Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 03-1862, SECTION "N" (3)
February 12, 2004
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is the Motion to Remand filed by Plaintiff, Calvin Willis, on July 24, 2003 (Rec. Doc. No. 6). Asserting that this action is not one over which this Court has removal jurisdiction, Plaintiff seeks remand pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a). Plaintiff additionally requests that an award of costs, including attorney's fees, and expenses incurred in connection with this motion, be assessed in his favor and against Defendants, Waste Management National Services, Inc., John Henderson, and Jeff Mathis, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
Because the Court does not find plaintiff's claims to be preempted by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), this Court has no removal jurisdiction. The Court does not agree, however, that an award of costs and expenses pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) is warranted. Accordingly, plaintiff's motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
Background
Plaintiff, a diesel mechanic, is a member of Teamsters Union, Local 270. He worked for Defendant Waste Management from 1999 until March 2002. A collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") governed the terms and conditions of plaintiff's employment with Waste Management. Pursuant to that CBA, Plaintiff filed a grievance with his local union on the afternoon of March 15, 2002. In his grievance, Plaintiff contended that his fellow employee, John Henderson, was hired for a position for which Henderson was not qualified to the detriment of Plaintiff and several other more highly qualified employees. According to Plaintiff, he advised Henderson of his intent to file the grievance prior to actually submitting it to the union.
The Court is not certain of the actual status of plaintiff's employment with Waste Management. plaintiff's petition suggests that, in August or September 2002, he was notified that he was "suspended pending civil suit." See Petition at ¶ 15. Defendants' opposition memorandum, however, states that Plaintiff worked at Waste Management of Louisiana, L.L.C., until March 16, 2002. See Defendants' Opposition to plaintiff's Motion to Remand ("Defendants' Opposition") at 1.
After working a night shift at Waste Managment on March 15, 2002, Plaintiff returned home at approximately 4:00 a.m., on March 16, 2002. Later that same day, at approximately 12:00 p.m., he returned to Waste Management to work a day shift. Upon arrival, Plaintiff was arrested by Jefferson Parish Sheriffs deputies on theft charges. He spent three days in jail before being released on bond.
Plaintiff was arrested because Henderson told plaintiff's and Henderson's non — union supervisor, Jeff Mathis, that he had observed Plaintiff stealing automobile tires belonging to Waste Management. Upon receiving this information, Mathis, on behalf of Waste Management, reported plaintiff's alleged crime to the Jefferson Parish Sheriffs Department. According to Plaintiff, Henderson's statement to Mathis "is false, fraudulent, malicious, [and] defamatory" and was made "as a quid pro quo retaliation for petitioner's having previously filed a union grievance against John Henderson."
Id. at ¶ 17.
On March 25, 2002, Plaintiff filed a complaint with his union describing the theft allegation, the circumstances of his arrest, and the written notice he had received from Waste Management forbidding him from returning to Waste Management property. Plaintiff alleges that his post — arrest grievance requested information regarding his employment status. Waste Management reportedly responded, over six months later, that he was "suspended pending civil suit."
See Exhibit C to Defendants' Opposition.
Petition at ¶ 14.
Id. at ¶ 15.
Plaintiff commenced this action in state court on March 14, 2003. Focusing on his March 16, 2002 arrest, Plaintiff asserts claims against Defendants of (1) "intentional willful, and retaliatory infliction of emotional distress"; (2) "intentional, retaliatory and malicious prosecution"; (3) "intentional, malicious, and retaliatory acts of defamation"; and (4) "intentional, malicious, and retaliatory false arrest." Asserting that plaintiff's claims are preempted by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), Defendants removed the case to this Court on June 27, 2003. Disagreeing that his state law claims are preempted, Plaintiff filed the instant motion to remand on July 24, 2003.
Law and Analysis
I. Request for Remand
"Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction." Howery v. Allstate Ins. Co., 243 F.3d 912, 916 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 459 (2001). Furthermore, courts "must presume that a suit lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction rests on the party seeking the federal forum." Id. Thus, in the context of actions removed from state court, the removing party bears the burden of demonstrating the federal court's jurisdiction and that removal was proper. See Manguno v. Prudential Prop, and Cas. Ins. Co., 276 F.3d 720, 723 (5th Cir. 2002). Because the removal statute should be strictly construed in favor of remand, any ambiguities in the state court petition are construed against removal. Id. (citing Acuna v. Brown Root. Inc., 200 F.3d 335, 339 (5th Cir. 2000)).
State law claims are completely preempted by § 301 of the LMRA, and thus serve as a federal question basis for removal, if application of state law requires the interpretation, i.e., depends upon the meaning, of a collective bargaining agreement. See Baker v. Farmers Elec. Coop., Inc., 34 F.3d 274, 280-81 (5th Cir. 1994). As long as the state law claim is "independent" of the CBA, i.e., can be resolved without interpreting the agreement, a claim is not preempted simply because a grievance can be filed based on the same set of facts. See Lingle, 486 U.S. at 408-9, 108 S.Ct. at 1882-83; Jones v. Roadway Express, Inc., 931 F.2d 1086, 1089 (5th Cir. 1991); Hanks v. General Motors Corp., 906 F.2d 341, 345 (8th Cir. 1990); Keehr v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc., 825 F.2d 133, 137 (7th Cir. 1987). In making this determination, the court analyzes the elements of the state law claim at issue. Jones, 931 F.2d at 1089.
The "independent corollary" to the well — pleaded complaint rule known as the "complete preemption" doctrine, which allows for removal of what purport to be state — law claims, is explained in Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 107 S.Ct. 2425 (1987).
Other grounds for preemption by federal labor laws exist. See the discussions in Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 410 n. 8, 108 S.Ct. 1877, 1883 n. 8.
If reliance on a collective bargaining agreement is "purely defensive," there is no § 301 preemption. Baker, 34 F.3d at 278 n. 3. See also Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 398-99, 107 S.Ct. at 2432-33 (presence of a § 301 question in a defensive argument does not overcome the well — pleaded complaint rule); Anderson v. American Airlines, Inc., 2 F.3d 590, 596-97 (5th Cir. 1993) (defendant's argument that the CBA justified its actions did not necessarily transform plaintiff's claim into one requiring interpretation of the CBA).
In Baker, the Fifth Circuit found a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, based on the employer's change of the plaintiff's work position as retaliation for his prior participation in an arbitration proceeding against the employer, to be preempted. In reaching this conclusion, the Fifth Circuit explained:
Baker must prove, as an element of his claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, that the defendants' actions in reassigning him were extreme and outrageous. The terms of the CBA are relevant to this issue, because the CBA expressly grants management rights over the business of Farmers and its employees which could be interpreted to include the right to reassign an employee's duties.
Baker, 34 F.3d at 280.
(1988); Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 397-98, 107 S.Ct. at 2432; and Baker, 34 F.3d at 278 n. 4. Thus, "because construction and understanding of the terms of the CBA" were "unavoidably and inextricably intertwined with resolution of the question whether defendants' conduct in reassigning Baker was extreme and outrageous," Baker's claim was preempted by § 301 of the LMRA.
Id.
Here, in urging that plaintiff's claims similarly are preempted, Defendant urges:
The CBA which governed the terms and conditions of plaintiff's employment expressly states [that] Waste Management has the "right to establish reasonable rules and regulations governing the conduct of employees" (Prior Affidavit: Exhibit A, Article 4) and to enforce those rules by disciplining or discharging employees. (Prior Affidavit: Exhibit A, Article 17.) Waste Management created reasonable rules and regulations specifically prohibiting "`[t]heft, or attempted theft of the property of the Company, [an] employee or [a] customer". (Prior Affidavit: Exhibit B, Rule 5.) The rules also provide "the Company may elect to implement any level of disciplinary action up to and including immediate discharge". (Prior Affidavit: Exhibit B.) Notwithstanding the stated right to discipline and discharge, the CBA requires Waste Management to "treat employees with dignity and respect at all times" and restrains it from "intimidate[ing], harass[ing], coerce[ing], or demean[ing] any employee in the performance of his or her duties". (Prior Affidavit: Exhibit A, Article 23).
Defendants' Opposition at 6.
Referencing these CBA provisions, Defendants maintain that Plaintiff "disagrees with Waste Management's choice of discipline and essentially claims that Waste Management breached the CBA by punishing him without cause . . . through `intimidating, harassing, coercing, or demeaning' actions." Accordingly, assert Defendants, plaintiff's claims are preempted by § 301 because their resolution requires interpretation of the disciplinary provisions of the CBA.
Id. at 6-7.
Id. at 6-11.
The Court disagrees. Although such measures easily could have been specifically provided for in the CBA, neither an arrest nor the filing of a criminal complaint is mentioned in that agreement. Indeed, the CBA provision relied upon by Waste Management merely authorizes it to "elect to implement andy [sic] level of disciplinary action up to and including immediate discharge." For a number of reasons, the Court does not find that this contractual grant of disciplinary authority can be interpreted to include Waste Management's filing of theft charges with law enforcement authorities for the purpose of having Plaintiff arrested.
Defendants' Opposition, Exhibit B at 1.
Although the Court's conclusion likely would be different if Plaintiff's claims were premised upon suspension or discharge resulting from the alleged theft of tires from Waste Management, Plaintiff has emphasized that his claims are based on his arrest, not from suspension or discharge. See Memorandum in Support of Motion to Remand at 8-11. Cf. Merola v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 683 F. Supp. 935, 938-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (state law claims addressing lawfulness of arrest, prosecution, and wiretap did not arise from discharge and thus were not preempted).
First, the punitive measures authorized by the disciplinary provisions of the CBA are those within the employer's control because of its status as an employer and party to the CBA. The power to report a crime in hopes of having the suspected perpetrator arrested, however, is one conferred by state law to the crime victim, and does not depend on a contract for its existence. Second, although an employer acting pursuant to the CBA determines the extent to which "disciplinary action" is taken, the same is not true when a crime is reported. To the contrary, a person reporting a crime does not control whether the filing of a criminal complaint ultimately will lead to arrest, prosecution, and/or conviction. Those decisions are made by law enforcement authorities, the prosecuting agency, and the trier of fact. Finally, the harshest punishment addressed by the disciplinary provisions of the CBA is discharge. Given the deprivation of personal liberty potentially resulting from the filing of a criminal complaint, the Court concludes that such conduct is not among the types of punitive measures addressed by the CBA. Accordingly, the Court finds that, in providing the information to the sheriff's deputies that led to plaintiff's arrest, Waste Management, through its employee Jeff Mathis, acted as a crime victim, not as an employer imposing discipline under the CBA.
The CBA provision relied upon by Waste Management authorizes it to "elect to implement andy [sic] level of disciplinary action up to and including immediate discharge" See Defendants' Opposition at 6 (emphasis added).
The undersigned should note that is not completely clear from plaintiff's petition whether he alleges that Mathis knew of the false nature of Henderson's accusation when he reported the alleged theft to the Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Department. It is not necessary to seek clarification on this point from Plaintiff, however, because evaluation of the outrageousness of that conduct, if this is in fact what Plaintiff alleges occurred, certainly would not require interpretation of the CBA. The discipline provisions of that agreement on which Defendants rely contemplate actions taken in response to violations of "reasonable rules and regulations governing the conduct of employees." They do not apply to deliberately false charges of criminal conduct made solely for the purpose of harming the accused. Cf. Albertson's, Inc. v. Carrigan, 982 F.2d 1478, 1482 (10th Cir. 1993) (determination of outrageousness of conspiracy to have employee arrested by fabricating theft of groceries from employer did not require interpretation or reference to the CBA).
In reaching this conclusion, the Court finds the analyses in Wright v. Pepsi Cola Company, 243 F. Supp.2d 117 (D. Delaware 2003), and Meier v. Hamilton Standard Elec. Sys., Inc., 748 F. Supp. 296 (E.D. Penn. 1990) instructive. In both cases, the CBA's in question authorized employer discipline and/or disciplinary investigations. The courts determined that claims based on dissemination of results of disciplinary investigations to third parties having no authority to discipline employees under the CBA's were not preempted, because the CBA's did not address how and if such information should be provided to third parties. Wright, 243 F. Supp.2d at 123-24; Meier, 748 F. Supp. at 299-300. The Ninth Circuit's opinion in Tellez v. Pacific Gas and Electric Company, 817 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 908, 108 S.Ct. 251 (1987), also is helpful. There, although the CBA allowed employer discipline for cause, the plaintiff's state law claims were not preempted because the CBA was silent with respect to the employer's authority to transmit notice of suspension letters. Tellez, 817 F.2d at 536-39.
Nor does the Court find the Fifth Circuit's decisions in Strachan v. Union Oil Company, 768 F.2d 703 (5th Cir. 1985), or Bagby v. General Motors Corporation, 976 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1992), to compel a different result. In both of those cases, the plaintiff's complained about investigations and suspensions for possible disciplinary action that undisputedly were undertaken by the employers in accordance with the CBA's in effect based on suspected violations of those agreements. Here, to the contrary, as previously explained, Defendants' conduct about which Plaintiff complains, that is, having him arrested on theft charges, simply is not addressed by the CBA.
The plaintiff in Bagby also complained about being escorted out of the plant by a security guard in accordance with the temporary suspension policy.
B. Request for Costs and Expenses
An award of costs and expenses under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) is a matter of the Court's discretion. Valdes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 199 F.3d 290, 292-93 (5th Cir. 2000) (summary calendar). In deciding whether such an award is appropriate, the Court must determine whether the defendant had objectively reasonable grounds to believe removal was proper. Id. at 293.
Despite the apparent agreement by the federal courts regarding the test for § 301 preemption, the application of that test, as evidenced by the case law, is, at times, no simple task. Indeed, in some instances, decisions within the same circuit are not easily reconciled with those coming before and after it. Some even appear to confuse the § 301 preemption analysis with other labor law preemption doctrines.
Furthermore, some courts have found state law claims involving reports of criminal conduct to law enforcement authorities to be preempted by § 301. See, e.g., Almonte v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 959 F. Supp. 569, 577 (D. Conn. 1997) (claims arising from the plaintiff's arrest were preempted because they were dependent on interpretation of CBA provision limiting the employer's right to control its premises and discipline its employees); Thomas v. Transit Mgmt., 1990 WL 223009, *2 (E.D. La.) (claim of harassment based on institution of false criminal charges arose out of discipline invoked by employer and thus was preempted); Gillis v. Reynolds Metals Co., 1986 WL 15711, *5 (N.D. Ala. 1986) (defamation claims based on employer communications to law enforcement authorities preempted because they were viewed to complain about the manner in which the employer handled an investigation and suspension allowed by the CBA). Given these decisions, though the Court believes them to be distinguishable or otherwise not persuasive, the dearth of well — reasoned decisions addressing the specific factual situation presented here, and the confusing nature of certain aspects of the jurisprudence on § 301 preemption, the Court does not find Defendants' removal, albeit improper, to have been so unreasonable as to justify an award of costs and expenses.
Conclusion
Contrary to Defendants' assertion, the Court does not find that the disciplinary provisions of the CBA can be interpreted to include Defendants' filing of theft charges against Plaintiff with the Jefferson Parish Sheriffs Department. For this reason, resolution of plaintiff's claims does not require interpretation of the CBA. plaintiff's claims, therefore, are not preempted by § 301 of the LMRA, and Defendants' removal of this matter from state court was improper. The Court does not conclude, however, that Defendants' removal was objectively unreasonable for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) and, thus, does not award costs and expenses to Plaintiff under that statute.Accordingly, as stated herein, plaintiff's motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The action is REMANDED to Civil District Court, Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana.