Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:01-CV-032-Y
October 7, 2001
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE AND NOTICE AND ORDER
This cause of action was referred to the United States Magistrate Judge under the provisions of Title 28 of the United States Code, § 636(b), as implemented by an order of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. The Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge are as follows:
I. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS A. NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a petition for writ of habeas corpus by a state prisoner under Title 28 of the United States Code, § 2254.
B. PARTIES
Petitioner Robert Charles Wilson, TDCJ-ID #822497, is in custody of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division, and is presently incarcerated in the Ellis I Unit in Huntsville, Texas.
Respondent Janie Cockrell is the Director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division.
C. PROcEDURAL HISTORY
Wilson was indicted for possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver. (State Habeas R. at 23.) Wilson pleaded not guilty, but a jury found him guilty, and the trial court sentenced him to 60 years' confinement. ( Id. at 24.)
Wilson was also convicted of possession of methamphetamine and another charge of possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver. (State Habeas R. at 26.) However, Wilson does not challenge these convictions in the present habeas corpus petition. (Federal Pet. at 2.)
The Court of Appeals for the Second District of Texas affirmed the trial court's judgment, and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals refused Wilson's petition for discretionary review. Wilson v. State, Nos. 2-98-140-CR (Tex.App.-Fort Worth Apr. 29, 1999, pet. ref'd) (not designated for publication). Wilson filed one state application for writ of habeas corpus, which the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied without written order. Ex parte Wilson, No. 44, 940-01 (Tex.Crim.App. Nov. 29, 2000) (not designated for publication). Wilson filed his federal petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Fort Worth Division, on December 28, 2000.
The court of appeals reversed Wilson's other conviction for possession with intent to deliver and affirmed the possession conviction. Wilson v. State, Nos. 2-98-138-39-CR (Tex.App.-Fort Worth Apr. 29, 1999, no pets.) (State Habeas R. at 49.)
Although Wilson initially filed his federal petition in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division, that court correctly transferred the petition to this court. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (d).
D. ISSUES
Wilson argues the following:1. His Fourth-Amendment rights were violated by a warrantless search.
2. The trial court erred when it would not submit the illegal-search issue to the jury.
3. The trial court had no jurisdiction.
E. RULE 5 STATEMENT
Cockrell believes Wilson has sufficiently exhausted available state remedies on all issues presented and, thus, does not move for dismissal on this ground.
F. DISCUSSION 1. Legal Standard for Granting Habeas Corpus Relief
This habeas corpus proceeding is controlled by the provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (the AEDPA"). The AEDPA's compelled deference to decisions of state courts is now familiar. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody under a state court judgment shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings unless he shows that the prior adjudication: (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A decision is contrary to clearly established federal law if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the United States Supreme Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000); see also Hill v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 481, 485 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S.Ct. 2001 (2001). A state court decision will be an unreasonable application of clearly established precedent if it correctly identifies the applicable rule but applies it unreasonably to the facts of the case. Williams, 529 U.S. at 407-08.
Section 2254(e)(1) provides that a determination of a factual issue made by a state court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant has the burden of rebutting this presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. Hill, 210 F.3d at 485. When the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denies relief in a state habeas corpus application without written order, it is an adjudication on the merits, which is entitled to this presumption. Ex parte Torres, 943 S.W.2d 469, 472 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997). In this case, Wilson raised the same claims on direct appeal and in his state habeas application that he raises in the present federal habeas corpus petition. The intermediate state appellate court adjudicated Wilson's claims on the merits, and the Court of Criminal Appeals refused to review that decision. The state trial court did not comment on Wilson's state application, and the Court of Criminal Appeals denied the application without written order. Because this is an ambiguous state habeas decision, this Court should "look through" to the last clear state decision on the matter. Jackson v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 641, 651 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Lott v. Hargett, 80 F.3d 161, 164 (5th Cir. 1996)), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1027 (2000). This last clear decision, such as the intermediate appellate court's opinion in this case, is entitled to a presumption of correctness. See Hoover v. Johnson, 193 F.3d 366, 368 (5th Cir. 1999) (applying presumption of correctness to intermediate appellate court decision that adjudicated claim on the merits).
2. Fourth-Amendment Claims
Wilson argues that the trial court should have suppressed the evidence that arose from the police's search of his pocket, which led to his arrest for possession with intent to deliver. Federal courts have no authority to review a state court's application of FourthAmendment principles in habeas corpus proceedings unless the petitioner was denied a full and fair opportunity to litigate his claim in state court. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976).
The trial court conducted a hearing on Wilson's motion to suppress and denied the motion. (2 Rep. R. 14-50.) This claim was raised and addressed on direct appeal and in Wilson's state habeas corpus application. Because Wilson was provided a full and fair opportunity to litigate his Fourth-Amendment claims in state court, they are barred from federal habeas corpus review.
3. Trial Court Jurisdiction
Wilson argues that his due-process rights were violated, thereby divesting the trial court of jurisdiction, when a retired judge, and not the elected trial judge, presided over his trial. But even if the retired judge should not have presided over the trial under state law, this violation did not constitute a denial of due process. This court cannot correct errors under state law and may only intervene to correct errors under the United States Constitution. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 221 (1982); Manning v. Warden, La. State Penitentiary, 786 F.2d 710, 711 (5th Cir. 1986). In other words, this court's only inquiry is whether Wilson's trial was rendered fundamentally unfair by the state-law error. Manning, 786 F.2d at 711-12. To establish his trial was fundamentally unfair, Wilson must show that he was prejudiced when a retired judge presided over his trial. Id. at 712. Wilson has not alleged, and the record does not indicate, that the alleged violation could have had any impact on the outcome of his trial. Thus, Wilson is not entitled to relief. See generally Lavernia v. Lynaugh, 845 F.2d 493, 496 (5th Cir. 1988).
4. Summary
In sum, Wilson is lawfully restrained because he has failed to prove that he has been denied a constitutionally protected interest. Accordingly the state courts' determination that Wilson was not entitled to relief is not contrary to or does not involve an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law and is not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceedings.
II. RECOMMENDATION
Wilson's petition for writ of habeas corpus should be denied.
III. NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT TO PROPOSED FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION AND CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE TO OBJECT
Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), each party to this action has the right to serve and file specific written objections to the United States Magistrate Judge's proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation within ten (10) days after the party has been served with a copy of this document. The court is hereby extending the deadline within which to file, not merely place in the mail, specific written objections to the United States Magistrate Judge's proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation until October 25, 2001. Failure to file specific written objections within the specified time shall bar a de novo determination by the district court of any finding of fact or conclusion of law and shall bar a party, except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice, from attacking on appeal any unobjected to, proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district court. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc op. on reh'g); Carter v. Collins, 918 F.2d 1198 (5th Cir. 1990).
IV. ORDER
Under 28 U.S.C. § 636, it is ORDERED that each party is granted until October 25, 2001 to serve and file, not merely place in the mail, written objections to the United States Magistrate Judge's proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation. It is further ORDERED that if objections are filed and the opposing party chooses to file a response, the response shall be filed within seven (7) days of the filing date of the objections.
It is further ORDERED that the above-styled and numbered action, previously referred to the United States Magistrate Judge for findings, conclusions, and recommendation, is returned to the docket of the United States District Judge.