Opinion
C.A. No. 03C-06-177 MMJ.
Submitted: January 31, 2005.
Decided: February 14, 2005.
Upon Defendant-Below/Appellee's Rule 56 Motion for Summary Judgment
DENIEDMatthew M. Bartkowski, Esquire, Kimmel, Carter, Roman Peltz, Bear, Delaware, Attorneys for Plaintff-Below, Appellant
Sherry Ruggerio Fallon, Esquire, Tybout, Redfearn Pell, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorneys for Defendant-Below, Appellee
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Factual and Procedural Context
On August 9, 2001, a driver allegedly lost control of her vehicle. The vehicle ran off the road and crashed into the living room wall of the home of Barbara Wisnewski, Plaintiff-Below/Appellant ("Plaintiff"). At the time the vehicle struck Plaintiff's house, Plaintiff was standing in her living room. The vehicle did not physically strike Plaintiff. Plaintiff claims to have suffered psychological injuries resulting from the severe noise and shaking caused by the accident.
The driver was insured by State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, Defendant-Below/Appellee ("State Farm"). State Farm denied that Plaintiff's injuries were covered by the driver's no-fault insurance policy issued by State Farm. By Decision dated May 30, 2003, the Department of Insurance Arbitration Panel ruled in favor of State Farm, finding: "Claimant not defined as pedestrian. No PIP coverage." On June 23, 2003, Plaintiff filed in this Court a Complaint on Appeal from the Department of Insurance Arbitration Panel.
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
State Farm has moved for summary judgment. Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no material issues of fact in dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. State Farm asserts that because "Plaintiff was not occupying a motor vehicle at the time of the accident, she is not entitled to no-fault benefits unless she can demonstrate that she is a `pedestrian'." State Farm relies upon 21 Del. C. § 2118(a)(2)(e), which provides:
Burkhart v. Davies, 602 A.2d 56, 59 (Del. 1991).
The coverage required in this paragraph shall apply to pedestrians only if they are injured by an accident with any motor vehicle within the State. . . .
State Farm also argues that coverage should be denied to Plaintiff because Plaintiff is not an insured person as defined by the policy. Section II — No-Fault — Coverage defines "Insured" as "any person while occupying or injured in an accident as a pedestrian by your car. . . ." Neither section 2118 nor the policy define "pedestrian."
The Court does not find State Farm's argument persuasive. The question of whether or not Plaintiff is a "pedestrian" need not be resolved. The minimum amount of no-fault insurance coverage required by Delaware law is established by section 2118. Section 2118(2)(c) provides:
The coverage required by this paragraph shall be applicable to each person occupying such motor vehicle and to any other person injured in an accident involving such motor vehicle , other than an occupant of another motor vehicle. (Emphasis added).
To constitute an "accident involving such motor vehicle," a causal connection is required between the use of the vehicle and the injury. The injury must originate from, be incidental to, or have some connection with the use of a motor vehicle. This Court has held that there is no burden on a plaintiff to prove that the injury was proximately caused by the use of the automobile. The plaintiff need only demonstrate a causal connection between the use of the vehicle and the injury. The injury must have occurred by virtue of the inherent nature of using the motor vehicle.
Gray v. Allstate Insurance Co., 668 A.2d 778, 780 (Del.Super. 1995) (Cyclist's injury was found to be caused by his own negligence when he lost control of his bicycle while swerving to avoid a motor vehicle, however, he was found to be entitled to compensation under section 2118.).
Id.; Dickerson v. Continental Casualty Co., Del. Super., C.A. No. 82C-MR-8, Poppiti, J. (Sept. 1, 1983).
The issue of causation must be interpreted from the viewpoint of the injured person. The primary objective of section 2118 is to protect and compensate all persons injured in automobile accidents, regardless of fault. Section 2118 also furthers the public policy of assuring health care providers that they will be compensated for care, regardless of the cause of the accident. By extending coverage to "any other person injured in an accident involving such motor vehicle," the General Assembly expressed its clear intention to favor injured persons over the no-fault vehicle insurer.
Hudson v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 569 A.2d 1168, 1171 (Del. 1990).
Id.
Marvin v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 2002 WL 31151655, at *4 (Del.Super.)
See Gray, 668 A.2d at 781 n. 3.
The inherent nature of a motor vehicle is to carry passengers from one place to another. Whether or not the collision occurred on an established roadway is not determinative. In this case, it is undisputed that the vehicle was traveling on a roadway, and as part of a continuous course of events, ran off the roadway and into a structure. Therefore, the Court finds that the accident, allegedly causing injury to Plaintiff, involved a motor vehicle, occurred by virtue of the inherent nature of the use of the vehicle, and was causally connected to the use of the vehicle. This is not a situation in which a vehicle was the mere situs of an injury or where an accident occurred in the vicinity of a vehicle.
See, e.g., Nationwide General Ins. Co. v. Royal, 700 A.2d 130, 133-34 (Del. 1997) (plaintiff struck by a bullet in a drive-by shooting while asleep inside her trailer home, was not entitled to underinsured motorist benefits); Oggenfuss v. Big Valley Associates, 1996 WL 453319, at *1 (Del.Super.) (plaintiff who slipped and fell between the curb and a parked vehicle not covered by PIP); Carter v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 1992 WL 240479, at *1-3 (Del.Super.) (plaintiff not covered for injury sustained while walking to a convenience store after fueling his vehicle); Dick v. Koutoufaris, 1990 WL 106182, at *5 (Del.Super.) (plaintiff who was raped in her vehicle was not entitled to no-fault benefits); Selected Risks Ins. Co. v. Pennsylvania Manufacturers Assoc. Ins. Co., 1986 WL 13107, at *2 (Del.Super.) (handicapped child left in a school bus not covered by PIP insurance).
The only remaining issue is whether the more restrictive language in the State Farm insurance policy may circumscribe the minimum coverage required by section 2118, and, more specifically, the inclusive language in section 2118(2)(c). Section 2118(2)(f) permits vehicle owners to elect coverage subject to certain deductibles, waiting periods, sublimits, percentage reductions, excess provisions and similar reductions offered by insurers.
The Delaware Supreme Court has established a two-pronged test to determine if the exclusion from coverage is valid. First, the exclusion must be one that is customary in the field of Delaware Insurance. Second, the exclusion must be consistent with the purpose of section 2118. There has been no evidence presented as to whether or not the State Farm policy limitation of coverage to occupants and "pedestrians" is customary. The Court, however, need not decide that issue. The Court finds that exclusion of coverage to persons injured in an accident involving a motor vehicle, but who are neither occupants nor "pedestrians," is inconsistent with the purpose of Delaware's no-fault statute — "to protect and compensate all persons injured in automobile accidents."
State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Wagamon, 541 A.2d 557, 560-61 (Del. 1988).
Hudson, 569 A.2d at 1171.