Opinion
Case No. 20030011-CA.
Filed July 15, 2004. (Not For Official Publication).
Appeal from the Second District, Farmington Department, The Honorable Rodney S. Page.
Michael J. Boyle, Ogden, for Appellant.
F. Kevin Bond and Budge W. Call, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
Before Judges Bench, Greenwood, and Jackson.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Respondent (Wife) first argues that the trial court erred in failing to comply with rule 63 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. We disagree. Rule 63 requires that a motion to disqualify a judge must "be accompanied by a certificate that the motion is filed in good faith and shall be supported by an affidavit stating facts sufficient to show bias, prejudice or conflict of interest." Utah R. Civ. P. 63(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added). Here, the court acknowledged the receipt of a certificate that the motion was filed in good faith. However, Wife did not provide the required supporting affidavit. Furthermore, a motion to disqualify must "be filed after commencement of the action, but not later than 20 days after . . . assignment of the action or hearing to the judge" or "the date on which the moving party learns or with the exercise of reasonable diligence should have learned of the grounds upon which the motion is based." Utah R. Civ. P. 63(b)(1)(B). For several months before trial, Wife knew that Judge Page was assigned to the case. Wife also had every document that now forms the basis for the allegation of bias. Yet, the motion was not filed until the day of trial. Therefore, because Wife's motion to disqualify was untimely and lacked the required affidavit, the motion was facially deficient.
Wife next contends that the court erred when it limited the cross examination of Petitioner (Husband) on the issue of bonuses. "We will not interfere with a trial court's decision to limit [testimony] unless the trial court abused its discretion." Shepherd v. Shepherd, 876 P.2d 429, 432 (Utah Ct.App. 1994). Here, "the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting [Husband's] testimony" because the nature of the bonuses was adequately addressed during trial. Id. Both Husband's father and the company's accountant testified that bonuses were strictly tied to net profit, and that bonuses to Husband had not been given since 2000 because the company had a loss in net profit. Furthermore, the court stated that "I'll find that he regularly gets a bonus, except for the last two years and I'll make a provision for that."
Wife further alleges that the court erred in not finding Husband in contempt of a previous temporary order requiring Husband to maintain health insurance for their minor child. Wife's argument fails because this issue was not adequately preserved below. While there was testimony regarding health insurance at trial, Wife failed to request a ruling on this issue from the court. Therefore, there is no ruling for us to review. See Hart v. Salt Lake County Comm'n, 945 P.2d 125, 130 (Utah Ct.App. 1997).
Lastly, Wife argues that the trial court abused its discretion in determining the amount of alimony, contending that Husband's bonuses were not properly factored into Wife's alimony. We disagree. Contrary to Wife's assertion, the court properly included bonus payments into the alimony. In the court's final findings, the court ordered that "any bonuses received by the petitioner [Husband] in this matter are to be shared with the respondent [Wife] so long as he is paying alimony, and that bonus is to be shared with the respondent in a percentage of 15 percent of any bonus so paid."
Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
WE CONCUR: Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge and Norman H. Jackson, Judge.