Opinion
No. 04-C-502-C.
July 23, 2004
ORDER
This is a civil action brought by two patients confined at the Sand Ridge Secure Treatment Center in Mauston, Wisconsin, alleging violations of their federal constitutional rights and rights under state law in connection with their confinement and treatment as Chapter 980 patients. Petitioners submitted a U.S. Postal money order in the amount of $10 toward their filing fee, but requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis as to the remainder of the fee. For the reasons set out below, I am dismissing this action without prejudice to petitioners' filing separate complaints. Therefore, I am directing the clerk of court to return petitioners' money to them.
In Lindell v. Litscher, 212 F. Supp. 2d 936 (W.D. Wis. 2002), I ruled that I would not allow prisoners proceeding pro se to prosecute a group complaint in this court because of the many problems inherent in administering such cases. The problems are equally applicable to joint lawsuits brought by two or more patients involuntarily committed under Wis. Stat. Chapter 980.
First, there is no guarantee that patients who bring joint lawsuits will remain in contact with each other for the length of time it takes a lawsuit to reach resolution. Patients are subject to administrative transfers from one institution to another and may be moved regularly within an institution from area to another and to administrative segregation status. Their freedom to meet with one another to discuss strategy for a combined lawsuit or to draft documents jointly for filing in a case is not guaranteed.
Second, all too often one person takes charge of the group lawsuit and obtains the agreement of other persons to act on their behalf in prosecuting the joint lawsuit although he lacks the legal authority to do so. There is no practical way for the court to insure that each co-plaintiff would receive the information he would need before agreeing to the strategic decisions being made in the case.
Third, Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 requires any person who files a lawsuit to certify by his signature that to the best of the signer's knowledge, information and belief formed after reasonable inquiry, the allegations of the complaint are well grounded in fact and the lawsuit is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law and that the filing of the complaint is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or cause unnecessary delay or needlessly increase the cost of litigation. Although both of the co-petitioners in this case have signed their names to the last page of the complaint, it is impossible to tell whether each petitioner actually saw and read the complaint he was signing.
Fourth, a pro se litigant who lets another pro se litigant prosecute a joint action on his behalf faces significant potential adverse consequences. In some instances, he may be exposed to sanctions because the lawsuit lacks legal merit. Even if the lawsuit raises claims of arguable legal merit, a pro se litigant who has not made his own legal and tactical decisions may find him bound by a judgment against him simply because his co-plaintiff made strategic errors.
Finally, to the extent that a pro se litigant wishes to recover money damages for alleged unconstitutional practices or conditions, it does not help him to file his suit along with another pro se litigant. Each plaintiff claiming damages is required to prove his own damages independently. Joint filings concerning individual claims of injury only raise the costs of litigating the case and needlessly complicate its management.
Accordingly, I will dismiss petitioners' complaint without prejudice to each petitioner's filing his own separate lawsuit. In preparing their separate complaints, each petitioner should pay particular attention to describing clearly what each individual respondent did to violate his constitutional rights. I will dismiss general allegations of illegal conditions that lack any indication that they apply to the particular petitioner on the ground that the petitioner lacks standing to assert the claim.
ORDER
IT IS ORDERED that this case is DISMISSED without prejudice to each petitioner's refiling the claims in his own lawsuit separate from this one. A copy of the complaint is enclosed to each petitioner for his reference in drafting a new complaint that sets out only those claims that relate directly to him. Because it is not clear whether one or both petitioners paid for the $10 money order submitted in this case, the clerk of court is directed to return $5 to each petitioner.
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR EMERGENCY INJUNCTION
Now, comes the plaintiff's Daniel R. Williams and Dennis R. Thiel does hereby present to the Court the following Brief in Support of Motion For Emergency Injunction, and relief requested.1. The plaintiff, Mr. Williams while in the Racine Correctional Institution (hereinafter referred to as RCI) was diagnosed by the institutions psychiatrist as suffering from Axis I: Anxiety Disorder and created a prescription to provide Mr. Williams with the appropriate medication. Where upon the completion of his prison sentence Mr. Williams was released to the Department of Health and Family Services pending commitment under Chapter 980, Wis. Stats. In the process of examining Mr. Williams at the Mendota Mental Health Institution (hereinafter referred to as MMHI) unknown party or parties discontinued the medication prescribed by the RCI psychiatrist. Upon transfer to the Wisconsin Resource Center (hereinafter referred to as WRC) unknown party or parties continued the practice of not providing Mr. Williams with the medication as prescribed by the RCI psychiatrist.
2. Since Mr. Williams had been diagnosed by a medical professional at the RCI the MMHI, WRC and SRSTC institutions and its employees had a duty to continue to follow the orders of the RCI psychiatrist. At the very least they had duty to provide Mr. Williams with an examination by a medical profession for determination of his present mental health needs.
3. Mr. Williams while detained at MMHI, pending commitment, had a realistic expectation to be provided with the same process of examination as any other person detained pending a commitment under chapter 51.20, Wis. Stats. That such routine procedures would include an testing and data collection from electroencephalogram, a neurological examination, a medical examination, and a complete battery of psychological tests and school evaluation, as well as a psychiatric evaluation. When all their data has been compiled, an entire staff conference is held, which is called a new case conference, at which point the complete case is re-examined and it is decided whether or not the individual needs hospitalization, and at that same time, as well, an adequate treatment course is planned." 99 S.Ct. 2523, 2527, 2528, 442 U.S. 640, Secretary of Public Welfare of Pennsylvania v. Institutionalized Juveniles, (U.S.Pa. 1979)
4. Psychologist, Craig Monroe while employed at the MMHI diagnosed Mr. Williams and presented the Court with his written determination of his scientific judgement as to the mental deficiences that Mr. Williams was suffering from. The transfer to WRC brought numerous behavioral problems for Mr. Williams with the assistance of medication.
5. Not until Mr. Williams arrived almost eight years later at the Sand Ridge Secure Treatment Center did he find some relief after being examined by the institution psychiatrist, Dr. Aeytey, MD. It is the conclusion of Dr. Aeytey that Mr. Williams now suffers on an Axis I: Anxiety Disorder, Mood Disorder and Depression. Dr. Aeytey has also provided the appropriate departments within the SRSTC facility as to the need of Mr. Williams and his treatment.
6. Clearly it is recognized by the medical professionals of RCI and SRSTC that Mr. Williams is in need of medication and the appropriate form of treatment. The SRSTC facility has only two doctors, Dr. Aeytey, psychiatrist and Dr. Ness who is the head medical professional. It is the psychological staff members from the treatment department of SRSTC who are refusing to provide the treatment necessary as medically ordered are in violation of a medical directive.
7. The question before this court is a one of imminent physical and emotional harm. The phrase "imminent physical harm" is not composed of technical words having a peculiar meaning in the law but is, as the court of appeals correctly determined, "composed of terms commonly used and understood by the general populace." 421 N.W.2d 107, 112, 143 Wis.2d 274, State v. McCoy, (Wis. 1988). "Imminent" means "close," "near at hand," or "on the point of happening." "Physical harm" means injury to the body, that is, physical pain or injury, illness or impairment of physical condition. 407 N.W.2d 319, 139 Wis.2d 291, State v. McCoy, (Wis.App. 1987). Emotional damage means harm exhibited by "severe anxiety, depression, withdrawal or outward aggressive behavior" or a combination of them. Sec. 813.122(1)(e), Stats. 449 N.W.2d 75, 78, 152 Wis.2d 701, H.Q., In Interest of, (Wis.App. 1989).
8. Mr. Williams has been diagnosed by a medical professional at SRSTC and at RCI. The comparison of the two diagnosis clearly demonstrates a harm that has already been caused. So now we turn to the issue of having one professional providing an order and a second professional and an arm of the Department of Health and Family Services refusing the appropriate treatment necessary.
9. The applicable law governing this case is found in the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. Under that clause prison officials' deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious medical need can constitute cruel and unusual punishment. 704 F.Supp. 885, 888 Jones v. Ehlert, (E.D.Wis. 1989). In the case of a mental health patient this indifference goes beyond just punishment.
10. We ask this court to consider the education and experience of these professionals as well as the level of medication which is be provided to Mr. Williams. An objectively serious medical need is "one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention." 220 F.3d 805, 810, Zentmyer v. Kendall County, Ill., (C.A.7 (Ill.) 2000)
11. We conclude, therefore, that the standard to be applied to assess the professional defendants' conduct toward these plaintiffs is an objective test based on their compliance with recognized standards applicable to their professions. It is not a subjective standard predicated on actual knowledge of harm or risk, nor is [ 198 Wis.2d 48] it a reasonable person standard by which determinations of negligence and recklessness are made. 542 N.W.2d 777, 787, 198 Wis.2d 24, Kara B. by Albert v. Dane County, (Wis.App. 1995).
12. The real concern is just how much more can Mr. Williams mind and body abosrb before he becomes another statistic within the records of the Wisconsin Department of Health and Family Services.