Opinion
Case No. 1:18-cv-00098 (Erie)
01-22-2020
KEVIN WILLIAMS, Plaintiff v. SUPT. OVERMYER, OBLANDER, SAWTELLOE, BLICHA, GUSTAFSON, RIETTENHOUSE, MAHONEY, TERMAINE, TREVOR WINGARD, GINA, AND PATRICA PETERSON, Defendants
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ECF NO. 53
ECF NO. 62 I. Recommendation
It is respectfully recommended that the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 62) be GRANTED and that Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 53) be DENIED. II. Report
A. Introduction
Plaintiff Kevin Williams a/k/a Kirby Stewart (Williams), an inmate incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Forest in Marienville, Pennsylvania ("SCI-Forest"), began this action by filing a pro se civil rights complaint, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, on April 12, 2018. Plaintiff then filed an Amended Complaint on June 13, 2018 [ECF No. 18], the operative pleading here. Named as Defendants are Michael D. Overmyer, Superintendent at SCI-Forest ("Overmyer); and prison officials Oberlander, Sawtelle, Blicha, Gustafson, Riettenhouse, Mahoney, Termaine, Trevor Wingard ("Wingard"), "Gina," and Patrice Peterson ("Peterson") (collectively, "DOC Defendants"). After a period of discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. See ECF No. 53; ECF No. 62.
Williams misspells Defendant Rittenhouse's name throughout his filings as "Riettenhouse." The Court will use the Defendant's own spelling. Williams only refers to Defendant "Gina" by her first name and did not provide any further identification for her during the discovery period. In his response to the Defendants' summary judgment motion, Williams states that "Gina" is a "public relations person" within the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections. See ECF No. 74, ¶ 9. The Defendants argue that, without further information properly identifying this Defendant, the Court should treat Defendant "Gina" as a fictitious person and dismiss any claims against this unknown individual. See, e.g., Brooks v. Purcell, 57 Fed. Appx 47, 50 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that a defendant identified by a first name only, with no additional identifying information, should be considered a fictitious party). The Court notes, however, the service was accepted on behalf a "Gina Orlando" on September 26, 2018. See ECF No. 32. Thus, it cannot be recommended that this Defendant be dismissed outright.
B. Standards of Review
1. Summary Judgment
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) requires the court to enter summary judgment "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Under this standard "the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). A disputed fact is "material" if proof of its existence or nonexistence would affect the outcome of the case under applicable substantive law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Gray v. York Newspapers, Inc., 957 F.2d 1070, 1078 (3d Cir. 1992). An issue of material fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257; Brenner v. Local 514, United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners of Am., 927 F.2d 1283, 1287-88 (3d Cir. 1991).
When determining whether a genuine issue of material fact remains for trial, the court must view the record and all reasonable inferences to be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. Moore v. Tartler, 986 F.2d 682 (3d Cir. 1993); Clement v. Consol. Rail Corp., 963 F.2d 599, 600 (3d Cir. 1992); White v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 862 F.2d 56, 59 (3d Cir. 1988). To avoid summary judgment, however, the nonmoving party may not rest on the unsubstantiated allegations of his or her pleadings. Instead, once the movant satisfies its burden of identifying evidence that shows the lack of a genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party must to go beyond his pleadings with affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories or other record evidence to demonstrate specific material facts that give rise to a genuine issue. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986).
Further, under Rule 56, a defendant may seek summary judgment by pointing to the lack of a genuine fact issue on one or more essential claim elements. The Rule mandates summary judgment if the plaintiff then fails to make a sufficient showing on each element. When Rule 56 shifts the burden of production to the nonmoving party, "a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. See Harter v. G.A.F. Corp., 967 F.2d 846, 851 (3d Cir. 1992).
The court applies these standards no differently when, as here, it reviews cross-motions for summary judgment. Lawrence v. City of Phila., 527 F.3d 299, 310 (3d Cir. 2008). "'Cross-motions are no more than a claim by each side that it alone is entitled to summary judgment, and the making of such inherently contradictory claims does not constitute an agreement that if one is rejected the other is necessarily justified or that the losing party waives judicial consideration and determination whether genuine issues of material fact exist.'" Id. (quoting Rains v. Cascade Indus., Inc., 402 F.2d 241, 245 (3d Cir. 1968)). If review of cross-motions reveals no genuine issue of material fact, then judgment may be granted in favor of the party entitled to judgment in view of the law and undisputed facts. Iberia Foods Corp. v. Romeo, 150 F.3d 298, 302 (3d Cir. 1998) (citation omitted).
2. Pro Se Pleadings and Filings
Pro se pleadings, motions, and other filings, "however inartfully pleaded," are held to "less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520- 521 (1972); see also Leamer v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 547-48 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that the court must construe a pro se plaintiff's filings liberally). This means that if the court can reasonably read pleadings or filings to state a valid claim, position, or argument on which the litigant could prevail, it should do so despite failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax, and sentence construction, or litigant's unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. See Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982); United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Bierley, 141 F.2d 552, 555 (3d Cir. 1969) (reading petition prepared by a prisoner "with a measure of tolerance" where it was inartfully drawn).
C. The Amended Complaint
Williams raises violations of his due process rights and retaliation by the Defendants stemming from a misconduct he received for using abusive language toward prison staff members. Id. at pp. 2-4. Williams also claims constitutional violations by Defendants Gina, Peterson, and Wingard for their failure to respond to telephone calls from his family and, alternatively, for providing his family with incorrect information about Williams' administrative custody status. Id. at p. 4. A final claim against Defendants Rittenhouse, Mahoney, and Termaine for their handling of his property is also pled. Id. at p. 5.
Some paragraphs of the Amended Complaint are numbered in compliance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). Others are not. If able, the Court will cite to paragraph numbers.
D. Background
Williams filed a Concise Statement of Material Facts (ECF No. 54) and the Defendants' filed their own Statement of Material Facts (ECF No. 64). Williams responded to the Defendants' Concise Statement. ECF No. 77. To date, the Defendants have not filed a Responsive Concise Statement to Williams', as is required by LCvR 56(C)(1). Under this rule, a party opposing a motion for summary judgment is required to file a responsive concise statement of material facts in which he or she must: respond to each numbered paragraph in the movant's concise statement; admit or deny the facts contained in the movant's concise statement; set forth the basis for denial if any fact within the movant's concise statement is not entirely admitted by the non-moving party, with appropriate citation to the record; and set forth, in separately numbered paragraphs, any other material facts at issue. See LCvR 56(C)(1). Courts in this district require strict compliance with the provisions of Local Rule 56. See, e.g., Coleman v. Tice, 2018 WL 5724125, at *2 n. 3 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 10, 2018), adopted by 2018 WL 5722316 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 1, 2018); First Guard Ins. Co. v. Bloom Services, Inc., 2018 WL 949224, at *2-3 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 2018); Hughes v. Allegheny County Airport Auth., 2017 WL 2880875, at *1 (W.D. Pa. July 6, 2017). The consequences of not responding to the other party's Concise Statement are "severe." Hughes v. Allegheny County Airport Auth., 2017 WL 2880875, at *1 (W.D. Pa. July 6, 2017). Any alleged material facts "set forth in the moving party's Concise Statement of Material Facts ... which are claimed to be undisputed, will for the purpose of deciding the motion for summary judgment be deemed admitted unless specifically denied or otherwise controverted by a separate concise statement of the opposing party." LCvR 56(E). Here, because the Defendants have not filed a Responsive Concise Statement, the Court will deem Williams' statement as admitted. See, e.g., Abed-Rabugh v. Hoobrajh, 2019 WL 343178, *2 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 28, 2019). The Court will also cite to other, uncontested portions of the record to supply additional background facts of this case. See, e.g., Sam Mannino Enterprises, LLC v. John W. Stone Oil Distributor, LLC, 127 F. Supp. 3d 318, 321 n.1 (W.D. Pa. 2015). See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3).
By order of January 7, 2020, the parties were to file Responsive Concise Statements by January 14, 2020.
On March 9, 2018, Williams was issued a misconduct charge based on his use of abusive language. ECF No. 63-2, p. 1; ECF No. 64, ¶ 2; ECF No. 77, ¶ 3. The Defendants claim that Williams stated, in speaking about Defendant Rittenhouse, "you'd think she would have learned from what happened at Somerset." ECF No. 64, ¶ 3. The Defendants explain the significance of Williams' comment and why it warranted issuance of the misconduct by noting that "it occurred just two days after the funeral of Sergeant Baserman, who had died 11 days earlier after being brutally attacked and kicked by an inmate at SCI-Somerset." ECF No. 64, ¶ 4. Williams disputes this, restating his statement as "you'd think she would be more careful when entering cells while a prisoner is present." ECF No. 77, ¶ 4. In the Amended Complaint, Williams expounds on his statement that he was not threatening the sergeant but instead was "just going to tell her to be careful [b]ecause I don't want to see her get jumped on/get assaulted." ECF No. 18, p. 2. The misconduct charge was referred to a unit manager who then forwarded it the hearing examiner. ECF No. 77, ¶ 6. Williams was confined in disciplinary custody.
On March 12, 2018, however, an "other report" was filed against Williams by a Lt. Harding. ECF No. 63-4. This report suggested that "the inmate is a danger to some person(s) in the facility and cannot be protected by alternative measures." ECF No. 63-4 (Report of Lt. Harding). On March 20, 2018, Hearing Examiner Schneck reviewed the misconduct charge. According to the Discipline Hearing Report, Williams pleaded guilty to the misconduct report. ECF No. 63-2, p. 3. His guilty plea was accepted and he was sentence to "time served." Id.
Williams apparently remained in disciplinary custody pending his appeal of the misconduct. See ECF No. 63-4, p. 2 ("[I]nmate Stewart will be continued in AC status because he is pending the outcome of a misconduct.").
On March 22, 2018, the PRC reviewed the "other report" and elected to continue Williams' confinement. ECF No. 64, ¶ 10. The PRC determined that Williams would be removed from disciplinary custody but confined to administrative custody because of safety concerns. ECF No. 63-5, p. 1. Williams was released from administrative custody on May 17, 2018. ECF No. 64, ¶ 12; ECF No. 77, ¶ 13.
Additionally, Williams states that on March 12, 2018, Defendant Rittenhouse told Williams' cellmate to pack-up Williams' property. ECF No. 54. Defendants Mahoney and Termaine confiscated loose papers that were in Williams' phone book. Id. at ¶ 7. Neither party's Concise Statement includes any statements of fact about Williams' claim that when his fiance and daughter telephoned the Department of Corrections seeking information concerning why Williams was placed on AC status, they were provided with misleading information from Defendants Gina and Peterson. Id. No undisputed facts are reported as to Williams' final claim that Defendant Wingard violated his rights by failing to answer a letter from Williams. No exhibit in the summary judgment record relates to this claim.
E. The Motions for Summary Judgment
As noted, each party has filed a motion for summary judgment. Although the same standard of review applies to each cross-motion, the Court should consider the motions separately. See Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 834 F. Supp. 794, 797 (E.D. Pa.1993), aff'd, 27 F.3d 560 (3d Cir. 1994). "[T]he denial of one does not require the grant of another." Christian Heritage Acad. v. Okla. Secondary Sch. Activities Ass'n, 483 F.3d 1025, 1030 (10th Cir. 2007). The Court will consider the Defendants' motion first. If Williams' claims survive Defendants' motion, the Court will consider whether Williams is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See, e.g., Furman v. Matos, 2019 WL 4926378, *3 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 21, 2019).
1. The Due Process Claim
Defendants Overmyer, Oberlander, Sawtelle, Blicha, and Gustafson first move for summary judgment on Williams' due process claim. Defendants contend that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Williams was not deprived of a legally cognizable liberty interest when he was placed in disciplinary custody. The Court agrees.
The Due Process Clause offers procedural and substantive protections against deprivations of "life, liberty, or property." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979). The threshold issue of any due process analysis is whether a plaintiff has been deprived of one of these protected interests. Although Williams has not specifically identified which liberty interest these Defendants allegedly violated, the allegations of the Amended Complaint reflect he is basing his claim on his interest in avoiding the initial placement in disciplinary custody that resulted from the misconduct charge and the later confinement in administrative custody. See ECF No. 18, pp. 2-4. Due process requirements apply, however, only when the government's actions impose "an atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 471, 484 (1995). "[T]he baseline for determining what is 'atypical and significant'—the 'ordinary incidents of prison life'—is ascertained by what a sentenced inmate may reasonably expect to encounter as a result of his or her conviction in accordance with due process of law." Griffin v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 706 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that an allegedly fraudulent misconduct report and related disciplinary sanctions lasting longer than thirty days fell short of a due process violation. Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 653-54 (3d Cir. 2002). Of special significance to this case, however, the Third Circuit has also stated that "prison disciplinary proceedings may ... constitute a denial of due process in the context of a civil rights action under § 1983 when they are instituted for the sole purpose of retaliating against an inmate for his/her exercise of a constitutional right." Bond v. Home, 553 F. App'x 219, 224 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 642, 653 (3d Cir. 2002)). It is also well established that the United States Constitution does not confer any right upon an inmate to any particular custody or security classification. Brown v. Parker, 2010 WL 2080004, *2 (M.D. Pa., 2010) (citing Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 88 (1976); Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242 (1976)). Thus, inmates do not have a liberty interest in retaining or receiving any particular security or custody status "[a]s long as the [challenged] conditions or degree of confinement is within the sentence imposed ... and is not otherwise violative of the Constitution." Id.
Here, Williams was only sanctioned with twelve days disciplinary custody as a result of the misconduct. He does not point to any record facts showing that the length of his confinement, or the conditions of his confinement, amounted to an "atypical and significant hardship" under Sandin sufficient to deprive him of a protected liberty interest. "[C]onfinement in administrative or punitive segregation will rarely be sufficient, without more, to establish the kind of 'atypical' deprivation of prison life necessary to implicate a liberty interest." Smith, 293 F.3d at 653 (quoting Sandin).
The same is true for Williams' approximately one-month detention in administrative confinement. Periods of administrative confinement much longer than Williams' have been found not to implicate a prisoner's liberty interest. See, e.g., Griffin, 112 F.3d at 708 (segregated confinement of 15 months is not an atypical and significant hardship); Velasquez v. DiGuglielmo, 516 F. App'x 91, 97 (3d Cir. 2013) (4-month confinement in the RHU does not constitute an atypical or significant hardship); Smith, 293 F.3d at 654 (seven months in disciplinary confinement did not impose an atypical and significant hardship). Williams has pointed to no facts showing that either his twelve-day disciplinary detention or his one-month confinement in administrative segregation constituted atypical or significant hardships. For that reason, he failed to establish that he was deprived of a protected liberty interest. His due process claim necessarily fails and summary judgment should be granted to Defendants Overmyer, Oberlander, Sawtelle, Blicha, and Gustafson.
2. Retaliation Claim
Williams also claims that all of the DOC Defendants placed him in administrative custody as retaliation for the comments he made on March 9, 2018. ECF No. 18, p. 3. Williams contends that he "went back in front of PRC - Sawtelle did all of the talking, 'well the misconduct is over with, we felt that you should have gotten more DISCIPLINARY TIME, than TIME SERVED, so we're going to CONTINUE confinement under 802.'" (capitalization in original). Defendants argue that they did not retaliate against Williams but confined him to administrative custody based on legitimate concerns of prison security, including Williams' own personal safety. See ECF No. 63, p. 7.
The First Amendment protects diverse expressive activities. See U.S. CONST. amend I. These rights are lessened, but not extinguished, in the prison context, where legitimate penological interests must be considered in assessing the constitutionality of official conduct. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). Retaliation for expressive activities can infringe on an individual's rights under the First Amendment. See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 224-25 (3d Cir. 2000). To prevail on a retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that he was engaged in constitutionally protected activity; (2) that he suffered an "adverse action" by government officials; and (3) that there is "a causal link between the exercise of his constitutional rights and the adverse action taken against him." Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Allah, 229 F.3d at 225).
Williams fails to point to any evidence showing that he was engaged in a constitutionally protected activity. As a general matter, the First Amendment does not protect threatening or harassing speech. See e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358-360 (2003) (noting that "[t]he protections afforded by the First Amendment [ ] are not absolute" and that "true threats" and "fighting words" do not constitute speech protected under the First Amendment); Versarge v. Twn. of Clinton, 1991 WL 247611, *6 (D.N.J. Nov. 18, 1991); Jermosen v. Coughlin, 878 F. Supp. 444, 450 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that plaintiff's use of "threatening and abusive language" found "little protection" under the First Amendment). It also does not protect insubordinate or argumentative statements. See e.g., Riddick v. Arnone, 2012 WL 2716355, at *7 (D. Conn. July 9, 2012) (holding that an inmate's statement to a correctional officer that he could not issue a disciplinary report was not protected speech because it was a "schoolyard taunt").
Fatal to any claim of retaliation here is Williams' guilty plea to the misconduct charge. See ECF No. 63-2, p. 3 ("I/M pleads GUILTY to charge #33" (capitalization in original)). Williams does not that he pleaded guilty to this charge. This then establishes that Williams was guilty of using abusive language in violation of prison regulations. As such, Williams has checkmated his own retaliation claim because he admits that he was not engaged in protected activity. See Mearin v. Folina, 654 F. App'x 58, 61 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing Henderson v. Baird, 29 F.3d 464, 469 (8th Cir. 1994) (concluding that because the finding of guilt in the inmate's disciplinary hearing was based on "some evidence," that finding "essentially checkmates his retaliation claim")). Thus, given this undisputed fact, a reasonable finder of fact could not conclude that Williams was engaged in a constitutionally protected activity when he made his comments on the date in question. Put another way, a prison acts on a legitimate penological interest when it acts to deter an inmate's use of abusive language. See, e.g., Bullock v. Buck, 611 F. App'x 744, 748 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing Rauser, 241 F.3d at 334). That forecloses Williams retaliation claim based on the misconduct charge in question and summary judgment should be entered in favor of the Defendants.
3. Constitutional Violations in Application of DOC Policy
Next, and reading the Amended Complaint generously, Williams appears to claim that the Defendants violated his constitutional rights by failing to follow the dictates of their own internal policy, DC-ADM 802. See ECF No. 18, p. 3 ("Inmate Stewart . . . was placed on AC status pursuant to DC ADM 802"). Even if prison personnel did violate this policy, Williams' claim fails because a prison policy does not create a right, constitutional or otherwise. "The simple . . . application of state law procedures, policies and regulations does not ordain those procedures, policies and regulations with federal constitutional protection." Nobel v. Wetzel, 2019 WL 4279975, *9 (Aug. 1, 2019) (citing United States v. Jiles, 658 F.2d 194, 200 (3d Cir. 1981); Lee v. Schrader, 2014 WL 2112833, at *4 (W.D. Pa. May 20, 2014)). See also Jackson v. O'Brien, 2019 WL 1316108, *7 (W.D. Pa. March 22, 2019) (citing Dantzler v. Beard, 2007 WL 44208, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 5, 2007); Bohm v. Straw, 2013 WL 85273, at *9 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 8, 2013)). Thus, any claimed constitutional violation ostensibly brought for a violation of prison policy must fail and the Defendants should be granted summary judgment on that claim.
4. Claims based on allegations relating to telephone call
Williams next asserts a constitutional violation against Defendants Orlando and Peterson for their failure to "report[] the matter of [his] illegal confinement in the Restricted Housing Unit." ECF No. 18, p. 4. He also faults these Defendants for providing his family members with misleading information. Id. Williams also alleges that Defendant Wingard violated his constitutional rights in failing to respond to a letter he sent him. Id. He states that all of foregoing actions show these Defendants' "complicity in this matter." Id. Summary judgment should be granted on these claims as they are not cognizable in a § 1983 action.
First, this claim presupposes that Williams' detention in the RHU was unlawful, which is not the case. See discussion, supra. Second, Williams has produced no evidence from which a jury could conclude that these Defendants had some obligation to report a telephone call from a family member in which the family member shared a concern that an inmate was improperly detained in the RHU. Thus, Defendants' motion for summary judgment should be granted on this claim.
5. Allegations about personal property.
Finally, Williams raises a claim about the treatment of his personal property. Id. Williams claims that his constitutional rights were violated when Defendant Rittenhouse ordered Williams' cellmate to pack his personal property and based upon the assertion that several items were missing when his personal property was returned to him. Id. The Amended Complaint further alleges that Williams "eventually retrieved (all) of his property back, except for the job address, and opportunity contacts, and 20 photos" as well as "missing food items." Id. Although unclear, Williams also faults Defendants Mahoney and Tremaine for not following prison procedures dealing with inmate property. Id. ("Also, both c.o.'s is [sic] supposed to sign, date and time the Property Inventory Sheet, and sign the tape on boxes, this never happened.").
As determined, if Williams is alleging a constitutional violation based on the improper application of prison policy, such a claim fails as a matter of law. See, e.g., Jackson, 2019 WL 1316198 at *7. Furthermore, Williams' due process claims based on the loss of his property do not give rise to the level of constitutional violations if the state provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). See also Tillman v. Lebanon Cty. Corr. Fac., 221 F.3d 410 (3d Cir. 2000). Williams does not dispute that the prison grievance process as well as Pennsylvania law provided him with an adequate remedy for the deprivation of his property. Nothing in the record reveals that he availed himself of either remedy. Thus, because due process requires "only adequate post-deprivation remedies," summary judgment should be granted to the Defendants on this claim. Vega v. Mullen, 2017 WL 1021064, *4 (E.D. Pa. March 16, 2017) (citing Hudson, 494 U.S. at 132). III. Conclusion
In conclusion, and for all these reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by the Defendants [ECF No. 62] be GRANTED. Consequently, Williams' Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 53] should be DENIED. IV. Notice
The parties are referred to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 72(C)(2) for the appropriate procedure if any party desires to file objections to these findings and recommendations. Objections must be in writing and must be filed within fourteen days of this date. Failure to file timely objections may constitute a waiver of appellate rights. Angle v. Murin, 2013 WL 5888272, *1 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 31, 2013).
Submitted this 22nd day of January, 2020.
/s/_________
RICHARD A. LANZILLO
United States Magistrate Judge