Opinion
Record No. 0298-92-3
February 16, 1993
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF AMHERST COUNTY J. MICHAEL GAMBLE, JUDGE
Gregory W. Smith for appellant.
Marla Lynn Graff, Assistant Attorney General (Mary Sue Terry, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Present: Judges Baker, Benton, and Coleman
Argued at Salem, Virginia
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not designated for publication.
Alvin Willis Woodruff was convicted of assault and sentenced to five days in jail. The sole issue on appeal is whether the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. We affirm the conviction.
The evidence proved that Deputy Sheriff Alicia Call went to a cell block because of complaints by inmates concerning the lack of fresh air. Call became involved in a verbal dispute with Woodruff because he was not satisfied with the windows Call opened. Woodruff wanted her to open another set of windows and continued to protest verbally along with other inmates. Call believed Woodruff's conduct caused an "argumentative situation between [Call] and the inmates in the cell block," and Call requested assistance from Sergeant Higginbotham. After Higginbotham arrived, Call went to Woodruff's cell to escort Woodruff to a holding cell in the basement of the building.
When Call asked Woodruff to come out of the cell, Woodruff slowly gathered his personal belongings and began to mumble. Woodruff told Call, "if you want me out, you come get me." Because of Woodruff's remark and his slow response, Call went to the hallway and asked Higginbotham to assist her. Woodruff left the cell only after Higginbotham arrived. As he walked with Call and Higginbotham to the holding cell, Woodruff was upset, continued to mumble, and cursed.
When they arrived at the basement holding cell, Woodruff went into the cell. He moved behind the steel door, which weighed 250 pounds and opened into the cell. As Call backed away from the door and reached to close the door, the door came toward her with such great force that it slammed shut with a loud crack and bounced open again. The door barely missed hitting Call's face. Higginbotham said that when he turned to ask Call if she was all right, Woodruff "was ranting and raving, very verbal, very abusive." Woodruff testified that he pushed the door and that the door "flew back open," but he denied that he slammed the door with force. On this evidence, the trial judge convicted Woodruff of assault.
Common law assault "is any attempt or offer with force or violence to do a corporal hurt to another, whether frommalice or from wantonness, as by striking at [that person]."Jones v. Commonwealth, 184 Va. 679, 681, 36 S.E.2d 571, 572 (1946). Both malice and wantonness connote more than negligence. "Malice inheres in the intentional doing of a wrongful act without legal justification or excuse. It includes any action flowing from a wicked or corrupt motive, done with an evil mind or wrongful intention, where the act has been attended with such circumstances as to carry in it the plain indication of a heart deliberately bent on mischief." Williams v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 393, 398, 412 S.E.2d 202, 205 (1991). "[W]antonness imports premeditation or knowledge and consciousness that injury is likely to result from the act done." Boward v. Leftwich, 197 Va. 227, 231, 89 S.E.2d 32, 35 (1955). Malice and wantonness may be inferred from acts and conduct. Long v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 194, 198, 379 S.E.2d 473, 475-76 (1989); Boward, 197 Va. at 230-32, 89 S.E.2d at 34-35.
Woodruff argues that his conduct did not constitute assault when measured by the definition of assault found in Park Oil Co. v. Parham, 1 Va. App. 166, 336 S.E.2d 531 (1985). He relies upon this Court's statement that:
to commit an assault, one must either: (1) attempt to commit a battery; or (2) put another person in reasonable fear of receiving bodily hurt. One may commit an assault even though the victim is not aware of any acts directed at him, provided the specific intent to commit a battery is present (according to the first definition); it cannot be done by accident or even as a result of negligence.
Id. at 170, 336 S.E.2d at 534 (citation omitted). Although the phrasing in Park Oil that describes "assault" is not identical to the language in Jones, these cases do not provide conflicting or inconsistent standards for determining assault. The import of the definitions is the same. Park Oil, like the other assault cases, requires proof of criminal intent. Moreover, it is well established that intent may be shown by a person's conduct or statements. Long, 8 Va. App. at 198, 379 S.E.2d at 476.
The evidence was sufficient for the trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that when Woodruff slammed shut the heavy steel door he intended to put Call in reasonable fear of bodily harm. The evidence proved that Woodruff was angry and abusive when he acted. In addition, when Woodruff slammed the door, he knew or had reason to know that Call was in such proximity to the fast closing door that she was in danger of being hit. The evidence of Woodruff's conduct and demeanor excluded the hypothesis that Woodruff merely acted negligently or accidently.
For these reasons, we affirm the conviction.
Affirmed.