Opinion
No. 5-401 / 04-1548
Filed May 25, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Fayette County, James L. Beeghly, Judge.
Michael Willie appeals the district court's order sustaining AG Vantage, F.S., Inc.'s motion for summary judgment. AFFIRMED.
Larry F. Woods, Oelwein, for appellant.
Beth Hansen and James DeKoster of Swisher Cohrt, P.L.C., Waterloo, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Miller and Hecht, JJ.
Michael Willie appeals the district court's ruling sustaining AG Vantage, F.S., Inc.'s (AG Vantage) motion for summary judgment and the resulting dismissal of his petition, which sought recovery for property damage and loss of income arising out of a fire. Finding no error in the district court's decision, we affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
In the spring of 2000, Michael Willie, his wife, Nita, and five of his children moved to Fayette County and began operating a dog breeding operation in a building that was formerly a hog house. The adapted dog kennel was heated by an unspecified number of heaters fueled by LP gas. The Willie family contracted with AG Vantage in September of 2000 to supply LP gas to the Willies.
In early December, Michael informed an AG Vantage gas delivery man that the LP tanks supplying his dog kennel heaters with fuel were down to approximately ten percent of their capacity. Michael was told someone would come and provide him with more fuel soon. However, later in the week Nita was informed that there would be no further deliveries of LP gas until the Willies paid their gas bill.
On December 9, the LP tank fueling the dog kennel ran out of gas. Because it was very cold outside, Michael and Nita decided to install a wood-burning stove in the dog kennel that very day. The ventilation pipe for the stove was enclosed in a wooden box and was run through the roof of the dog kennel. Neither Michael nor Nita could remember whether it was an insulated pipe.
That evening Michael stayed up late because the family was expecting a litter of puppies to be born that night and because he had to feed the wood-burning stove every two or three hours. On December 10 around 1:30 a.m., Michael discovered that the dog kennel was on fire. Sadly, the dog kennel and all of its contents were lost in the fire. It was undisputed that the fire was caused by the defective, or defectively installed, wood-burning stove.
On July 10, 2003, Michael filed a petition alleging two separate claims; (1) that AG Vantage breached its contract with the Willies, and (2) that AG Vantage breached an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Michael alleged he suffered damages as a result of both breaches. On July 13, 2004, AG Vantage filed a motion for summary judgment. After a hearing held on AG Vantage's motion, the district court granted the motion for summary judgment and dismissed both of Michael's claims. Michael appeals.
II. Scope and Standard of Review
A ruling granting a motion for summary judgment is reviewed for correction of errors at law. See Kolbe v. State, 625 N.W.2d 721, 725 (Iowa 2001). "Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Id. (citation omitted).
III. Breach of Contract
"In a breach-of-contract claim, the complaining party must prove: (1) the existence of a contract; (2) the terms and conditions of the contract; (3) that it has performed all the terms and conditions required under the contract; (4) the defendant's breach of the contract in some particular way; and (5) that plaintiff has suffered damages as a result of the breach." Molo Oil v. River City Ford Truck Sales, 578 N.W.2d 222, 224 (Iowa 1998). In this case, the district court dismissed Michael's breach of contract claim based on its conclusion that, "The plaintiff has presented no evidence from which the court could find that the plaintiff's loss was reasonably foreseeable and might result from a breach of contract from the defendant." Thus, with regard to Michael's breach of contract claim the only dispute before us is whether the district court properly determined that Michael could not recover the losses caused by the dog kennel fire in the form of damages from AG Vantage for AG Vantage's failure to provide him with LP gas.
The district court did not make any conclusions regarding the first four elements of Michael's breach of contract claim.
Only damages "as were reasonably contemplated by the parties at the time of entering into the agreement are recoverable for a breach thereof." R.E.T. Corp. v. Frank Paxton Co., Inc., 329 N.W.2d 416, 420 (Iowa 1983). Stated otherwise,
Damages for breach of contract . . . are limited to "those injuries which may reasonably be considered as arising naturally from the breach of contract itself, or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of the parties, at the time of contracting, as a probable result of the breach."
Id. (citations omitted). In this case Michael produced no evidence indicating that the parties contemplated the type of loss that occurred at the time they contracted. Moreover, while it may have been foreseeable that Michael would seek an alternate source of heat if he was not provided with LP gas, it was not foreseeable that Michael would choose an alternate heat source that would pose such a risk and independently cause damage. The district court was correct in determining that the fire caused by a wood burning stove was not the probable, natural, or foreseeable result of a failure to provide LP gas. Therefore, we conclude the district court did not err in finding as a matter of law that Michael could not demonstrate the last element of a breach of contract claim. See Falcon Tankers, Inc., v. Uniroyal, Inc., 355 A.2d 898, 907 (Del.Super.Ct. 1976) (stating that under the great weight of authority damages for breach of a contract are recoverable only when the damages are foreseeable and holding that a plaintiff could not recover for damages resulting from the use of defective replacement parts even though it was foreseeable that the defendant's breach would require the need for replacement parts, because it was not foreseeable that the replacement parts would be defective).
III. Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Michael provides no argument or authority in his appellate brief regarding the dismissal of his breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim. We accordingly deem this issue waived. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.14(1)( c). AFFIRMED.