Opinion
October 7, 1953 —
November 3, 1953.
APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for La Crosse county: LINCOLN NEPRUD, Circuit Judge. Affirmed.
For the appellant the cause was submitted on the briefs of Lees Bunge of La Crosse.
For the respondent there was a brief by the Attorney General and Stewart G. Honeck, deputy attorney general, and Beatrice Lampert, assistant attorney general, and oral argument by Mrs. Lampert.
Appeal by Gateway Glass Company, Inc., from a judgment entered by the circuit court for La Crosse county on March 2, 1953, in favor of the petitioner, Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, granting enforcement of an order of the board entered on October 8, 1952.
This appeal presents for construction certain language of a bargaining agreement entered into on September 11, 1950, between the Gateway Glass Company, Inc., hereinafter referred to as the "company," and its employees represented by Local 124, International Union United Automobile, Aircraft, and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, hereinafter referred to as the "union." The pertinent provisions are these:
"The occupational classifications and hourly rates of pay therefor which shall prevail for the duration of this agreement are listed in Schedule `A' attached hereto and made a part hereof."
Schedule "A" reads as follows:
"The company shall pay twelve cents (12¢) per hour, effective September 5, 1950, and an additional three cents (3¢) effective October 30, 1950.
"The company shall pay twenty-five dollars ($25) to each person employed from July 31, 1950, to September 1, 1950.
"Those people employed for only a portion of this period shall be paid five dollars ($5) for each five-day week worked during the period from July 31 to September 1.
"Hiring Rate. "Women .................. $.75 regular .80 radium "Men .................... .85 general .90 buffers "After 60 days .......... .05 increase "After 120 days ......... .10 increase" On December 6, 1951, the company and the union supplemented the contract by an agreement entitled "Appendix on Wages," effective from August 1, 1951, to July 31, 1953, of which paragraphs II and III read:"II. The hiring rate for women shall be $.90 per hour. At the end of thirty calendar days, this shall be increased to $1 per hour. After sixty calendar days the rate shall be increased to $1.10 per hour. At the end of ninety calendar days the rate shall be increased to $1.15 per hour. At the end of one hundred eighty calendar days the rate shall be increased to $1.20 per hour.
"The hiring rate for men shall be $1 per hour. At the end of thirty calendar days this shall be increased to $1.10 per hour. At the end of sixty calendar days the rate shall be increased to $1.20 per hour. At the end of ninety calendar days the rate shall be increased to $1.30 per hour. At the end of one hundred eighty calendar days the rate shall be increased to $1.40 per hour.
"III. A. Rates per hour as specified in article VIII, section 1, will be increased as of August 1, 1951, by twelve (12¢) cents per hour."
Proceedings were instituted by the union before the board charging that the company had failed to observe the terms of the agreement. The board found that the company had failed to pay the rates specified in the agreements for all employees, both old and new, and that such failure was a violation of the terms of the contract and an unfair practice. An action brought by the company against the board in the circuit court for a review of the order resulted in judgment confirming the award. The company appeals.
The question is: Does the contract require payment of wages as therein specified to employees hired before and in the employment of the company at its effective date? The company contends that the term "hiring rate" can refer only to the rate to be paid employees entering the service after the date of the contract. The board and the trial court concluded that it does not, and that it applies to all employees.
The term is ambiguous. It is undisputed that the contract was prepared by the company. There is applicable the familiar rule that doubtful language in a contract is to be interpreted most strongly against the person who drew it. Hoffmann v. Danielson, 251 Wis. 34, 27 N.W.2d 759.
The meaning of the term "hiring rate" as it is used in the contract is open to more than one interpretation. It is therefore proper for us to consider the reasonableness of one meaning as compared with that of the other, the probability that persons situated as the parties were would be expected to contract in one way as against the other. It is not likely that the union when bargaining for increased wages would be concerned only with those persons who might enter the company's employment after the date of the contract. It would be unreasonable to assume that the union had no interest in the people then employed, the only people it then represented in its negotiations with the company. Nor does it seem likely that the company would consider that the union was not interested in those at the time employed and represented by it.
"Under recognized rules of interpretation of contracts, where one construction would make a contract unusual and extraordinary while another equally consistent with the language used would make it reasonable, just, and fair, the latter must prevail." Bank of Cashton v. La Crosse C. S. T. M. I. Co. 216 Wis. 513, 518, 257 N.W. 451.
We construe the term as being applicable to employees in service at the time of the making of the agreement as well as to those to be employed thereafter.
By the Court. — Judgment affirmed.