Opinion
43672.
SUBMITTED MAY 7, 1968.
DECIDED JUNE 6, 1968.
Foreclosure. Bibb Superior Court. Before Judge Culpepper.
John P. Nixon, for appellant.
Buford E. Hancock, Jr., for appellee.
A party who furnished labor and installed furnaces in mobile homes (trailers) which were subject to recorded mortgages titled in Georgia, but did not perfect a lien or security interest by the method prescribed by the Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title Act cannot successfully assert a claim to the furnaces in an action to foreclose the mortgages.
SUBMITTED MAY 7, 1968 — DECIDED JUNE 6, 1968.
The plaintiff bank filed an action to foreclose its mortgages on 13 mobile homes (trailers) and at a foreclosure sale held pursuant to an order of the court became the purchaser of the property. Mr. Wooden (hereinafter called claimant) filed a claim in these proceedings alleging that certain furnaces installed in the mobile homes were his property. The claimant appeals from a summary judgment in favor of the bank as to the claim.
The following facts appeared from evidence submitted on the bank's motion for summary judgment: The writing upon which the claimant relied was dated October 28, 1966, and reads: "Conditional sales contract by and between James S. Vaughan [the mortgagor of the trailers] and Howard's Mobile Homes Service [the claimant] is that the furnaces that Howard's installs will be paid for in 3 payments, I/3 on completion, I/3 in 60 days, and I/3 in 90 days," followed by a list of 11 amounts for "total labor and parts to swap oil furnace for gas," each apparently identified with a trailer number, showing a total of $2,367.47. It was signed by Vaughan, and "Reaffirmed this 7th day of Feb. 1968" with another signature of Vaughan and a witness. Stamped on this paper is "Filed in Office 8 day of Feb 1968 (signature) Deputy Clerk." All of the bank's mortgages were titled by the State of Georgia and recorded not later than October 25, 1966. The claimant completed the installation of the heaters in December 1966.
This case involves the interrelated application of two important recent statutes, the Uniform Commercial Code (Ga. L. 1962, p. 156; Code Ann. Title 109A) and the Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title Act (Ga. L. 1961, p. 68; Code Ann. Ch. 68-4A). The Commercial Code is designed to apply to all commercial transactions in personal property within the State (see Code Ann. §§ 109A-1-102, 109A-9-102, 109A-9-102), but recognizes and contemplates that some transactions are to be governed by the laws dealing with special classes of property, e.g., see Code Ann. § 109A-9-302 (3, 4). The plaintiff contends that for several reasons title to the furnaces did not pass from him. The evidence shows that the claimant installed furnaces in the mobile homes; he delivered and surrendered possession of them. Therefore any reservation of title in the claimant was limited to a security interest by the Uniform Commercial Code. Code Ann. § 109A-2-401. We do not decide whether or not the writing set out above was a "security agreement which contains a description of the collateral," as required by the Uniform Commercial Code ( Code Ann. § 109A-9-203) to create an enforceable security interest, nor whether it met the requisites of a financing statement prescribed by Code Ann. § 109A-9-402.
Assuming that the writing did create a security interest in the claimant, so far as the writing itself shows, the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code relating to accessions ( Code Ann. § 109A-9-314) would be applicable, as well as the provision requiring the perfecting of security interests by the filing of a financing statement ( Code Ann. § 109A-9-302), which does not except security interests in accessions from its application. However, it appears from the evidence that the transaction between the claimant and Vaughan was affected by provisions of the Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title Act. In that Act "`Vehicle' means a device in, upon, or by which a person or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a highway." Code Ann. § 68-402a (n). Under that Act the claimant acquired a special lien when he installed the furnaces in the trailers, which lien he could have perfected by the method prescribed in that Act ( Code Ann. §§ 68-422a, 68-423a). Moreover, that Act provides that the method provided therein for perfecting security interests and liens with respect to motor vehicles is exclusive, and that such interests are exempt from other laws relating to recording and filing. Code Ann. § 68-427a. There is no evidence that the claimant complied with the aforesaid provisions of the Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title Act.
For the reasons stated above the trial court did not err in granting the bank's motion for summary judgment.
Judgment affirmed. Bell, P. J., and Quillian, J., concur.