Opinion
No. WD 65068
June 6, 2006
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cole County, The Honorable Thomas Joseph Brown, III, Judge.
Before Robert G. Ulrich, P.J., Patricia A. Breckenridge, and James M. Smart, Jr., JJ.
Eric Wilson appeals the circuit court's grant of summary judgment for respondents Gary Kempker and Dennis Agniel (hereinafter referred to as the "State"). The trial court ruled that Wilson had two prior commitments under section 558.019, RSMo Cum. Supp. 2004, unrelated to the present offenses. The court ruled that, accordingly, Wilson must serve fifty percent of his current sentence as a mandatory minimum term. We affirm.
Factual Background
Wilson pleaded guilty on March 30, 1992, to three stealing charges. These charges resulted from two different incidents. First, Wilson pleaded guilty to stealing one hundred and fifty dollars or more, case number 90CR-32233(8), and stealing a credit card, case number 90CR-3422(5), on April 29, 1990 ("Case 1"). Second, Wilson pleaded guilty to stealing one hundred and fifty dollars or more on September 26, 1991, case number 91CR-5985(6) ("Case 2"). He was sentenced to three concurrent terms of three years.
On October 29, 1999, Wilson pleaded guilty to the sale of a controlled substance near public housing, case number 991-900A ("Case 3"). He was sentenced to fifteen years but was given an opportunity to participate in a long-term substance abuse treatment program with the prospect of probation. Upon successful completion of that program, he was placed on probation. He was discharged from his probation on February 20, 2004.
On the same day, February 20, 2004, Wilson was found guilty of stealing, case number 021-2921 ("Case 4"). He was sentenced to a term of seven years. When the Missouri Department of Corrections received Wilson on February 27, 2004, they considered both Wilson's 1992 incarceration (for stealing) and his 1999 incarceration in the long-term drug treatment program as prior commitments. Because the Department of Corrections determined that Wilson had two commitments, the Department of Corrections considered Wilson to have a mandatory-minimum prison term of fifty percent for his latest conviction.
Wilson filed a petition for declaratory judgment against the State on May 24, 2004, asserting that his time in the long-term drug treatment program pursuant to section 217.362 should not count as a prior commitment under section 588.019. The trial court granted summary judgment for the State denying Wilson's petition. This appeal follows.
All statutory references are to the Revised Statutes of Missouri, Cumulative Supplement 2004, unless otherwise noted.
Standard of Review
On an appeal from summary judgment, the appellate court's review is "essentially de novo." ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Mid-Am. Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371, 376 (Mo. banc 1993). The issue of whether summary judgment was properly granted is an issue of law. Id. Because the trial court's judgment is based solely on the record submitted and the law, we do not defer to the trial court's judgment in our review. Id.
Analysis
Wilson raises one point on appeal. He states that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for the State by not applying section 217.362.5 retroactively. As discussed below, that question is tangential in this appeal.
The first issue is to determine Wilson's prior commitments. Section 558.019.2 provides, in relevant part, as follows:
Other provisions of the law to the contrary notwithstanding, any offender who has pleaded guilty to or has been found guilty of a felony other than a dangerous felony as defined in section 556.061, RSMo, and is committed to the department of corrections shall be required to serve the following minimum prison terms:
. . . .
(2) If the offender has two previous prison commitments to the department of corrections for felonies unrelated to the present offense, the minimum prison term which the offender must serve shall be fifty percent of his or her sentence or until the offender attains seventy years of age, and has served at least forty percent of the sentence imposed, whichever occurs first.
Section 558.019.2 further provides that "[f]or the purposes of this section, `prison commitment' means and is the receipt by the department of corrections of an offender after sentencing."
In Carroll v. Missouri Board of Probation Parole, 113 S.W.3d 654, 657-58 (Mo.App. 2003), this court stated the following concerning the purpose of section 558.019 and how that purpose is to be carried out in applying the statute:
That purpose is to "punish [a person] as a repeat offender for his latest offense on the basis of a demonstrated propensity for misconduct." To allow a prisoner to be sheltered from the this type of statute simply because the crime was committed and he was sentenced while serving a sentence or because he was sentenced on one offense prior to the resolution of a pending offense would undermine the purpose of the statute. This court refuses to interpret Section 558.019 to permit an unreasonable result. There is no requirement in Boersig or in the statute that a period of time must elapse or a release must occur between commitments.
(Citations omitted.)
Wilson's first commitment occurred in connection with Case 1 for stealing on April 29, 1990. His second commitment occurred in connection with Case 2 for stealing on September 26, 1991. Both of those commitments resulted from guilty pleas entered on March 30, 1992. Combining the plea hearing and running the sentences concurrently does not make both of these offenses one prior commitment. Section 558.019 separates commitments if they are unrelated to the current offense. § 558.019.2(2)-(3). The crimes in Case 1 and Case 2 occurred seventeen months apart and are each unrelated to each other and to the current offense. The purpose of section 558.019 is to measure out punishment according to offenses, not to provide a fortuitous benefit to an individual who, in the interests of judicial economy, happens to have been sentenced at the same time for more than one unrelated offense. See Carroll, 113 S.W.3d at 657-58. Therefore, they are each a "previous prison commitment" for purposes of section 558.019.
In Case 3, Wilson pleaded guilty to the sale of a controlled substance in 1999. The court sentenced him to a long-term substance abuse treatment program pursuant to section 217.362. Wilson's point in this case is that his sentencing under section 217.362 should not apply as a prior commitment for the purposes of section 558.019. We need not address that issue, however, because before the current case, Case 4, Wilson already had two prior commitments in Cases 1 and 2. Under section 558.019.2(2), Wilson is required to serve fifty percent of his seven-year sentence. This is the same outcome the Department of Corrections reached, although the Department calculated it differently. The trial court did not err.
Conclusion
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Ulrich and Breckenridge, JJ., concur.