Opinion
Case No. 5:15-cv-02538-EJD
03-31-2017
HARRY J. WILLIBY, Plaintiff, v. HEARST CORPORATION, et al., Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS; DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS
Re: Dkt. Nos. 49, 56, 60
Harry Williby ("Plaintiff") brings this action against The Hearst Corporation and Ernesto Mourelo (collectively, "Defendants") for defamation and intentional interference with prospective economic relations. Compl. ¶¶ 31, 33, 35, Dkt. No. 1. Presently before the court is Defendants' Special Motion to Strike Under the California Anti-SLAPP Statute and Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim and for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction. Dkt. No. 49, ("Def. Mot."). Plaintiff filed a written opposition to the Motion, and also filed a separate Motion for Sanctions against Defendants. Dkt. No. 54 ("Pl. Opp."); see Dkt. Nos. 56, 60 ("Sanctions Mot.").
The court found these matters suitable for decision without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-1(b). Based on a careful review of the parties' briefing in this matter and for the reasons explained below, the court hereby GRANTS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss; DENIES AS MOOT Defendants' Motion to Strike; and DENIES Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is the "Owner/Chief Video Editor" of a collection of online blogs referred to as "Williby Blogs," as well as the YouTube channel "The Attorney Depot," both of which were created in October 2008. Compl. ¶ 5. Plaintiff is also the owner and administrator of the Google+ profiles "The Attorney Depot" and "Harry Williby." Id.
The Hearst Corporation is "one of the nation's largest diversified media and information companies," with interests including ownership of nearly 40 major newspapers like the Houston Chronical and the San Francisco Chronicle, hundreds of major magazines, 29 television stations, and numerous leading cable networks. Id. ¶ 6. The Hearst Corporation is the indirect corporate parent of Hearst Television Inc. ("HTV"), which in turn is the corporate parent of other subsidiary entities that operate various television stations. Declaration of Catherine A. Bostron ("Bostron Decl.") ¶ 2, Dkt. No. 49-2. The Hearst Corporation is headquartered in New York, New York. Id.; Compl. ¶ 1.
Defendant Ernesto Mourelo ("Mourelo") is the Executive Digital Media Manager of Editorial Operations at HTV. Compl. ¶ 7; Declaration of Ernesto Mourelo ("Mourelo Decl.") ¶ 1, Dkt. No. 49-1. In this capacity, Mourelo is "responsible for monitoring the use of news video from HTV stations by third-parties on YouTube and determining whether to request removal of such video through notices pursuant to YouTube's system for accepting takedown notices." Mourelo Decl. ¶ 2. Mourelo is a resident of New York. Compl. ¶ 1, 7.
Between October 2008 and August 2014, Plaintiff posted several videos to "The Attorney Depot" channel that contained portions of news segments initially aired by HTV news stations. Mot. at 5. Between August 1 and August 20, 2014, Mourelo filed a series of "take-down notices" with YouTube pursuant to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA"). See Compl. ¶ 16; Def. Mot. at 3. According to Plaintiff, upon receipt of a take-down notice, YouTube imposes a "copyright strike" against the channel and "immediately removes, or blocks access" to the reported content and certain features of the associated account. Compl. ¶ 14. A "copyright strike" and its attendant restrictions stay in effect for six months. Id. If any channel or channel owner receives more than three "copyright strikes," YouTube suspends the YouTube account, blocks or deletes all account content, and "prohibits the channel owner/operator from accessing, or claiming other Google accounts," including Google+ accounts. Id. However, the DMCA also provides that individuals who had their content reported and/or their account suspended may file a "counter-copyright claim" or "counter-notice" challenging any such restrictions imposed against them. Id.; see Mot. at 2-3. The counter-claim review process lasts 10 to 14 days and in the interim the content in questions remains blocked. Id. ¶ 15.
As a result of Mourelo's August 2014 take-down notices, Plaintiff's YouTube account, "The Attorney Depot," as well as his Google+ account profiles for "The Attorney Depot" and "Harry Williby" were suspended. Id. ¶ 16. On August 20, 2014, Plaintiff filed "counter-copyright claims" with YouTube arguing that his posting of the at-issue video clips constituted fair use or was otherwise legally permissible. Id. ¶¶ 17, 19. On or about September 4, 2014, YouTube informed Plaintiff that upon review, his YouTube channel, all video content, and his access to both Google+ accounts would be restored. Id. ¶¶ 17-18.
On or about November 6, 2014, Mourelo filed another DMCA take-down notice against "The Attorney Depot" concerning a video on the channel entitled "Ex-Raven Cheerleader Indicted on Rape Charges" ("the Video"). Id. ¶ 19. The Video was promptly removed from Plaintiff's channel. Id. Plaintiff again filed a counter-notice and the Video was restored to his channel on November 24, 2014. Id. ¶ 20. Two days later, on November 26, 2014, Mourelo accessed "The Attorney Depot" account page and posted in the viewer "comment" section of the Video: "Fight Piracy on YouTube. You stole this clip from a legitimate news source. It's called copyright infringement" (the "Comment"). Id. ¶ 21; Mourelo Decl. ¶ 10.
In response to the Comment, Plaintiff filed the instant action on June 8, 2015, for defamation and intentional interference with perspective economic relations against Mourelo and The Hearst Corporation. Compl. ¶ 21. Plaintiff seeks $20 million in compensatory damages and $30 million in punitive damages. Id. ¶ 38.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2)
Under Rule 12(b)(2), a defendant may move for dismissal based on lack of personal jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). Where there is no applicable federal statute governing personal jurisdiction, "the district court applies the law of the state in which the district court sits. Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L'Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1205 (9th Cir. 2006); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A). Thus, there are two limitations on a federal court's power to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant: the applicable state personal jurisdiction rule and constitutional principles of due process. Sher v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 1357, 1360 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Data Disc, Inc. v. Sys Tech. Assoc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1286 (9th Cir 1977)). California's personal jurisdiction rule provides that "[a] court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States." Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 410.10 (1989). Accordingly, in California, the statutory limitation on a court's personal jurisdiction is "coextensive with the outer limits of due process," and the federal and state jurisdictional inquiries merge into a single analysis. Sher, 911 F.2d at 1361; Yahoo!, 433 F.3d at 1205; Cal.Code Civ. Pro. § 410.10.
"The plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that jurisdiction is appropriate." Love v. Associated Newspapers, Ltd., 611 F.3d 601, 608 (9th Cir. 2010). When the motion to dismiss is based on arguments presented in the parties' briefing papers, "the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts." Id. "Uncontroverted allegations in the complaint must be taken as true, and conflicts over statements contained in affidavits must be resolved in [the plaintiff's] favor." Id.
B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires a plaintiff to plead each claim with sufficient specificity to "give the defendant fair notice of what the... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Although particular detail is not generally necessary, the factual allegations "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level" such that the claim "is plausible on its face." Id. at 556-57. A complaint which falls short of the Rule 8(a) standard may be dismissed if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Dismissal of a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) may be based on a "lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory." Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988); see Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008).
When deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss, the court generally "may not consider any material beyond the pleadings." Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n. 19 (9th Cir. 1990). However, the court may consider material submitted as part of the complaint or relied upon in the complaint, and may also consider material subject to judicial notice. See Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 688-89 (9th Cir. 2001). In the event that a motion to dismiss is granted, "leave to amend should be granted 'unless the court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.'" DeSoto v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986)).
C. Pro Se Pleadings
Where, as here, the pleading at issue is filed by a plaintiff proceeding pro se, it must be construed liberally. Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000). In doing so, the court "need not give a plaintiff the benefit of every conceivable doubt" but "is required only to draw every reasonable or warranted factual inference in the plaintiff's favor." McKinney v. De Bord, 507 F.2d 501, 504 (9th Cir. 1974). The court "should use common sense in interpreting the frequently diffuse pleadings of pro se complainants." Id. A pro se complaint should not be dismissed unless the court finds it "beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 521 (1972).
III. DISCUSSION
Defendants' Motion raises two threshold arguments in favor of dismissal that will be addressed at the outset. First, Defendants argue that The Hearst Corporation is not a proper defendant to this case because it is merely "an indirect parent corporation to Hearst Television Inc. (HTV), which itself is the parent to the corporate entities that operate the stations at issue." Mot. at 5; Bostron Decl. ¶ 2. And second, Defendants argue that Mourelo is not subject to personal jurisdiction in California. Id. at 6. To the extent that any of Plaintiff's claims survive these threshold challenges, Defendants further contend that Plaintiff's claims fail on the merits and should be dismissed for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). Id. at 6-12. Defendants also move to strike Plaintiff's claims under California's anti-SLAPP statute. Id. at 3.
A. The Hearst Corporation is Not a Proper Party to This Action
Defendants argue that The Hearst Corporation is not a proper party to this lawsuit and should therefore be dismissed. The claims asserted in this action arise exclusively from the allegedly defamatory Comment Mourelo posted on Plaintiff's YouTube page. Plaintiff's claims against The Hearst Corporation therefore depend on Mourelo's actions being attributable to The Hearst Corporation under a valid theory of corporate liability.
Construing the Complaint and Opposition papers broadly, Plaintiff asserts two arguments in support of his position that The Hearst Corporation is a proper defendant in this case. First, in his Complaint, Plaintiff appears to argue that because The Hearst Corporation is a corporate parent of HTV, and HTV is Mourelo's employer, Mourelo's actions may be ascribed to The Hearst Corporation through agency principles. See Compl. ¶¶ 6-7, 16, 19, 22. And second, in his Opposition brief, Plaintiff contends that The Hearst Corporation is a proper party because it is "partners" with Google, and "Google owns and operates YouTube." Pl. Opp. at 3. Neither argument has merit.
i. The Hearst Corporation's Liability Under Agency Principles
Generally, it is a "principle of corporate law deeply ingrained in our economic and legal system that a parent corporation... is not liable for the acts of its subsidiaries." United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 61 (1998); see Pantoja v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1177, 1192 (N.D. Cal. 2009) ("It is the general rule that a parent corporation and its subsidiary will be treated as separate legal entities."). "Only in unusual circumstances will the law permit a parent corporation to be held either directly or indirectly liable for the acts of its subsidiary." Bowoto v. Chevron Texaco Corp., 312 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1234 (N.D. Cal. 2004); whiteCryption Corp. v. Arxan Techs., Inc., 2016 WL 3275944, at *8 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (same).
As an exception to this general principle, a parent corporation may be held vicariously liable for a subsidiary's actions where the subsidiary acted as an agent of the parent. Bowoto, 312 F. Supp. 2d at 1234. An agency relationship arises when "the parent so controls the subsidiary as to cause the subsidiary to [] become merely the instrumentality of the parent." Pantoja, 640 F. Supp. 2d at 1192. "Mere ownership of a subsidiary does not justify the imposition of liability on a parent." Pearson v. Component Tech. Corp., 247 F.3d 471, 484 (3d Cir. 2001). To establish actual agency, a party must show: (1) a manifestation by the principal that the agent shall act for the principle; (2) acceptance by the agent of the undertaking; and (3) an understanding between the parties that the principal is in control of the undertaking. Bowoto, 312 F. Supp. 2d at 1239.
Plaintiff has failed to make such a showing here. Plaintiff alleges no facts that suggest The Hearst Corporation authorized or otherwise manifested the intent for Mourelo or HTV to act on its behalf. There is also nothing in the record to indicate that "an understanding" existed between Mourelo and The Hearst Corporation at all, much less with respect to Mourelo commenting on Plaintiff's YouTube channel. See id. Liability for a corporate parent - such as The Hearst Corporation - cannot be imputed simply by virtue of an individual's employment with an indirect subsidiary to the parent entity. Stern v. News Corporation, a factually similar case out of the Southern District of New York, is instructive in this regard. There, the district court held that a parent news corporation was not liable for defamation based on statements made by employees of one of the corporation's subsidiary companies. Id. at *4. In light of the plaintiff's failure to show that the defendant, News Corporation, had any kind of special control over the subsidiary, the court dismissed the defamation claims as having been brought against an improper party. Id.
2010 WL 5158635 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 14 2010), report and recommendation adopted, 2010 WL 5158637 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2010)
The same analysis applies here. In the absence of evidence that Mourelo was acting as an agent of The Hearst Corporation, The Hearst Corporation cannot be held liable under this theory of corporate liability.
ii. The Hearst Corporation's Relationship with Google and YouTube
Plaintiff's second argument in support of The Hearst Corporation's inclusion in this action is even less compelling. To the extent it is discernable, Plaintiff's position is that The Hearst Corporation is a proper party because it is "partners" with Google, and "Google owns and operates YouTube." Pl. Opp. at 3. Purportedly in support of this, Plaintiff attaches the online biography of Eve Burton, Vice President and General Counsel of The Hearst Corporation, which states: "She is also one of Hearst's leaders in establishing worldwide strategic enterprise deals with partners, including Apple, Amazon, and Google among others." See Ex. 1, Dkt. No. 55.
This position makes little sense. Plaintiff offers no additional explanation as to the relevance of this statement. See Pl. Opp. at 3. And even if some kind of legally relevant partnership did exist between The Hearst Corporation and the entities Plaintiff identifies, it is immaterial to the claims asserted in this matter. Plaintiff does not allege wrongdoing by Google or YouTube. Rather, Plaintiff's claims arise solely from the Comment made by Mourelo. Thus, Google and/or YouTube's relationship with The Hearst Corporation has no bearing on whether The Hearst Corporation is a proper party.
Finding no legitimate theory of corporate liability under which The Hearst Corporation is a proper defendant to this lawsuit, the court hereby GRANTS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss as to The Hearst Corporation in its entirety.
B. The Court Lacks Personal Jurisdiction Over Mourelo
Defendants also move to dismiss all claims against Defendant Mourelo for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2). Mot. at 6. In response, Plaintiff makes two points in support of the court exercising jurisdiction over Mourelo in California: (1) Plaintiff resides in California; and (2) Mourelo posted the Comment on YouTube, which is owned and operated by Google, and Google is a California company. See Compl. ¶ 2; Pl. Opp. at 3-4.
For a court to exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, the defendant must have sufficient contacts with the forum state such that the exercise of jurisdiction "does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). Two categories of contacts may satisfy this requirement. First, a federal district court has general jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant where the defendant had "substantial" contacts or conducted "continuous and systematic" activities within the state that the district court sits, "even if the cause of action is unrelated to those activities." Sher, 911 F.2d at 1361; Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 924 (2011). General jurisdiction requires "[t]he defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State" be such that the defendant would "reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." Id. (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)) (internal quotations omitted).
Where general jurisdiction is does not exist, a court may still exercise specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant where: (1) the defendant purposefully directed activities toward the forum or purposefully availed himself of the benefits and protections of the forum's laws; (2) the claim arises out of the defendant's forum-related activities; and (3) exercise of jurisdiction would be reasonable. Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 802 (9th Cir. 2004). To determine "purposeful direction" in the context of Internet-related tort allegations, courts employ the "effects test," which looks at whether the defendant committed "(1) intentional actions (2) expressly aimed at the forum state (3) causing harm, the brunt of which is suffered-and which the defendant knows is likely to be suffered-in the forum state." Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1321 (citing Core-Vent Corp. v. Nobel Industries AB, 11 F.3d 1482, 1486 (9th Cir. 1993)).
Here, Plaintiff contends jurisdiction over Mourelo is proper in California because Plaintiff - a California resident - was the "target of the defamatory statement." See Compl. ¶ 2. Absent more, the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have both squarely rejected this theory of personal jurisdiction. In Walden v. Fiore, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that "mere injury to a forum resident is not a sufficient connection to the forum." Walden 134 S. Ct. at 1125 (citing and reiterating its holding in Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984)). In so doing, the Court highlighted "two related aspects" of a defendant's connection to a forum state as particularly relevant to the personal jurisdiction analysis in this regard:
134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014)
First, the relationship must arise out of contacts that the "defendant himself " creates with the forum State. .... Second, our "minimum contacts" analysis looks to the defendant's contacts with the forum State itself, not the defendant's contacts with persons who reside there.Id. at 1121-22 (emphasis in original). The Court concluded by clarifying that "the plaintiff cannot be the only link between the defendant and the forum. Rather, it is the defendant's conduct that must form the necessary connection with the forum State that is the basis for its jurisdiction over him." Id. at 1122; see Schwarzenegger, 374 F. 3d at 802-03 (holding that although the harmful effects of defendant's tortious advertisements were suffered in California by a well-known California resident, California courts lacked personal jurisdiction over the out of state defendant; distinguishing the foreseeability of conduct's effect in a forum state from a defendant's purposeful direction of his conduct toward the state). In line with this precedent, here, the court similarly finds that Plaintiff's domicile alone is insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over Mourelo.
The only remaining question, then, is whether Mourelo himself had sufficient contacts with California to warrant the exercise of personal jurisdiction over him here. Construed broadly, Plaintiff argues that Mourelo satisfies this requirement because he "published" the allegedly defamatory Comment on YouTube, thus purposefully directing his conduct toward California by his use of YouTube and/or Google, YouTube's parent company. Stated differently, Plaintiff's theory appears to be that the use of an Internet platform gives rise to personal jurisdiction in the state where the company that owns or operates the platform is based. This position is unsupported by the law.
Courts have routinely concluded that, in the context of Internet websites, there must be "something more" than the website itself "to indicate that the defendant purposefully (albeit electronically) directed his activity in a substantial way to the forum state." Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 418-20 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that an Arizona court could not exercise personal jurisdiction over a Florida company that had no contacts with Arizona other than maintaining a website that was accessible to anyone over the Internet); see Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1321 (9th Cir. 1998) (explaining that in reaching its decision in Cybersell, the court had "carefully reviewed cases from other circuits regarding how personal jurisdiction should be exercised in cyberspace...[and] concluded that no court had ever held that an Internet advertisement alone is sufficient to subject a party to jurisdiction in another state."); Dinar Corp. Inc. v. Sterling Currency Grp, LLC, 2014 WL 4072023 (D. Nev. 2014) (finding a lack of personal jurisdiction in Nevada where a Nevada company sued a Georgia competitor for posting disparaging information on a website); see also Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int'l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1020 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that Nevada had personal jurisdiction over defendant under the effects test where defendant engaged in an "insistent marketing campaign directed toward Nevada," specifically targeting Nevada consumers through radio and print advertisements in Las Vegas). To determine what rises to the level of "something more," the Ninth Circuit has looked to "several factors, including the interactivity of the website ... the geographic scope of defendant's commercial ambitions ... and whether the defendant individually targeted a plaintiff known to be a forum resident." Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand Techs., Inc., 647 F.3d 1218, 1229 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Here, Plaintiff does not plead any facts that demonstrate Mourelo's Comment on or use of YouTube satisfies this jurisdictional standard. Given the nature of the website, writing a comment in the comment section of a YouTube channel that has no apparent affiliation with California is a "passive" interaction with the forum. See; Dinar, 2014 WL 4072023, at *4 (finding that because the website at issue did "not have the capability to facilitate transactions or create contracts," and instead "merely offer[ed] a forum for customers to post information relating to various service providers," the site and the defendant's use of it was passive and did not amount to purposeful availment of the forum); Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (holding that "[a] passive Web site that does little more than make information available to those who are interested in it is not grounds for the exercise personal jurisdiction."); Medinah Mining, Inc. v. Amunategui, 237 F. Supp. 2d 1132, 1135 (D. Nev. 2002) (explaining that "when the defendant is charged with posting information on a passive website, that is, a website where information is simply made available to those interested in accessing it, the exercise of jurisdiction is not proper.").
Moreover, the Complaint lacks any allegations from which the court could conclude that Mourelo even knew that Plaintiff was a California resident; much less that he "expressly aimed" his conduct here. Other than Plaintiff being the one who suffered the alleged harm, there is nothing in the Complaint to suggest that the Comment's "effect" was any greater in California than elsewhere. While Plaintiff alleges that his YouTube channels have between 14,000 and 20,000 viewers per month, Plaintiff does not allege that such viewers were California residents, or that his audience was disproportionately impacted by the Comment in California. See Compl. ¶¶ 5, 10, 25, 31. In fact, Plaintiff highlights that the Comment's audience is not California specific, claiming:
By publishing the statement on the Internet in the comment section of the video in question, defendants knew it would be republished and read by the YouTube Community and the general public throughout the United States and elsewhere. The Statement was in fact republished and read by members of the YouTube Community and the general public throughout the United States and elsewhere consequence republication. .... [And] Defendants knew, anticipated, foresaw and intended the statement would be read by persons throughout the United States and the world and would damage the reputation of the Plaintiff.Compl. ¶¶ 25, 31. Thus, Plaintiff himself alleges that the intended and actual effect of Mourelo's Comment was directed nationally or even globally, not specifically at California.
In light of the foregoing, without more, the court concludes that posting a comment on the YouTube website is insufficient to subject an individual to jurisdiction in California simply because its parent company, Google Inc., has a presence here. Finding otherwise would not only be inconsistent with this Circuit's case law, but would also have the impractical effect of conferring personal jurisdiction in California over virtually all Internet users. Finding no other reasonable basis for jurisdiction over Mourelo in California, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Mourelo for lack of personal jurisdiction is GRANTED.
C. Defendants' Anti-SLAPP Motion
By dismissing both The Hearst Corporation as an improper party and Mourelo for lack of jurisdiction, the court has dismissed the only named defendants to this action. As a result, it is unnecessary for the court to reach the merits of Defendants' anti-SLAPP Motion to Strike, which was filed conjointly with its Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 49). See Sikhs for Justice "SFJ", Inc. v. Facebook, Inc., 144 F. Supp. 3d 1088, 1097 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (holding that the court "need not reach the merits of ...[d]efendant's anti-SLAPP motion to strike" where it had already dismissed the relevant claims on other grounds; denying anti-SLAPP motion as moot); see also Fotinos v. Sills, 2012 WL 5870681, at *5 n. 9 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (denying anti-SLAPP motion as moot after dismissing state law claims). The Motion to Strike is therefore DENIED AS MOOT.
D. Plaintiff's Motions for Sanctions
In response to Defendants' combined Motion to Strike and Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff also filed a Motion for Sanctions. See Sanctions Mot., Dkt. Nos. 56, 60, 60-1. First, Plaintiff argues that the fact that Defendants combined their motion to dismiss and motion to strike "is highly improper" and "renders the motion procedurally defective." Sanctions Mot. at 2, Dkt. No. 60-1. Plaintiff is incorrect; Defendants' combined Motion is acceptable to the court. Next, Plaintiff contends that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction is "objectively unreasonable and entirely unsupported by the relevant facts and applicable law." Id. at 5. The court disagrees. As discussed above, Defendants raise reasonable, supported, and non-frivolous arguments in favor of dismissal. While the court did not reach the merits of Defendants' 12(b)(6) arguments for failure to state a claim, the court notes that such arguments were also non-frivolous and appropriate to raise in a motion to dismiss. Finally, Plaintiff offers a lengthy discussion opposing a "heightened pleading standard" that has no obvious bearing to the contentions made in Defendants' Motion, and appears to misconstrue Defendants' argument challenging the sufficiency of Plaintiff's allegations. See id. at 5-9. This argument is similarly unavailing.
Plaintiff filed two separate documents, both of which are entitled "Motion for Sanctions" (Dkt. Nos. 56 and 60), on February 18, 2016 and March 7, 2016. However, Docket Item 56 is a single page entitled "Notice of Motion," and is filed without the supporting documents it purports to be based on. Docket Item 60 appears to be the same first page as Docket Item Number 56, but also includes an attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities (Dkt. No. 60-1). Accordingly, the court construes these two documents as a single Motion for Sanctions, and any reference made thereto should be assumed to be in reference to Docket Item Number 60-1 unless specified.
The court finds no basis for imposing Rule 11 sanctions. Plaintiff's repeated assertions that Defendants' arguments are "frivolous" and "unfounded" does not make it so, and his personal objections to the substance of Defendants' arguments should be raised in his responsive briefing, not a motion for sanctions. Plaintiff's Motion for Sanctions is DENIED.
IV. ORDER
Based on the foregoing, the court orders as follows:
1. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss all claims against The Hearst Corporation on the grounds that it is an improper party is GRANTED.
2. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss all claims against Ernesto Mourelo for lack of personal jurisdiction is GRANTED.
3. While the court is doubtful that Plaintiff could amend the Complaint so as to cure the deficiencies warranting dismissal, the court cannot conclude as a matter of law that no such amendment is possible. Accordingly, all claims are DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.
4. Any amended complaint must be filed on or before May 5, 2017, and must be consistent with the discussion above. Plaintiff is advised that the court may dismiss this action without further notice for failure to prosecute under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) if an amended complaint is not filed by the designated deadline.
5. Defendants' Motion to Strike is DENIED AS MOOT.
6. Plaintiff's Motion to Sanctions is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: March 31, 2017
/s/_________
EDWARD J. DAVILA
United States District Judge