Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment and postjudgment order of the Superior Court of San Diego County No. GIC871616, Richard E. L. Strauss, Judge.
McCONNELL, P. J.
This case involves a dispute over an easement that James Lightner (Lightner) and Scott Bondurant (Bondurant) have over land owned by Dean Wilson (Wilson) and Deborah Wilson (together the Wilsons). The Wilsons appeal a judgment that, among other things, grants declaratory relief sought by Lightner and Bondurant and denies declaratory relief sought by the Wilsons regarding the scope and permissible uses of the easement. The Wilsons contend the court erred by: (1) incorrectly construing the easement based on the language of the grant deed and extrinsic evidence; (2) excluding evidence showing Lightner's intended future development of his property and use of the easement would overburden the easement and the Wilsons' property; and (3) retaining jurisdiction to determine whether future uses, improvements, or modifications of the easement constitute a surcharge to the servient tenement. The Wilsons also appeal a postjudgment order awarding Lightner $341,295.00 as costs incurred in proving matters not admitted in responses to requests for admission. (Code of Civ. Proc. § 2033.420.) We affirm the judgment and reverse the postjudgment order.
All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise specified.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In two separate transactions in November 1999 and January 2000, Lightner bought 580 acres of landlocked, undeveloped land in rural San Diego County (County) near the town of Alpine. The adjoining property to the east was the Double D Ranch (the Double D), consisting of about 720 acres owned by the Williams family. Lightner's property can be accessed by an unpaved road known as the Bell Bluff Truck Trail that runs across the northern portion of the Double D.
In early 2000, Lightner began negotiating with Dudley Williams III (Dudley) for the purchase of two parcels of the Double D consisting of approximately 180 acres that were contiguous to the 580 acres Lightner already owned. Lightner also negotiated for the purchase of an access easement across the northern portion of the 540 acres of the Double D that the Williams family would retain. In December 2000, the Williams family and Lightner entered into a written agreement that separately provided for the sale to Lightner of the two parcels (identified in the agreement by the County's tax assessor's parcel numbers), an easement along the Bell Bluff Truck Trail "for road, access, and utilities" expressly made appurtenant to those two parcels, and the same easement expressly made appurtenant to three specified tax assessor's parcels that comprised Lightner's other 580 acres. The purchase price under the agreement was $720,000, consisting of $360,000 for the two parcels Lightner was purchasing and the easement appurtenant to those parcels, and $360,000 for the same easement appurtenant to the parcels Lightner already owned.
The agreement identifies the sellers as Jane E. Williams, individually and as Trustee of the Williams Community Property Trust UDT March 19, 1991, Dudley D. Williams III, and Steven D. Williams.
The relevant language of the twice-stated easement is as follows: "An easement from the public road to [the parcels Lightner purchased from the Williams family] for road, access, and utilities over and across [the northern portion of the Williams family retained property]. This easement shall be appurtenant to [the five tax assessor's parcels comprising Lightner's property]. This easement shall be 30 feet in width with the centerline being the centerline of the existing Bell Bluff Truck Trail, and subject to Sellers' right to relocate the 30 foot wide easement within property then owned by Seller and within [the] tax parcel [comprising the northern portion of the Williams family retained property] provided the terminus at both ends of the easement remain the same, the relocated road is graded to a condition equivalent to the road at the time of the relocation, that there are no grades steeper than any of the existing grades on the road, that any and all permits required for the relocation of the easement road have been acquired by Sellers prior to the relocation, and that the existing road shall not be blocked or in any manner restricted by reason of that location until the relocated road is completely graded as herein provided and available for use."
The purchase-sale agreement between the Williams family and Lightner was evidenced by two recorded grant deeds - one granting Lightner the 180 acres and appurtenant easement over the Williams family property, and the other granting the same easement appurtenant to the 580 acres Lightner already owned. The grant deeds indentified the 760 acres to which the easement was appurtenant by the legal description of that land as well as by the five tax assessor's parcel numbers comprising it.
In late 2003, Lightner learned that a tax assessor's parcel is different from a legal parcel and that his 760 acres to which the easement over the Bell Bluff Truck Trail was appurtenant consisted of seven legal parcels. Consequently, Lightner did three boundary adjustments that resulted in there being seven tax assessor's parcels on his 760 acres instead of five, and he obtained recorded certificates of compliance from the County approving those adjustments.
In December 2003, Bondurant introduced Wilson to Lightner. The three men had been members of the same fraternity at Stanford University, and Bondurant and Lightner became close friends during their college years. In January 2004, Lightner met with Bondurant and Wilson at Wilson's house and showed them maps of his property and surrounding properties. The three men discussed the possibility of a group of friends owning a development of "high-end" rural ranches that shared common property with amenities such as a clubhouse, swimming pool, and stables. Lightner then drove Wilson and Bondurant out to see his property, which they accessed by driving along the Bell Bluff Truck Trail. Lightner told Wilson and Bondurant that the Williams family wanted to sell the remaining Double D property. He gave Wilson the telephone number of Jane Larson (Larson), the Williams family's real estate broker who had been involved in Lightner's purchase of a portion of the Double D property.
In March 2004, the Wilsons entered into a contract with the Williams family to purchase the remainder of the Double D property. The contract gave the Wilsons a 60-day "free look" period and an 18-month escrow period. Escrow closed in March 2005. In November 2004, the Wilsons leased the Double D from the Williams family so they could take possession before escrow closed.
After the Wilsons entered into the contract to purchase the Double D, Wilson began negotiating with Lightner for the purchase of Lightner's property. In August 2004, Lightner showed Wilson a chart he had made depicting various options for selling the seven legal parcels that comprised his 760 acres and the advantages and disadvantages of the various options. The options included selling four, five, or all seven of the parcels to Wilson, and selling three parcels to Bondurant. A map attached to the chart showed the boundaries of the seven parcels. In September 2004, Wilson offered to purchase four of Lightner's parcels, but they did not reach an agreement.
In January and February of 2005, Lightner performed repair work and installed a culvert on a portion of the Bell Bluff Truck Trail that was on County property just east of the Double D property. Dudley, who then still owned the Double D, gave Lightner permission to take decomposed granite from a pit on the Double D to use on the road work. The grading contractor Lightner hired to perform the work removed additional decomposed granite from a knoll near the site of the work to place over the culvert.
Lightner informed Wilson of the repair work he was planning to do on the road and Wilson agreed to share the cost of the work. However, after the work was completed, Wilson became upset with Lightner when he saw the scope of the work and how much the knoll had been cut down. Lightner sent Wilson an e-mail stating he felt bad about the "misunderstanding over the road" and that in the future he would respect Wilson's "wish to control all work on your land regardless of easement."
Wilson paid half the cost of the road work, but he cautioned Lightner in a letter: "As the owner of the Double D Ranch, I am the only one allowed to work on the Double D Ranch roads. It is important that you are clear that your 30-foot road, access, and utility easement... only gives you the access rights enclosed therein. It would be at my sole determination for all future maintenance, changes, additions and improvements to the [Bell Bluff] Road through the Double D Ranch." Lightner responded with a letter in which he asserted various implied legal rights as the easement owner, including the right to develop or improve the easement up to its full 30-foot width, the right to maintain and improve the road, and the "right to modernize the access route and make it more convenient, for example by installing an automatic gate."
In March 2006, Lightner sold 285 acres of his property to Bondurant. Bondurant's property included an easement across Lightner's adjacent property to the east in addition to the easement across Wilson's property along the Bell Bluff Truck Trail that was appurtenant to the property Bondurant purchased. Wilson expressed displeasure to Lightner over Lightner's sale of property to Bondurant when Lightner told him about it in January 2006. Between February and May 2006, Wilson placed within the 30-foot easement along the Bell Bluff Truck Trail various items that restricted but did not cut off Lightner's access to his property, including a cattle grate with side braces, three large posts near the cattle grate, two heavy wooden posts near an old tractor within the easement, and a fence that ran from a post by the tractor to an oak tree within the easement.
Title to Bondurant's property is jointly held by Bondurant and the Eugene Scott Bondurant Trust dated 8/21/95 (Bondurant Trust).
In August 2006, the Wilsons sued Lightner for quiet title and declaratory relief, seeking a declaratory judgment that Lightner does not have the right to pave, improve, alter, or expand the use of his easement. The Wilsons' operative pleading is a third amended complaint against Lightner and Bondurant alleging twelve causes of action. The first through fourth causes of action seek declaratory relief regarding the scope of the easement; the fifth cause of action is for quiet title; the sixth, seventh and eighth causes of action seek reformation of the easement grant deeds based on mutual mistake, unilateral mistake, and intentional misrepresentation, respectively; the ninth and tenth causes of action allege private nuisance and trespass, respectively, against Lightner only; and the eleventh and twelfth causes of action allege negligent damage to real property and negligence per se, respectively, against Lightner only.
The third amended complaint names Bondurant individually and the Bondurant Trust.
The heart of the third amended complaint is the allegation in the first cause of action for declaratory relief that Lightner and the Williams family "mutually agreed" to the following "easement limitations" (capitalization omitted) before they signed and recorded the easement grant deeds: (1) use of the easement by Lightner and his successors in interest would be limited to access over a rural dirt road (the Bell Bluff Truck Trail); (2) use of the Bell Bluff Road by Lightner and his successors in interest "would be limited to personal use in order to access up to one residence only, to possibly be constructed on the Lightner [p]roperty"; and (3) the easement rights of Lightner and his successors in interest "would be limited to the use [the Bell Bluff Truck Trail] as it then existed, without the ability to improve the road" by grading or widening the road, removing trees "that have existed in the area for nearly 100 years, " paving the road, removing "objects that present no obstacle to their use of the easement, " changing a gate on the road, installing signage, or making other improvements "in order to secure building permits for construction and development of [Lightner's property and Bondurant's property]."
The Wilsons filed an amendment to the third amended complaint that changed the allegation that Lightner and the Williams family "mutually agreed" to the easement limitations to the allegation that they "contemplated and intended" the easement limitations.
Lightner filed a first amended cross-complaint against the Wilsons for declaratory relief, quiet title, and private nuisance. In his declaratory relief cause of action, Lightner sought a judicial declaration that, among other things, he was "entitled to use, maintain and improve the [e]asement in a manner consistent with all applicable federal, state and local laws, rules and regulations, which includes, but is not limited to, the right to: (a) enjoy safe and convenient ingress and egress to and from the real property [benefitted by the easement]; (b) use, maintain and improve the [e]asement to facilitate and accommodate improvements on the real property [benefitted by the easement]; (c) install utilities, along with the infrastructure necessary to support such facilities, to service said improvements; (d) grade and widen, within the [e]asement, the existing road; (e) remove trees, brush and shrubs to accommodate the use, maintenance and improvement of the [e]asement; (f) surface, with all-weather surfacing, a road within the [e]asement; (g) install drainage systems to control storm-water and erosion on the road within the [e]asement; (h) remove obstacles placed by [the Wilsons] within the [e]asement; (i) improve and maintain a gate at or before the entrance to the [e]asement including, but not limited to, installing an automatic opening and closing mechanism for the existing gate; and (j) post street address numbers and/or indentifying signs at the eastern entrance to the [e]asement[.]"
Bondurant (and the Bondurant Trust) also filed a cross-complaint for declaratory relief and quiet title against the Wilsons, seeking a declaratory judgment that as lawful owners of the subject easement they were entitled to grade and widen the existing dirt road within the easement; clear the easement and remove trees, shrubs and other obstacles within the easement; pave the easement road; install an automatic gate at the entrance to the easement; and improve the easement "such that it allows for road, access and utilities as necessary for the use of all real property benefitted by the [easement], consistent with the A-72 General Agricultural San Diego County zoning designation, including but not limited to, construction of residences, installation of utilities and ingress/egress from those residences."
After the Wilsons presented their case in chief at trial, Lightner moved for judgment under section 631.8 on the Wilsons' first cause of action for declaratory relief regarding the alleged easement limitations and Bondurant, joined by Lightner, moved for judgment on the fourth cause of action for declaratory relief regarding "non-expansion" of the easement and the sixth, seventh, and eighth causes of action for reformation. The court granted both motions. In doing so, the court ruled that the language of the easement grant was not susceptible to the easement limitations.
In its statement of decision, the court stated Bondurant joined in Lightner's motion for judgment on the first cause of action, although the reporter's transcript does not show the joinder.
During oral argument on in limine motions at the beginning of trial, the court on its own motion "removed" the Wilsons' ninth through twelfth causes of action from their third amended complaint without prejudice. Those causes of action were all tort claims based on alleged damage to Wilson's land caused by Lightner's installation of the culvert in the easement road and his grading of the nearby knoll. The court "removed" them without prejudice on the ground they were premature because the County had not taken any action against the Wilsons regarding the culvert or grading on the knoll. The court observed that the alleged damage in those causes of action "all relates to some future governmental action which may not ever happen. So it's without prejudice to raise it again in the future."
After receiving evidence on the parties' remaining causes of action, the court filed a statement of decision and entered judgment in favor of Lightner and Bondurant on every cause of action. The judgment grants the declaratory relief requested by Lightner and Bondurant in their cross-complaints, including the declaration that "the [e]asement is appurtenant to all of the land (approximately 760 acres) described in the February 7, 2001 Grant Deeds, currently consisting of seven legal parcels." As both declaratory relief and relief under Lightner's nuisance cause of action, the judgment ordered the Wilsons and their successors in interest to remove "the posts, stakes, fencing near the entrance gate, the cattle grate braces and tractor from within the [e]asement."
Regarding use of the easement, the judgment states that Lightner and Bondurant and any successors in interest to their land benefitted by the easement "are entitled to use, maintain and improve the [e]asement in a manner consistent with applicable federal, state and local laws, rules and regulations, which includes, but is not limited to, the right to:
In the declaratory section of the judgment, the court retained jurisdiction "over this matter to the extent a dispute arises as to whether a certain item, currently within the [e]asement or placed in the future within the [e]asement by the Wilsons or their successors-in-interest obstructs any portion of the [e]asement, so as to unreasonably interfere with a purpose or use of the [e]asement." With respect to Lightner's nuisance cause of action, the court similarly ruled that although it was not presently issuing an injunction governing the Wilsons' future uses of the servient tenement outside the easement, it was retaining "jurisdiction over Lightner's nuisance claims and may, upon request and appropriate showing, issue an injunction against the Wilsons enjoining future conduct on the Wilsons' property that unreasonably interferes with the [e]asement and/or the Lightner and Bondurant properties."
We will present additional procedural facts as they become relevant to our discussion.
DISCUSSION
I. The Court's Construction of the Easement
The Wilsons contend the court's construction of the easement grant deeds was erroneous and the extrinsic evidence does not support the finding that Lightner, in the Wilsons' words, "could make unlimited modifications to the existing Bell Bluff Truck Trail beyond the requirements for [his] own ingress and egress." We conclude the language of the grant deeds and extrinsic evidence sufficiently supports the court's construction of the easement.
The court did not find Lightner could make "unlimited" modifications to the easement road. As noted, the judgment allows Lightner and Bondurant to maintain and improve the easement in a manner consistent with applicable federal, state and local laws, rules and regulations.
"In construing an instrument conveying an easement, the rules applicable to the construction of deeds generally apply." (Scruby v. Vintage Grapevine, Inc. (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 697, 702 (Scruby).) Generally, grant deeds are to be interpreted in the same manner as contracts. (Civ. Code, § 1066; Continental Baking Co. v. Katz (1968) 68 Cal.2d 512, 521.) " 'It is fundamental that the language of a grant of an easement determines the scope of the easement.' " (Van Klompenburg v. Berghold (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 345, 349, citing County of Sacramento v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 300, 313 and Civ. Code, § 806 ["The extent of a servitude is determined by the terms of the grant, or the nature of the enjoyment by which it was acquired."].) If the language of the easement grant "is clear and explicit..., there is no occasion for the use of parol evidence to show the nature and extent of the rights acquired. [Citations.] If the language is ambiguous, extrinsic evidence may be used as an aid to interpretation unless such evidence imparts a meaning to which the [grant] is not reasonably susceptible." (Scruby, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at p. 702.)
When the trial court admitted conflicting extrinsic evidence to resolve any ambiguity or uncertainty in the contract, the substantial evidence standard of review applies to the court's factual findings. (De Anza Enterprises v. Johnson (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1307, 1315.) Under that standard, we view the court's factual findings in favor of the prevailing party and in support of the judgment, and we resolve all conflicts in the evidence in favor of the judgment. (Heard v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1735, 1747.)
Here, the grant deeds expressly convey an easement for "road, access, and utilities" that is 30-foot-wide and appurtenant to the five tax assessor's parcels comprising the 580 acres of property currently owned by Lightner and Bondurant. Although there is no language in the grant deeds that subjects the easement to the limitations alleged in the Wilsons' third amended complaint, the court considered extrinsic evidence the Wilsons presented as proof that Lightner and the Williams family agreed to the alleged easement limitations.
In receiving the extrinsic evidence, the court expressed its intent to apply the following two-step process that courts use in deciding whether to admit parol evidence to construe a written instrument: "First, the court provisionally receives (without actually admitting) all credible evidence concerning the parties' intentions to determine 'ambiguity, ' i.e., whether the language is 'reasonably susceptible' to the interpretation urged by a party. If in light of the extrinsic evidence the court decides the language is 'reasonably susceptible' to the interpretation urged, the extrinsic evidence is then admitted to aid in the second step-interpreting the contract." (Winet v. Price (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1165.)
During trial, the court referred to testimony by Lightner, Dudley, Larson, Bondurant, and Wilson and related documentary evidence regarding the creation of the easement as "a lot of evidence received, but not admitted, in this first prong process." The court did not expressly exclude that evidence but found it was not persuasive evidence that the grant deeds were reasonably susceptible of being interpreted to include the alleged easement limitations. In its statement of decision the court stated: "The testimonial and documentary extrinsic evidence did not support the meaning urged by the Wilsons. The [g]rant [d]eeds are not reasonably susceptible to the interpretation urged by the Wilsons. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Wilsons failed to prove that Lightner and/or the Williams Family contemplated and/or intended that Lightner's use of the [e]asement would be subject to the [e]asement [l]imitations."
The evidence sufficiently supports the court's finding. Dudley admitted that none of the Williams family's counteroffers to Lightner purported to limit Lightner's easement rights to his own personal use, limit his ability to transfer the rights, or prohibit Lightner and his successors in interest from improving the easement road. One of those counteroffers proposed a straight-line easement across the Williams family's property over undeveloped land where there was no road. Dudley testified that the written agreement between the Williams family and Lightner containing the easement language reflected his final understanding of the agreement. He never told Lightner that the easement prohibited him from selling his property to other people or prohibited him from building more than one home. He never asked Lightner how many parcels he intended the easement to be appurtenant to, and he understood that the grant deeds described the appurtenant land in more detail than just identifying tax assessor's parcels. He left the grant deeds silent on the issue of maintenance of the easement and did not intend to prohibit Lightner from placing an address sign at the entrance to the easement. Dudley admitted Lightner never told him that he (Lightner) would not use the easement for the construction of more than one residence, would not maintain the easement, would not surface the easement road, would not trim trees and brush within the easement, or would not install utilities, an automatic gate opener, or an address sign within the easement.
In reviewing a judgment to determine whether a finding is supported by substantial evidence, we are not limited to evidence cited in the statement of decision. (In re Marriage of Schmir (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 43, 49-50.)
Lightner rejected the straight-line easement proposal and, as a compromise, the parties agreed that the Williams family would have the right to relocate the easement as provided in the grant deeds.
Dudley testified that he and Larson thought the 30-foot easement "would allow for a roadbed that would be satisfactory to the Cleveland National Forest Fire Department for emergency road, plus utilities, slopes, cuts, culverts, you know, all the things that go along with a road." He intended that the easement road would have two lanes of traffic and a minimum width of 16 feet, and that the easement would have 15 feet on each side of the center line "for a lane of traffic, cuts and fills and utilities." He testified that by granting an easement for utilities he "suspected there would be... a line of poles down the side of the road." In its statement of decision, the court correctly noted that "[s]uch testimony directly contradicts the claimed [e]asement [l]imitations, in particular, the claim that Lightner's use was to be limited to the Bell Bluff Truck Trail as it existed in 2001 without the ability to improve the dirt road within the easement."
Dudley and Larson both testified they believed the easement as written would limit Lightner's use of the property and not overburden the servient tenement, but Larson testified she never told Lightner that Williams agreed to a 30-foot easement to restrict the number of homes Lightner would be able to build and be serviced by the easement. Larson testified the Williams family was "okay" with granting Lightner an easement for road, access and utilities and made no attempt to limit Lightner's use of the easement or his property beyond the 30-foot limitation that was written in the agreement. Larson never told Lightner he had no right to pave the road, and never discussed with him what he would or would not be able to do within the easement. Larson testified that Lightner never told her he intended the easement to apply only to one residence, and she never told Wilson the easement prevented Lightner from building a residence on each of his legal parcels or that it provided for the construction of only one residence on Lightner's entire property and prevented Lightner from making improvements to the road within the easement.
Although Dudley testified he told Lightner he did not want to sell the Double D property to anyone who was going to develop or subdivide it, in 1967 Dudley's parents sold the property to a developer that proposed building a residential community of approximately 170 homes, with shared rural amenities such as pools, tennis courts, and hiking trails. In the 1990's, the Williams family marketed the Double D property as 722 acres as a whole or as separate parcels with a minimum lot size of 40 acres. Before Lightner's purchase of land from the Williams family, Larson had showed the property to representatives of Ford Motor Company, who were interested in developing a sports utility vehicle testing track, and an off-road vehicle organization that wanted to develop an off-road vehicle park. Larson had also spoken to other prospective buyers, including a Viejas Casino representative about the casino's interest in the property as a possible site for a western theme hotel, a representative from Microsoft, and someone who was interested in using the property as a honeymoon retreat.
The Williams family took back a note from the developer in that sale of the Double D, and foreclosed on the note after the developer defaulted.
Based on the evidence discussed above, the court could reasonably find that when Lightner and the Williams family entered into the agreement creating the subject easement, they did not "contemplate or intend" that Lightner's use of the easement would be subject to the alleged easement limitations.
The Wilsons contend the court erred in ruling that the easement language gives Lightner and his successors in interest the various rights enumerated in the judgment, such as the right to improve the easement; to install utilities in the easement and necessary infrastructure to support them; to grade, widen, and pave the road within the easement; to remove trees, brush and shrubs to accommodate the use, maintenance and improvement of the easement; to improve and maintain a gate at or before the entrance to the easement; and to post street address numbers or indentifying signs at the eastern entrance to the easement. The Wilsons cite Atchinson, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Abar (1969) 275 Cal.App.2d 456 (Atchinson)for the proposition that the court was required to find a purpose for the easement before declaring there were no restrictions to Lightner's use of the easement within the 30 feet. The Wilsons contend the court failed to find a purpose for the easement and therefore could not properly decide whether widening, paving, and grading the easement road was reasonably necessary and consistent with the purposes for which the easement was granted. We disagree with this analysis.
The Atchinson court stated: "The scope of an easement is determined by the terms of its grant. [Citation.] The grant of an unrestricted easement, not specifically defined as to the burden imposed upon the servient land, entitles the easement holder to a use limited by the requirement that it be reasonably necessary and consistent with the purposes for which the easement was granted." (Atchinson, supra, 275 Cal.App.2d at p. 464.) Here, the court specifically noted in its statement of decision that "[t]he [g]rant [d]eeds affirmatively convey an easement for the purposes of 'road, ' 'access, ' and 'utilities.' " (Italics added.) This statement is an adequate finding of the purpose of the easement under the express terms of its grant.
The Atchinson court considered easement grant language that expressly limited use of the easement to construction of tracks " 'with necessary switches and turnouts' and to operate... a railroad across the [servient] property." (Atchinson, supra, 275 Cal.App.2d at p. 466.) The Atchinson court concluded that because the easement was expressly limited to "main line" railroad operations with switches and turnouts, the trial court erred in finding the easement was for unlimited "railroad purposes" and therefore could be used for a "team track, " which is a siding on which a railroad places freight cars to be loaded and unloaded (ibid.), and is not part of but merely incidental to main line railroad operations. (Id. at p. 467.)
The Wilsons argue that the court's finding of the easement's "purpose" was required to include a determination of how Lightner intended to develop his property - i.e., how many homes the easement would allow him to construct. The Wilsons are confusing the issue of the scope and permissible uses of an express easement in light of its stated purpose in the easement grant with the issue of whether particular hypothetical future uses would overburden the easement. Whether possible future uses of an easement "go beyond the extent and scope of the easement is a matter for future determination of the court if and when the question is presented." (Pipkin v. Der Torosian (1973) 35 Cal.App.3d 722, 729, italics added; Sufficool v. Duncan (1960) 187 Cal.App.2d 544, 550 ["Whether acts of interference with easements or the uses thereof constitute a violation of the rights of the parties is a matter for future determination of a court when the particular acts are presented to it for determination."]; O'Banion v. Borba (1948) 32 Cal.2d 145, 155 [whether defendants could construct and maintain gates across easements was a matter for future determination if and when the question were presented].)
The Wilsons additionally argue that we can independently determine the parties did not intend Lightner to have the declared easement rights because the testimony regarding the purpose of the easement is not in conflict. They contend the court could not properly declare that Lightner had any rights under the easement that were not expressly stated in the easement grant, or at least orally agreed to or discussed by Lightner and the Williams family when the easement was being negotiated. Essentially, they argue that Lightner and Bondurant have no implied or incidental rights under the easement.
As we discussed above, the evidence sufficiently supports the court's finding that Lightner and the Williams family did not contemplate or intend that the easement would be subject to the limitations alleged in the Wilsons' third amended complaint. We also noted that "[t]he grant of an unrestricted easement, not specifically defined as to the burden imposed upon the servient land, entitles the easement holder to a use limited by the requirement that it be reasonably necessary and consistent with the purpose for which the easement was granted." (Atchinson, supra, 275 Cal.App.2d at p. 464; City of Pasadena v. California-Michigan Land & Water Co. (1941) 17 Cal.2d 576, 582.) Accordingly, an easement granted for road purposes in broad or general terms "creates 'a general right of way capable of use in connection with the dominant tenement for all reasonable purposes.' " (Wall v. Rudolph (1961) 198 Cal.App.2d 684, 692, quoting Laux v. Freed (1960) 53 Cal.2d 512, 525.)
"[A] right of way is a privilege of passage over the land of another, 'with the implied right... to make such changes in the surface of the land as are necessary to make it available for travel in a convenient manner.' " (White v. Walsh (1951) 105 Cal.App.2d 828, 832, quoting Ballard v. Titus (1910) 157 Cal. 673, 681.) Use of the easement is " 'limited only by the requirement that it be reasonably necessary and consistent with purposes for which the easement was granted.' " (Wall v. Rudolph, supra, 198 Cal.App.2d at p. 692, quoting City of Pasadena v. California-Michigan Etc. Co. (1941) 17 Cal.2d 576, 582.) "This reasonable contemplation presumptively includes normal future development within the scope of the basic purpose [citations], but not an abnormal development [that] actually increases the burden upon the servient tenement [citation]." (Wall v. Rudolph, supra, 198 Cal.App.2d at p. 692.)
"Where the way over the surface of the ground is one of expressly defined width, ... the owner of the easement has the right, free of interference by the owner of the servient estate, to use the land to the limits of the defined width even if the result is to give him a wider way than necessary." (Tarr v. Watkins (1960) 180 Cal.App.2d 362, 365, citing Ballard v. Titus, supra, 157 Cal. at p. 681.) Although an easement owner cannot change the character of the easement or materially increase the burden on the servient estate, within those limits the owner "may make repairs, improvements, or changes that do not affect its substance." (Burris v. People's Ditch Co. (1894) 104 Cal. 248, 252.) At least one treatise on California real property law has commented that "[t]he owner of a road easement has a right to grade and pave the surface, install guard rails, and add other improvements reasonably required to make the use of the easement safe and convenient." (6 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate (3d ed. 2006) § 15:59, pp. 202-203, fns. omitted.)
In light of these principles, we conclude that the subject easement for "road, access, and utilities" is reasonably construed as a right-of-way easement for road and utility purposes, and that the permissible uses of the easement specified in the judgment (ante, fn. 8) are reasonably necessary and consistent with those purposes. The trial court could reasonably find that by agreeing to a 30-foot-wide road and utilities easement, Lightner and the Williams family contemplated parcels within the dominant tenement would be developed, and the roadway serving those parcels would be improved and widened to meet the needs of that anticipated future development.
The Wilsons contend that the scope and use of the easement was fixed by Lightner's initial use before the Williams family sold the Double D to the Wilsons. They cite Winslow v. City of Vallejo (1906) 148 Cal. 723, 725 (Winslow) for the proposition that "where a grant of an easement is general as to the extent of the burden to be imposed on the servient tenement, an exercise of the right, with the acquiescence and consent of both parties, in a particular course or manner, fixes the right and limits it to the particular course or manner in which it has been enjoyed." The Wilsons suggest that because Lightner did not make any modifications to the easement road before the Williams family moved from the servient tenement, the Double D property, he could not change the road after the Wilsons took possession of that property.
Winslow and the cases it relied on involved attempts by an easement holder to change the use of an easement in a way that would substantially increase the burden of the easement on the servient tenement where the language of the easement grant was general as to the extent of that burden and the less burdensome use of the easement had been established by a long period of active use after the grant. The easement at issue in Winslow gave the City of Vallejo the right to lay and maintain water pipes across the servient tenement but the easement grant did not specify the number, size, or exact location of the pipes. The city laid a single 10-inch diameter pipe across the servient tenement and nine years later sought to lay an additional 14-inch diameter pipe. (Winslow, supra, 148 Cal. at p. 724-725.) The California Supreme Court concluded that the laying of the single 10-inch diameter pipe with the acquiescence of both parties fixed the location and extent of the easement, and the city could not later replace the pipe with pipe of a greater diameter or lay more than one pipe. (Id. at p. 727.) However, the Winslow court noted that "if the language of the grant in question, viewed in light of all the conditions existing when it was executed, clearly gave to the defendant a right in excess of the one actually used, such right would still exist, notwithstanding the exercise for a time of a lesser privilege." (Winslow, supra, 148 Cal. at p. 726.)
Here, the easement grant clearly gave Lightner easement rights in excess of those he has actually used by specifying an easement width of 30 feet and including "utilities" as one of the purposes of the easement. If Lightner's initial use fixed the scope and permissible uses of the easement as the Wilsons argue, upon acquiring the easement Lightner would have had to take immediate steps to exercise all of the rights of use listed in the judgment to avoid forever losing them. The Wilson's argument contravenes the principle that "an easement created by grant is not lost by mere nonuser. [Citations.] By statute the extent of the servitude is determined by the terms of the grant (Civ. Code, § 806), and only servitudes acquired by enjoyment shall be extinguished by disuse [citation]. For an easement acquired by grant to be thus lost it must be accomplished with an express or implied intention of abandonment." (Haley v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist. (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 285, 290-291.) The rights that inhere in Lightner and Bondurant's easement grant remain part of the easement regardless of whether or when they are fully exercised; Lightner did not waive those rights by not immediately exercising them.
II. Evidentiary Rulings
The Wilsons contend the court committed reversible per se error by excluding evidence showing Lightner's intended future development of his property and use of the easement would overburden the easement and the Wilsons' property. Based on the Wilsons' citations to the record, it appears that the specific evidentiary ruling they are challenging is the court's qualified granting of Lightner's motion in limine No. 5 "to exclude [the Wilsons] from introducing any evidence, or making any argument, as to whether the County will issue a building permit to Lightner, including but not limited to, whether Lightner will be able to design an improved access road within the [e]asement that will be approved by the County... or the terms of such approval." The evidence targeted by Lightner's motion was expert testimony that County regulations would preclude or limit Lightner's construction of an improved road within the easement and therefore limit the extent to which Lightner and Bondurant could develop their property served by the easement. The Wilsons characterize the excluded expert testimony as evidence that their property would be overburdened "by the massive development and modifications planned by [Lightner]."
The Wilsons state their engineer and land use expert, Michael Pallamary, would have testified "as to the overburden of the [e]asement on [the Wilsons'] ranch that would inevitably occur should [Lightner] be permitted to use the [e]asement to serve more assessors parcels than expressly identified in the [e]asement [g]rant [d]eeds." Pallamary would have further testified that use of the easement to service more than one or two homes was inconsistent with the terms of the grant deeds because the easement would have allowed only a 16-foot road. The Wilsons' engineering expert Mark Farrington would have testified that County "road standards would significantly impact the amount of improvement required for an access road, depending on how many homes were using the road[.]" The Wilsons submit that Farrington and Chief Nissen of the Rural Fire District would have testified that County regulations and requirements preclude construction of a road on the easement that could serve more than two homes.
The Wilsons also complain that the court excluded the testimony of David Bark, a title expert and attorney who would have testified about the custom and practice relating to language used in easement deeds and that the language in the easement grant deeds at issue here was consistent with a limited easement to preserve the status quo that existed when the easement was created. Bondurant successfully moved in limine to exclude Bark's testimony on the grounds "(1) his interpretation and legal opinions concerning the deeds [would] encroach upon the court's exclusive judicial function; (2) his interpretation of the deeds is not one to which they are reasonably susceptible; and (3) he [would provide] no admissible evidence or foundation as to the 'custom and practice' that supports his interpretation of the granting language."
The court minutes reflect the following ruling on Lightner's motion in limine No. 5: "[O]n Court's own Motion, issues pertaining to speculative work that will be done by Lightner shall be removed ('taken out') without prejudice, with no findings on the merits as to whether Lightner can satisfy requirement[s] of appropriate agency/ies regarding improvements, whether any damages would come about to Mr. Wilson, and that there is no prevailing party on the issue[.]"
During oral argument on the motion, the court explained, "Whether what future use overburdens the servient tenement or not is going to depend on what the future use is. Sure, maybe it's another lawsuit, I don't know, but until then, it's just speculation at this stage." The court later commented, "I'll try to decide the issues properly before me based on existing evidence. But when it comes to speculation about what may happen sometime in the future, either by Mr. Bondurant or Mr. Lightner or Mr. Wilson or the County or the fire chief or any of those, maybe it will, maybe it won't. I can't decide any of that, I don't think. We don't know what's going to happen. If that gives any direction. Seems to me that I'd just be guessing."
" '[A]n appellate court reviews any ruling by a trial court as to the admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion.' " (Dart Industries, Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1059, 1078; Boston v. Penny Lane Centers, Inc. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 936, 950 [exclusion of expert opinion].) Even if the trial court improperly excluded evidence, the error does not require reversal of the judgment unless it caused a miscarriage of justice. (Saxena v. Goffney (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 316, 332.) It is appellant's burden to show that a more favorable outcome would have resulted if the evidence had been admitted. (Ibid.)
In support of their contention that the exclusion of the evidence in question was reversible per se error, the Wilsons cite Gordon v. Nissan Motor Co., Ltd. (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 1103, 1114, in which the Court of Appeal stated that "when a trial court erroneously denies all evidence relating to a claim, or essential expert testimony without which a claim cannot be proven, the error is reversible per se because it deprives the party offering the evidence of a fair hearing and of the opportunity to show actual prejudice." (Italics in original.)
The evidentiary rulings that the Wilsons challenge did not deny them all evidence relating to any of their claims, or essential expert testimony. The Wilsons presented testimony from lay witnesses, including Dudley, Wilson, Bondurant, and Larson, in addition to documentary evidence on all of their claims. The exclusion of expert testimony regarding the scope or extent of future development of the dominant tenement that the easement could accommodate was reasonable because what development might be proposed on that property in the future, and what development the County ultimately would allow, are speculative matters that are largely irrelevant to the issue of the construction of the easement grant in light of its language and the extrinsic evidence regarding the intent of the parties who agreed to it.
We reiterate that whether possible future uses of an easement "go beyond the extent and scope of the easement is a matter for future determination of the court if and when the question is presented." (Pipkin v. Der Torosian, supra, 35 Cal.App.3d at p. 729, italics added; Sufficool v. Duncan, supra, 187 Cal.App.2d at p. 550; O'Banion v. Borba, supra, 32 Cal.2d at p. 155.) As the Scruby court stated, if any "portion of the court's judgment is unduly burdensome [to the servient tenement], then proof to that effect can be made in the trial court if subsequent proceedings are necessary. 'We must assume reasonable action of the trial court in the future in determining whether its decree has in fact been violated.' " (Scruby, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at p. 708.)
Through the excluded expert testimony the Wilsons essentially sought to prove that Lightner and Bondurant would overburden the easement in the future by seeking to improve the easement or their properties in a manner that the County would not allow. There is no present overburdening issue because it is purely speculative whether or how Lightner or Bondurant or any successors in interest to their property will attempt to develop the property in the future and whether they will attempt to construct a road that is too big for the easement. An easement cannot be presently overburdened by speculative future uses. The court acted well within its discretion in excluding the Wilsons' proposed expert testimony regarding allowable future development of the easement and dominant tenement.
If Lightner and Bondurant attempt to develop their property served by the easement in a way that would render their easement inadequate to provide legal access to the property, they presumably would be forced to either negotiate for a wider easement from the owner of the servient tenement or find another means of ingress and egress to their properties.
Further, the court did not abuse its discretion by excluding Bark's testimony concerning the custom and practice relating to language used in easement deeds and the meaning of the language used in the grant deeds at issue here. The construction of the language in grant deeds was essentially a judicial function. (City of Manhattan Beach v. Superior Court (1996) 13 Cal.4th 232, 238.) As such, it was not a proper matter for expert testimony, as " '[i]t is thoroughly established that experts may not give opinions on matters which are essentially within the province of the court to decide.' " (Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker (1989) 47 Cal.3d 863, 884.)
The California Supreme Court in City of Manhattan Beach v. Superior Court, supra, 13 Cal.4th 232 stated the well-established rule that "[i]t is... solely a judicial function to interpret a written instrument unless the interpretation turns upon the credibility of extrinsic evidence.' " (Id. at p. 238.) Although the court here considered extrinsic evidence on the issue of the construction of the easement grant deeds, it was a judicial function to decide whether the language of the deeds was reasonably susceptible to the Wilsons' interpretation based on the extrinsic evidence, and the court was the trier of fact to the extent its construction of the deeds turned on the credibility of extrinsic evidence. It was not an abuse of discretion for the court to rule that Bark's expert opinion regarding the meaning of the easement language was not relevant or otherwise admissible on the issue of the intent of Lightner and the Williams family in agreeing to the easement.
We find no error in the court's evidentiary rulings or construction of the easement.
III. Retention of Jurisdiction
The judgment states that the trial court "retains jurisdiction over this matter to determine whether a future use, improvement or modification of the [e]asement may constitute a surcharge to the servient tenement." Although this provision of the judgment appears on its face to benefit the Wilsons, they contend the court's retention of jurisdiction to determine whether future uses, improvements, or modifications of the easement overburden their servient property constitutes "coercive relief" and reversible error because it is "beyond the function of a declaratory relief action."
As noted, the court also retained jurisdiction "over this matter to the extent a dispute arises as to whether a certain item, currently within the [e]asement or placed in the future within the [e]asement by the Wilsons or their successors in interest obstructs any portion of the [e]asement, so as to unreasonably interfere with a purpose or use of the [e]asement[, ]" and retained jurisdiction over Lightner's nuisance claims to issue, upon request and appropriate showing, "an injunction against the Wilsons enjoining future conduct on the Wilsons' property that unreasonably interferes with the [e]asement and/or the Lightner and Bondurant properties." The Wilsons do not challenge those portions of the judgment in this appeal.
An action for declaratory relief is an equitable proceeding and the powers of a court in such an action are as broad and as extensive as in any other suit in equity. (Culbertson v. Cizek (1964) 225 Cal.App.2d 451, 462.) "[A] court of equity may retain continuing jurisdiction to meet future problems and changing conditions." (Rynsburger v. Dairymen's Fertilizer Co-op., Inc. (1968) 266 Cal.App.2d 269, 278.) The court "may... make such orders as are necessary to preserve its jurisdiction so as to prevent impairment of its judgment, to avoid conflicting regulations and vexatious litigation, and to make a complete adjudication of the controversy." (Id. at p. 279.) Thus, "retention of jurisdiction by the court for the purpose of interpreting and enforcing its judgment is within the scope of declaratory relief." (Dawson v. East Side Union High School Dist. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 998, 1044-1045.) The court did not err in retaining jurisdiction to determine whether future actions by Lightner or Bondurant with respect to the easement constitute a surcharge to the servient tenement.
IV. Costs of Proof Award
The Wilsons contend the court erred in awarding Lightner $341,295.00 under section 2033.420 as costs incurred in proving matters not admitted in responses to requests for admission. Lightner moved for costs under section 2033.420 based on the Wilsons' denial of 12 requests for admission that asked them to admit the easement was appurtenant to the land identified in the grant deeds. Lightner's requests for admission Nos. 30 through 34 asked the Wilsons to admit that the subject grant deeds granted the easement as appurtenant to the five tax assessor's parcels specified in the deeds as parcels A through E. Lightner's requests for admission Nos. 35 through 41 asked the Wilsons to admit that the easement is currently appurtenant to the seven legal parcels that comprise the same land as the five tax assessor's parcels identified as parcels A through E.
Section 2033.420 provides in full as follows:
The Wilsons responded to each of requests for admission Nos. 30 through 32 by stating: "[The Wilsons] admit that the language recited from the Grant Deed... is as reflected in this request. [The Wilsons] deny that the easement as described in the Grant Deeds was the easement that was agreed to by the Williams Family at the time of the sale of the easement to defendant LIGHTNER." The Wilsons unequivocally denied requests for admission Nos. 33 and 34 concerning the two tax assessor parcels identified as parcels D and E, and they responded to requests for admission Nos. 35 through 41 by stating: "Unable to admit or deny."
After Lightner noticed an ex parte hearing to seek leave from the court to file a motion to compel further responses to his requests for admission, the Wilsons agreed to amend their responses. They then served supplemental responses in which they simply denied each of requests for admission Nos. 30 through 41. However, at the same time, they served responses to form interrogatories, including form interrogatory No. 17.1, which required them to state the basis for any response to a request for admission that was not an unqualified admission. In their response to interrogatory No. 17.1, the Wilsons stated as to each of requests for admission Nos. 30 through 40: "Plaintiffs admit that Defendant LIGHTNER owns an easement for access across the Wilson property to parcels 523-030-05, 523-030-06 and appurtenant to 523-030-02, 523-030-01, and 523-020-02 only, as the foregoing parcels existed at the time the easement was created. Plaintiffs disagree with Defendant LIGHTNER as to the nature and extent of the easement." Thus, the Wilsons admitted the easement was appurtenant to the five tax assessor parcels identified in the grant deeds.
Form interrogatory No. 17.1 in Judicial Council Form DISC-001 asks: "Is your response to each request for admission served with these interrogatories an unqualified admission? If not, for each response that is not an unqualified admission: [¶] (a) state the number of the request; [¶] (b) state all facts upon which you base your response; [¶] (c) state the names, ADDRESSES, and telephone numbers of all PERSONS who have knowledge of the facts; and [¶] (d) identify all DOCUMENTS and other tangible things that support your response and state the name, ADDRESSES, and telephone number of the PERSON who has each DOCUMENT or thing."
The Wilsons' response to interrogatory No. 17.1 did not include an explanation for their denial of request for admission No. 41.
"Requests for admissions differ fundamentally from other forms of discovery. Rather than seeking to uncover information, they seek to eliminate the need for proof." (Stull v. Sparrow (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 860, 864.) Their primary purpose is to expedite trial by setting triable issues to rest. (Id. at p. 865.) "Under Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420, a party that denies a request for admission may be ordered to pay the costs and fees incurred by the requesting party in proving that matter. The court 'shall' order the payment of such fees and costs unless it finds: (1) that an objection to the admission was sustained or a response to the request was waived; (2) the admission sought was of no substantial importance; (3) the party failing to make the admission had reasonable ground to believe that the party would prevail on the matter; or (4) there was other good reason for the failure to admit the request." (Laabs v. City of Victorville (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1276 (Laabs).)
"A request for admission has 'substantial importance when the matter requested for admission [is] central to disposition of the case.' " (Laabs, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1276; Brooks v. American Broadcasting Co. (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 500, 509 (Brooks).) "In evaluating whether a 'good reason' exists for denying a request to admit, 'a court may properly consider whether at the time the denial was made the party making the denial held a reasonably entertained good faith belief that the party would prevail on the issue at trial.' " (Laabs, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 1276 .)
"One need not be a prevailing party to be entitled to sanctions under [section 2033.420]." (Smith v. Circle P Ranch Co. (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 267, 275.) On the other hand, costs of proof "are not recoverable simply because the party promulgating the request prevails at trial." (Brooks, supra, 179 Cal.App.3d at p. 513.) We review a trial court's ruling on a motion for costs of proof under section 2033.420 for abuse of discretion. (Miller v. American Greetings Corp. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1055, 1066.)
We conclude the court abused its discretion by awarding Lightner costs of proof under section 2033.420. The record reveals that relatively little time and attention at trial was devoted to the issue of easement appurtenance. The court's ruling that the easement "is appurtenant to the all of the land (approximately 760 acres) described in the February 7, 2001 Grant Deeds, currently consisting of seven legal parcels" was not central to the disposition of the case; it was an easy call on a question of law based on the plain meaning of the language of the grant deeds. The central focus of the case was not whether the easement was appurtenant to all of the land described in the grant deeds, but rather how many residences on that land the easement could accommodate without being overburdened, and to what extent the easement could be developed and improved under the language of the grant deeds. Accordingly, the requested admissions regarding appurtenance were not of "substantial importance" within the meaning of section 2033.420, subdivision (b)(2). It was unreasonable to conclude that Lightner incurred over $300,000 in litigation expenses to obtain an obvious ruling on a question of law based on the plain language of the easement grants.
In its statement of decision, the court noted that "[g]iven the appurtenant language in the [g]rant [d]eeds, the [g]rant [d]eeds are not reasonably susceptible to an interpretation that the [e]asement was limited to Lightner's personal use...." The court also stated that Lightner's interpretation of the grant deeds as conveying an easement for road, access, and utilities that is 30 feet wide and appurtenant to his and Bondurant's properties "mirrors the plain and unambiguous language of the [g]rant [d]eeds. Indeed, it is the only interpretation to which the [g]rant [d]eeds are 'reasonably susceptible.' "
More important, however ill-advised or disingenuous the Wilsons' denials of the requests for admission may have been based on the plain meaning of the language of the easement grant deeds, the denials were largely negated by their response to interrogatory No. 17.1. In that response, the Wilsons acknowledged that Lightner owns an access easement across their property and that the easement is appurtenant to the five tax assessor's parcels specified in the easement grant deeds. They then clarified that their disagreement with Lightner was "as to the nature and extent of the easement." Read in context of the entire record, the Wilsons' response to interrogatory No. 17.1 reflects their position that the number of individual parcels or lots to be served by the easement should at least be limited to five, based on the grant deeds' specification of five tax assessors' parcels, and not expanded to the seven legal lots that the County recognized - i.e., they effectively admitted that the easement was appurtenant to the five parcels referenced in the grant deeds but denied that it served seven parcels. Although the trial court did not accept the Wilsons' position on the number of lots or parcels served by the easement, we do not view their position as unreasonable and conclude it constituted sufficient "good reason for the failure to admit" the requests for admission under section 2033.420, subdivision (b)(4), and that the Wilsons had a reasonable ground to believe they would prevail on that point within the meaning of section 2033.420, subdivision (b)(3).
In any event, we are of the view that costs of proof sanctions under section 2033.420 are not properly awarded with respect to an issue as to which there is no substantial controversy. Because there was no substantial controversy as to area of land served by the easement in light of the Wilsons' responses to interrogatory No. 17.1 and that issue was not central to the disposition of the case, we conclude the court erred in awarding Lightner costs of proof under section 2033.420.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The postjudgment order awarding Lightner costs of proof under Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.420 is reversed. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.
WE CONCUR: HUFFMAN, J., McDONALD, J.
(a) enjoy safe and convenient ingress and egress to and from the land described in the Grant Deeds; (b) facilitate and accommodate improvements for the land described in the Grant Deeds; (c) install utilities, along with the infrastructure necessary to support such utilities and to service such improvements; (d) grade and widen, within the [e]asement, the existing road; (e) remove trees, brush and shrubs to accommodate the use, maintenance and improvement of the [e]asement; (f) surface and pave the road within the [e]asement; (g) install drainage systems to control storm-water and erosion on the road within the [e]asement; (h) remove the posts, stakes, fencing near the entrance gate and cattle grate braces, and other obstacles placed in the future by the Wilsons or their successors-in-interest within the [e]asement; (i) improve and maintain a gate at or before the entrance to the [e]asement including, but not limited to, installing an automatic opening and closing mechanism; and (j) post street address numbers and/or identifying signs at the eastern entrance to the [e]asement."
"(a) If a party fails to admit the genuineness of any document or the truth of any matter when requested to do so under this chapter, and if the party requesting that admission thereafter proves the genuineness of that document or the truth of that matter, the party requesting the admission may move the court for an order requiring the party to whom the request was directed to pay the reasonable expenses incurred in making that proof, including reasonable attorney's fees.
"(b) The court shall make this order unless it finds any of the following:
"(1) An objection to the request was sustained or a response to it was waived under Section 2033.290.
"(2) The admission sought was of no substantial importance.
"(3) The party failing to make the admission had reasonable ground to believe that that party would prevail on the matter.
"(4) There was other good reason for the failure to admit."