Opinion
00-CV-0502E(Sc)
December 10, 2002
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This decision may be cited in whole or in any part.
Plaintiff ("Williams") commenced this civil action May 11, 2000 in New York State Supreme Court, County of Erie, against his former employer ("Saint-Gobain"), claiming violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. and section 296 of the New York State Human Rights Law ("Human Rights Law"). Saint-Gobain removed this action to this Court June 8, 2000. Williams's ADA and retaliation claims were dismissed April 12, 2001. Saint-Gobain now moves for summary judgment with respect to the remaining claims. Such motion will be denied.
Williams's claims stem from his termination during a 1998 reorganization of Saint-Gobain's Coated Abrasives North America ("CANA") unit. Williams was a Technical Manager in the Quality Assurance Department at Saint-Gobain's Wheatfield, N.Y. facility. Williams claims, inter alia, that Greg Silvestri, Saint-Gobain's Vice President of CANA, was influenced by Wheatfield Plant Manager, Patrice DuBois, who had allegedly made various ageist comments. Silvestri denies having been influenced by DuBois and, to the contrary, he claims to have been unimpressed with Dubois to the point that he decided to terminate him.
The Wheatfield, N.Y. plant where Williams worked was originally owned by Carborundum Co., which hired him in 1963. A series of mergers resulted in Saint-Gobain's ownership of the Wheatfield plant.
See e.g., Williams Dep., at 38-47, 50-56.
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("FRCvP") states that summary judgment may be granted only if the record shows "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." In other words, after discovery and upon a motion, summary judgment is mandated "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Summary judgment is thus appropriate where there is "no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
Of course, the moving party bears the burden of showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Goenaga v. March of Dimes Birth Defects Found., 51 F.3d 14, 18 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970)). If the moving party makes such a showing, the non-moving party must then come forward with evidence of specific facts sufficient to support a jury verdict in order to survive the summary judgment motion. Ibid.; FRCvP 56(e).
With respect to the first prong of Anderson, a genuine issue of material fact exists if the evidence in the record "is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, at 248. Stated another way, there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact" where there is a "complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case." Celotex, at 323. Under the second prong of Anderson, the disputed fact must be material, which is to say that it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law * * *." Anderson, at 248.
See also Anderson, at 252 ("The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [movant's] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [movant].")
Furthermore, "[i]n assessing the record to determine whether there is a genuine issue as to any material fact, the district court is required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all factual inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought." St. Pierre v. Dyer, 208 F.3d 394, 404 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing Anderson, at 255). Nonetheless, mere conclusions, conjecture, unsubstantiated allegations or surmise on the part of the non-moving party are insufficient to defeat a well-grounded motion for summary judgment. Goenaga, at 18. Indeed, in order to survive a motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs in discrimination cases must offer more than "purely conclusory allegations of discrimination, absent any concrete particulars * * *." Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 998 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 829 (1985). Summary judgment is nonetheless appropriate in discrimination cases. Holtz v. Rockefeller, 258 F.3d 62, 69 (2d Cir. 2001).
In employment discrimination cases, district courts must be "especially chary in handing out summary judgment * * * because in such cases the employer's intent is ordinarily at issue." Chertkova v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 92 F.3d 81, 87 (2d Cir. 1996).
See footnote 4.
Turning to the governing substantive law, Williams alleges that Saint-Gobain discriminated against him on the basis of age in violation of the ADEA and the HRL by discharging him and subsequently promoting a thirty-something engineer to Manager of the department formerly managed by plaintiff. Section 623(a) of the ADEA, in relevant part, makes it unlawful for an employer:
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has held that "age discrimination suits brought under the State HRL and City HRL are subject to the same analysis as claims brought under the ADEA [ — which are analyzed] under the same burden shifting framework as claims brought pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended." Abdu-Brisson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 239 F.3d 456, 466 (2d Cir.) (citations omitted), cert denied, 122 S.Ct. 460 (2001). Accordingly, the undersigned considers plaintiff's age-based claims in tandem.
"(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age; * * *" 29 U.S.C. § 623(a).
ADEA claims are reviewed under the framework promulgated by McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), and its progeny for Title VII cases. Holtz, at 76. Under the McDonnell Douglas framework,
See also Texas Dept. of Comm. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981) ("[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff"); St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 508 n. 3 (1993) (discussing the burden-shifting analysis established in McDonnell Douglas and construed in Burdine).
See also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000) (applying McDonnell Douglas framework in ADEA context); Roge v. NYP Holdings, Inc., 257 F.3d 164, 168 (2d Cir. 2001) (same); Schnabel v. Abramson, 232 F.3d 83, 87 (2d Cir. 2000) (same).
"a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of age discrimination. Once the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case, the employer is required to offer a legitimate, non-discriminatory business rationale for its actions. If the employer articulates such a reason, the presumption of age discrimination dissolves, and the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the employer's stated reasons are merely pretextual and that age discrimination was the true reason for the adverse employment action." Abdu-Brisson, at 466 (citations omitted).
See footnote 8.
In establishing a prima facie case of age discrimination, a plaintiff must show that
"(1) he is a member of the protected class; (2) he is qualified for the position; (3) he has suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the circumstances surrounding that action give rise to an inference of age discrimination." Id. at 466-467 (citing McDonnell Douglas).
This burden is de minimis. Id. at 467.
This Court assumes arguendo that Williams has established a prima facie case of age discrimination — to wit, that (1) he is over forty years of age,(2) he is qualified for the position, (3) he was terminated and (4) the circumstances of his termination give rise to an inference that he was discriminated against on the basis of age. Saint-Gobain, however, has satisfied its intermediate burden of production under McDonnell Douglas where it proffers that the reason for Williams' termination was business efficiency realized during Saint-Gobain's 1998 reorganization. Accordingly, the presumption of discrimination disappears and Williams must show that age was a motivating factor in the defendant's decision to terminate him. See Reeves, at 143; Holtz, at 78-79.
See e.g., Duncan v. New York City Transit Auth., 2002 WL 1964401, at *16 (2d Cir. 2002) (discussing application of McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis where the court assumes arguendo that plaintiff has established a prima facie case); Mercado v. Div. of N.Y. State Police, 2001 WL 563741, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (same); Clark v. New York State Elec. Gas Corp., 67 F. Supp.2d 63, 72 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (same).
See 29 U.S.C. § 631(a).
See Interdonato v. Bae Systems, Inc., 2001 WL 637363, at *28-29 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that an inference of age discrimination existed where evidence indicated, inter alia, that management made ageist comments and that management maintained a list of employees over the age of 60 whom the employer sought to terminate); Carlton v. Mystic Transp., Inc., 202 F.3d 129, 135 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1261 (2000) ("a plaintiff has demonstrated an inference of age discrimination and thus established a prima facie case * * * where the majority of plaintiff's responsibilities were transferred to a younger co-worker, and shortly thereafter some of plaintiff's other duties were transferred to a newly hired younger employee").
"Even within the context of a legitimate reduction-in-force, however, an employer may not discharge an employee `because' of his age." Carlton, supra note 14, at 136.
Once a defendant articulates a "legitimate, clear, specific and non-discriminatory reason" for discharging plaintiff, "the McDonnell Douglas framework * * * disappear[s] and the sole remaining issue * * * [is] discrimination vel non." Holtz, at 77 (quoting Reeves, at 142-143). In other words, the plaintiff has the "ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against [him]." Schnabel, at 90 (quoting Reeves, at 143).
This burden "may often be carried by reliance on the evidence comprising the prima facie case, without more." Cronin v. Aetna Life Ins., 46 F.3d 196, 203 (2d Cir. 1995).
A genuine issue of material fact exists whether age may have been "a substantial motivating factor" in Williams' termination. See Holtz, at 81. Indeed, defendant erroneously asserts that it is undisputed that Patrice DuBois "had no influence on Silvestri's decision to terminate plaintiff." Def.'s Mem. of Law, at 12. What influence, if any, DuBois had on Silvestri's decision to terminate Williams is a matter for the trier of fact to determine. See McLee v. Chysler Corp., 109 F.3d 130, 135 (2d Cir. 1997) ("the court, in deciding a motion for summary judgment, is not to resolve issues of fact * * * [and] caution must be exercised in granting summary judgment where motive is genuinely in issue").
Williams alleges that DuBois made various ageist comments and that these comments influenced Silvestri's decision to terminate Williams.
See also Carlton, supra note 14, at 134 ("Because this is a discrimination case where intent and state of mind are in dispute, summary judgment is ordinarily inappropriate"); Chertkova, at 87 ("trial courts must be especially chary in handing out summary judgment in discrimination cases, because in such cases the employer's intent is ordinarily at issue").
Defendant cites McLee for the proposition that "evidence regarding a biased non-decisionmaker is only probative of discrimination if the plaintiff can show a direct causal connection between the decision maker and the biased non-decision maker." Def.'s Mem. of Law, at 12. Although Silvestri states that he did not heed DuBois's opinions — see Silvestri Aff., at ¶¶ 38-40 — sufficient evidence exists for a jury to find otherwise. For example, Silvestri testified that he consulted DuBois with respect to personnel issues and the 1998 reorganization during which Williams was terminated. See Silvestri Dep., at 79-85, 133-135. Moreover, unlike Williams, the plaintiff in McLee conceded that the allegedly biased manager "was not consulted" about the decision to terminate plaintiff. McLee, at 137. Accordingly, a genuine issue of material fact exists with respect to what Silvestri considered when he decided to terminate Williams.
Saint-Gobain fails to show that Silvestri was insulated from DuBois where it merely, at best, suggests that Silvestri did not heed DuBois. Consequently, the cases it cites in support fail to support Saint-Gobain's argument. See e.g., Griffin v. Washington Convention Center, 142 F.3d 1308, 1310 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ("We hold that evidence of a subordinate's bias is relevant where, as here, the ultimate decisionmaker is not insulated from the subordinate's influence * * *. Unlike the court in Willis [v. Marion County Auditor's Office, 118 F.3d 542, 547 (7th Cir. 1997)], we cannot say that `[t]he record affirmatively demonstrates that [the decsionmaker's] estimation of the quality of [plaintiff's] work was not jaded by anyone else's subjective and possibly [sexually] biased evaluation.'").
Additionally, McLee involved issues of employee dishonesty and unsatisfactory performance that do not appear to exist in this case. See id. at 135-137.
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that defendant's motion is denied and that the parties shall appear before Part III of this Court on the 10th day of January, 2003 at 3:00 p.m. (or as soon thereafter as they may be heard) to set a date for trial.