Opinion
No. 1 CA-IC-12-0074
02-13-2014
LAURA M. WOOD, Petitioner, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF ARIZONA, Respondent, FRY'S FOOD STORES OF ARIZONA, Respondent Employer SEDGWICK CLAIMS, INC., Respondent Carrier
Laura M. Wood, Phoenix Petitioner In Propria Persona Andrew Wade, Chief Counsel, Phoenix The Industrial Commission of Arizona Counsel for Respondent Jardine, Baker, Hickman & Houston, Phoenix By Scott H. Houston Counsel for Respondent Employer
NOTICE: NOT FOR PUBLICATION.
UNDER ARIZ. R. SUP. CT. 111(c), THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT
AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED.
Special Action - Industrial Commission
ICA Claim No. 20112-160198 Carrier Claim No. 301107419100001
Layna Taylor, Administrative Law Judge
AWARD AFFIRMED
COUNSEL
Laura M. Wood, Phoenix
Petitioner In Propria Persona
Andrew Wade, Chief Counsel, Phoenix
The Industrial Commission of Arizona
Counsel for Respondent
Jardine, Baker, Hickman & Houston, Phoenix
By Scott H. Houston
Counsel for Respondent Employer
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Thompson delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Winthrop and Judge Downie joined. THOMPSON, Judge:
¶1 This is a special action review of an Industrial Commission of Arizona (ICA) award and decision upon review finding Laura M. Wood's (claimant) claim for benefits noncompensable. The claimant essentially asserts the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) erred in accepting Dr. Brooks's opinion that her claim did not arise from a work related injury. Because we find that Dr. Brooks's opinion was legally sufficient to support the ALJ's award, we affirm.
¶2 This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) §§ 12-120.21(A)(2) (2003), 23-951(A) (2012), and Arizona Rule of Procedure for Special Actions 10. In reviewing findings and awards of the ICA, we defer to the ALJ's factual findings, but review questions of law de novo. Young v. Indus. Comm'n, 204 Ariz. 267, 270, ¶ 14, 63 P.3d 298, 301 (App. 2003). We consider the evidence in a light most favorable to upholding the ALJ's award. Lovitch v. Indus. Comm'n, 202 Ariz. 102, 105, ¶ 16, 41 P.3d 640, 643 (App. 2002).
¶3 Claimant was working for Fry's Food Stores of Arizona at the customer service desk on July 30, 2011, when she heard noise and discovered smoke coming from a small electrical fire in a nearby power strip. Although the fire department arrived, the store was never closed and the fire was contained to the power strip. Within an hour of the fire, claimant reports she was feeling confused, suffering from a headache, blurred vision, pain in her ears, a swollen throat and a clogged nose. Claimant finished her shift five hours later and left without advising the manager on duty of her symptoms.
¶4 Later that day claimant drove back into work to report her symptoms and to get a referral to urgent care. The physician who examined her at the urgent care found no injury and released her to return to work. Over the next several months, claimant saw several physicians and had diagnostic studies, including a CT scan, a brain MRI and a nasopharyngoscope. The medical records demonstrate that each provider and each diagnostic study failed to find a demonstrable physical cause for claimant's complaints.
Employer stipulated to liability for the initial urgent care visit, but disputed liability for any later treatment as unrelated to a compensable claim.
¶5 The claimant filed a workers' compensation claim, was denied for benefits, and she timely requested an ICA hearing. The ALJ heard testimony from the claimant, two former coworkers and Dr. Brooks who had performed an independent medical examination on claimant. In preparation for the hearing, Dr. Brooks reviewed the store's video recording of the fire and claimant's medical records. At the compensability hearing, Dr. Brooks testified that it was his opinion that claimant's complaints were unrelated to the smoke exposure on July 30, 2011. He stated that her complaints either were from an "unknown preexisting medical condition that was in no way related to her workplace exposure or there's a functional [psychological] component to it." Claimant did not proffer a medical expert to support her claim, but asserts that she continues to have ongoing medical issues from being exposed to the fire.
¶6 The ALJ entered an award for a noncompensable claim, and claimant requested administrative review. The ALJ affirmed the Award on administrative review, and claimant brought this appeal.
¶7 Compensability requires an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment. See A.R.S. § 23-1021(A) (2012). This involves both legal and medical causation. DeSchaaf v. Indus. Comm'n, 141 Ariz. 318, 320, 686 P.2d 1288, 1290 (App. 1984). It is the claimant's burden to prove all elements of a compensable claim. Toto v. Indus. Comm'n, 144 Ariz. 508, 512, 698 P.2d 753, 757 (App. 1985). Unless the industrial injury immediately causes injuries that are obvious to a layman, expert medical evidence is required to establish a causal relationship between the industrial injury and its alleged consequences. W. Bonded Prod. v. Indus. Comm'n, 132 Ariz. 526, 527-28, 647 P.2d 657, 658-59 (App. 1982) ("The two most often cited examples of injures which are clearly apparent to laymen both in their existence and causal relationship to the industrial accident are the loss of a limb or an external lesion").
¶8 The ALJ is the sole judge of witness credibility. Holding v. Indus. Comm'n, 139 Ariz. 548, 551, 679 P.2d 571, 574 (App. 1984). It is the ALJ's duty to resolve all conflicts in the evidence and to draw all warranted inferences. Malinski v. Indus. Comm'n, 103 Ariz. 213, 217, 439 P.2d 485, 489 (1968). Where more than one inference may be drawn, the ALJ is at liberty to choose either and this court will not disturb his conclusion unless it is wholly unreasonable. Id. In reaching an award, the ALJ considers all relevant evidence, both testamentary and documentary. Perry v. Indus. Comm'n, 112 Ariz. 397, 398, 542 P.2d 1096, 1097 (1975). An ALJ is not bound to accept or reject an expert's entire opinion, but instead, he is free to combine portions of the expert testimony in a reasonable manner. Fry's Food Store v. Indus. Comm'n, 161 Ariz. 119, 122-23, 776 P.2d 797, 800-01 (1989).
¶9 Claimant appears to argue that the ALJ erred by relying on Dr. Brooks's opinion because it contradicts her subjective complaints which she asserts are due to the fire exposure. She does not, however, assert that this is a matter where the causation of her injury would be obvious even to a layman. Indeed, she notes that in search of an answer to her problems she has seen a neurologist and that she is receiving treatment for exposure to toxins.
¶10 Medical opinions must be based on findings of medical fact. See Royal Globe Ins. Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 20 Ariz. App. 432, 434, 513 P.2d 970, 972 (1973). These findings come from the claimant's history, medical records, diagnostic tests, and examinations. Id. When medical evidence is uncontroverted and based on matters peculiarly within the realm of medical knowledge, the findings are binding on the ALJ. Cammeron v. Indus. Comm'n, 98 Ariz. 366, 371, 405 P.2d 802, 805 (1965). Here, the only expert medical opinion offered was by Dr. Brooks and the court found Dr. Brooks credible. As no medical testimony causally links claimant's physical injury to her exposure to the fire, claimant has failed to meet her burden of proof. See W. Bonded Prod., 132 Ariz. at 527-28, 647 P.2d at 658-59.
¶11 For the foregoing reasons, the award is affirmed.