Opinion
14909 Index No. 151858/20 Case No. 2021-01589
12-28-2021
Stephen WINIARSKI, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. John E. BUTLER, Jr., et al., Defendants–Respondents.
Rasco Klock Perez & Nieto, LLC, New York (James Halter of counsel), for appellant. Gordon Ress Scully Mansukhani LLP, New York (Francis J. Giambalvo of counsel), for respondents.
Rasco Klock Perez & Nieto, LLC, New York (James Halter of counsel), for appellant.
Gordon Ress Scully Mansukhani LLP, New York (Francis J. Giambalvo of counsel), for respondents.
Kern, J.P., Moulton, Mendez, Shulman, Higgitt, JJ.
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (David B. Cohen, J.), entered on or about April 2, 2021, which granted defendants’ motion to dismiss this action asserting defamation and tortious interference with business relations, unanimously affirmed, without costs.
"New York does not recognize the tort of wrongful discharge" for at-will employees ( Lobosco v. New York Tel. Co./NYNEX, 96 N.Y.2d 312, 316, 727 N.Y.S.2d 383, 751 N.E.2d 462 [2001] ), and discharged employees cannot "subvert the traditional at-will contract rule by casting [their] cause of action in terms of [another] tort" ( Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 303–304, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232, 448 N.E.2d 86 [1983] ; see Baker v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 12 A.D.3d 285, 285, 785 N.Y.S.2d 437 [1st Dept. 2004] ).
Plaintiff's defamation claims were properly dismissed, since they are "based upon the statements defendants made concerning the reasons for plaintiff's discharge" ( Rohnke v. National Broadcasting Co., 186 A.D.2d 436, 437, 588 N.Y.S.2d 564 [1st Dept. 1992] ). His claim for tortious interference with business relations, arising from the same statements, was likewise "an outgrowth of the wrongful discharge claim" ( McEntee v. Van Cleef & Arpels, Inc., 166 A.D.2d 359, 360, 561 N.Y.S.2d 25 [1st Dept. 1990] ). That the statements were allegedly made externally to defendants’ retail construction client, one month before plaintiff was fired, does not undercut the conclusion that they are "too closely related" to plaintiff's termination "to stand as a distinct cause of action" ( LaDuke v. Lyons, 250 A.D.2d 969, 973, 673 N.Y.S.2d 240 [3d Dept. 1998], quoting Brooks v. Blue Cross of Northeastern N.Y., 190 A.D.2d 894, 895, 593 N.Y.S.2d 119 [3d Dept. 1993] ; see McEntee, 166 A.D.2d at 359, 561 N.Y.S.2d 25 [allegedly defamatory statements made "to unidentified persons at unspecified times"]).
We have considered plaintiff's remaining contentions and find them unavailing.