Opinion
No. COA10-1338
Filed 20 September 2011
Appeal by Plaintiff from order entered 28 May 2010, nunc pro tunc 29 April 2010 by Judge W. Allen Cobb, Jr. in Carteret County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 23 March 2011.
Harvell and Collins, P.A., by Wesley A. Collins and Russell C. Alexander, for Plaintiff-Appellant. Beswick Goines, PLLC, by Erin B. Meeks and George W. Beswick, for Defendant-Appellees.
Carteret County No. 08 CVS 203.
Anthony G. Willis (Anthony), executor of the Estate of Janice D. Willis (Ms. Willis), beneficiary and trustee of the Janice D. Willis Revocable Trust, and individually, and the Janice D. Willis Revocable Trust (collectively Plaintiff) appeal the trial court's order granting a directed verdict to Robert Willis (Robert), Robin Willis (Robin), and the Estate of Edward Carroll Willis (Eddie) (collectively Defendants). After careful review, we affirm the trial court's order.
I. Background
In December 2004, Ms. Willis procured the services of attorney John Way (Mr. Way) to draft her will. At that time, Ms. Willis' husband was deceased and she had two adult sons, Eddie and Anthony. The will signed by Ms. Willis included the following provision regarding Ms. Willis' "home place":
I bequeath and devise any interest that I may own in my home place to my son, Edward Carroll Willis. If I decide to convey my home place in Beaufort, North Carolina to Edward Carroll Willis before my death, and, if he decides to sell said home, then it is my wish that he divide the proceeds after expenses with his brother, Anthony Grady Willis.
Ms. Willis bequeathed the residue of her estate to Eddie and Anthony in equal shares. The will further provided that if one or both of her sons predeceased her, then the residue of her estate would pass to the deceased son's "living issues per stirpes."
Ms. Willis continued to conduct meetings with Mr. Way and consulted with him about her legal options for transferring an interest in her home to Eddie immediately, rather than upon her death. It is undisputed that Ms. Willis expressed a desire to provide a place for Eddie, who was currently living with Ms. Willis in her home, to live for the remainder of his life. As a result of these meetings, Mr. Way drafted a general warranty deed (Deed) in which Ms. Willis reserved a life estate in her home and transferred the remainder interest to Eddie in fee simple. The Deed did not devise any interest in the home to Anthony or contemplate a reversionary interest of any kind. Ms. Willis executed the Deed on 4 January 2005. The Deed stated it was "for a valuable consideration paid by the Grantee, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged." However, the Deed was filed without revenue stamps and no money changed hands between Ms. Willis and Eddie.
In November 2007, Eddie died intestate. Shortly thereafter, Ms. Willis received a copy of the Deed and realized that Eddie's interest in her property would pass to his two children, Robin and Robert. It is undisputed that Ms. Willis expressed displeasure regarding the legal ramifications of the Deed she executed.
In February 2008, Ms. Willis initiated an action in Carteret County Superior Court to reform the Deed on the basis of a unilateral mistake. Ms. Willis asserted in the complaint that she "thought that the [D]eed only gave . . . [Eddie] the right to live in her home the rest of his life." Beginning on 26 April 2010, the case was tried by a jury. After all of the evidence was presented, Defendants moved for a directed verdict, which was granted by the trial court. Ms. Willis appealed.
After notice of appeal was entered, Ms. Willis died. By consent of the parties, her estate was substituted as Plaintiff for purposes of this appeal.
II. Discussion
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by directing a verdict for Defendants at the close of all the evidence. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review
"The standard of review for a motion for directed verdict is whether the evidence, considered in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, is sufficient to be submitted to the jury. A motion for directed verdict should be denied if more than a scintilla of evidence supports each element of the non-moving party's claim. This Court reviews a trial court's grant of a motion for directed verdict de novo."
Weeks v. Select Homes, Inc., 193 N.C. App. 725, 730, ___ S.E.2d ___, (2008) (quoting Herring v. Food Lion, LLC, 175 N.C. App. 22, 26, 623 S.E.2d 281, 284 (2005)). "Where the question of granting a directed verdict is a close one, the better practice is for the trial judge to reserve his decision on the motion and submit the case to the jury." Edwards v. West, 128 N.C. App. 570, 573, 495 S.E.2d 920, 923 (1998).
B. Reformation of the Deed
Generally, "[i]n an action for reformation of a written instrument, the plaintiff has the burden of showing that the terms of the instrument do not represent the original understanding of the parties and must do so by clear, cogent and convincing evidence." Hice v. Hi-Mil, Inc., 301 N.C. 647, 651, 273 S.E.2d 268, 270 (1981). "Additionally, there is `a strong presumption in favor of the correctness of the instrument as written and executed, for it must be assumed that the parties knew what they agreed and have chosen fit and proper words to express that agreement in its entirety.'" Id. (quoting Clements v. Insurance Co., 155 N.C. 57, 61, 70 S.E. 1076, 1077 (1911)).
In the instant case, Plaintiff sought the reformation of the Deed on the basis of a unilateral mistake. Plaintiff relies on Nelson v. Harris, 32 N.C. App. 375, 232 S.E.2d 298 (1977), for the proposition that unilateral mistake by one party, when not induced by the fraud or inequitable conduct of the other, may still support the reformation of a deed conveying property as a gift. Specifically, "[t]he grantor of a conveyance for which no consideration was given by the grantee is entitled to reformation when the deed fails to express the actual intent of the parties due to the grantor's unilateral mistake." Nelson, 32 N.C. App. at 379, 232 S.E.2d at 300 (citing 66 Am. Jur., Reformation of Instruments, § 45 (1973); Annot. 69 A.L.R. 423, 430-431 (1930)). Thus, in order for this case to proceed to the jury, Ms. Willis had to produce more than a scintilla of evidence that the Deed was not supported by consideration and that the Deed failed to express her actual intent in executing the Deed due to her unilateral mistake. Assuming, arguendo, that there was sufficient evidence to establish that the Deed was executed without consideration, we hold that there was not sufficient evidence to establish that a unilateral mistake occurred on the part of Ms. Willis.
There is abundant testimony in the record that Ms. Willis intended to provide a place for Eddie to live for the rest of his life; however, there was not a scintilla of evidence to establish that Ms. Willis intended to merely give Eddie a life estate as she now contends. In fact, the evidence presented to the jury tended to establish that Ms. Willis fully understood that the Deed conveyed fee simple title to Eddie and a life estate to Ms. Willis. Mr. Way testified that he and Ms. Willis discussed tax consequences and Ms. Willis' eligibility for Medicare as she contemplated the best devisal to Eddie. The discussion in reference to the impact of the conveyance to Eddie on Ms. Willis' eligibility for Medicare tended to show that Ms. Willis fully understood the effect of a conveyance by life estate and by fee simple. As demonstrated by her own deposition and Mr. Way's testimony, Ms. Willis thoroughly considered her options and Mr. Way complied with Ms. Willis' requests. Moreover, it is not enough for Plaintiff to assert that Ms. Willis did not read the Deed and that she assumed that Mr. Way drafted the Deed pursuant to her wishes — to give Eddie a life estate. See Rourk v. Brunswick County, 46 N.C. App. 795, 797, 266 S.E.2d 401, 403 (1980) ("It must be assumed the plaintiff[] signed the instrument [she] intended to sign.").
Mr. Way may have given Ms. Willis improper advice about how a conveyance to Eddie might affect Ms. Willis' qualifications for Medicare, and Ms. Willis may have relied on this advice. However, Plaintiff does not raise this issue and Mr. Way's advice, even if incorrect, did not alter Ms. Willis' general intent.
Additionally, the evidence established that Ms. Willis "had no idea that Eddie was going" to die before her and that she was angry when she discovered the legal effect of the Deed after Eddie's death. These facts do not negate the validity of the original understanding of the parties at the time that the property was devised but, rather, show only that Ms. Willis simply had not expected Eddie's untimely death and never anticipated that his children would be entitled to inherit the property. As discussed, a party's "mistake[] as to the legal consequences of the deed . . . will not support reformation." Mims v. Mims, 48 N.C. App. 216, 218, 268 S.E.2d 544, 546 (1980), rev'd on other grounds, 305 N.C. 41, 286 S.E.2d 779 (1982).
Our Courts have often acknowledged that "mere ignorance of law, unless there be some fraud or circumvention, is not a ground for relief in equity whereby to set aside conveyances or avoid the legal effect of acts which have been done." Mims, 305 N.C. at 60, 286 S.E.2d at 792 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The case sub judice is thus unlike Nelson, in which reformation was predicated on a mistake of fact, see Nelson, 32 N.C. App. 375, 232 S.E.2d 298 (affirming order reforming deed where draftsman failed to include a lot description in the deed that all parties had intended to be included), and more akin to Mims, where "[t]he only mistake supported by the evidence [was the] plaintiff's erroneous understanding of North Carolina law governing deeds and perhaps his misunderstanding of the legal effect of having the deed made to both him and his wife as grantees." Mims, 305 N.C. at 60, 286 S.E.2d at 792. While the plaintiff in Mims, "relying on a real estate agent, was mistaken as to the legal requirements in this state" and the deed's legal effect, "[h]e was not mistaken as to how the deed was drawn"; thus, recovery could not be had on the theory of reformation by mistake. Mims, 48 N.C. App. at 218, 268 S.E.2d at 546.
Although Ms. Willis regretted the results of the conveyance after Eddie died, Plaintiff has the burden of proving that the Deed did not represent the original intent of the parties at the time the deed was signed. See Hice, 301 N.C. at 651, 273 S.E.2d at 270. As stated supra, all of the evidence in this case showed that Ms. Willis understood the conveyance she made in the Deed at the time she deliberately and intentionally signed the instrument. See Wright v. McMullan, 249 N.C. 591, 596, 107 S.E.2d 98, 101 (1959) ("[Plaintiff's] mistake as to the legal consequences flowing from his deliberate and intentional act cannot destroy the force and effect of the law."). While we recognize that, in a close case, it is better for the trial court to submit the case to the jury upon a motion for directed verdict, the record does not contain even a scintilla of evidence that a unilateral mistake occurred when Ms. Willis executed the Deed at issue. Therefore, the trial court properly granted Defendants' motion for directed verdict, and we affirm the trial court's order.
Affirmed.
Judge STEELMAN concurs.
Judge CALABRIA dissents.