Opinion
No. 01-CV-0099-DRH
August 16, 2001
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
I. Introduction and Procedural Overview
This matter comes before the Court on Defendants Election Systems Software, Inc., and Melbourne Technical Services, Inc.'s motion to strike the amended complaint (Doc. 30) and Plaintiffs' motion to remand (Doc. 29). Based on the reasons stated herein, the Court denies the motion to strike and grants the motion to remand.
This case purports to be a class action. The purported class consists of registered voters in counties nationwide using the punch card voting system known as the "Votomatic." To date, no motion to certify the class has been filed. Thus, as of this date, this suit is not proceeding as a class action.
On January 9, 2001, Andrea Wirth, Judy Kent and Lee Bright filed a seven-count complaint against Election Systems Software, Inc. ("ES S"), Sequoia Pacific Systems ("Sequoia"), Fidlar and Chambers ("Fidlar") and Melbourne Technical Services, Inc. ("Melbourne") (Doc. 2). Counts Two and Four of the complaint asserts causes of action against ES S and Sequoia for violations of the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of the United States Constitution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 1988. In addition, the complaint asserts claims against all Defendants under various consumer protection statutes: the Nebraska Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, R.R.S. Neb §§ 87-301-302.10 (Count One); the California Unfair Competition Act, Cal. Bus. Prof. Code §§ 17200-17210 17500-17581 (Count Three); the Illinois Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices statute, 815 ILCS §§ 510/1-510/7 (Count Five); the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, 815 ILCS §§ 505/1-505/12 (Count Six); and the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, Fla. Stat. §§ 501.201-501.213 (Count Seven).
Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants "have designed, marketed, advertised, promoted, manufactured, serviced, sold and/or distributed" the "Votomatic" — a "punch card voting system in which a ballot with prescored holes is used. . ." (Doc. 2, ¶ 2). Plaintiffs contend that the "Votomatic" "has a long and notorious history of failing to perform as intended, failing to perform as they have represented it to perform, routinely frustrating the intentions of the voters and consistently disenfranchising large number of voters in election after election. . ." (Doc. 2, ¶ 2). Further, Plaintiffs maintain that "[d]espite this notorious history of disenfranchising voters and severely injuring the democratic process throughout the United States, Defendants continue to design, market, advertise, promote, manufacture, service, sell, and/or distribute their services and products for the Votomatic system" (Doc. 2, ¶ 3). Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief and attorneys' fees against Defendants.
On February 15, 2001, ES S, Sequoia, Fidlar and Melbourne removed the case to this Court based on federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331. On March 30, 2001, all of the Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint (Docs. 16, 18 21) and Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Class Action Complaint for Declaration and Injunctive Relief (Doc. 24). Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint contains five counts; the Equal Protection and Due Process claims (Counts Two and Four of the original complaint) have been omitted. Thereafter, Fidlar moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint (Doc. 27); Plaintiffs moved to remand (Doc. 28) and ES S and Melbourne filed a motion to strike the First Amended Complaint (Doc. 30). Subsequently, the Court denied as moot the motions to dismiss that pertained to the original complaint (Doc. 32). Next, Sequoia moved to dismiss the First Amended Complaint (Doc. 34).
Along with their First Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs filed a notice to the Clerk of the Court indicating that they were filing an amended complaint pursuant to FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 15(a) (Doc. 23).
Now before the Court are ES S and Melbourne's motion to strike Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint and Plaintiffs' motion to remand (Docs. 30 28, respectively). Based on the reasons stated herein, the Court rules as follows.
II. Motions to Strike
FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(f) governs motions to strike. The rule authorizes the district courts to strike insufficient defenses. Additionally, the courts may strike from any pleading "redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." Allegations may be stricken if the matter alleged bears no possible relation to the controversy or may cause the objecting party prejudice. Talbot v. Robert Matthews Distributing Co., 961 F.2d 654, 664 (7th Cir. 1992). As a general rule, motions to strike are disfavored, in part because they tend to delay judicial proceedings. Heller Financial, Inc. v. Midwhey Powder Co., Inc., 883 F.2d 1286, 1294 (7th Cir. 1989). See also Williams v. Jader Fuel Co., 944 F.2d 1388, 1400 (7th Cir. 1991) ("Motions to strike `are not favored. . . .'"), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 957 (1992). The burden lies with the party moving to strike. See Vakharia v. Little Co. of Mary Hosp. Health Care Ctrs., 2 F. Supp.2d 1028 (N.D.Ill. 1998).
III. Analysis
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' attempt to file an amended complaint is a nullity and should be stricken because: (1) Plaintiffs did not get the Court's approval to dismiss their "class" claims as required under Rule 23(e) and (2) Plaintiffs did not notify the class of the amendment. Plaintiffs assert that they have not dismissed the "class" allegations, but, that they have simply dropped two of their claims against ES S and Sequoia. The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that Court approval and class notice were not required to amend their complaint.
FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 23(e) provides:
A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such a manner as the court directs.
"Rule 23(e) was designed to prevent representative plaintiffs from settling or dismissing cases to the detriment of the absent members of the class. Settlement or dismissal of a case that has been certified as a class creates obvious dangers; the representative may have been a poor negotiator or may even been in cahoots with the defendant." Glidden v. Chromallory American Corp., 808 F.2d 621, 626-27 (7th Cir. 1986). "The class allegation in the complaint gives the plaintiff some leverage in negotiations." Id.
Defendants rely on Yaffe v. Detroit Steel Corp., 50 F.R.D. 481 (N.D.Ill. 1970) for the proposition that Plaintiffs can not amend their complaint without Court approval and without class notice. The Court rejects Defendants argument. First, the Court does not have to follow Yaffe because it is not considered precedent. Second, the facts in Yaffe are distinguishable from the facts in this case. In Yaffe, the "[P]laintiffs sought and were granted leave by the emergency judge to amend their complaint to strike all references to a class action. Following shortly on the heels of this amendment, a settlement was reached as to the named plaintiffs." Yaffe, 50 F.R.D. at 482 (emphasis added). The Yaffe court vacated the order allowing the amendment of the complaint and denied the stipulation for dismissal because the amended complaint deleted all of the class allegations which converted the case into an individual action. Id. at 483.
A district court decision binds no judge in any other case, save to the extent that doctrines of preclusion (not stare decisis) apply. Gould v. Bowyer, 11 F.3d 82, 84 (7th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted).
Here, Plaintiffs have neither dismissed nor compromised the class allegations. The class allegations are still present in the case. Plaintiffs did not drop all of the claims against any one of the Defendants. They merely dropped two out of seven counts of their original complaint. Further, the record does not reveal a collusion between Plaintiffs and Defendants. The Court finds that Plaintiffs did not need to obtain Court approval or provide class notice to amend their complaint. Thus, the Court denies ES S and Melbourne's motion to strike Plaintiffs' amended complaint.
IV. Motion to Remand
Plaintiffs argue that the Court should remand this case to the Circuit Court of St. Clair County, Illinois because all of the federal claims which gave rise to this Court's jurisdiction are no longer before the Court. Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 the Court should decline supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. Defendants maintain that the Court should continue to exercise supplemental jurisdiction even though the federal question claims are no longer present in the case. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), the Court declines to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' state law claims and remands this cause of action. Federal courts, may under limited circumstances, exercise jurisdiction over state law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) provides:
in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.
While under § 1367(a) a district court properly exercises supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims that are part of the same case or controversy over which the district court has original jurisdiction, § 1367(c)(3) provides that a district court "may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if . . . the district court had dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction." District courts enjoy wide discretion in determining whether to retain supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim once all federal claims are dismissed. The Commentary to § 1367(c)(3) explains:
the idea here is that once the crutch is removed — the claim that supports the supplemental jurisdiction of the other claim or claims — the other should not remain for adjudication. . . [J]udicial discretion here is a particularly important element. Here the `may' in `may decline' has a major role to play.28 U.S.C. § 1367 Practice Commentary.
In reaching this decision, the Court shall bear in mind the considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to the litigants embraced in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966). However, "federal jurisdiction is not defeated by dropping federal claims after the case has been properly removed to federal court, United Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co. v. Metropolitan Human Relations Comm'n, 24 F.3d 1008, 1014 (7th Cir. 1994), although if all of the federal claims drop out before trial, even as a consequence of the plaintiff's own voluntary dismissal, the district judge normally will relinquish jurisdiction over the state-law claims." Sullivan v. Conway, 157 F.3d 1092, 1095 (7th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). "A district court should have a good reason for retaining jurisdiction and therefore should make a finding as to the balance of judicial economy, convenience, fairness and comity to justify retention." Wright v. Associated Insurance Companies, Inc., 29 F.3d 1244, 1252 (7th Cir. 1994).
Here, the Court finds that the balance of judicial economy, convenience, fairness and comity do not warrant retention of the state law claims. First, the case is at the very beginning stages of litigation. Plaintiffs filed their original complaint in January 2001. In February 2001, Defendants removed the case to this judicial district and Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint on March 31, 2001. As of this date, Plaintiffs have not moved for class certification. There has been very little federal judicial investment in this case and substantial judicial resources have not been committed to this case. See, Graf v. Elgin, Joliet E. Ry. Co., 790 F.2d 1341, 1347-48 (7th Cir. 1986) (retaining state law claims when "substantial judicial resources have already been committed."). At this point, the burden of the state law claims would be the same for a federal court as for a state court.
Next, the Court finds that the litigating the case in the St. Clair County, Illinois Circuit Court rather than in the East St. Louis Division of the Southern District of Illinois is nearly as convenient. The East St. Louis Division is located in St. Clair County. Moreover, the two courthouses are less than a fifteen minute car ride from one another. Consequently, the convenience to the parties is almost identical. Further, the Court does not find that ligating this case in St. Clair County would be unfair to Defendants. All of the discovery that has occurred since the case has been removed would also apply to the state law claims — whether Defendants violated several state consumer protection statutes. In addition, the remaining claims are matters of exclusive state remedies; this in itself weighs heavily in favor of allowing a state court to decide these issues. Moreover, Illinois state courts previously have analyzed the consumer protection laws of other states, where the class was nationwide. See, Avery v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 746 N.E.2d 1242 (Ill.App. 2001). After balancing the various factors, the Court finds that remand is proper.
V. Conclusion
Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendants Election Systems Software, Inc., and Melbourne Technical Services, Inc.'s motion to strike the amended complaint (Doc. 30). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), the Court in its discretion GRANTS Plaintiffs' motion to remand (Doc. 28). The Court REMANDS this case to the Circuit Court in St. Clair County, Illinois. Further, the Court DENIES as moot the remaining pending motions (Docs. 27, 34 57).
IT IS SO ORDERED.