Summary
In Woodard v. United States, 2005 WL 524725 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2005), the Court adopted Judge Trager's comprehensive and well-reasoned opinion.
Summary of this case from Rodriguez v. U.S.Opinion
No. 04-CV-3570 (FB).
March 7, 2005
JAMES W. WOODARD, Pro Se United States Penitentiary, Jonesville, VA, for the Petitioner.
ROSLYNN R. MAUSKOPF, United States Attorney, Eastern District of New York, JACK SMITH, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Brooklyn, NY, for the Respondent.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, pro se petitioner James Woodard ("Woodard") seeks to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence. In his petition, Woodard contends that his sentence was enhanced in violation of the Sixth Amendment. For the reasons set forth below, his petition is denied.
BACKGROUND
In February 2001, Woodard was convicted by a jury in this Court of robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery; he was sentenced in May 2002 to concurrent terms of 137 months in prison. In calculating his sentence, the Court assessed several enhancements under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines"). Woodard appealed to the Second Circuit, arguing that the Court erred by allowing a co-conspirator to identify him at trial and that the sentencing enhancements were not supported by the evidence; the circuit court affirmed in a summary order. See United States v. Woodard, 2003 WL 21069875 (2d Cir. May 12, 2003).
In his petition, Woodard contends that the sentencing enhancements were unconstitutional in light of the Supreme Court's holding in Blakely v. Washington, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (2004), that the Sixth Amendment prohibits sentences greater than "the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant." Id. at ___, 124 S.Ct. at 2537 (emphasis omitted). He further requests that the Court consider the constitutionality of his sentence in light of any new rules articulated in the then-pending decision in United States v. Booker, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005), which held that the enhancements established by the Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment as construed in Blakely.
DISCUSSION
In a comprehensive and well-reasoned decision issued on February 22, 2005, Judge Trager concluded that the new rules of law in Blakely and Booker did not apply retroactively to collateral challenges to judgments that were final at the time those rules were announced. See Hamdani v. United States, 2005 WL 419727 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2005). Judge Trager explained, in relevant part:
In Green v. United States, 397 F.3d 101, 2005 WL 237204 (2d Cir. Feb. 2, 2005), the Second Circuit held that neither Booker nor Blakely applies retroactively to a second or successive habeas appeal. See also Carmona v. United States, 390 F.3d 200 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that the rule articulated in Blakely does not apply retroactively to second/successive habeas petition); Forbes v. United States, 202 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2001) (same with respect to Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 . . . (2000)). Green involved a second/successive habeas action, the first of which had already been dismissed by the district court before the new rule of law was announced. The case at bar, however, involves a habeas petition not yet decided at the time of the announcement of the new rule of law. Thus, there is potentially some factual difference between this case and prior cases treating the question of Booker's retroactivity.
However, as the Seventh Circuit has made clear, see McReynolds v. United States, 397 F.3d 479, 2005 WL 237642 (7th Cir. 2005), prior Supreme Court case law establishes that Booker does not apply retroactively to first or second cases on collateral review. In Schriro v. Summerlin, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 2519 . . . (2004), the Supreme Court considered whether its prior ruling in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 . . . (2002), which held that any aggravating factors leading to the imposition of the death penalty had to be submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt, applied retroactively to the case of an individual prosecuted under an Arizona statute wherein the judge, not a jury, determined the aggravating factors warranting imposition of the death penalty. Ring extended the Court's prior holding in Apprendi that "any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt," see Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, to the Arizona statute at issue in that case.
The Schriro court held that only those "new rules" deemed substantive, as opposed to those that are merely procedural, apply retroactively to convictions that are already final. ___ U.S. at ___, 124 S.Ct. at 2522. Deeming Ring to be "properly classified as procedural," id. at 2523, the Court held that the rule did "not apply retroactively to cases already final on direct review." Id. at 2526. The Supreme Court's refusal to apply Ring retroactively to cases already decided, even when the underlying conviction would lead to death, resolves, a fortiori, any doubt about the extent of the Second Circuit's decision in Green. After Green, and in light of Schriro, it makes no difference whether petitioner's collateral challenge was his first or second appeal. . . . See McReynolds, 397 F. 3d 479, 2005 WL 237642 at *2 (" Booker does not apply retroactively to criminal cases that became final before its release date on January 12, 2005").Id. at *1-*2 (internal footnote omitted). The Court agrees with Judge Trager's reasoning and, accordingly, denies Woodard's petition because it is a collateral challenge to a judgment that was final at the time the rules of Blakely and Booker were announced.
CONCLUSION
The petition is denied. A certificate of appealability will not issue because Woodard has failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a federal right. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253.