as such, his equal protection claim should be dismissed.
3. Negligence
Finally, Woodson alleges that Gressel's failure to prevent him from harming himself amounted to medical negligence. Gressel contends that this claim should be dismissed because of Woodson's failure to file a certificate of merit within 60 days of the filing of his initial complaint.
Rule 1042.3 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure requires a plaintiff in a medical malpractice action to file a certificate of merit with the complaint, or within 60 days after the filing thereof, attesting that there is a reasonable probability that the medical care described in the complaint fell outside of acceptable professional standards. The Third Circuit has held that Rule 1042.3 is substantive law that must be applied by federal courts under Erie R.R. v. Thompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1983). See Liggon-Redding v. Estate of Sugarman, 659 F.3d 258, 26264 (3d Cir. 2011). Thus, for purposes of a motion to dismiss, the Pennsylvania certificate of merit rule is applied as “controlling, substantive state law.” Scaramuzza v. Sciolla, 345 F.Supp.2d 508, 509-10 (E.D. Pa. 2004).
“[A] plaintiffs failure to comply with Rule 1042.3 requires dismissal of any malpractice claim.” Bennett v. PrimeCare Medical, Inc., 2018 WL 6072126, at *10 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 14, 2018). However, “Pennsylvania practice expressly provides plaintiffs with notice of Rule 1042.3's requirements and an opportunity to cure any failure to file a certificate of merit before a matter is dismissed.” TranSystems Corp. v. Hughes Associates, Inc., 2014 WL 6674421, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 24, 2014). Under Pennsylvania Rule 1042.6:
(a) ... a defendant seeking to enter a judgment of non pros under Rule 1042.7(a) shall file a written notice of intention to file the praecipe and serve it on the party's attorney of record or on the party if unrepresented, no sooner than the thirty-first day after the filing of the complaint.
Pa. R. Civ. P. 1042.6(a). No judgment can be entered against a plaintiff for failure to timely file a certificate of merit until the defendant has complied with the notice requirements of Rule 1042.6(a). Pa. R. Civ. P. 1042.7(a)(4); Schmigel v. Uchal, 800 F.3d 113, 124 (3d Cir. 2015) (“The condition of thirty days' notice prior to seeking dismissal of an action for failure to comply with the [certificate of merit] regime is substantive and must be applied in federal court.”).
In the instant case, Gressel provided Woodson with the requisite notice on March 30, 2021. See ECF No. 33. Over six months later, Woodson has still not filed the required certificate. Under such circumstances, dismissal is ordinarily appropriate. Bennett, 2018 WL 6072126, at *10.
In his brief in response, however, Woodson suggests that a certificate of merit is unnecessary because “[t]he issue of negligence in this case is not related to the ‘technical' matter of how to diagnose and treat Plaintiff' but rather “[c]ommon sense - the judgment imparted by human experience - would tell a lay person that this inmate should be provided with protection against himself.” ECF No. 39 at 11. Thus, according to Woodson, “no special expertise or expert testimony is needed to show Plaintiffs claim is meritorious.” Id.
Courts distinguish medical malpractice from ordinary negligence in two ways. “First, medical malpractice can occur only within the course of a professional relationship. Second, claims of medical malpractice necessarily raise questions involving medical judgment.” Brownstein v. Geida, 2009 WL 2513778 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 13, 2009) (quoting Ditch v. Waynesboro Hospital, 917 A.2d 317, 321-22 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) (additional quoting sources omitted)). Thus, to determine whether a claim involves medical malpractice, a court must ask: “(1) whether the claim pertains to an action that occurred within the course of a professional relationship; and (2) whether the claim raises questions of medical judgment beyond the realm of common knowledge and experience.” Ditch, 917 A.2d at 321-22. Answering each of these questions in the affirmative means that the claim involves medical malpractice and requires a certificate of merit. Brownstein, 2009 WL 2513778 at *3.
In the instant case, there is no question that Woodson's claim involves an interaction that “occurred within the course of a professional relationship” with a medical professional. Ditch, 917 A.2d at 321-22. It is unclear, however, whether his claim “raises questions of medical judgment beyond the realm of common knowledge and experience.” Id. As noted above, Woodson maintains that Gressel failed to offer any intervention at all in response to a credible threat of self-harm. In the Court's view, an ordinary juror can determine whether a self-injurious inmate should be given some form of treatment without the benefit of expert testimony. See, e.g., Brownstein, 2009 WL 2513778 at *4 (expert testimony not required for claim that medical professionals negligently subjected plaintiff to a procedure without his consent). On the other hand, if the record ultimately supports Gressel's contention that her statement to Woodson represented the exercise of medical judgment, rather than a brush-off, Woodson would need expert testimony to establish that this advice fell below the medical standard of care.
Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that Gressel's motion to dismiss Woodson's medical negligence claim be granted in part and denied in part. To the extent that Woodson alleges a complete denial of care, his claim should proceed to discovery, as no expert testimony is required to support such a claim. However, Woodson's failure to provide a certificate of merit precludes him from arguing that any care that he did receive fell below generally acceptable medical standards.
In arguing that a certificate of merit is unnecessary, Woodson implicitly invokes Pennsylvania Rule 1042.3(a)(3) which provides that a party may comply with the certificate of merit requirement by certifying that “expert testimony of an appropriate licensed medical professional is unnecessary for prosecution of the claim.” Courts have held that “a filing that a litigant intends to proceed without an expert, even in a case where the Court believes an expert will be necessary, will satisfy Pennsylvania's certificate of merit requirement, ” Scales v. Witherite, 2011 WL 5239142, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 1, 2011), but will bar the litigant from later offering expert testimony at summary judgment or trial. Liggon-Redding v. Estate of Sugarman, 659 F.3d 258, 265 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that “the consequence of such a filing is a prohibition against offering expert testimony later in the litigation, absent ‘exceptional circumstances'”). Consistent with this principle, the Court's recommendation permits Woodson's negligence claim to advance, but only to the extent that he can ultimately prevail without relying on expert testimony.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons stated herein, it is respectfully recommended that Defendant's motion to dismiss [ECF No. 34] be granted in part and denied in part. Defendant's motion should be granted as to Woodson's equal protection claim and any claim based on medical negligence. Defendant's motion should be denied as to Woodson's Eighth Amendment claim and his negligence claim based on a complete denial of care.
IV. Notice
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, the parties may seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of Objections to respond thereto. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections may constitute a waiver of appellate rights. See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 194 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007).