Opinion
No. A06-147.
Filed December 19, 2006.
Appeal from the Department of Employment and Economic Development, File No. 11726 05.
Peter B. Knapp, Paul D. Hallen (certified student attorney), MN 55105-3076 (for relator).
Northland Transportation, Inc, MN 55372-9777 (respondent-employer).
Linda A. Holmes, Lee B. Nelson, Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic Development, MN 55101-1351 (for respondent department).
Considered and decided by WORKE, Presiding Judge; SHUMAKER, Judge; and STONEBURNER, Judge.
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2004).
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Relator challenges the decision of the unemployment law judge (ULJ) disqualifying him from unemployment benefits because he quit without good reason caused by the employer or, if he was discharged, he was discharged for misconduct. Relator argues that (a) he did not quit and instead was discharged from employment for reasons other than misconduct when he reasonably refused to drive a van that he believed to be unsafe; and (b) if he quit, it was for good reason caused by the employer. We hold that relator quit his job without good reason caused by the employer, and we affirm.
FACTS
Relator Leon Williams worked as a van driver for Northland Transportation from May of 2003 until June of 2005. He generally drove a year-2000 Chevrolet van, although on one occasion he was assigned an older van. He was allowed to change back to the newer van when he complained about steering problems. In mid-June of 2005, Williams switched to a part-time schedule. His dispatcher then told him that he was being reassigned to the older van because he had changed shifts.
Williams testified that on the day he was told of his reassignment to the older van, he inspected it to ensure that it was safe to operate. When he examined the steering wheel he said that there was "two to three maybe even more inches" of give before the wheels on the ground would respond. He told the dispatcher about his safety concerns and said that he would not be driving that van. Williams testified that the dispatcher told him that he was self-terminated unless he switched vans. He also testified that he unsuccessfully attempted to contact one of the co-owners of the company. Williams then told the dispatcher that he would not switch vans but would finish up the day's work, take the van home, and that the dispatcher could make arrangements for someone to pick the van up the next day. Williams did not return to work and had no further conversations with anyone from Northland after June of 2005.
The dispatcher testified and disagreed with William's version of what happened. The dispatcher stated that when he told Williams that he had to switch vans, Williams was upset that he had to drive the older van and quit on the spot without first inspecting the vehicle or calling either co-owner. Additionally, the dispatcher testified that if Williams had complained about the safety of the vehicle, accommodations would have been made to provide him with another vehicle.
Williams established a benefit account with the Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic Development (DEED), and a department adjudicator determined that Williams quit his employment with Northland without good reason caused by the employer and was therefore disqualified from receiving benefits. Williams appealed. In October of 2005, a de novo hearing was held before the ULJ, who issued findings of fact upholding DEED's decision. Williams filed a request for reconsideration, and the ULJ affirmed the decision in December of 2005. This certiorari appeal followed.
DECISION
The Minnesota legislature recently amended the Court of Appeal's permissive scope of review in 2005, effective for ULJ decisions issued on and after June 25, 2005. 2005 Minn. Laws ch. 112, § 34, at 710. Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7(d) (Supp. 2005), reads as follows:
The Minnesota Court of Appeals may affirm the decision of the unemployment law judge or remand the case for further proceedings; or it may reverse of modify the decision if the substantial rights of the petitioner may have been prejudiced because the findings, inferences, conclusion, or decision are: (1) in violation of constitutional provisions; (2) in excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the department; (3) made upon unlawful procedure; (4) affected by other error of law; (5) unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted; or (6) arbitrary or capricious.
This court will reverse a ULJ's decision when it reflects an error of law, is "arbitrary or capricious," or the findings are "unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the entire record . . . ." Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7(d) (Supp. 2005). Minnesota courts have defined "substantial evidence" as "(1) such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion; (2) more than a scintilla of evidence; (3) more than some evidence; (4) more than any evidence; or (5) the evidence considered in its entirety." Minn. Ctr. for Envtl. Advocacy v. Minn. Pollution Control Agency, 644 N.W.2d 457, 466 (Minn. 2002.).
This court defers to the ULJ's determinations regarding witness credibility and conflicting evidence. Skarhus v. Davanni's, Inc., 721 N.W.2d 340, 344 (Minn.App. 2006). "When the parties have presented conflicting evidence on the record, this court must defer to the [ULJ's] ability to weigh the evidence; we may not weigh that evidence on review." Whitehead v. Moonlight Nursing Care, Inc., 529 N.W.2d 350, 352 (Minn.App. 1995). Whether an employee's conduct constituted misconduct disqualifying the employee from unemployment benefits is a mixed question of fact and law. Schmidgall v. FilmTec Corp., 644 N.W.2d 801, 804 (Minn. 2002).
1. Voluntary Quit
Williams first argues that he was discharged from employment for reasons other than misconduct and that he did not quit. The ULJ held, and we agree, that "a greater weight of the evidence shows that Williams quit his employment." A voluntary "quit from employment occurs when the decision to end the employment was, at the time the employment ended, the employee's." Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 2 (2004). "A discharge from employment occurs when any words or actions by an employer would lead a reasonable employee to believe that the employer will no longer allow the employee to work for the employer in any capacity." Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 5(a) (2004).
Williams argues that the dispatcher's demand that he either drive an unsafe vehicle or face "self-termination" constituted a discharge. He cites Anson v. Fisher Amusement Corp. for the premise that he did not voluntarily quit employment because voluntary unemployment is the exercise of "a free-will choice and control" in terminating the employment. 254 Minn. 93, 98, 93 N.W.2d 815, 819 (1958).
However, the ULJ determined, and substantial evidence supports the conclusion, that Williams quit and that he did so voluntarily. According to statute, an employee is discharged if the employer has led the employee to believe that the employee will not be allowed to continue to work " in any capacity." Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 5(a) (2004) (emphasis added). The ULJ found that
[t]he preponderance of the evidence in this matter shows that Northland was willing to allow Williams to continue working for it after June 28, 2005 if he would drive [the older van]. Williams, however, chose to finish his route that day, drive the [newer] van home and not return to work.
When he was told that he had to drive the older van or else be discharged, the ULJ found credible the dispatcher's testimony that Williams responded by stating that he quit. Williams did not attempt to get his assessment of the van's safety confirmed, nor did he pursue other avenues of negotiation with the dispatcher or his employer, nor did he request any other accommodation.
Because this court can only overturn a ULJ's determination if it reflects an error of law, is "arbitrary or capricious," or the findings are "unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the entire record," we conclude that Williams quit his employment and was not discharged. Minn. Stat. § 268.105, subd. 7(d) (Supp. 2005).
2. Good Reason Caused by the Employer
Williams next argues that, if he did quit, it was for good reason caused by the employer. An employee who voluntarily quits is entitled to unemployment benefits if the decision to quit is the result of a good reason caused by the employer. Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 1(1) (2004). Whether an employee quit for good reason caused by the employer is a question of law that this court reviews de novo. Rootes v. Wal-Mart Assocs., Inc., 669 N.W.2d 416, 418 (Minn.App. 2003). A good reason to quit is a reason directly related to the employment and for which the employer is responsible; it is adverse to the worker; and it is significant enough that it would compel an average, reasonable worker to quit and become unemployed rather than remain in the employment. Minn. Stat. § 268.095, subd. 3(a) (2004). "A good personal reason does not equate with good cause" to quit. Kehoe v. Minn. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 568 N.W.2d 889, 891 (Minn.App. 1997).
The issue is whether "the employer made unreasonable demands of [the] employee that no one person could be expected to meet." Zepp v. Arthur Treacher Fish Chips, Inc., 272 N.W.2d 262, 263 (Minn. 1978) (concluding that employee had good reason to quit when employer doubled his workload and hours over a two-year period). "The standard for determining good cause is that standard of reasonableness as applied to the average man or woman, and not to the supersensitive." Erb v. Comm'r of Econ. Sec., 601 N.W.2d 716, 718 (Minn.App. 1999) (quotation omitted).
Here, a review of the facts shows that Williams quit because of a reason directly related to his employment, in that he was upset over the van he was required to drive. But he speculated about the van's safety without actually attempting to operate it and without seeking conformation of the vans's condition. It is unlikely that, under these circumstances, a reasonable person would quit the employment without giving the employer an opportunity to address the issue. Furthermore, the record indicates that Williams had complained about driving older vans in the past and was generally upset about being asked to change vans, and that he considered the newer van to be his. The ULJ found, and we agree that, although "Williams may have felt he had good personal reasons for quitting, a preponderance of the evidence on record fails to show that he quit for a good reason caused by Northland." Because this court must defer to the ULJ's determinations regarding witness credibility and conflicting evidence, we agree with the ULJ's determination that Williams did not quit for good reason caused by Northland. Jenson v. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 617 N.W.2d 627, 631 (Minn.App. 2000), review denied (Minn. Dec. 20, 2000).
Furthermore, Williams' cursory inspection of the vehicle was inadequate to support his determination that driving the van would be unsafe. The record indicates that Williams merely "felt" that the wheels were not responsive enough; he did not ask anyone else to verify this assessment nor did he test the vehicle by actually driving it. The record shows that the van was officially inspected by the department of transportation earlier in the year and that nothing was wrong with the steering. Additionally, no other employees complained about the van, and it remained in service after June of 2005.
Even though employee misconduct was an issue on appeal, substantial evidence in the record supports the ULJ's determination that Williams quit without good reason caused by the employer and was not discharged. Therefore, we need not address whether William's refusal to drive the older van constituted misconduct.