Opinion
No. 579, 2009.
Submitted: September 3, 2010.
Decided: November 22, 2010.
Court Below — Superior Court of the State of Delaware, in and for New Castle County, Cr. ID 0512020169.
Before STEELE, Chief Justice, JACOBS, and RIDGELY, Justices.
ORDER
This 22nd day of November 2010, upon consideration of the parties' briefs, the record on appeal, as well as the appellant's motion to remand, it appears to the Court that:
(1) The appellant, Bruce Wood, filed this appeal from the Superior Court's denial of his first motion for postconviction relief. Wood enumerates two issues in his opening brief on appeal. We find no merit to his arguments. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment below.
(2) The record reflects that, in February 2007, a Superior Court jury convicted Wood of sixteen counts of first degree rape and two counts of continuous sexual abuse of a child. The charges stemmed from multiple incidents involving two minor victims, both of whom testified against Wood at trial. The Superior Court sentenced Wood to a total period of 290 years at Level V incarceration. This Court affirmed his convictions and sentence on direct appeal. In April 2009, Wood filed his first motion for postconviction relief, which was referred to a Superior Court Commissioner for consideration. The Commissioner obtained Wood's trial counsel's affidavit and the State's response thereto. The Commissioner recommended denial of Wood's motion. The Superior Court adopted the Commissioner's report and recommendation. This appeal followed.
Wood v. State, 956 A.2d 1228 (Del. 2008).
(3) In his opening brief on appeal, Wood contends that: (i) the Superior Court erred in failing to appoint counsel and in failing to hold a hearing on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims; and (ii) the Superior Court erred in rejecting his prosecutorial misconduct claim. To the extent Wood raised additional issues in the postconviction motion he filed in the Superior Court, those claims are deemed to be waived due to Wood's failure to brief them on appeal.
Murphy v. State, 632 A.2d 1150, 1152 (Del. 1993).
(4) In reviewing the Superior Court's denial of postconviction relief, this Court first must consider the procedural requirements of Rule 61 before addressing any substantive issues. Rule 61(i)(3) bars litigation of any claim that was not asserted in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction unless the defendant can establish cause for the procedural default and prejudice. In this case, Wood could have raised his prosecutorial misconduct claim on direct appeal but failed to do so. To the extent that Wood asserts that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing raise this claim on appeal as cause for his procedural default, we still must reject his claim because Wood does not allege with any specificity what statements were allegedly improper or how those statements allegedly affected the outcome of his trial. Accordingly, we fail to find prejudice sufficient to overcome the procedural hurdle of Rule 61(i)(3).
Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990).
See id. at 556.
(5) To prevail on his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, Wood was required to establish that (i) his trial counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (ii) but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the outcome of his trial would have been different. Wood was required to set forth and substantiate concrete allegations of actual prejudice in order to overcome the "strong presumption" that counsel's representation was professionally reasonable.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 692 (1984).
Younger v. State, 580 A.2d at 556.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 689.
(6) In this case, Wood contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate Wood's use of psychotropic medications before and during trial and for failing to conduct an adequate investigation and call additional witnesses on Wood's behalf. Wood also argues that the Superior Court abused its discretion in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on these claims.
(7) We disagree. First, Wood did not raise his complaint that his attorney failed to investigate his use of psychotropic medications to the Superior Court in his motion for postconviction relief. Accordingly, we will not review this claim for the first time on appeal in the absence of plain error. An error is "plain" when it is "apparent on the face of the record" and "so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial process." In this case, Wood suggests that his use of medication made him incompetent to stand trial because he could not participate in his own defense. There is simply no support in the record for this contention. A review of the trial transcript, in fact, reflects that Wood understood the proceedings against him and was able to actively participate in his own defense by consulting with his counsel and testifying on his own behalf. Accordingly, we reject this claim.
Del. Supr. Ct. R. 8 (2010).
Wainwright v. State, 504 A.2d 1096, 1100 (Del. 1986).
See Harris v. State, 410 A.2d 500, 502 (Del. 1979) (noting that the standard for legal competency to stand trial is whether the defendant has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him).
(8) Moreover, we reject Wood's claim that his counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate his case by subpoenaing documents and for failing to call additional defense witnesses. Contrary to Wood's assertion, defense counsel did subpoena school records and counseling records for both of the victims. To the extent Wood argues that additional witnesses should have been called in his defense, he fails to explain what these witnesses would have told the jury and how it could have impacted the outcome of his trial. Wood's failure to make concrete allegations of cause and prejudice is fatal to his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Under these circumstances, we find no abuse of the Superior Court's discretion in denying Wood's postconviction motion without a hearing.
Younger v. State, 580 A.2d at 556.
Maxion v. State, 686 A.2d 148, 151 (Del. 1996).
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED. The motion to remand is DENIED.