Opinion
No. FA08-4017663S
April 21, 2009
MOTION TO BIFURCATE PENDENTE LITE
ISSUE
Before the court is the plaintiff's motion to bifurcate pendente lite, pursuant to General Statutes § 52-205 and Practice Book § 15-1. As a threshold issue, this court must determine whether the validity of a premarital agreement should be determined prior to the final hearing on the dissolution of the marriage or as part of the final hearing.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The basic facts surrounding the issue are undisputed. On November 11, 2002, the plaintiff, Carole Winer-Sorensen, and the defendant, Ronald Sorensen, Jr., entered into a premarital agreement prior to their marriage on November 17, 2002. Subsequently, on September 2, 2008, the plaintiff commenced this action seeking a dissolution of the parties' marriage upon the ground that the marriage had broken down irretrievably. An amended complaint was filed on October 6, 2008, whereby the plaintiff seeks enforcement of the terms of the parties' premarital agreement. Filed on March 25, 2009, and argued before the court on March 30, 2009, the plaintiff is now moving for a bifurcation of the trial proceedings to adjudicate the validity of the parties' premarital agreement prior to proceeding with any trial on the defendant's claims of alimony, counsel fees and equitable distribution. The defendant opposes the plaintiff's motion to bifurcate but has not briefed his arguments for the court, choosing instead to rely on his arguments made orally on March 30, 2009.
The premarital agreement was not presented to the court, but is described in the plaintiff's prayer for relief included in her amended complaint.
DISCUSSION
Whether a dissolution action can be bifurcated so that the validity of a premarital agreement can be decided prior to the final hearing on the dissolution of the marriage is not a new issue before the court. Unfortunately, the few Superior Court cases that have addressed the issue refer to agreements made by the parties to bifurcate, or provide no analysis or explanation regarding the court's decision to bifurcate the trial. See LaCore v. LaCore, Superior Court, judicial district of Middlesex, Docket No. FA 05 4001964 (February 3, 2006, Dubay, J.) (matter bifurcated to accommodate counsel); Krawczynski v. Krawczynski, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. FA 0100149 (February 24, 1993, Harrigan, J.) (bifurcated by agreement of the parties); Wincheshter v. McCue, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. FA 02 0471185 (February 26, 2004, Gilardi, J.) (36 Conn. L. Rptr. 717) (no analysis provided by court); Oliver v. Oliver, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford/New Britain, Docket No. FA 95 551531 (December 30, 1997, Shortall, J.) (same).
In the case at hand, there is no agreement by the parties to bifurcate. The plaintiff argues that her motion to bifurcate should be granted to protect her contractual rights, negate any prejudice thereto and serve the interests of judicial convenience and efficiency. She argues that if the validity of the premarital agreement is determined first, it will save her from being "forced to participate in an expensive and emotionally and psychologically exhausting trial . . ." The defendant opposes the motion, claiming that he is the disadvantaged party in this action and that he cannot afford two hearings. The defendant further argues that his claim that the premarital agreement is unconscionable as set forth in General Statutes § 46b-36g(a)(2) is to be addressed at the time when enforcement is sought, which he equates to being at the final dissolution hearing.
Bifurcation is a judge's ability to divide a trial into two parts so as to render a judgment on a set of legal issues without looking at all aspects of the case. "Bifurcation may be appropriate in cases in which litigation of one issue may obviate the need to litigate another issue." Barry v. Quality Steel, 263 Conn. 424, 449, 820 A.2d 258 (2002).
Pursuant to General Statutes § 52-205 and Practice Book § 15-1, a trial court has the discretion to determine the order in which issues shall be tried. "The bifurcation of a trial proceeding lies solely within the discretion of the trial court . . . [and] appellate review is limited to a determination of whether this discretion has been abused." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Saczynski v. Saczynski, 109 Conn.App. 426, 428, 951 A.2d 670 (2008). "Discretion means a legal discretion, to be exercised in conformity with the spirit of the law and in a manner to subserve and not to impede or defeat the ends of substantial justice . . . It goes without saying that the term abuse of discretion does not imply a bad motive or wrong purpose but merely means that the ruling appears to have been made on untenable grounds." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) O'Shea v. Mignone, 50 Conn.App. 577, 583, 719 A.2d 1176, cert. denied, 247 Conn. 941, 723 A.2d 319 (1998)
General Statutes § 52-205 provides: " In all cases, whether entered upon the docket as jury cases or court cases, the court may order that one or more of the issues joined be tried before the others." (Emphasis added.)
Practice Book § 15-1 provides in relevant part: "Order of Trial
In all cases, whether entered upon the docket as jury cases or court cases, the judicial authority may order that one or more of the issues joined be tried before the others." (Emphasis added.)
In Saczynski v. Saczynski, supra, 109 Conn.App. 429, the Appellate Court, in affirming the judgment of the trial court to bifurcate the trial, held that "[i]n light of the broad discretion reposed in the court, the fact that neither party requested bifurcation does not change our conclusion." (Emphasis added.)
"The interests served by bifurcated trials are convenience, negation of prejudice and judicial efficiency." Reichhold v. Hartford Accident Indemnity Co., 243 Conn. 401, 423, 703 A.2d 1132 (1997), on appeal after remand, 252 Conn. 774, 750 A.2d 1051 (2000). "Factors to be considered in the detailed analysis required in bifurcation cases have been articulated in federal cases. Among those factors are: `(1) whether the issues are significantly different from one another; (2) whether the issues are to be tried before a jury or to the court; (3) whether the posture of discovery on the issues favors a single trial or bifurcation; (4) whether the documentary and testimonial evidence on the issues overlap and; (5) whether the party opposing bifurcation will be prejudiced if it is granted.' Dallas v. Goldberg, 143 F.Sup.2d 312, 315 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)." Pri Cap. Group v. E. Cap. Funding, Superior Court, complex litigation docket at Middlesex, Docket No. X04 CV 01 0103512 (November 17, 2004, Quinn, J.).
In considering the arguments made by the parties as applied to the factors set forth above, this court is of the opinion that bifurcation of the proceedings would be appropriate. A determination of the validity of the premarital agreement at a time prior to the final dissolution would best serve the interests of judicial convenience and efficiency. A ruling in favor of bifurcation does not prejudice the defendant to the same extent that an opposite ruling would prejudice the plaintiff. The court is not persuaded by the defendant's alleged prejudice of having to prepare for two trials, and the costs associated therein. If the court were to rule against the plaintiff on this motion, the defendant would still have to prepare for a trial in which he would have to challenge the validity of the agreement, as well prepare to contest his claims of alimony, counsel fees and equitable distribution of property. If anything, a separation of these issues will be beneficial to him, because if the premarital agreement is deemed enforceable that would lessen the need to prepare for the final dissolution hearing. In the alternative, if the agreement is deemed unenforceable, the same level of preparation would still be required as in one full hearing on all of the issues.
On the other hand, if the court was to deny this motion, the potential prejudice faced by the plaintiff would be unjust. By entering into a premarital agreement, a long contested trial was exactly what the parties were attempting to avoid. Given Connecticut's recognition of premarital agreements, it would be counterproductive not to allow a party to benefit from their bargain. It would also be unfair to require the plaintiff to prepare for a full trial, incurring the associated expenses in doing so, as well as enduring the emotional and psychological aspects of the trial, when a ruling on the enforceability of the premarital agreement beforehand could obviate the need to do so.
Furthermore, the defendant's argument that the unconscionableness of the premarital agreement, as set forth in General Statutes § 46b-36(a)(2) is only to be considered at the final dissolution hearing is also misguided. Nothing within the statute or in cases applying the statute limits a determination of unconscionableness to the final dissolution date. See Intravia v. Intravia, Superior Court, judicial district of Middlesex, Docket No. FA 02 0099715 (October 15, 2003, Dyer, J.) (35 Conn. L. Rptr. 635) (the court determined if the premarital agreement was unconscionable at the time of enforcement in ruling on a Motion in Limine prior to the dissolution hearing). The defendant will get his opportunity to argue that the premarital agreement is unconscionable at the time of the hearing on the validity of the premarital agreement.
"Prenuptial agreements in Connecticut have been governed since October 1, 1995, by the Connecticut Premarital Agreement Act, General Statutes § 46b-36a et seq. General Statutes § 46b-36g(a) provides: `A premarital agreement or amendment shall not be enforceable if the party against whom enforcement is sought proves that: (1) Such party did not execute the agreement voluntarily; or (2) [t]he agreement was unconscionable when it was executed or when enforcement is sought; or (3) [b]efore execution of the agreement, such party was not provided a fair and reasonable disclosure of the amount, character and value of property, financial obligations and income of the other party; or (4) [s]uch party was not afforded a reasonable opportunity to consult with independent counsel.'" (Emphasis added.) Friezo v. Friezo, 281 Conn. 166, 182, 914 A.2d 533 (2007).
Although not binding on this court, the court rules of our sister state, California, are persuasive and particularly instructive when dealing with the issue of bifurcation as it relates to the validity of a premarital agreement. Under California Rule 5.175(c), "[t]he court may try separately one or more issues before trial of the other issues if resolution of the bifurcated issue is likely to simplify the determination of the other issues. Issues to that which may be appropriate to try separately in advance include: (1) Validity of a postnuptial or premarital agreement . . ." (Emphasis added.)
ORDERS
With this authority in mind, as well as taking into consideration the protection of the plaintiff's contractual rights, the negating of any prejudice thereto and serving the interests of judicial convenience and efficiency, the court hereby grants the plaintiff's motion to bifurcate. In doing so, the court will not be making an assignment of property or an award of alimony, which must, by statute, await the entering of the final decree. Rather, it will simply be ruling on the enforceability of the premarital agreement as provided by the statute. Counsel are directed to contact the Family Case Flow coordinator to arrange a date for the hearing on the enforceability of the premarital agreement.