Opinion
No. 13-03-589-CV
Memorandum Opinion Delivered and Filed July 7, 2005.
On appeal from the 214th District Court of Nueces County, Texas.
Before Justices HINOJOSA, YAÑEZ, and GARZA.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Karen Williamson, pro se, attempts to appeal an August 12, 2002 order of the district court dismissing her case and granting sanctions against her. We vacate the district court's order and dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Williamson originally initiated suit in small claims court. The small claims court ruled against her, and she subsequently appealed to the county court at law. The county court at law entered a directed verdict against Williamson and she appealed to this Court. We held that there is no appeal to an appellate court from a judgment of the county court or county court at law after a de novo appeal from a small claims court. Williamson v. A-1 Elec. Auto Serv., 28 S.W.3d 731, 731 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2000, pet. dism'd w.o.j.). Accordingly, we dismissed Williamson's appeal for want of jurisdiction. See id.
Williamson subsequently filed a new proceeding in the district court below. The district court found that all matters in dispute between the parties had been compromised:
Adopting the rulings of both the Thirteenth Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of Texas regarding this cause of action, this Court holds that this matter has been adjudicated as a small claim to the court of final appeal. . . .
The district court dismissed the cause with prejudice and enjoined Williamson from continuing to pursue the cause against any of the named defendants. The district court further ordered that Williamson be sanctioned in the amount of $25,000, with the caveat that the court "will not enforce the sanction unless [Williamson] further pursues the cause of action in any manner whatsoever." The instant appeal ensued.
After reviewing Williamson's notice of appeal and the parties' docketing statements, the Clerk of this Court notified Williamson that the appeal might be subject to dismissal given that it appeared that the final judgment in this matter had already been subject to appeal. We have reviewed and considered Williamson's response and the documents on file in this appeal. Williamson's response fails to indicate or establish that the instant appeal is properly before this Court as an appeal of a separate or distinct proceeding from that originally brought in small claims court, appealed to the county court at law, and finally, previously appealed to this Court.
Based on our review, we conclude that the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider Williamson's filings. As we have previously held, the judgment of the county court at law on Williamson's appeal is final. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 28.053(d) (Vernon 1988). The word "final" means that there is no further appeal to any other court. Woodlands Plumbing Co., Inc. v. Rodgers, 47 S.W.3d 146, 148 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2001, pet. denied) , see also Tumlinson v. Gutierrez, 55 S.W.3d 673, 674 (Tex. App-Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.); Oropeza v. Valdez, 53 S.W.3d 410, 411-12 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2001, no pet.); Howell Aviation Servs. v. Aerial Ads, Inc., 29 S.W.3d 321, 323 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2000, no pet.); Williamson, 28 S.W.3d at 731. Williamson cannot seek to avoid the judgment of the county court at law by simply renewing her claims in district court.
Because the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider a further appeal of Williamson's case, its August 12, 2002, order is void. See In re Dickason, 987 S.W.2d 570, 571 (Tex. 1998) (per curiam) (holding that order granting new trial after court's plenary power expired is void). With regard to the district court's award of conditional sanctions, a court has no more power to act in sanction matters than it does elsewhere. Accordingly, we conclude the entire order is void, including the award of sanctions. See id.
We vacate the trial court's order of August 12, 2002, and we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. All pending motions are denied as moot.