Opinion
Case No. 02-CV-71040-DT
May 17, 2002
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I. FACTS
Plaintiffs Complaint, dated February 15, 2002, was docketed in this Court on March 21, 2002. The Complaint, which is entitled "Conspiracy Against Rights Synonymous with Plaintiff's 18 U.S.C.A. 2241," alleges that the named Defendants engaged in a conspiracy to have him convicted of rape under MCL § 750.520b(1)(a). Attached to the Complaint are affidavits of two individuals, each attesting to Plaintiff's claim of conspiracy.
On April 26, 2002, Plaintiff filed a "Motion to Amend Conspiracy Against Rights Synonymous with Plaintiff's 18 U.S.C. § 2241." Apparently unbeknownst to Plaintiff, this Court had summarily dismissed Plaintiff's Complaint on April 24, 2002, because Plaintiff's claims were not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Before the Court is Plaintiff's "Motion for Reconsideration of Order of Summary Dismissal," dated April 26, 2002 and docketed with the Court on May 1, 2002. Although Plaintiff's "Motion to Amend Conspiracy Against Rights Synonymous with Plaintiff's 18 U.S.C. § 2241" is not technically before the Court, this Motion will also be considered. Having reviewed the arguments advanced by Plaintiff, the Court DENIES both of Plaintiff's Motions.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Motion for Reconsideration Standard
Plaintiffs Motion will be construed as being brought pursuant to Local Rule 7.1. This Rule provides that any motion for reconsideration shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of any order for which reconsideration is requested. No response to the motion and no oral argument thereon shall be allowed unless the court, after filing of the motion, otherwise directs. The Local Rule further states:
(3) Grounds. Generally, and without restricting the Court's discretion, the court will not grant motions for rehearing or reconsideration that merely present the same issues ruled upon by the court, either expressly or by reasonable implication. The movant must not only demonstrate a palpable defect by which the court and the parties have been misled but also show that correcting the defect will result in a different disposition of the case.
E.D. Mich. LR 7.1(g)(3).
B. Motion to Amend Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 allows for the amending and supplementing of pleadings under certain circumstances. Rule 15(a) states in relevant part that "a party may amend the party's pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given." Rule 15(a) enables parties to amend the pleadings upon discovery of matters either overlooked or unknown at the time the original pleading was filed. Iron Workers' Local No. 25 Pension Fund v. Klassic Services, 913 F. Supp. 541, 543 (E.D. Mich. 1996).
In Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962), the United States Supreme Court explained that:
Rule 15(a) declares that leave to amend "shall be freely given when justice so requires"; this mandate is to be heeded. If the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by the plaintiff may be a proper subject of relief, he ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his claim on the merits. In absence of any apparent or declared reason — such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, etc. — the leave sought should, as the rules require, be "freely given." of course, the grant or denial of an opportunity to amend is within the discretion of the District Court, but outright refusal to grant the leave without any justifying reason is not an exercise of discretion; it is merely an abuse of discretion and inconsistent with the spirit of the Federal Rules.Id.; see also Ziegler v. IBP Hog Market, Inc., 249 F.3d 509, 519 (6th Cir. 2001); Willis v. New World Van Lines, 123 F. Supp.2d 380, 398 (E.D. Mich. 2000). The Sixth Circuit has added that lack of notice to the opposing party and futility of amendment are also factors which may affect the decision whether to grant leave to amend a pleading. Wade v. Knoxville Utilities Bd, 259 F.3d 452, 458-59 (6th Cir. 2001).
III. ANALYSIS
This Court previously dismissed Plaintiff's Complaint, construing the action as one brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff now contends that he does not bring his suit under § 1983, but instead filed his Complaint pursuant to "28 U.S.C. § 241." See Pl.'s Mot for Reconsideration at 2. Specifically, Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration asserts that "Plaintiff filed a Civil Criminal Complaint pursuant to: 28 [U.S.C.] § 241, 18 U.S.C. [§] 2241 . . . stating that for all practical purposes synonymous with the deprivation of Plaintiff's rights and privileges, in as much as the Following Defendant's Conspired in concert to illegally incarcerate the Plaintiff." Id. at 1.
While it is not readily ascertainable from reviewing Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration, it appears that Plaintiff is arguing that the crime for which Plaintiff was convicted, MCL § 750.520b(1)(a), is "synonymous" with 18 U.S.C. § 2241. Both statutes concern sexual abuse, the former more specifically prohibiting sexual intercourse with a person under the age of thirteen (13).
The statute cited by Plaintiff, "28 U.S.C. § 241," does not exist. Attempting to construe Plaintiff's Complaint, however, the Court assumes that Plaintiff intends to pursue his action under 18 U.S.C. § 241, which criminalizes conspiracy to deprive any person of his rights to exercise rights under the laws of the United States. In this regard, Plaintiff argues that Defendants conspired to have Plaintiff convicted of a crime similar to that prohibited by 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
Even assuming the validity of Plaintiff s argument, the Court determines that the Motion for Reconsideration must be denied. 18 U.S.C. § 241 states that:
If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the same; or If two or more persons go in disguise on the highway, or on the premises of another, with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege so secured —
They shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; and if death results from the acts committed in violation of this section or if such acts include kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse or an attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill, they shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for any term of years or for life, or both, or may be sentenced to death.
Stated simply, this statute does not provide Plaintiff with a private right of action. That is, Plaintiff is not able to bring a civil suit for an alleged violation of this criminal statute.
It appears that Plaintiff's allegations may be more properly asserted in his habeas petition, which was filed on March 8, 2002 and is currently before Judge George Caram Steeh (Case No. 02-CV-70839-DT).
As the Court stated in Horn v. Peck, 130 F. Supp. 536, 540 (W.D. Mich. 1955), § 241 relates "only to the punishment by fine or imprisonment for the deprivation of certain Federal rights, privileges or immunities therein referred to, and it is clear that [it has] no application to the plaintiffs present action for money damages." In Watson v. Devlin, 167 F. Supp. 638 (E.D. Mich. 1958), it was noted that this Court "cannot assume jurisdiction of a civil action filed under [ 18 U.S.C. § 241]." Id. at 640. The Court further noted that § 241 is "part of the criminal code and civil relief is not afforded by them." Id.
The above cited cases require the denial of Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration. To be sure, Plaintiff may have shown a palpable defect by which the Court has been misled, to wit: that his Complaint was brought pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 241 and not 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, Plaintiff has not shown that correcting the defect will result in a different disposition of the case because the Complaint, construed as Plaintiff requests, would have to be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Watson, 167 F, Supp. at 640. For these same reasons, it would be futile to allow Plaintiff to amend his Complaint. Both the Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Amend are DENIED.
IV. CONCLUSION
18 U.S.C. § 241 does not provide for enforcement of its provisions via a private right of action. It would be futile, therefore, to allow Plaintiff to amend his Complaint to expand upon his theories under this statute. Plaintiffs Motion to Amend is DENIED for this reason. Further, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that construing his Complaint as one alleged under § 241 would result in a different disposition of this case. Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration is also DENIED.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's "Motion to Amend Conspiracy Against Rights Synonymous with Plaintiff's 18 U.S.C. § 2241" (Docket #6, filed April 26, 2002) is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's "Motion for Reconsideration of Order of Summary Dismissal" (Docket # 7, filed May 1, 2002) is DENIED.