Opinion
Case No. C2-03-162
June 11, 2003
ORDER AND OPINION
I. Introduction
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss based on the Younger abstention doctrine. For the following reasons, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.
II. Factual and Procedural Background
In October 2002, the Women's Medical Center of Dayton, an abortion clinic owned by Women's Medical Professional Corporation and Martin Haskell, M.D. (collectively, "Plaintiffs") filed an application with the Ohio Department of Health ("ODH") for a license to operate as an Ambulatory Surgical Facility ("ASF"). Ohio law defines an ASF as a facility "where outpatient surgery is routinely performed" and requires that all ASFs receive a license from the director of ODH. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3702.30 (West 2003). ODH regulations require that all ASFs must "have a written transfer agreement with a hospital for transfer of patients in the event of medical complications, emergency situations, and for other needs as they arise." Ohio Admin. Code § 3701-83-19(E) (2003).
On January 9, 2003, J. Nick Baird, M.D. ("Defendant"), the director of ODH, sent a notice to Plaintiffs proposing an order denying their license to operate an ASF because they did not meet the written transfer agreement requirement. Defendant's notice stated that Plaintiffs could request a hearing before Defendant within thirty days to challenge Defendant's proposed order. On the same day, Defendant issued an Order to Cease Operations to Plaintiffs, ordering them to stop operating their abortion clinic because they failed to comply with the written transfer agreement requirement. Also on January 9, Plaintiffs sought a temporary restraining order from this Court to permit them to continue operating their abortion clinic. The Court granted Plaintiffs a TRO, and the parties later voluntarily extended the TRO. The case is now set for a consolidated preliminary injunction hearing and bench trial on June 12, 2003.
Plaintiffs challenge the constitutionality of Defendant's transfer agreement requirement and seek injunctive relief against Defendant's order to cease operations and his denial of their application for an ASF license. Plaintiffs bring their suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and they seek declaratory and injunctive relief pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 57 and 64 and 28 U.S.C. § 2201-2202.
Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss on March 31, 2003, pursuant to the Younger abstention doctrine. The Court will now consider this motion.
III. Analysis
Generally, the Anti-Injunction Act bars federal courts from granting injunctions that stay pending state court proceedings. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2283 (West 2003). The Supreme Court has established an exception to the Anti-Injunction Act for actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the Court has determined that Congress has expressly authorized such injunctions. See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972) ("The very purpose of § 1983 was to interpose the federal courts between the States and the people. . . . In carrying out that purpose, Congress plainly authorized the federal courts to issue injunctions in § 1983 actions, by expressly authorizing a `suit in equity' as one of the means of redress."). The case subjudice is brought pursuant to § 1983; therefore, the Anti-Injunction Act does not bar this Court from issuing an injunction staying state court proceedings in this case.
Although the Anti-Injunction Act does not bar this Court from staying state court proceedings in § 1983 actions, the judge-made Younger abstention doctrine requires the Court to abstain from enjoining certain state proceedings. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 54 (1971). In Younger, the Supreme Court decided that federal courts should not enjoin pending state criminal proceedings. The Court held "that the possible unconstitutionality of a statute `on its face' does not in itself justify an injunction against good-faith attempts to enforce it." Id. The Court made clear that its decision was not based on the Anti-Injunction Act, id., but rather on notions of comity and "Our Federalism," id. at 44. The Court recognized that abstention would not be appropriate where a state acted in bad faith or where the statute in question was flagrantly unconstitutional, thereby requiring immediate relief. See id. at 53-54.
Since Younger, the Supreme Court has extended this abstention doctrine to civil proceedings that involve important state interests, even if the state is not a party. See Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 334-335 (1977); see also Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982) ("The policies underlying Younger are fully applicable to noncriminal judicial proceedings when important state interests are involved."). Younger abstention also applies to state administrative proceedings if they are judicial in nature. Middlesex County Ethics Comm., 457 U.S. at 433-34. Younger abstention requires this Court to abstain from enjoining pending state proceedings if the following three requirements are satisfied: (1) state judicial proceedings are pending; (2) the state "proceedings implicate important state interests;" and (3) there is "an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges." Id. at 432; Fieger v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 740, 744 (6th Cir. 1996) (quoting Middlesex County Ethics Comm., 457 U.S. at 432).
The Court must first determine whether Plaintiffs seek an injunction of a pending state proceeding that is judicial in nature. Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief with respect to Defendant's order that Plaintiffs stop operating their abortion clinic and Defendant's denial of Plaintiffs' license to operate an ASF. They further seek declaratory relief by asking the Court to declare that ODH's requirement of a written transfer agreement is unconstitutional as applied to Plaintiffs. Defendant argues that there is a pending state judicial proceeding because Plaintiffs were given an opportunity to seek a hearing before Defendant and because Plaintiffs have a right to appeal Defendant's decisions to state court.
In Middlesex County Ethics Committee, the Supreme Court found that Younger abstention was appropriate where a state bar committee had served formal charges of misconduct on a lawyer, thereby instituting an administrative proceeding before the committee. 457 U.S. at 428. Rather than answering the charges brought against him, the lawyer sought an injunction of the proceedings in federal court asserting that the disciplinary rules in question violated his First Amendment rights. Id. at 429. The Court also found Younger abstention appropriate with respect to state administrative proceedings in Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., 477 U.S. 619 (1986). In that case, a teacher filed a complaint with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission alleging sex discrimination. Id. at 623. The school sought an injunction of the state proceedings in federal court alleging violations of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. Id. at 624.
In this case, however, no administrative proceedings have been instituted against Plaintiffs or by Plaintiffs. Unlike in Middlesex County Ethics Committee and Ohio Civil Rights Commission, Defendant has not brought any charges against Plaintiffs. Rather, Defendant has denied Plaintiffs a license and ordered them to stop operating an abortion clinic. Although Plaintiffs may have a right to request a hearing before Defendant, they have not chosen to request such a hearing. Furthermore, although they may be able to seek relief in state court, Plaintiffs have not chosen to pursue that avenue of relief. The fact that Plaintiffs may seek judicial review of Defendant's decision in state court does not mean that such a state court proceeding is pending. See Norfolk Western Ry. Co. v. Pub. Utilities Comm'n of Ohio, 926 F.2d 567, 572-73 (6th Cir. 1991) (concluding that Younger abstention is inappropriate where no administrative proceedings are pending and an appeal to court, although available, has not been filed).
Defendant cites Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 337 (1977), and argues that Plaintiffs' failure to request an administrative hearing constituted a waiver of their right to raise a constitutional challenge to Defendant's decisions. In Juidice, the Court noted that parties "need be accorded only an opportunity to fairly pursue their constitutional claims in the ongoing state proceedings and their failure to avail themselves of such opportunities does not mean that the state procedures were inadequate." Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The point made in Juidice was only that a party cannot seek an injunction of a state court proceeding based on an argument that it could have raised in a pending state court proceeding, but failed to raise. In this case, however, there were no pending state proceedings when Plaintiffs instituted this action. In Juidice, the Court did not hold that if a party has an opportunity to commence state proceedings, but fails to do so, the federal court must abstain from hearing the case. If this were the rule of Younger, federal courts would be required to abstain from deciding all cases unless they had exclusive jurisdiction over the matter.
Therefore, although Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief, they do not ask this Court to enjoin pending state judicial proceedings. Instead, Plaintiffs ask the Court to enjoin Defendant's order to stop operating an abortion clinic. Not only is there no pending state proceeding regarding this order, Defendant's issuance of this order was an executive action, not a judicial proceeding. In emphasizing the limited reach of Younger abstention, the Supreme Court has said:
Although our concern for comity and federalism has led us to expand the protection of Younger beyond state criminal prosecutions, to civil enforcement proceedings, and even to civil proceedings involving certain orders that are uniquely in furtherance of the state courts' ability to perform their judicial functions, it has never been suggested that Younger requires abstention in deference to a state judicial proceeding reviewing legislative or executive action.New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of the City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 367-68 (1989) (citations omitted). Even if Plaintiffs had instituted state court proceedings to review Defendant's order, this Court would not be required to defer to those proceedings because they would be reviewing an executive action.
Because Plaintiffs do not seek an injunction of a pending state judicial proceeding, Younger abstention is not appropriate in this case. Therefore, the Court need not consider whether important state interests are at stake or whether Plaintiffs would have an opportunity to raise constitutional issues in the state court proceeding. The Court also need not consider any potential exceptions to Younger abstention such as whether Defendant acted in bad faith or whether the state law at issue is blatantly unconstitutional.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.