Opinion
Civil No. 02-1116 (JRT/FLN)
January 21, 2004
Daniel Eric Warner, WARNER LAW OFFICE, Inver Grove Heights, MN, for plaintiff
Todd E Taylor, FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION LEGAL DEPARTMENT, Memphis, TN and Barak Jonathan Babcock, SEATON BECK PETERS BOWEN FEUSS, Edina, MN, for defendant
MEMORANDUN OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff, a former courier for Federal Express Corporation ("FedEx"), has brought this lawsuit alleging sexual harassment and constructive discharge. She brings claims under the Minnesota Human Rights Act ("MHRA"), and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Defendant has moved for summary judgment, arguing that even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, she fails to allege conduct that rises to the level of actionable sexual harassment. Defendant also argues that once plaintiff put FedEx on notice of the objectionable conduct, such conduct did not occur again and therefore defendant is entitled to summary judgment on all plaintiff's claims. For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants defendant's motion.
With a few exceptions that are not applicable here, the same standards are applicable to federal Title VII claims and claims raised under the MHRA. See Klein v. McGowan, 198 F.3d 705, 708 (8th Cir. 1999) (addressing MHRA and Title VII claims simultaneously); Todd v. Ortho Biotech. Inc., 175 F.3d 595, 599 (8th Cir. 1999) (noting that Minnesota courts frequently look to Title VII cases when interpreting the MHRA). See also Mems v. City of St. Paul, Dept. of Fire and Safety Services, 327 F.3d 771, 785 n. 11 (8th Cir. 2003) (noting that it is proper to analyze Title VII and MHRA claims under Title VII precedent).
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing substantive law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Summary judgment is not appropriate if the dispute about a material fact is genuine, that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. Summary judgment is to be granted only where the evidence is such that no reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. Employment discrimination cases, such as the case before the Court, often "turn on inferences rather than direct evidence," and therefore, this Court heeds the Eighth Circuit's repeated warning that "the court must be particularly deferential to the party opposing summary judgment." Bell v. Conopco, Inc., 186 F.3d 1099, 1101 (8th Cir. 1999); accord Snow v. Ridgeview Med. Ctr., 128 F.3d 1201, 1205 (8th Cir. 1997); Webb v. Garelick Mfg. Co., 94 F.3d 484, 486 (8th Cir. 1996); Crawford v. Runyon, 37 F.3d 1338, 1341 (8th Cir. 1994).
The moving party bears the burden of bringing forward sufficient evidence to establish that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The nonmoving party is entitled to the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts in the record. Vette Co. v. Aetna Casualty Surety Co., 612 F.2d 1076, 1077 (8th Cir. 1980). However, the nonmoving party may not merely rest upon allegations or denials in its pleadings, but it must set forth specific facts by affidavits or otherwise showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Forrest v. Kraft Foods, Inc., 285 F.3d 688, 691 (8th Cir. 2002).
II. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff began working for FedEx as a part-time courier in June of 1999, at the Bloomington station ("FBL" station). One of her coworkers was Paul Cameron, who had been employed at FedEx for about 10 years and since 1992 had been a full-time "swing courier." Swing couriers know all the routes in a particular station, and primarily cover for other drivers who are unavailable for some reason. Plaintiff claims that Cameron began harassing her shortly after she started working at FedEx, and plaintiff alleges the harassment continued throughout her employment.
A. Alleged Harassing Conduct
Plaintiff complains about Cameron's nickname for her, "princess." Cameron referred to plaintiff by this nickname, and encouraged others, including four customers, to do the same. He regularly wrote "princess" on her paychecks. Plaintiff complained to management about this nickname, and a coworker confirms hearing these informal complaints. Plaintiff also alleges that Cameron sent her messages over the DADs unit (DADs units are akin to instant messaging) such as "I see you princess, [sic] I can see you" and "I know where you're at [sic]." Based on this harassing conduct, plaintiff thought Cameron was stalking her. Plaintiff had been close friends with a Mason City, Iowa, anchorwoman, Jodi Huisentruit, who disappeared — some assume that the individual who stalked her also kidnapped her. Huisentruit remains missing, and the case remains unsolved.
Plaintiff testified that he wrote "Princess" on her paycheck about six times over the course of her employment.
In February of 2000, plaintiff complained that Cameron left an offensive message on her DADS unit. She reported this incident to management. The manager reviewed the message, and determined it was not inappropriate. Plaintiff was offered an EEO packet, but declined to fill it out and turn it in.
Then, in November or December of 2000, plaintiff was on a "checkride" with her manager Ruth Michaels. Plaintiff complained to Michaels about Cameron, and told Michaels about her friend who had been abducted. Plaintiff indicated that she felt Cameron was following her. Plaintiff did not fill out an EEO packet at that time, and it does not appear that any corrective action was taken, or that plaintiff voiced her complaint to any other manager.
During a "checkride" a manager rides along with an employee on the employee's route. It appears that checkrides are scheduled approximately every six months, and that additional checkrides are scheduled if a triggering event, such as an accident, occurs.
In May of 2001, again on a checkride, plaintiff showed Michaels a label on which Cameron had written "princess." Michaels wrote "you know it" and "fur sure" on the label. Michaels admits to writing on the label, but states that she does not remember why she did it. Plaintiff claims that she complained to another manager, Beth Erickson about the princess label in December of 2001. Erickson told Cameron to stop putting label's inside plaintiff's drop-box, and Cameron said he would stop.
On December 6, 2001, Cameron left a box in plaintiff's drop box that was addressed to "Playboy" and "Hugh Heftier" and included `whackoff drive" and "cute little bunny" on the airbill. Plaintiff did not notice the "joke" until the box was already on the delivery truck. She tried to stop the truck, but could not. Plaintiff immediately reported it to her manager, Beth Erickson, and Erickson put a stop order on the box, and requested that the box be destroyed. The next day, Erickson counseled Cameron, and advised him his behavior was inappropriate and he was not to repeat it. Erickson believed the matter was resolved.
Plaintiff also complains about other actions that she attributed to Cameron, but that she did not report to management until she filed the EEO report, if at all. For example, in August 2000, someone gave plaintiff a penis-shaped sucker with an offensive birthday card. Plaintiff also alleges that Cameron insinuated she needed batteries for a vibrator, though he did not say so in so many words. Then in November 2001 Cameron put hot tamales in her drop box; written on the box was a message — plaintiff remembers the message as "Hope this satisfies your desires. Hot Sexy." Cameron admits he gave her the hot tamales, but says it was only because he knew she liked hot tamales, and claims there was no sexual message attached. Plaintiff further complains that Cameron told her jokes of a sexual nature, but she cannot remember any particular joke. Plaintiff also alleges that Cameron sent her inappropriate messages on the DADS unit, including one in November 1999, and one in November 2001. She also alleges that he sent her a message over the DADS unit saying he had a dirty joke to tell her, but that he could not send it over the DADS unit.
Neither of these two incidents were reported to management and were not contained in plaintiff's internal EEO complaint or in her formal complaint with the EEOC.
Plaintiff also complains about an incident that occurred when she was on medical leave. Defendant scheduled Cameron to drive a route that took him by plaintiff's house, and Cameron had to deliver a package to one of plaintiff's neighbors. Plaintiff saw Cameron, and believes that the delivery truck lingered outside her home. Management was aware of plaintiff's address and was aware that Cameron would drive near her home.
B. Plaintiff's Reaction
Plaintiff suffered an emotional breakdown in mid-December, 2001. She obtained a medical release from driving her route, and was on medical leave from December 18, 2001 until March 8, 2002. Plaintiff saw two doctors during this initial episode. The doctors essentially agreed that the main cause of her stress was work, particularly the harassing behavior she endured. In early January 2002, plaintiff went through an intensive partial hospitalization in the Adult Psychiatry Unit of Fairview University Hospital. The program involved daily psychotherapy and medication management, and lasted about two weeks. Her doctor in this program diagnosed her with major depressive disorder, severe, without psychotic features and agreed that her primary source of distress was the sexual harassment she reported. After her release from the intensive partial hospitalization, she continued to be treated by a licensed clinical social worker.
C. Plaintiff's Reports to Management and Resulting Investigation
Plaintiff filed a formal complaint on December 21, 2001. The company's investigation began in early January. The investigation concluded in February, when defendant sent plaintiff a letter noting that the investigation was complete. The letter did not indicate whether Cameron was disciplined in any way, transferred or terminated. The letter did, however, note that plaintiff was free to call the author if she had any questions. Cameron was suspended for two days without pay, and was issued a "warning letter" that was included in his personnel file. Cameron was also required to attend diversity training which was specifically focused on sexual harassment. The investigation was completed before plaintiff returned from medical leave.
Plaintiff protests that defendant did not take proper precautions when she returned from leave. While plaintiff was on leave, plaintiff's therapist communicated with one of the Human Capital Management Program Managers at FedEx. Plaintiff's therapist recommended that Cameron not be scheduled at the same times that plaintiff was and that plaintiff needed to be able to avoid Cameron. The district manager in charge of the sexual harassment investigation was also aware of the recommendations. Neither supervisor took the recommendation into account or informed the scheduling supervisor of the recommended restriction.
Plaintiff attempted to return to work, but had contact with Cameron after her return. She was transferred to another station, but then transferred back to the Bloomington station, purportedly because she was talking about her harassment complaints against Cameron. Defendant never attempted to transfer Cameron to a different station. Plaintiff finally quit when she encountered Cameron near a filing cabinet, and he allegedly refused to leave the area.
III. HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT
An employee is subject to hosfile work environment sexual harassment when "the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment." Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (internal quotations and citation omitted). To establish a prima facie case of hosfile work environment sexual harassment by non-supervisory co-workers, a plaintiff "must establish all of the following: 1) membership in a protected group, 2) the occurrence of unwelcome harassment, 3) a causal nexus between the harassment and her membership in the protected group, 4) the harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment, and 5) the employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt remedial action." Jacob-Mua [v. Veneman], 289 F.3d [517,] 522 [8th Cir. 2002].Meriwether v. Caraustar Packaging Co., 326 F.3d 990, 993 (8th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added to reflect the elements at issue in this case). See also Kopp v. Samaritan Health Sys. Inc., 13 F.3d 264, 269 (8th Cir. 1993); Cummings v. Koehnen, 568 N.W.2d 418, 421 (Minn. 1997) (remedial action must be timely).
Plaintiff belongs to a protected class, and defendant concedes, for the purposes of this motion only, that plaintiff endured unwelcome sexual harassment that was based on gender. Defendant disputes that the harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment. Defendant also argues that plaintiff cannot show that FedEx knew or should have known about the harassment but failed to take timely proper remedial action.
A. Term, Condition or Privilege of Employment
The Court must decide whether the behavior about which plaintiff complains affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment. Harassment affects a term, condition, or privilege of employment if it is "sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment." Harris, 510 U.S. at 21 (internal quotation omitted). In determining whether conduct is sufficiently severe or pervasive, courts look to the totality of the circumstances. Duncan v. General Motors Corp., 300 F.3d 928, 934 (8th Cir.), cert. denied 123 S.Ct. 1789 (2003). The inquiry often includes factors such as "the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance." Id. at 23.
"To support a cause of action, `conduct must be extreme and not merely rude or unpleasant to affect the terms and conditions of employment.'" Meriwether v. Caraustar Packaging Co., 326 F.3d 990, 993 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting Alagna v. Smithville R-II Sch. Dist., 324 F.3d 975 at 980 (8th Cir. 2003)). The Supreme Court instructs that "`[s]imple' teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the `terms and conditions of employment.'" Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998) (citations omitted). Similarly, the Eighth Circuit has held that for sexual harassment to be sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hosfile working environment "more than a few isolated incidents are required." Kimzey v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 107 F.3d 568, 573 (8th Cir. 1997) (citing Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)).
There is both an objective and a subjective prong to establishing a hosfile work environment. The plaintiff must present evidence that he or she subjectively perceived the harassment as sufficiently severe and pervasive to alter the terms or conditions of employment, and this subjective perception must be objectively reasonable. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81-82 (1998); see also Bishop v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 66 F. Supp.2d 650, 664 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (noting that Title VII was not designed to protect the overly sensitive plaintiff).
In this case, there is no question that the subjective prong is met — plaintiff suffered an emotional breakdown and was treated extensively for work-related stress. However, it is a closer question as to whether the objective prong is met.
In plaintiffs favor, courts have noted that the separate incidents of harassment may accumulate "and that the work environment created thereby may exceed the sum of the individual episodes." Rogers v. Western-Southern Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 668, 675 (7th Cir. 1993). In addition, whether an environment is hosfile is usually a question for the jury. See Moring v. Arkansas Dep't of Corrections, 243 F.3d 452, 456 (8th Cir. 2001) (noting that "there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Mr. Smith's conduct was sexual harassment. Mr. Smith engaged in improper conduct. There was evidence that [plaintiff] was offended by his conduct. Whether that conduct rose to the level of sexual harassment is usually a factual determination for the jury.").
However, there is a high standard in this Circuit for what constitutes harassment sufficient to create a hosfile work environment. See, e.g., Tuggle v. Mangan, 348 F.3d 714, 721-22 (8th Cir. Nov. 6, 2003) (determining that the conduct at issue did not clear the "high threshold" to qualify as a hosfile work environment, reasoning that it is appropriate to compare the alleged conduct to the harassing conduct discussed in other cases; also listing cases in which the Court has found, as a matter of law, that particular conduct did not amount to hosfile work environment); Duncan v. GMC, 300 F.3d 928, 933 (8th Cir. 2002) (reversing a jury award to the employee and directed a verdict for the employer where alleged conduct included supervisor sexually propositioning plaintiff, supervisor keeping a planter in his office that looked like a penis, and on one occasion asking plaintiff to draw the planter; asking plaintiff to type the minutes of a fictitious "man haters' Club"). But see Eich v. Board of Regents for Central Missouri State University, 350 F.3d 752, 760 (8th Cir. 2003) (reversing district court's grant of judgment as a matter of law for defendant in hosfile environment case, and noting that "[e]ach case must stand on its own circumstances" and distinguishing the facts before it with those before the panel in Duncan).
Considering the cumulative incidents of harassing conduct, and comparing those allegations to other cases in which the courts have found no actionable harassment, the Court cannot find that plaintiff has set forth adequate facts to establish a hosfile work environment. Although the Court is troubled by the allegations of stalking, the complained of conduct is not more severe or pervasive than conduct that the Eighth Circuit has held is not actionable. For example, Alagna v. Smithville R-II School District, the court determined that a male teacher's inappropriate conduct toward female faculty member over two school years, which included, among other things, physical contact, exhibiting a demeanor of a sexual nature, and calling her many times at home was not sufficiently severe or pervasive. 324 F.3d 975 at 980. Similarly, in Meriweather v. Caraustar Packaging Co., 326 F.3d 990 (8th Cir. 2003), the plaintiff's allegations did not satisfy the "high threshold" for actionable sexual harassment where the plaintiff complained that a co-worker walked up behind her in the company parking lot and grabbed her buttock, which she described it as a grab with force, not merely a pinch. Id. at 992. The next day, that same co-worker and another co-worker stopped the plaintiff and joked about the incident, and in doing so the two blocked plaintiff's passage and prevented her from leaving the area. Id.
Allegations of stalking have been found to create hosfile work environments, but such cases involve far more alarming facts than plaintiff alleges here. See, e.g., Homesley v. Freightliner Corp., 2003 WL 1908744 (4th Cir. April 22, 2003) (upholding jury verdict for plaintiff where sexual harassment included persistent staring and "stalking" by plaintiff's supervisor, the supervisor also rubbed plaintiff's breast on two occasions, and frequently made lewd and suggestive comments to female employees); Crowley v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 303 F.3d 387, 397-98 (1st Cir. 2002) (upholding verdict for plaintiff where co-worker's stalking included frequent unwelcome physical contact, giving plaintiff unwelcome gifts, following her home, lurking in the dark outside the women's bathroom while he waited for her to emerge, parking next to her in the parking lot and following her to her car when she was leaving work, frequently blocking her in the aisles at work and forcing her to squeeze by him, and peeping into plaintiff's window at home and on one occasion breaking into plaintiff's home while she was there); Frazier v. Delco. Electronics Corp., 263 F.3d 663 (7th Cir. 2001) (reversing summary judgment for employer where plaintiff complained that co-worker was stalking her; the co-worker frequently drove past plaintiff's home and sometimes parked in front of it and watched her; the co-worker approached plaintiff at work and told her he had seen her husband barbecuing in his backyard; when plaintiff told him to stay away from her, he became verbally abusive and threatened to kill her; the co-worker's behavior continued at an extreme level even after he was reprimanded, and the employer transferred both employees to the same plant where the parties would necessarily come into contact, despite fact that plaintiff had a no contact order prohibiting the harasser from having contact with her); Westvaco Corp. v. United Paperworkers Int'l, 171 F.3d 971, 972-73 (4th Cir. 1999) (conduct included going into plaintiff's office and staring and calling her at home; leaving messages with heavy breathing, panting, and "love you, baby"; addressing her as "foxy mama" and "foxy lady" for a year; asking for a kiss and, when she refused, saying "I am serious, I want some tongue"); Stoll v. Runyon, 165 F.3d 1238, 1239 (9th Cir. 1999) ("stalking" is alleged but the court also described the "gruesome facts" as "[n]umerous male coworkers and supervisors asked [plaintiff] to perform oral sex on them, commented on her body, shot rubber bands at her backside, asked her to wear lacy black underwear for them, bumped and rubbed against her from behind, pressed their erect penises into her tack while she was sorting mail and unable to get away, followed her into the women's bathroom, asked her to go on vacations, `stalked her throughout the postal facility,' and fondled her body"); Kimzey v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 107 F.3d 568, 570-74 (8th Cir. 1997) (involving one harasser "following her around the store" but also involving testimony that harassers treated women employees differently than men, one harasser made overt sexual remarks to plaintiff and commented on her body; smacked his lips with kissing noises at her; kicked her legs when he walked by; swore at her, commented on her "tight-ass jeans;" the other harasser called her "idiot" daily, and yelled at her for extended periods, telling her he wanted her to work on the ladder so he could see her "cute ass").
The Court finds that plaintiff has presented a somewhat close question. However, the allegation that Cameron sent two instant messages that might be construed as "stalking" simply does not rise to the level that this Circuit demands for actionable sexual harassment, even if those messages are considered in conjunction with the other alleged conduct. Cameron's insistence on calling plaintiff "princess" and his instruction to others to do the same certainly amounts to annoying and inappropriate conduct. However plaintiff did not perceive the nickname to be sexual in nature, and the use of such a nickname is more akin to "simple teasing" than the extreme behavior required to create an actionable hosfile work environment. Plaintiff alleges that Cameron told dirty jokes, but does not indicate how often such jokes were told, or that she complained about them or told Cameron to stop telling them. In sum, while plaintiff has satisfied the subjective prong of this element, the behavior complained of does not satisfy the objective prong, and therefore defendant is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's hosfile environment sexual harassment claim.
In addition, Cameron had nicknames for many employees, male and female.
Plaintiffs testimony on whether she perceived the nickname to be sexual in nature is not consistent. She told a psychologist that the nickname was offensive and demeaning, but not sexual. In contrast, in her deposition, she indicated she did believe the nickname to be sexual.
B. Remedial Action
Even if plaintiff had established an objectively hosfile environment, she must also point to evidence that defendant failed to take prompt remedial action reasonably calculated to end the harassment. Defendant may be held liable for Cameron's conduct only if defendant "knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt remedial action." Meriweather, 326 F.3d at 994 (internal quotations omitted). The Court considers "several factors in assessing the reasonableness of an employer's remedial measures: the temporal proximity between the notice and remedial action, the disciplinary or preventive measures taken, and whether the measures ended the harassment." Id. (citing Stuart v. Gen. Motors Corp., 217 F.3d 621, 633 (8th Cir. 2000))
The record reflects that defendant timely investigated each complaint and took appropriate remedial action. With regards to the airbill incident, manager Erickson counseled Cameron the day after he sent the fictitious airbill. Similarly, Cameron was again counseled by more senior management when the senior manager was informed of the conduct. After plaintiff filed a formal complaint, which contained numerous allegations in addition to the airbill incident, defendant began an investigation. The investigation was begun within a week, and Cameron was placed on investigative leave. Upon completion of the investigation, Cameron was suspended without pay, had a warning letter placed in his file, and was given individualized training focused on sexual harassment. Cameron was also told to stay away from plaintiff. In addition, when plaintiff returned to work after her medical leave and after the investigation against Cameron had concluded, she was scheduled to work in the office, where she would have little to no contact with drivers, including Cameron. Plaintiff has presented evidence that she did come into contact with Cameron after Cameron was disciplined and ordered not to have contact with plaintiff. In one of these instances, however, plaintiff entered the break room, and Cameron was already there. Plaintiff has presented no evidence that Cameron intentionally followed her, spoke to her, or even "stared" at her. Plaintiff alleges that Cameron would not move away from a filing cabinet that plaintiff needed to access, however, it appears that plaintiff approached the filing cabinet when Cameron was already there. Despite defendant's reasonable efforts to separate the employees, some infrequent and incidental contact occurred. In some cases, employers might be obligated to remove harassing employees from the workplace entirely to avoid liability under Title VII; this is not such a case. See Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 106-07 (4th Cir. 1989) vacated in part, 900 F.2d 27 (reversing grant of summary judgment to employer where harassment included unwanted sexual touchings and innuendo and an assault and battery; and noting that employer had obligation to prevent plaintiff and harasser from coming into contact).
An employer is not necessarily obligated to terminate an employee who engages in sexual harassment. See Bailey v. Runyon, 167 F.3d 466, 468 (8th Cir. 1999). Rather, what an employer must do is take prompt remedial action reasonably calculated to end the harassment. Id. at 468-69. Defendant's actions were prompt, in fact, the investigation was concluded before plaintiff returned from medical leave. Defendant's actions in reprimanding Cameron, placing a letter in his file, ordering him to avoid contact with plaintiff, and requiring him to attend additional diversity training, were sufficiently remedial, and the Court finds that no reasonable jury could conclude otherwise. Therefore, defendant is entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's claims of hosfile work environment sexual harassment.
IV. CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGE
"Constructive discharge occurs when an employer deliberately renders the employee's working conditions intolerable and thus forces [her] to quit [her] job." C.L.D. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 79 F. Supp.2d 1080, 1088 (D. Minn. 1999) (quoting Klein v. McGowan, 198 F.3d 705, 708 (8th Cir. 1999). "An employee is constructively discharged if an employer renders the employee's working conditions so intolerable that the employee is forced to quit." Duncan, at 935 (citing Henderson v. Simmons Foods, Inc., 217 F.3d 612, 617 (8th Cir. 2000)). "[A]n employee has an obligation not to assume the worst and not to jump to conclusions too quickly. An employee who quits without giving [her] employer a reasonable chance to work out a problem has not been constructively discharged." Id. (citing Summit v. S-B Power Tool, 121 F.3d 416, 421 (8th Cir. 1997)).
To succeed on its motion for summary judgment, defendant must demonstrate, as a matter of law, that its actions would not have forced a person in plaintiff's position to quit. See Duncan at 935. Plaintiff must ultimately show that the conditions "were so intolerable as to cause a reasonable person to resign." Id. at 935-36 (citing Jones v. Fitzgerald, 285 F.3d 705, 716 (8th Cir. 2002) ("Constructive discharge requires considerably more proof than an unpleasant and unprofessional environment.").
While it is clear that plaintiff could not continue in her job at FedEx; it is not so clear that this was a reasonable reaction to the work environment. Plaintiff has not established that her work environment was sufficiently hosfile to support a violation of Title VII; therefore, she has not made the requisite showing that she was constructively discharged. See Reedy v. Quebecor Printing Eagle, Inc., 333 F.3d 906, 910 (8th Cir. 2003) ("An employee must show that his employer intended to force him to quit or, at a minimum, that the employee's resignation was reasonably foreseeable as a consequence of his working conditions, and we have previously noted that a `plaintiff must show more than just a Title VII violation by [her] employer in order to prove that [she] has been constructively discharged.'") (quoting Coffman v. Tracker Marine, L.P., 141 F.3d 1241, 1247 (8th Cir. 1998)). Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on this claim.
ORDER
Based upon the foregoing, the submissions of the parties, the arguments of counsel and the entire file and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant' motion for summary judgment [Docket No. 38] is GRANTED. Plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice.
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.