Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
City & County of San Francisco Super. Ct. No. 444489
Judge of the Superior Court of San Francisco City and County, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
In an action for ejectment from real property, the defendant (Jamerson) filed a cross-complaint to quiet title to the property in his favor. The trial court granted summary adjudication to the Plaintiffs and cross-defendants on the cross-complaint, and summary judgment on Plaintiffs Wong and Yee’s first cause of action for ejectment. Following a stipulated judgment, the Defendant appeals. We affirm the summary adjudication ruling and judgment on the ground of res judicata.
This appeal is from a ruling by a civil trial department involving an ejectment action filed by Plaintiffs Wong and Yee. In that action, Jamerson, as Defendant, filed a cross-complaint to quiet title in a property, 3200 Harrison Street. Also discussed in this opinion are certain proceedings before the probate court involving the sale of real property (including 3200 Harrison Street) by the co-conservators of the estate of Elizabeth G. Jamerson. In the probate court proceeding captioned In re Conservatorship of Elizabeth G. Jamerson (Super. Ct. S.F. City and County, 2004, No. 240746), the co-conservators of the estate wanted to obtain probate court approval to sell three parcels of real estate, including 3200 Harrison Street. Jamerson, as Defendant, sought to challenge the authority of the co-conservators to dispose of the assets of Elizabeth, his mother, and, specifically, he sought, in a cross-complaint in the probate proceedings, to quiet title to the same property before this court, the property at 3200 Harrison Street. In another proceeding filed in the civil court, captioned Jamerson v. Conservatorship of Elizabeth G. Jamerson (Super. Ct. S.F. City and County, 2004, No. 436707), the appellant sought to quiet title on the same property, 3200 Harrison Street. In this opinion any reference to “Jamerson” will be to Defendant and appellant, Lafayette Jamerson. Regarding the issue of claim preclusion in this matter, in both the relevant probate court proceeding and the general jurisdiction suit which triggered this appeal, Defendant was in fact the cross-complainant plaintiff seeking to quiet title.
Background
Lafayette Jamerson (Defendant) is the son of Elizabeth G. Jamerson (Conservatee). In the 1980s, Conservatee became incapacitated and a conservatorship was established over her person and estate. Initially, Defendant’s sister Alice Lane acted as conservator. In 2004, the probate court replaced Lane as conservator of the estate and appointed two of Defendant’s nephews. Lane remained conservator of Conservatee’s person.
On August 5, 2004, the co-conservators of the estate petitioned the probate court for authority to sell three parcels of real property, subject to court confirmation, in order to prevent waste. The properties to be sold included 3200 Harrison Street in San Francisco.
On August 20, 2004, Defendant filed a pro se “Opposition to Petition to Sell Properties . . . .” He described the proposed sale “as a financial absurdity certain to bankrupt the entire estate due to the unnecessary creation of a capital gains sales tax estimated at well over . . . $300,000. This is clearly illegal . . . .” In an August 23 supplement to his opposition, Defendant cited legal authority for the proposition that the probate court could not order actions “that work to the financial detriment of an estate.”
On August 24, 2004, the probate court filed an order granting the co-conservators authority, subject to court confirmation, to sell the three properties, including 3200 Harrison Street. Defendant appealed the order pro se on August 31. On November 24, the appeal was dismissed for failure to deposit reporter’s fees or file a fee waiver.
On September 29, 2004, Defendant filed a “motion to quiet title” in the probate proceeding. As relevant to Defendant’s quiet title claim, the motion states that an “Oral Trust [was or has been] extant for over 4 decades between Elizabeth G. Jamerson [conservatee] and Lafayette S. Jamerson.” The motion adds under section III: “1.) Lafayette Jamerson is the sole owner in Trust to Elizabeth Jamerson of certain real property namely 3200 Harrison Street . . . . 2.) The bases of plaintiff’s claim are: [¶] a. First in time is plaintiff[;] [¶] b. Adverse possession for forty years continuous[;] [¶] c. Oral Trust and implied contract with Elizabeth G. Jamerson, mother, continuous for over 3 decades (32+ years)[;] [¶] d. Primogenitor (eldest and sole son)[;] [¶] e. Latches [sic] precludes defendants[’] claims known or unknown[;] [¶] f. Concordance with mother and sister heirs over thirty years[;] [¶] g. A contract beginning in 1972 as a consequence of Urban Renewal and the attempted relocation of Jamerson Printing Co., 817 Laguna Street, San Francisco, CA 94102[;] [¶] h. The present Co-Conservators were hardly born and is [sic] operating with hearsay knowledge.” Significantly, the “motion to quiet title” contained a signed verification by Defendant attesting to the validity of the above facts as true. The motion also continued to challenge the wisdom of the proposed sale of the three properties.
On November 30, 2004, Defendant filed a pro se quiet title action in superior court, which was captioned Jamerson v. Conservatorship of Elizabeth G. Jamerson (Super. Ct. S.F. City and County, 2004, No. 436707). Consequently, Defendant had two separate proceedings to quiet title pending at this time: in order of filing, the probate matter and the civil matter.
On December 8, 2004, the probate court held a hearing on the status of the property sale and on Defendant’s motion to quiet title. At the outset of the hearing, the parties debated the wisdom of the proposed property sales. In the course of this discussion, Defendant stated: “Everyone here is aware that I claim ownership of 3200 Harrison Street. [¶] Now, there’s been some proceedings that have ignored, you know, this reality that I have a claim to.” The court responded: “From day one I advised you that you should have a lawyer. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . [I]f you had someone here representing your interests, they could have put things in a legal and proper perspective, and maybe I would have made different rulings. But under the circumstances I ruled base[d] upon what was before me. And what was before me a lot of times was not enough. . . . [Your] petition today, it goes on and on. To be frank, I don’t know, I know what you’re saying, but . . . you certainly haven’t presented a case from your petition.” After a digression, the court added, “I’m not saying that you don’t have a valid claim but the way it’s been presented to[] me you haven’t demonstrated that you have a valid claim.”
When Defendant mentioned that he had a quiet title action pending in superior court, the court indicated it might dismiss his probate quiet title motion without prejudice. Opposing counsel objected. Counsel for the Conservatee told the court: “Without the authority to sell 3200 Harrison, I seriously question whether this estate can be made solvent and whether the other properties can be saved. [¶] . . . [I]f the court doesn’t rule upon this petition and dismiss it, I think Mr. Jamerson’s essential goal is being met in that he’s going to delay the conservators’ plans so significantly that it won’t be feasible any longer. [¶] . . .[¶] . . . Mr. Livingston [Conservator Lane’s counsel] has informed me that if the court dismisses the motion to quiet title that was filed with the probate court that it’s more likely that he would be able to succeed with a petition to remove the complaint that was filed in civil court because the matter had already been ruled upon.”
Mr. Livingston commented: “Couple of things procedurally. One, we will make every effort to remove that [civil quiet title litigation] to the probate court to make and [sic] it an ultimate determination. And perhaps Mr. Jamerson would seek some sort of greater proceeding than merely a standard petition or motion on a 9 o’clock calendar for something like this. [¶] We would need to do a significant amount of discovery on our side, because we don’t see anything in any of the papers other than some vague reference to four decades of promises that he’s entitled to this property. [¶] Now, I don’t want to get into whether he is or he isn’t, the point is this: as we sit here today he can have his quite [sic] title action. There is no lawyer—there’s no stay order regarding the disposition of that property in place. [¶] Second of all, I wanted to remind the court there is over a 4-million-dollar judgment against this man for moneys owed to the estate, so ultimately that property whether title is quieted in Mr. Jamerson or not is going to be the subject of enforcement of that order, which is now a final order. [¶] Third. I’ve rarely been involved in a proceeding . . . where the estate was just ravaged by nothing more than delay in time. We are at a point now where we need to make some decisions as to what we are going to do here. Mr. Jamerson has been, basically, the focal point of a delay after delay, delay, delay. [¶] You might recall we still have no records. We still don’t know what happened in this estate for years prior to the time that we have all gotten together here. And everyone of these hearings, which just go on and on and[] on[,] we have three attorneys, two business people, Mr. Jamerson’s time, and others that constantly have to appear at these things at great cost to the estate.”
The court then announced: “I will make what I said an order. Based upon the papers that I have read, and I did read them thoroughly, I don’t find enough for me to rule in favor of Mr. Jamerson. And I would, therefore, deny the petition. And that’s what I’m doing right now.” (Italics added.) After some comments by Defendant, the court added, “Well, I have to bring this to an end. I have made a ruling.”
On January 4, 2005, the court filed an “Order After Hearing Denying Motion to Quiet Title; Affirming Authority to Sale; Setting Date for Confirmation of Sale; and Directing Status Report.” The order provided: “THE COURT FINDS that: [¶] Lafayette Jamerson was granted a final opportunity to present any and all objections to the sale of the real properties located at 3200 Harrison Street, 1674 Golden Gate Avenue, and 2148 Pine Street, to the Court on or before September 29, 2004. Lafayette Jamerson filed a motion to quiet title to 3200 Harrison Street on September 29, 2004, and that motion was heard on December 8, 2004. [¶] IT IS ORDERED that: [¶] 1. That the Motion of Lafayette Jamerson to quiet title to 3200 Harrison Street, San Francisco, California is denied, and all objections of Lafayette Jamerson to the sale of the estate properties, including, specifically 3200 Harrison Street are denied; [¶] 2. That the Order of this Court made on July 20, 2004, granting authority to the Co-Conservators of the Estate of Jamerson to sale estate properties located at 3200 Harrison Street, 1674 Golden Gate Avenue, and 2148 Pine Street, is affirmed and final; . . . .” (Italics added.) Defendant did not appeal the order.
Quiet Title Action
As noted above, Defendant filed a pro se quiet title action in November 2004, which was captioned Jamerson v. Conservatorship of Elizabeth G. Jamerson. This is indicated in the Register of Actions. Also, according to the same Register, on December 16, 2004, an attorney substituted in as counsel for Defendant in the civil proceedings.
This court makes reference to the Register of Actions in these several lawsuits because these collateral proceedings are quite significant. Yet neither party has chosen to provide all documents that might assist the court in this matter. The court’s analysis is hampered by this omission of key pleadings to support argument considered relevant by the appellate counsel.
Defendant recorded a notice of lis pendens on 3200 Harrison Street on December 15, 2004. The Register of Actions shows the co-conservators filed a motion to expunge the notice and Defendant opposed the motion with a supporting declaration. On February 9, 2005, the superior court granted the motion.
The co-conservators also filed a petition for expungement of lis pendens in the probate action. The probate court denied the petition without prejudice on January 18, 2005.
Also on February 9, 2005, the court sustained a demurrer to Defendant’s quiet title complaint without leave to amend, and dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the court lacked jurisdiction over the cause of action, and that another action on the cause of action was pending. Defendant, represented by counsel, appealed the dismissal but abandoned the appeal in July. The appeal was dismissed August 5.
Sale of 3200 Harrison Street and Action for Ejectment
According to the Register of Actions for the probate matter, Defendant filed a new petition to quiet title to 3200 Harrison Street in the probate action in March 2005. The hearing on the petition was repeatedly continued to August 12. In the meantime, on June 7, the probate court signed an order confirming the sale of 3200 Harrison Street to Douglas Wong and Pearl Yee, who are Plaintiffs in this action. The Register of Actions indicates that on August 12 the “petition [was] dismissed per Jamerson, Lafayette.”
On August 30, 2005, Plaintiffs filed in superior court a complaint against Defendant for ejectment from 3200 Harrison Street. Defendant, represented by counsel, answered and filed a cross-complaint to quiet title to the particular property. As later amended, the cross-complaint alleged that sometime before July 30, 1968 Defendant entered into an oral trust agreement with his mother whereby she agreed to acquire and hold title to 3200 Harrison Street in trust for Defendant until Defendant paid all acquisition indebtedness in full. Under the trust agreement, Defendant provided the down payment to purchase the property, paid all property taxes as they came due, and assigned his mother his army disability payments to service the acquisition indebtedness. The assigned disability payments exceeded the monthly cost of servicing the indebtedness and his mother used the excess for her support and as partial consideration for the oral trust agreement. She paid the mortgage and underlying loan in full using funds provided by Defendant. She did not transfer title to him because she became incapacitated. Defendant alleged he alone was the beneficial owner of the property and Plaintiffs had no interest in the property. Defendant alleged his claim was not barred by the Statute of Frauds because the oral agreement had been fully executed. He also alleged that he entered into an oral long-term sales contract with his mother, and that he fully performed his obligations under the contract. Finally, he alleged he acquired ownership by way of adverse possession of the property.
On January 9, 2006, Plaintiffs filed a motion to expunge a notice of lis pendens that Defendant had recorded on the property in October 2005. The motion was made on the ground that Defendant could not establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, the probable validity of his real property claim. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 405.30, 405.32.) Plaintiffs pointed out that Defendant’s motion to quiet title in the probate action had been denied and his separate quiet title action in the probate court had been dismissed. They argued that the only evidence of Defendant’s ownership was his own self-serving declaration.
In opposition to the motion, Defendant submitted evidence supporting his claims of ownership of 3200 Harrison Street, including documentation that he paid property taxes and insurance premiums on the property and collected rents from a tenant. He averred that he fully paid the loan on the property and attached a title report as “an illustration that the Property was free and clear.” The title report does not list any outstanding loans that were secured by the property. Defendant also provided evidence that in August 1998 he entered into a contract with Lane, then conservator of Jamerson’s person and estate, to provide construction services to the estate properties. The contract provided: “All bills and taxes on 3200 Harrison are to be paid by [Defendant] as this property is held in trust.”
The court granted the motion to expunge the notice of lis pendens on April 18, 2006.
Motion for Summary Judgment
On July 21, 2006, Plaintiffs moved for summary adjudication of the issue of their ownership and right to possession of the property. Plaintiffs first argued that the probate court order confirming the sale of 3200 Harrison Street entitled them to possession of the property as a matter of law. Second, they argued that Defendant was barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel from relitigating his claims of ownership of the property.
In opposition, Defendant argued the probate court did not have the power to convey clear title to the property as against Defendant. He also argued collateral estoppel did not apply because he was not a party or in privity with a party to the conservatorship proceeding, his ownership claims were not actually litigated in that proceeding, no judgment of his claim was ever entered, his claims were not decided on the merits, and he had no right to appeal the order authorizing the sale of 3200 Harrison Street.
On December 18, 2006, the court granted the summary adjudication motion on the ground that, under Probate Code section 857, subdivision (b), Plaintiffs were entitled to ownership and possession of the property because they purchased it pursuant to a probate court order. The court then granted Defendant’s motion for reconsideration but reaffirmed its original ruling on the same ground.
All statutory references are to the Probate Code unless otherwise indicated.
On March 16, 2007, the parties filed a stipulation for entry of judgment and stay pending appeal. The stipulated judgment provided that Plaintiffs were entitled to possession of the premises, that Defendant’s first amended cross-complaint would be dismissed with prejudice, and that Plaintiffs would recover $50,000 in damages from Defendant. The parties agreed that Plaintiffs would forbear from executing on the judgment pending resolution of this appeal and, in consideration for this forbearance, Defendant would pay Plaintiffs $600 per month.
Discussion
Summary judgment is appropriate “if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of showing there is no triable issue of material fact. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) In ruling on the motion, the court must draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence in the light most favorable to the opposing party. (Id. at p. 843.) An order granting or denying summary judgment is reviewed de novo. (Id. at p. 860.)
I. Statutory Basis for the Probate Court’s Orders
As a preliminary matter, we distinguish between the statutory basis for the probate court proceedings that allegedly determined Defendant’s claim of title to 3200 Harrison Street and the proceedings that authorized and confirmed the sale of that property to Plaintiffs.
A. Order Denying Motion to Quiet Title
The probate court had authority to determine Defendant’s claim to title pursuant to sections 850 to 859. Section 850 provides that a “guardian, conservator, or any claimant” may “file a petition requesting that the court make an order under this part” where “the guardian or conservator or the minor or conservatee is in possession of, or holds title to, real or personal property, and the property or some interest therein is claimed to belong to another.” (§ 850, subd. (a)(1)(C).) Defendant’s motion to quiet title was a petition by a claimant to an interest in property to which the estate held record title. Therefore, it was the proper subject of a section 850 petition. Defendant implicitly acknowledges that his quiet title claim was the proper subject of a section 850 petition, because he also acknowledges that he later filed a “petition under Probate Code [section] 850 to assert his title claims at 3200 Harrison Street” in March 2005.
Section 856 provides: “[I]f the court is satisfied that a conveyance, transfer, or other order should be made, the court shall make an order authorizing and directing the personal representative or other fiduciary, or the person having title to or possession of the property, to execute a conveyance or transfer to the person entitled thereto, or granting other appropriate relief.” Pursuant to section 857, subdivision (b), “After entry of an order that the personal representative, other fiduciary, or other person execute a conveyance or transfer, the person entitled thereunder has the right to the possession of the property, and the right to hold the property, according to the terms of the order as if the property had been conveyed or transferred in accordance with the terms of the order.”
Sections 856 and 857 authorized the probate court, after determining Defendant’s claim to title, to issue an appropriate order conveying the property. That is, if the court determined that Defendant had a right to title in the property, it had the authority to order the estate to convey the property to Defendant. If the court made that order, Defendant would have had the right to possession of the property. However, because the court determined that Defendant did not establish a legal right to title in the property, the court did not issue such an order. Sections 856 and 857 did not authorize the court to order the estate to convey the property to third parties not involved in the title dispute. As specifically relevant here, the sections did not authorize the court to order the estate to convey the property to Plaintiffs Wong and Yee.
B. Order Confirming Sale of Property to Plaintiffs
The statutes governing the probate court’s orders authorizing and confirming the sale of the property to Plaintiffs were sections 2540 to 2548, which in turn incorporate sections 10300 to 10316. (See § 2543, subd. (b).) “The sale of conservatorship real property seldom requires court approval before the sale . . . .” (Cal. Conservatorship Practice (Cont.Ed.Bar 2008) Sales and Real Property Transactions, § 17.31, p. 903.) The statutory requirements are that the conservator publish notice of a sale and seek court confirmation following the sale. (§§ 10300, 10308, 10310, 10313.)
If, on a petition to confirm such a sale, the court determines that statutory requirements have been satisfied, it makes an order confirming the sale and directing conveyances or assignments or both to be executed. (§ 10313, subd. (a).) “A conveyance made in compliance with the court order confirming the sale and directing the conveyance to be executed vests in the purchaser both of the following: [¶] (1) All the right, title, and interest which the decedent had in the property at the time of the decedent’s death. [¶] (2) Any other or additional right, title, or interest in the property acquired by the estate of the decedent, by operation of law or otherwise, prior to the sale.” (§ 10314, subd. (c).) As applicable here, the purchasers were vested in all right, title, and interest Conservatee had in the property when the conservatorship estate came into existence, and any other rights acquired by the estate prior to the sale. (See § 2543, subd. (b).)
Section 10314 governs Plaintiffs’ title and rights to 3200 Harrison Street following the court’s June 2005 order confirming the sale of the property by the estate to Plaintiffs. Their rights are determined by the rights held by the estate prior to the sale. Whether the estate’s rights to the property were determined by the probate court’s resolution of Defendant’s September 2004 “motion to quiet title” turns on whether that motion to quiet title was the equivalent of a section 850 petition, regardless of how Defendant styled his motion. We then must determine whether the probate court ruled on the merits of Defendant’s petition /motion.
The critical issues in this appeal, therefore, are whether Defendant’s filings were properly construed as a section 850 petition and whether the court adjudicated that petition on the merits.
II. Defendant’s Filings Were the Equivalent of a Section 850 Petition
Defendant argues that his “objection to the petition for permission to sell the properties,” apparently a reference to his August 20, 2004 “Opposition to Petition to Sell Properties” and supplement to that opposition, was not a section 850 petition to quiet title to 3200 Harrison Street. We agree.
Defendant also argues that his “motion,” apparently a reference to his September 29, 2004 “Motion to Quiet Title,” was not a section 850 petition. He argues: “While the petition [sic] referenced a title interest in 3200 Harrison Street, it also alleged issues concerning other properties which were extraneous to a petition under Section 850 [subdivision] (a). Moreover, Mr. Jamerson framed his objections as a motion, and the probate court and the parties accepted this motion characterization.” We disagree.
Defendant writes: “As a fair reading of Mr. Jamerson’s motion (‘petition’) discloses, Appellant did petition under Section 850.” Although Defendant unambiguously states in this sentence that he did petition pursuant to section 850, it is clear from context that this phrasing is a typographical error and Defendant meant to write that he did not petition under section 850.
The motion unambiguously sought to quiet title to 3200 Harrison Street in Defendant’s favor. While the motion did raise several objections to the co-conservators’ handling of the estate and their plan to sell the real property parcels, the clearly labeled “bases of the plaintiff[’]s complaint” were theories regarding his alleged ownership of 3200 Harrison Street. The Probate Code does not impose any special procedural formalities on a section 850 petition other than formal service of the petition. (§ 851, subd. (a).) In all other respects, the rules of practice applicable to civil actions apply to proceedings on the petition. (§ 1000.) That the motion was not labeled a “petition” and did not cite section 850, therefore, is not dispositive.
Defendant’s contention that the court and the parties accepted his characterization of his filing as a “motion,” as distinct from a section 850 petition, is clearly not supported by the record. At the hearing on the motion and in its written order denying the motion, the court referred to it as a “petition.” Opposing counsel also referred to the filing as a “petition.” Defendant did not object to these characterizations.
Defendant’s comments during the December 8, 2004 hearing at the probate court further indicate that he was seeking a ruling on the merits of his quiet title claim. Defendant clearly stated that he was claiming ownership of 3200 Harrison Street and that he was frustrated that his ownership claim had been ignored in prior proceedings. Implicit in Defendant’s contention is that he wanted the probate court to adjudicate his claim to ownership of the property before it allowed the co-conservators to sell the property. He stated: “I want to make it clear that the only thing I want is a clear title, a quiet title to 3200 Harrison Street.” Defendant’s comment that he had a separate quiet title action pending in superior court does not undermine the inference that Defendant was asking the probate court to rule on his title claim. The Probate Code anticipates circumstances where a section 850 petition is filed even though another civil proceeding is pending on the same issue. (§ 854.) Where, as here, the civil action is filed after the section 850 petition, the probate court has the power adjudicate the section 850 petition. (Ibid.)
Finally, Defendant argues that the fact that the court held no evidentiary hearing on his motion demonstrates that the court did not treat it as a section 850 petition. As we explain further in the next section, the court decided the petition on the papers presented by the parties and no evidentiary hearing was required to decide the petition on the merits.
We conclude Defendant’s motion to quiet title constituted a petition brought pursuant to section 850 and the probate court had the power to decide the petition on the merits.
III. The Probate Court Adjudicated the Section 850 Petition on the Merits
Defendant argues the court did not adjudicate his September 2004 motion to quiet title (hereafter, section 850 petition) on the merits. He relies particularly on the court’s comment: “I’m not saying that you don’t have a valid claim . . . .” However, when the court’s comments are read in the full context of the hearing, it is clear that the court denied the petition on the merits with the intention of finally resolving Defendant’s purported claims to title to the property, subject only to a challenge on direct appeal.
The probate court’s initial response to Defendant’s title claim at the hearing was a statement that Defendant had failed to plead a valid claim to title: “[Your] petition today, it goes on and on. . . . [Y]ou certainly haven’t presented a case from your petition.” “[T]he way it’s been presented to[] me you haven’t demonstrated that you have a valid claim.” The court had advised Defendant to obtain legal representation, but Defendant had not followed the court’s suggestion. The clear import of the court’s comments was that Defendant had decided to present his position as it was detailed in his papers. Now, his petition would be judged on its face, which failed to state a valid claim for relief.
When Defendant mentioned that he had filed a quiet title action in superior court, the probate court indicated it might dismiss Defendant’s motion and allow him to proceed with his similar claims in the superior court. However, opposing counsel urged the court to deny the petition on the merits so that the sale of the property could proceed. Conservatee’s counsel urged the court to enter a ruling on the merits so the civil action would not result in further delay. Conservator Lane’s counsel urged the court to deny the motion so the sale could go forward. The conservator’s counsel argued that Defendant could still litigate his claim of ownership to the property, presumably as an offset against what he represented was the estate’s four million dollar judgment against Defendant. However, the conservatorship wanted to proceed with the sale of the property in order to avoid further waste to estate assets.
The parties have not cited to any evidence of the $4 million judgment against Defendant alleged by Lane’s counsel. For our purposes, however, what matters is not whether the court’s ruling was supported by substantial evidence or whether it was legally correct, but simply what the court ruled. Even an erroneous final judgment has claim preclusive effect. (Slater v. Blackwood (1975) 15 Cal.3d 791, 796-797.)
In sum, opposing counsel urged the court to definitively rule on Defendant’s motion so that the property sale could go forward. Conservator Lane’s counsel specifically left open the possibility that Defendant could litigate his claim to ownership of the property in a monetary claim against the estate, which would be treated as an offset to the estate’s judgment against Defendant. Implicit in the comments of Conservator Lane’s counsel was the assertion that even if Defendant prevailed on his ownership claim he would not obtain title to 3200 Harrison Street because of the size of the offsetting judgment against him.
The court apparently was persuaded by the conservatorship’s view. After hearing from him, the court said: “I will make what I said an order. Based upon the papers that I have read, and I did read them thoroughly, I don’t find enough for me to rule in favor of Mr. Jamerson. And I would, therefore, deny the petition. And that’s what I’m doing right now.” After further argument by Defendant, the court said: “I have to bring this to an end. I have made a ruling.”
In sum, the probate court clearly intended to render a decision on the merits of the section 850 petition and to allow the sale of the property to proceed without further delays caused by litigation of Defendant’s quiet title claims in the probate action or a separate superior court action. Minimally, the court’s order quieted title to 3200 Harrison Street in the estate’s favor. Arguably, it left open a monetary claim for the value of the property as an offset against the estate’s judgment against Defendant, but that issue is not before us.
IV. Under the Doctrine of Res Judicata, the Court’s Determination of Defendant’s Quiet Title Claim is Conclusive
“[A] final judgment, rendered upon the merits by a court having jurisdiction of the cause, is conclusive of the rights of the parties and those in privity with them, and is a complete bar to a new suit between them on the same cause of action. This is the general doctrine of res judicata.” (Goddard v. Security Title Ins. & Guar. Co. (1939) 14 Cal.2d 47, 51; see Braye v. Jones (1954) 129 Cal.App.2d 827, 828 [affirming judgment on cross-complaint based on res judicata].) The burden of proving that the requirements of res judicata have been met is on the party invoking the doctrine. (Vella v. Hudgins (1977) 20 Cal.3d 251, 257.)
Defendant discusses the question of preclusion as one of issue preclusion (collateral estoppel) rather than claim preclusion (res judicata). Issue preclusion is broader than claim preclusion in that it applies in a subsequent proceeding on a different cause of action and may be asserted against a party (or person in privity with a party) to the prior action even if the party asserting the doctrine was not a party (or person in privity with a party) in the prior action. (Ferraro v. Camarlinghi (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 509, 531 (Ferraro).) Claim preclusion applies only between the same parties (or persons in privity with the same parties) on the same cause of action as the prior proceeding. (Ibid.) Issue preclusion is narrower than claim preclusion in that it applies only to issues actually litigated and necessarily decided in the prior action, whereas claim preclusion generally applies to any issue that was or could have been raised in the prior action. (Ibid.) Defendant focuses on the narrow reach of issue preclusion to an issue that was actually litigated and necessarily decided in the prior action.
“Collateral estoppel precludes a party to an action from relitigating in a second proceeding matters litigated and determined in a prior proceeding.” (People v. Sims (1982) 32 Cal.3d 468, 477.) It is “a ‘secondary aspect’ of the res judicata doctrine. [Citation.] In its primary aspect, res judicata operates as a bar to the maintenance of a second suit between the same parties or parties in privity with them on the same cause of action. [Citations.] The court decisions and legal commentators often do not distinguish between the two aspects of the doctrine and refer generally to ‘res judicata’ when discussing whether determinations [in one proceeding] . . . may be binding in subsequent proceedings.” (Id. at p. 477, fn. 6.) Defendant, for example, cites a case stating the “doctrine of res judicata precludes parties or their privies from relitigating an issue that has been finally determined by a court of competent jurisdiction.” (Levy v. Cohen (1977) 19 Cal.3d 165, 171.)
In this action, however, the prerequisites for claim preclusion apply. First, Defendant was a party to the probate court section 850 proceeding and Plaintiffs are in privity with the conservatorship estate, which was a party to that proceeding. “The concept of privity for the purposes of res judicata or collateral estoppel [includes] ‘. . . a mutual or successive relationship to the same rights of property . . . .’ [Citations].” (Citizens for Open Access etc. Tide, Inc. v. Seadrift Assn. (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1053, 1069-1070.) Second, both the section 850 proceeding and Defendant’s cross-complaint in the current action are based on the same cause of action—quiet title. For purposes of claim preclusion, “California law defines a cause of action ‘by focusing on the “primary right” at stake: if two actions involve the same injury to the plaintiff and the same wrong by the defendant then the same primary right is at stake even if in the second suit the plaintiff pleads different theories of recovery, seeks different forms of relief and/or adds new facts supporting recovery. [Citations.] . . . .’ [Citation.]” (Tensor Group v. City of Glendale (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 154, 160.) Here, Defendant’s section 850 petition and his cross-complaint involved the same injury (the loss of title to 3200 Harrison Street) and the same wrong by the opposing party or that party’s predecessor (the Jamerson estate’s failure to transfer title to Defendant). Indeed, the petition and cross-complaint also pled the same theories of recovery and sought the same relief, and both were founded on the same facts (although the facts were not alleged in the first proceeding).
Because claim preclusion applies, we need not determine which issues were actually litigated and necessarily decided in the section 850 proceeding. We merely need to decide whether the proceeding resulted in a final judgment on the merits. (Goddard, supra, 14 Cal.2d at p. 51.)
Defendant argues the probate court lacked jurisdiction to enter a valid judgment on the section 850 petition because it did not have jurisdiction over all of the necessary parties. As noted previously, section 851 requires formal service of the petition on the conservator and any person claiming an interest in, title to, or possession of the property. (§ 851, subd. (a).) There is no dispute that the co-conservators received notice of the petition and appeared at the hearing on the petition without raising objections to any defects in service. The court accordingly had personal jurisdiction over them as to the section 850 matter. (See Dial 800 v. Fesbinder (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 32, 52 [general appearance establishes personal jurisdiction].) Defendant does not identify any additional person who claimed an interest in, title to or possession of the property.
Defendant also argues the probate court entered an interlocutory order rather than a dispositive judgment. “The doctrine of res judicata applies only to final judgments, that is, to judgments which are free from attack on appeal. [Citations.]” (Morris v. McCauley’s Quality Transmission Service (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 964, 973.) An order adjudicating the merits of a claim under sections 850 to 859 is an immediately appealable order, not an unappealable interlocutory order. (§ 1300, subd. (k).) Because Defendant did not appeal from the December 2004 order denying his motion to quiet title, the order is now final and it will have claim preclusive effect in this action. It is free from direct attack on appeal.
Defendant argues the probate court did not enter judgment on the merits within the meaning of the claim preclusion doctrine. However, the probate court decided the quiet title motion on the merits at the hearing on December 8, 2004, and its January 2005 order reflects this decision. The court ruled that the Defendant had failed to state a valid claim for relief; in essence, Defendant had failed to allege a proper cause of action. We view this as tantamount to sustaining of a general demurrer for failure to state a valid cause of action or a judgment on the pleadings. This determination can legally amount to a judgment on the merits with claim preclusive effect, depending on the particular circumstances of the prior adjudication. (Goddard, supra, 14 Cal.2d at pp. 52-53; Keidatz v. Albany (1952) 39 Cal.2d 826, 829-830; Wells v. Marina City Properties, Inc. (1981) 29 Cal.3d 781, 789.) A judgment entered after a general demurrer “is a judgment on the merits to the extent that it adjudicates that the facts alleged do not constitute a cause of action, and will, accordingly, be a bar to a subsequent action alleging the same facts. [Citations.] Moreover, even though different facts may be alleged in the second action, if the demurrer was sustained in the first action on a ground equally applicable to the second, the former judgment will also be a bar. [Citations.] If, on the other hand, new or additional facts are alleged that cure the defects in the original pleading, it is settled that the former judgment is not a bar to the subsequent action whether or not plaintiff had an opportunity to amend his complaint. [Citations.]” (Keidatz, at p. 828, citing Goddard throughout the passage.)
Defendant does not discuss or apply the standards of the Goddard line of cases to the facts of this case in order to demonstrate that the probate court’s denial of his section 850 petition had no preclusive effect in the current action. (See Guthrey v. State of California (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1115-1116 [appellate court may deny claim on appeal that is unsupported by legal argument applying legal principles to the particular facts of the case on appeal].)
We conclude that claim preclusion, i.e., res judicata, does apply here. The proceedings in the probate court resulted in a final judgment on the merits regarding Defendant’s purported legal claim to the property known as 3200 Harrison Street. (Goddard, supra, 14 Cal.2d at 51.) The fact that the final judgment resulted from that court’s assessment of the legal pleadings and not a full blown trial or evidentiary hearing does not change this conclusion. Even a judgment on a general demurrer will have claim preclusion consequences in a subsequent action so long as the issue decided in the first proceedings is identical to the issue presented in the second; there is a final judgment on the merits in the first action; and the party against whom the claim preclusion plea is raised was a party or in privity with a party in the first adjudication. (Pollock v. University of Southern California (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1416, 1428; Ojavan Investors, Inc. v. California Coastal Com. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 373, 384.) The primary right involved in the probate court proceeding—Defendant’s title to 3200 Harrison Street—was the same primary right in this instant action. The probate court resolved the issue of title adversely for the Defendant. He was the losing party. Res judicata or claim preclusion is manifest. (See, e.g., See v. Joughin (1941) 18 Cal.2d 603, 607.)
Moreover, the policies underlying the res judicata doctrine support our giving the probate court’s ruling preclusive effect. Those policies are preservation of the integrity of the judicial system, promotion of judicial economy, and protection of litigants from harassment by vexatious litigation. (Alpha Mechanical, Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc. v. Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. of America (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1319, 1333 [discussing policies in context of issue preclusion].) It can also be inferred from the transcript of the December 8, 2004 hearing that the probate court entered a final order on the merits of Defendant’s petition because (1) the court had granted Defendant multiple opportunities to obtain legal counsel and present his claims in a legally cognizable fashion; (2) Defendant had not successfully done so; (3) further delay in litigating title to the property would cause waste of the estate’s assets; and (4) Defendant could still pursue his monetary claim against the estate. By giving the probate court’s ruling preclusive effect, we preserve the integrity of the probate court in overseeing management of the estate’s assets. (See Ross, Cal. Practice Guide: Probate (The Rutter Guide 2008) ¶ 15.337, p. 15-96 [sections 850 et seq. enacted to allow probate court to resolve an entire controversy over property in a single proceeding].) We promote judicial economy by preventing relitigation of the title issue. Finally, we protect the estate and its successors in interest to the property (Plaintiffs) from harassment by further litigation of the issue. In the particular circumstances of this case, delay in resolving the legal issues raised by Defendant’s petition would impose substantial burdens on the estate because it would cloud title to the property the estate apparently needed to sell in order to avoid waste of estate assets. (Cf. Keidatz, supra, 39 Cal.2d at p. 830 [noting that ordinarily “the hardship suffered by being forced to defend against a new action, instead of against an amended complaint, is not materially greater”].) At the same time, Defendant’s interest in recovering the monetary value of the property is protected, at least insofar as the value can be recovered from the estate, if Defendant can establish his legal claim.
Further, we may take into consideration the probate court’s clear intent to issue a ruling on the merits that would “bring this to an end.” “The intention of the court to make a determination on the merits may be important, but if the judgment is clearly not on the merits, the court’s intention to make it a bar is immaterial.” (Goddard, supra, 14 Cal.2d at p. 54.) Here, we cannot say the probate court’s denial of the petition was clearly not on the merits. Therefore, we may properly consider the court’s intent, which supports our conclusion that the ruling was on the merits.
Defendant argues Ferraro, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th 509, supports his argument that claim preclusion does not apply here. The facts of Ferraro, however, bear little resemblance to this case. The judgments held to have no claim preclusive effect in that case were a default judgment that had never been entered and that was based on a default the court deemed void, and a stipulated judgment to which the appellant was not a party. (Id. at pp. 533-535, 542.)
Finally, Defendant argues that a purchaser of real property from a conservatorship estate does not take clear title to the property, but only that title that the conservatee held prior to the sale. Section 10314, subdivision (c), appears to support the argument. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs prevail. Because we have determined that the probate court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to quiet title was on the merits, the ruling quieted title in the conservatee as against Defendant. Therefore, Plaintiffs took clear title to the property as against Defendant.
Disposition
We affirm the judgment. Appellant shall pay the Respondents’ costs.
We concur: JONES, P. J., NEEDHAM, J.