Opinion
2012-11-21
Thomas WOLFF, appellant, v. Julie E. GLICK, etc., et al., respondents.
Carl F. Lodes, Carmel, N.Y., for appellant. Julie E. Glick and Janine Prete, Patterson, N.Y., respondents pro se (one brief filed).
Carl F. Lodes, Carmel, N.Y., for appellant. Julie E. Glick and Janine Prete, Patterson, N.Y., respondents pro se (one brief filed).
REINALDO E. RIVERA, J.P., RUTH C. BALKIN, JOHN M. LEVENTHAL, and CHERYL E. CHAMBERS, JJ.
In an action, inter alia, to impose a constructive trust upon a business, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of a judgment of the Supreme Court, Putnam County (Nicolai, J.), dated September 15, 2010, as, upon a decision of the same court dated July 26, 2010, made after a nonjury trial, is in favor of the defendants and against him dismissing the complaint.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
“In reviewing a determination made after a nonjury trial, the power of this Court is as broad as that of the trial court, and we may render a judgment we find warranted by the facts, bearing in mind that in a close case, the trial judge had the advantage of seeing the witnesses” ( Rowe v. Kingston, 94 A.D.3d 852, 853, 942 N.Y.S.2d 161;see Northern Westchester Professional Park Assoc. v. Town of Bedford, 60 N.Y.2d 492, 499, 470 N.Y.S.2d 350, 458 N.E.2d 809). “In order to obtain the remedy of a constructive trust, a plaintiff generally is required to demonstrate four factors: (1) a fiduciary or confidential relationship between the parties, (2) a promise, (3) a transfer of some asset in reliance upon the promise, and (4) unjust enrichment flowing from the breach of the promise” ( Mei Yun Chen v. Mei Wan Kao, 97 A.D.3d 730, 730, 948 N.Y.S.2d 426;see Sharp v. Kosmalski, 40 N.Y.2d 119, 121, 386 N.Y.S.2d 72, 351 N.E.2d 721). Applying these principles, we discern no basis to disturb the Supreme Court's determination. Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly dismissed the plaintiff's cause of action to impose a constructive trust.
The plaintiff's remaining contentions, made in connection with the remaining causes of action, are without merit.