Opinion
No. 06-16-00220-CR
08-30-2017
BRANSON ROSHAWN WOODS, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 6th District Court Lamar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 26665 Before Morriss, C.J., Moseley and Burgess, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
On a December evening in 2015, Branson Roshawn Woods drove a maroon Ford Explorer to the home of Meshe Shorters in Paris, where Britney Davis was standing in the yard outside of the home. After Woods and another occupant of the vehicle exchanged words with Davis, two gunshots were fired from the vehicle's passenger window, neither of which struck Davis. Following a bench trial, Woods was convicted of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and sentenced to four years' incarceration. We affirm the judgment of the trial court because (1) the evidence is legally sufficient to support Woods' conviction as a party to the offense and (2) consolidated court costs were properly assessed in the judgment.
See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.02 (West 2011).
The trial court specifically found that Woods was guilty as a party to the offense of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon.
(1) The Evidence is Legally Sufficient to Support Woods' Conviction as a Party to the Offense
Woods claims the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we use the traditional standard of review. Sufficiency of the evidence is measured by the elements of the offense as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge. Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The hypothetically correct jury charge "sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State's burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State's theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried." Id.
We review all the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether any rational fact-finder could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)); Hartsfield v. State, 305 S.W.3d 859, 863 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2010, pet. ref'd). We examine legal sufficiency under the direction of the Brooks opinion, while giving deference to the responsibility of the fact-finder "to fairly resolve conflicts in testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts." Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The fact-finder is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony and may "believe all of a witnesses' testimony, portions of it, or none of it." Thomas v. State, 444 S.W.3d 4, 11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). We give "almost complete deference to a [fact-finder's] decision when that decision is based on an evaluation of credibility." Lancon v. State, 253 S.W.3d 699, 705 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
A person commits the offense of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon if he or she intentionally or knowingly threatens another with imminent bodily injury and uses or exhibits a deadly weapon during the threat. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.01(a)(2) (West Supp. 2016), § 22.02(a)(2). A firearm is per se a deadly weapon. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(17)(A) (West Supp. 2016).
Witnesses gave conflicting accounts of the events that took place outside of Shorters' home on the evening of December 6, 2015. According to Davis, who had known Woods for a little more than one year before the night in question, she was standing outside of Shorters' home when Woods drove in front of the house and stopped at the side of the house. Woods' front-seat passenger, Demontre Allen, yelled out of the window, "Britney with you fine a**." Woods then yelled that Davis was a "police a** bitch." Woods and Davis then began yelling back and forth at each other. The shouting escalated for several minutes. According to Davis, Woods then reached across Allen, raised a firearm, pointed it out of the window at her, and fired two shots. In shock, Davis, who was standing on the sidewalk in front of the house with her two children, pushed her children down to keep them out of harm's way. Shorters then emerged from the house, and Woods drove away. The gun remained inside the vehicle during the entirety of the encounter. Davis testified that she was certain that Woods, and not Allen, was holding the gun and that he fired two shots at her chest.
Woods was evidently angry about two altercations between Davis and Woods' mother, Damekia Woods. The initial altercation between Davis and Damekia happened early in December and was fueled by an interaction between Davis' brother and Damekia's son, Red, in which Red allegedly pistol whipped Davis' brother. Damekia evidently contacted the police to complain of Davis after this altercation. The second altercation between the two women happened on the morning of December 6, the day of the incident resulting in Woods' conviction. That morning, Davis and Damekia had a "run-in" regarding something that Damekia posted on the internet about Davis' son. Damekia testified at trial that Davis tried to run her over with a car in November 2016.
Officer Curtis Graham was unable, however, to locate shell casings or bullets at the scene of the shooting. Davis believed the gun was loaded with blanks.
According to Shorters, Davis was standing outside of Shorters' home when some young men drove by. Davis and the young men were having "confrontational words." Shorters told the young men that she had children in the house and asked them to move away from her house. Shorters told Davis' children to come in the house with her. As she turned around and walked back into the house, Shorters heard two gunshots. Shorters did not know the young men in the vehicle that she described as a red Ford Explorer, and she did not see who fired the gun.
Robert Anderson, Shorters' neighbor, testified that he was standing in his front yard on the evening of December 6 when he saw a vehicle stop on the side of Shorters' house. What began as a regular conversation between Davis and the occupants of the vehicle escalated, following which Anderson saw an individual hanging out of the car and the flash of a weapon outside of the vehicle. He heard two or three gunshots and believed that the person who fired the gun was seated in the vehicle's passenger seat. The vehicle then sped away. Anderson pursued the young men in his car. While following the maroon vehicle, Anderson called the police on his cell phone and directed the police to the location of the vehicle from which the shots were fired. When Anderson spotted the police car, he stuck his hand out of the car window and pointed in the direction of the maroon vehicle.
Later, in October 2016, Anderson spoke with Kelsey Doty from the District Attorney's Office and told her he thought he heard four shots and that he could not see a gun or who fired the gun. Anderson also related that the person involved in the altercation with the individuals in the vehicle was Shorters, not Davis. Anderson clarified that shots are often fired in his neighborhood and that, based on his review of his December 6 statement, it is pretty clear that he heard two shots. Anderson further explained that, from his vantage point on the southeast lawn of his home, he would not be able to see if someone was standing on the front porch of Shorters' home.
Officer Jeff Pradier of the Paris Police Department stopped the vehicle matching Anderson's description in an uninhabited, wooded area of Sycamore Street. Woods was driving the vehicle, Allen was in the front passenger seat, and Jaswon Walker was seated in the back. A search of the vehicle did not uncover a firearm, there was no odor of gunpowder in the vehicle, and no shells or casings were found in the vehicle. A search of the area, however, uncovered a backpack and a nine-millimeter handgun on the ground approximately one hundred yards from the vehicle, on its passenger side. The backpack contained a box of nine-millimeter Luger shells. When Pradier removed the magazine from the gun, two .380 shells fell from the gun or its magazine. The magazine contained one nine-millimeter shell. Pradier later determined that the gun's serial number was "connected" to Allen.
Allen, a long-time friend of Woods, testified that he called Davis a "bad bitch" as they drove by Shorters' house on the evening of December 6, but that Woods did not say anything to her and there was no altercation between them. Although Allen admitted that the gun recovered by the police belonged to him, he testified that nobody shot the gun that night. Allen explained that he threw the backpack containing the gun out of the car because he had been in trouble approximately one month earlier for carrying a concealed handgun without a license. The backpack also contained K2. According to Allen, Woods did not know there was a gun in the car, because the gun was in the backpack. Allen ultimately pled guilty to aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and was given a probated sentence.
According to Walker, a long-time friend of both Woods and Allen, Davis stood in the front yard of Shorters' home and cussed at Woods and Allen. Although Davis' cussing lasted for approximately three minutes, none of the vehicles' occupants responded to her. Walker never saw anybody in the vehicle pick up a firearm, and he was not aware that a firearm was in the vehicle. Walker did not see Allen throw the backpack out of the window. Walker testified that he, Woods, and Allen are "buddies" and that they have "each other's back."
Ciara Woods is a former friend of Davis and is Woods' cousin. Ciara testified that Davis stated that she lied about Woods' actions on the night of December 6. Davis told Ciara that Woods did not shoot at her, but they did have "words." Davis also told Ciara that, because she was unable to retaliate directly against Woods' mother, Damekia, she wanted to retaliate by sending Woods to jail. Finally, Davis told Ciara that she was going to set Ciara up and send her to jail just like she was going to do to Woods.
See supra, note 5.
At the conclusion of this evidence, the trial court specifically found that the State proved Woods' guilt "as a party beyond a reasonable doubt," and it found Woods "guilty of the offense of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon as alleged in the indictment." We, therefore, must determine whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support Woods' guilt under the law of parties.
"The law of parties in the Texas Penal Code defines when a person may be held criminally responsible for the conduct of another." Williams v. State, 473 S.W.3d 319, 324 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. ref'd). A person is criminally responsible for the conduct of another if, "acting with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, he solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid the other person to commit the offense." TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.02(a)(2) (West 2011). Consequently, to establish that Woods committed the offense of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon under the law of parties, the State was required to prove that Woods, with the intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense, solicited, encouraged, directed, aided, or attempted to aid in the commission of the offense.
"Evidence is sufficient to convict the defendant under the law of parties where he is physically present at the commission of the offense, and encourages the commission of the offense by words or other agreement." Ransom v. State, 920 S.W.2d 288, 302 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994); see Beier v. State, 687 S.W.2d 2, 3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (citing Tarpley v. State, 565 S.W.2d 525 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978)). "The agreement, if any, must be before or contemporaneous with the criminal event." Beier, 687 S.W.2d at 3-4 (citing Urtado v. State, 605 S.W.2d 907 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980)). "While an agreement of the parties to act together in a common design seldom can be proved by direct evidence, reliance may be had on the actions of the parties, showing by either direct or circumstantial evidence, an understanding and common design to do a certain act." Barnes v. State, 62 S.W.3d 288, 297 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, pet. ref'd). "Mere presence alone without evidence of intentional participation is insufficient." Beier, 687 S.W.2d at 4 (citing Acy v. State, 618 S.W.2d 362 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981)). "In determining whether the accused participated as a party, the court may look to events occurring before, during and after the commission of the offense, and may rely on actions of the defendant which show an understanding and common design to do the prohibited act." Id. "A court may also rely on circumstantial evidence to prove party status." Gross v. State, 380 S.W.3d 181, 186 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (citing Ransom, 920 S.W.2d at 302).
Viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment, we find that the evidence is legally sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find that Woods was a party to the offense of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. First, the evidence supports the conclusion that Davis was the victim of this offense. Although disputed, the evidence shows that shots were fired from the passenger-side window of the vehicle that Woods was driving. Davis testified that Woods fired those shots, while Anderson testified that the shots were fired by the passenger. The trial court, having found Woods guilty as a party to the offense, did not find Davis' testimony on this issue credible and thus believed Anderson. Nevertheless, the testimony at trial established, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Davis was the victim of this offense. Allen testified that he pled guilty to, and was convicted of, assault with a deadly weapon based on the events that happened on the evening of December 6.
It is not our role to resolve conflicts in the evidence. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).
Second, the testimony established that Woods was complicit in the commission of the offense. It is undisputed that Allen, a long-time friend of Woods, was the front-seat passenger in Woods' vehicle that evening. It is also apparent that there was a history of animosity between Woods and Davis resulting from more than one verbal altercation between Davis and Woods' mother, the most recent of which happened on the morning of December 6.
Woods does not dispute that he was present at the scene of the offense. It is further undisputed that Woods drove the maroon Explorer to Shorters' house on the evening of December 6. As Woods drove his vehicle down the street on which Shorters lived, he abruptly turned the car around and parked to the side of the house when he spotted Davis in the yard. Woods and Davis thereafter engaged in a heated argument which escalated prior to the time at which the shots were fired from the passenger-side window of the vehicle that Woods was driving. Still driving the car, Woods sped away after the shots were fired and drove to a secluded area where Allen threw out of the window the backpack and a nine-millimeter gun. After the shots were fired, Woods never asked Allen to exit the vehicle.
The cumulative force of the evidence presented to the trial court, including Woods' presence at the scene, his fleeing the scene directly after the shooting in the maroon Explorer, his transport of Allen—who was carrying a nine millimeter gun and ammunition for that gun—to the scene, and his verbal altercation with Davis immediately preceding the firing of shots at Davis, presents circumstances from which the fact-finder could have concluded, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Woods was a party to the offense of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 7.02(a)(2); Williams, 473 S.W.3d at 325 (cumulative force of all incriminating circumstances sufficient to support conviction). (2) Consolidated Court Costs Were Properly Assessed in the Judgment.
Woods next contends that the trial court's judgment should be modified to remove those portions of the consolidated court costs allocated to abused children's counseling and comprehensive rehabilitation, based on the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals' holding that the assessment of these costs is unconstitutional. See Salinas v. State, No. PD-0170-16, 2017 WL 915525 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 8, 2017). The constitutional holding of Salinas, however, does not apply retroactively:
We do, however, recognize the need to reward parties who persuade a court to overturn an unconstitutional statute, and we conclude that applying the new constitutional rule to the parties in the present case is necessary, but not quite sufficient to satisfy that need. Other defendants have challenged one or both of the fees at issue in petitions for discretionary review before this Court and can be said to have exerted some influence in procuring our current holding. Therefore, we will also apply our constitutional holding in this case to any defendant who has raised the appropriate claim in a petition for discretionary review before the date of this opinion, if that petition is still pending on the date of this opinion and if the claim would otherwise be properly before us on discretionary review. Otherwise, our holding will apply prospectively to trials that end after the date the mandate in the present case issues.Id. at *6. Because the trial in this case concluded December 8, 2016, the constitutional holding of Salinas does not apply retroactively. We, therefore, may not modify the court costs as requested.
We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Josh R. Morriss, III
Chief Justice Date Submitted: August 18, 2017
Date Decided: August 30, 2017 Do Not Publish