WILLIAMS v. REMINGTON ARMS COMPANY, INC.

Full title: TREVOR WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. REMINGTON ARMS COMPANY, INC. Defendant

Court: United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division

Date published: Oct 18, 2006

Civil Action No. 3:05-CV-1383-D (N.D. Tex. Oct. 18, 2006)

Opinion

Civil Action No. 3:05-CV-1383-D.

October 18, 2006

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

SIDNEY FITZWATER, District Judge

The September 12, 2006 motion of Turley Law Firm, f/k/a Law Offices of Windle Turley, P.C. ("Turley") to intervene is granted.¹

1 Under § 205(a)(5) of the E-Government Act of 2002 and the definition of "written opinion" adopted by the Judicial Conference of the United States, this is a "written opinion issued by the court" because it "sets forth a reasoned explanation for [the] court's decision." It has been written, however, primarily for the parties, to decide issues presented in this case, and not for publication in an official reporter, and should be understood accordingly.

I

Plaintiff Trevor Williams ("Williams") retained Turley on a contingent fee basis to represent him in pursuing claims against Remington Arms Company, Inc. ("Remington") arising from personal injuries he sustained in 2004. The Turley lawyer who represented Williams was Jeffrey W. Hightower, Jr., Esquire ("Hightower"). Williams sued Remington in this court in July 2005. Hightower left Turley in February 2006. In March 2006 Williams terminated Turley's services and hired the late Richard C. Miller, Esquire. In April 2006 Hightower became local counsel for Williams.

II

In the Fifth Circuit, a discharged attorney initially retained on a contingent fee basis can intervene as of right in an action in order to protect his interests under the contingent fee contract. See Keith v. St. George Packing Co., 806 F.2d 525, 526 (5th Cir. 1986). This rule — which traces back at least to Gaines v. Dixie Carriers, Inc., 434 F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1970), in this circuit — has been questioned, see Keith, 806 F.2d at 526; Gilbert v. Johnson, 601 F.2d 761, 767-68 (5th Cir. 1979) (Rubin, J., specially concurring), but it remains the law of the circuit. The court must therefore determine whether Turley has met the four requirements for intervention as of right.

An applicant is entitled to intervene as of right under Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a)(2) if he (1) files a timely application, (2) has an interest in the subject matter of the action, (3) demonstrates an impediment to protection of this interest arising from the pending action, and (4) shows inadequate protection of that interest by the existing parties to the action. Heaton v. Monogram Credit Card Bank of Ga., 297 F.3d 416, 422 (5th Cir. 2002). Williams challenges only the second element, contending that Turley lacks an interest in the subject matter of the action.² The Fifth Circuit has made clear, however, that a discharged attorney has an interest in the subject matter of the action. See, e.g., Keith, 806 F.2d at 526.

2 Relying on Texas law, Williams also maintains that intervention would cause needless confusion. Because the intervention question is governed by federal law as interpreted by the Fifth Circuit, the court need not address this contention.

Accordingly, because Turley has shown that it is entitled to intervene as of right, its September 12, 2006 motion to intervene is granted. Turley must file its complaint in intervention — electronically or on paper — within 10 days of the date this memorandum opinion and order is filed.

SO ORDERED.