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Windhorst v. Barnhart

United States District Court, D. North Dakota, Southwestern Division
Apr 15, 2003
Case No. A1-02-67 (D.N.D. Apr. 15, 2003)

Opinion

Case No. A1-02-67

April 15, 2003


MEMORANDUM AND ORDER


The Plaintiff seeks judicial review of the Social Security Commissioner's denial of his application for disability insurance benefits and Supplemental Security Income. For the reasons set forth below, the Commissioner's decision is affirmed.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Plaintiff, Leslie M. Windhorst ("Windhorst"), filed applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income benefits in January 1998 that were denied initially and again upon reconsideration. The denials were affirmed by an administrative law judge on April 28, 1999, and by the Court on August 14, 2001.

Thereafter, Winhorst filed successive applications for the same benefits on February 28, 2001. (Tr. 113-115, 382, 384-385). These applications were also denied initially and upon reconsideration. (Tr. 92-99, 102-103, 386-390). Windhorst then requested a de novo hearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ"). The ALJ conducted an administrative hearing on November 6, 2001. (Tr. 33-91). The ALJ issued a decision on December 12, 2001, and concluded that Windhorst was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. (Tr. 12-27). The Appeals Council denied Windhorst's request for review and adopted the ALJ's decision as the Commissioner's final decision. (Tr. 5-6). Windhorst then filed a complaint on May 24, 2002, seeking judicial review of the Commissioner's decision. The Commissioner filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on January 24, 2003. Windhorst has not filed a responsive pleading.

II. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE

Leslie M. Windhorst was born on October 5, 1957. (Tr. 38). He lives with his mother. (Tr. 60). Windhorst possesses a high school degree and has taken classes in power plant technology and plumbing (Tr. 58-59). He has worked as a farmer, sugar beet truck driver, and beet plant piler operator/foreman. (Tr. 72-75, 160).

Windhorst has diabetes and has been diagnosed with systemic lupus erythematosus. (Tr. 43, 71, 78, 181). He also suffers from deep right leg thrombocytopenia, Raynaud's phenomenon, chronic fatigue syndrome, rheumatoid arthritis, and hypertension. (Tr. 41-43, 146, 235). He has experienced difficulty sleeping, memory loss, unexplained weight loss, and vision problems that he attributes to his condition. (Tr. 43-45, 154). Windhorst has also complained of pain in his chest, lower back, wrists, elbows, and right leg. (Tr. 141). He rates his pain as a seven on a scale of zero to ten. (Tr. 52).

Windhorst takes multiple medications daily, but reports that they only provide him a modicum of relief. (Tr. 48, 58). He has been prescribed Prilosec, Danazol, Vaseretic, Procardia XL, Prednisone, Coumadin, Darvocet, Plaquenil, and Celebrex. (Tr. 142-143, 161, 227). His medications often leave him feeling weak, drowsy, light headed, and nauseous (Tr. 49-50, 143). He has also complained of nose bleeds and swelling in his extremities that he attributes to his various medications. (Tr. 143)

For Windhorst, a typical morning consists of taking his medications and either reading the paper or watching television. (Tr. 61-62). In the afternoon he usually takes naps, but on occasion will help unload groceries, go fishing, or work in the yard. (Tr. 63-64, 68, 144). Aside from an occasional fishing trip, a monthly church excursion, or an occasional visit by friends, Windhorst has little social contact with others. (Tr. 64-65). On good days, he is able to clean and cook. (Tr. 153). On bad days, he usually stays in bed and rests. (Tr. 153). While Windhorst can still drive his car on a limited basis, he reportedly can no longer operate heavy farm equipment. (Tr. 142).

Accepting Windhorst's testimony as factual, a vocational expert testified that Windhorst would be unable to perform any of his past jobs. (Tr. 88). However, the vocational expert testified that someone with Windhorst's limitations, education, and work history should be able to perform a full range of unskilled light and sedentary work. (Tr. 88). He cited work as a parking lot attendant, usher, ticket taker, and motel cleaner as examples of such work. (Tr. 88-89).

III. ALJ'S OPINION

The ALJ reviewed Windhorst's claims in accordance with the five-step sequential framework set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. (Tr. 16-17). At the first step, the ALJ determined that Windhorst had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since April 29, 1999. (Tr. 17). Moving on to the second and steps, the ALJ acknowledged that there was sufficient evidence documenting the presence of medically determinable impairments. (Tr. 17). He also acknowledged that Windhorst's lupus was by definition a severe impairment. (Tr. 17). Nevertheless, the ALJ concluded that it did not rise to listing level severity. (Tr. 17). After considering the objective medical evidence and residual functional capacity assessments, the ALJ was persuaded that Windhorst retained the ability to perform work at the light exertional range. (Tr. 18-20).

The Commissioner uses a following framework to determine disability: (1) whether the claimant is presently engaged in a substantial gainful activity, (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment that significantly limits the claimant's physical or mental ability to perform basic work activities, (3) whether the claimant has an impairment that meets or equals a presumptively disabling impairment listed in the regulations, (4) whether the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform his or her past relevant work, and (5) if the claimant cannot perform the past work, the burden then shifts to the Commissioner to prove that there are other jobs in the national economy that the claimant can perform.

The ALJ then proceeded to review Windhorst's subjective complaints in accordance with the standards set forth in Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir. 1984). The ALJ noted that Windhorst was able to work periodically, which detracted from claims that he was unable to work since April 1999. (Tr. 21). Next, the ALJ keyed in to Windhorst's reported symptoms, precipitating and aggravating factors, and the presence of medication side-effects. (Tr. 22). Upon reviewing the record in conjunction with Windhorst's statements, the ALJ could not establish that Windhorst's capacity for light work was compromised by pain or chronic fatigue. (Tr. 23). Moving on the fourth step of the analysis, the ALJ determined that Windhorst was no longer able to perform his past relevant work. (Tr. 23). At the fifth step, the ALJ accepted the testimony of the vocational expert and concluded that Windhorst was capable of performing a full range of light or sedentary work. (Tr. 24-25). As a result, the ALJ concluded that Windhorst was not disabled under the Social Security Act.

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court plays a limited role when reviewing the Commissioner's decisions. Wiseman v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 1153, 1155 (8th Cir. 1990). The Court does not conduct a de novo review. Keller v. Shalala, 26 F.3d 856, 858 (8th Cir. 1994). Rather, it looks at the record as a whole to determine whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence. Upon review of the pleadings and transcript of the record, the Court can affirm, modify, or reverse the decision of the Commissioner, with or without remanding the case for a rehearing. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). To affirm the Commissioner's decision, the Court must find that it is supported by substantial evidence appearing in the record as a whole. Cruse v. Bowen, 867 F.2d 1183, 1184 (8th Cir. 1989). "Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance, but enough so that a reasonable mind might find it adequate to support the conclusion." Robinson v. Sullivan, 956 F.2d 836, 838 (8th Cir. 1992). The review of the record is more than a search for evidence supporting the Commissioner's decision. The Court must also take into account matters that detract from the ALJ's findings and apply a balancing test to weigh evidence which is contradictory. Kirby v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1323, 1326 (8th Cir. 1991); Sobania v. Secretary of Health Human Services, 879 F.2d 441, 444 (8th Cir. 1989).

When conducting its review, the Court employs a "scrutinizing analysis" that balances the supporting and contradictory evidence on the record. Gavin v. Heckler, 811 F.2d 1195, 1199 (8th Cir. 1987). As noted, this requires more than a search for evidence that supports the Commissioner's decision. Id. The Court must review the entire record and weigh all evidence that fairly detracts from the Commissioner's findings. Cruse v. Bowen, 867 F.2d 1183, 1184 (8th Cir. 1989).

When determining whether there is substantial evidence to support the Commissioner's decision, the Court must consider:

1) the credibility findings made by the ALJ;

2) the plaintiff's vocational factors;

3) medical evidence from treating and consulting physicians;
4) the plaintiff's subjective complaints relating to exertional and non-exertional activities and impairments;
5) any corroboration by third parties of the plaintiff's impairments; and
6) the testimony of vocational experts that is based upon a proper hypothetical questions setting forth the plaintiff's impairment.

Baker v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 955 F.2d 552, 555 (8th Cir. 1992).

The substantial evidence standard "allows for the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions, thus it embodies a zone of choice within which the [Commissioner] may decide to grant or deny benefits without being subject to reversal on appeal." Culbertson v. Shalala, 30 F.3d 934, 939 (8th Cir. 1994). In other words, while the Court may weigh evidence differently, it cannot reverse a Commissioner's decision if there is sufficient evidence to support either outcome. Id.

V. LEGAL DISCUSSION

The record reveals that Windhorst has not responded in any manner to the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment filed on January 24, 2003. Under Local Rule 7.1., the failure to file a responsive brief may be deemed an admission that the Defendant's motion is well taken. In any event, the Court has carefully reviewed the record and concludes that there is substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ's decision.

The ALJ did not dispute that Windhorst suffered from lupus and associated symptoms. However, records of Windhorst's physical examinations reveal regular cardiac rates, clear lungs, and normal ranges of motion of the spine, left shoulder, and joints. (Tr. 184, 225, 231, 233, 235, 237, 399). Windhorst did undergo a colonoscopy and lymph node biopsy. (Tr. 290, 294). However, the results of these diagnostic procedures were negative and revealed no major abnormalities. (Tr. 290, 294). As for Windhorst's diabetes, thrombocytopenia, Raynauld's phenomenon, and lupus, all such conditions appeared to be controlled or amenable to treatment. (Tr. 181, 225, 230, 233, 234, 238, 400).

Windhorst's physician stated on August 23, 1999, and May 15, 2001, that Windhorst's symptoms were quite disabling. (Tr. 201, 383). However, the ALJ discounted such statements due to the fact that the physician did not identify or impose specific limitations on Windhorst. The ALJ also noted inconsistencies in the physicians treatment notes; i.e., that Windhorst was stable and had no major complaints. (Tr. 226, 227). These inconsistencies, when coupled with records indicating that Windhorst was responsive to treatment, provide a sufficient basis for the ALJ's skepticism regarding the treating physician's statements.

As for Windhorst's subjective complaints, it is clear from the record that the ALJ gave such complaints adequate consideration. The record reveals evidence that Windhorst was able to care for his own personal needs; he performed some household chores as well as some yardwork, and was able to help out with farm work on occasion; and he had engaged in work activity in 2000, all of which provided the ALJ with a reasonable basis for questioning Windhorst's credibility.

A residual functional capacity assessment stated that Windhorst could lift 20 pounds occasionally, lift 10 pounds frequently, could stand and/or walk for a total of 6 hours in an 8-hour day, could sit for a total of 6 hours in an 8-hour day, had unlimited push and/or pull abilities, suffered from no manipulative or visual limitations. (Tr. 23, 209-212). There is nothing in the medical records or in the other evidence submitted to contravene the conclusions drawn in this assessment. Finally, the record reveals that the hypotheticals posed to the vocational expert by the ALJ contemplated all of Windhorst's limitations as well as Windhorst's work history and education. The ALJ's reliance on the vocational expert's answers was reasonable given the issues of Windhorst's credibility and the medical evidence indicating that Windhorst was responsive to treatment and in no acute distress.

VI. CONCLUSION

The Court finds and concludes that the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Further, the Plaintiff failed to file any responsive pleading(s) in this case which arguably should be deemed an admission that the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is well-taken. Nevertheless, the Court has reviewed the record and concludes that there is substantial evidence to support the Commissioner's decision. Accordingly, the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 8) is GRANTED and the Commissioner's decision is AFFIRMED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.


Summaries of

Windhorst v. Barnhart

United States District Court, D. North Dakota, Southwestern Division
Apr 15, 2003
Case No. A1-02-67 (D.N.D. Apr. 15, 2003)
Case details for

Windhorst v. Barnhart

Case Details

Full title:Leslie M. Windhorst, Plaintiff, vs. Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of…

Court:United States District Court, D. North Dakota, Southwestern Division

Date published: Apr 15, 2003

Citations

Case No. A1-02-67 (D.N.D. Apr. 15, 2003)