Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-4111-14T4
06-15-2016
EDWARD WILLIAMS, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. TOM MOLNAR, Defendant-Appellant.
Tom Molnar, appellant, argued the cause pro se. Respondent has not filed a brief.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Ostrer and Haas. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Special Civil Part, Mercer County, Docket No. SC-65-15. Tom Molnar, appellant, argued the cause pro se. Respondent has not filed a brief. PER CURIAM
Defendant landlord Tom Molnar appeals from the trial court's judgment awarding his former tenant, plaintiff Edward Williams, the return of a security deposit without doubling, and dismissing defendant's counterclaim for a set-off. Defendant claimed that plaintiff was liable for rent because he failed to give proper notice that he was terminating his month-to-month tenancy and failed to return the keys timely. Defendant also claimed plaintiff was liable for the costs of cleaning and repairing the damaged premises. Having reviewed defendant's arguments in light of the record and applicable principles of law, we are constrained to reverse and remand for a new trial.
Although the landlord named in the lease is Soyka Estates, Williams sued Molnar, its apparent owner, personally, and Molnar's counterclaim was in his name. Molnar did not challenge his personal liability.
I.
Four witnesses testified at the trial: plaintiff; Valerie Morales, the woman with whom plaintiff shared the apartment along with their two infant children; defendant; and Rome Perry, defendant's employee who maintained the apartment.
Plaintiff leased the Trenton apartment for thirteen months, commencing November 1, 2013, and ending November 30, 2014. Monthly rent was $880. Plaintiff paid a security deposit of $1320, equal to one-and-a-half month's rent.
Although defendant introduced a complete copy of the lease at trial, which he stated consisted of fifty pages, he included only excerpts in his appendix.
Upon expiration of the initial term, the lease provided that the tenancy would continue on a month-to-month basis "until terminated as required by the laws of New Jersey or by mutual agreement between landlord and tenant." However, the lease included an addendum stating that to terminate the lease after its initial term expired, the tenant must give "30-calendar day notice," signed and delivered in person, or sent by certified mail. The lease also provided that tenant was deemed to be in continued possession of the unit until he returned all keys. Plaintiff signed additional addenda attesting to the fact that the apartment, upon its initial rental, was in good condition.
The lease stated, "Your letter must be signed in person upon receipt by the Landlord or sent by 'certified' mail to Soyka Estates . . . ."
Aside from the basic terms of the lease, many of the material facts were disputed. Plaintiff testified that notwithstanding the written acknowledgments, various repairs were required at the outset of the tenancy, which were discussed in emails between plaintiff and defendant. Plaintiff and Morales also testified that the apartment was infested with rodents and roaches. They contended that defendant's response to their complaints was inadequate, and did not abate the problem.
The parties also presented competing proofs regarding the adequacy of heat in the apartment, and whether defendant provided adequate notice before entering the apartment to perform maintenance.
As a result of the rodent problem, plaintiff contended that he decided to terminate. He testified that he explained to defendant he wanted to leave the property, recognizing that he would be responsible for the next month's rent. He asked if he could leave early, and defendant "didn't really reply to that." Plaintiff then provided notice of termination on the rent check for December 2014. On the memo line of the check dated November 25, 2014, plaintiff wrote: "Final payment, will be out by Jan. 1, 2015." The check was deposited November 25, 2014.
In December, after a strong odor permeated the apartment, plaintiff and his family moved into his mother's house, but left belongings in the apartment. Plaintiff contended the odor resulted from construction or cleaning work that defendant was performing in the apartment below plaintiff's. Shortly before midnight on December 31, 2014, plaintiff removed his property from the apartment. He contended that he tried without success to reach defendant to discuss when he could transfer the keys and conduct a walk-through. The parties ultimately agreed to meet on January 3, 2015. Plaintiff contended he returned the keys on that date.
In addition to seeking the return of his security deposit, plaintiff sought $1000 in damages for constructive eviction. The trial court's denial of this claim is not before us.
Plaintiff stated that during the walk-through, he identified areas that needed repairs during the course of the tenancy, which defendant had failed to address. Plaintiff contended he video-recorded the walk-through and defendant did not identify any problems with the apartment. Morales testified that she left the refrigerator "sparkling," and "probably" scrubbed and wiped down the stove with Lysol.
Defendant gave a different account. He asserted he responded as best he could to plaintiff's claims of rodent infestation, but questioned whether the infestation existed. In response to plaintiff's claims that the apartment was in need of repairs when he moved in, defendant testified that the apartment passed municipal inspection and he obtained a certificate of occupancy. He also relied on the addendum plaintiff signed acknowledging that the apartment was in good shape.
Defendant contended that plaintiff "broke the lease" by failing to provide notice to terminate by certified mail. Although he endorsed the November 25 rent check, he contended that the writing on the memorandum line of his check was "nebulous in terms of what that would mean . . . ." He also contended that plaintiff failed to return the keys until after the commencement of the January term.
Defendant presented photographs and a CD, which he stated showed damage plaintiff caused to the apartment. Perry testified that after plaintiff vacated, he found trash and debris in a bag with the name of the store where plaintiff worked. In addition, two windows were broken, a fire extinguisher was missing, a lock was broken, a molding was detached, and furniture that was included in the rental was damaged. Perry noted the stovetop was laden with grease, scratches were left on the floor, and the track lighting in one room was damaged. The apartment also needed sweeping. Perry stated that he obtained the appropriate materials, repaired the damage, and cleaned the apartment. Perry also stated that he never saw evidence of rodent infestation in the apartment.
The CD is not included in the appellate record.
Defendant introduced letters addressed to plaintiff after he vacated in which defendant asserted "the amount of clean-up, repairs, painting, supplies is only $500+." He also alleged that $880 in rent for January was owed, asserting plaintiff did not provide effective notice and failed to timely return the keys. Defendant contended that he attempted to hand deliver these letters to plaintiff, who refused to accept them or to give a forwarding address. In support of his damage claims, defendant also introduced a "moveout/movein check list" dated January 4, 2015 identifying damaged items and stating a total "cost to repair/replace" of $502, made up of $390 in labor costs and $112 in materials; workslips identifying each repair job, when it occurred, and how long it took; receipts from a Trenton hardware store dated January 15 and 20, 2015, for storm window repairs totaling $117.70; and invoices from Home Depot from 2014, which he asserted evidenced his bulk purchases of supplies later used in repairing the apartment.
There were several inconsistencies in the handwritten document: while the asserted labor cost was $390, the itemized costs added up to only $290, and defendant sought $112 for materials, even though the storm window receipts alone totaled $117.70. --------
Plaintiff offered to introduce in rebuttal his video of the walk-through to contest defendant's proofs regarding the condition of the apartment. However, the court barred any rebuttal evidence, finding it unnecessary.
The court found that plaintiff effectively provided notice to terminate with the November 25 check, stating that the note in the memorandum line that "he would be out by January 1st" was "all fairly clear." The court did not expressly find that defendant was actually notified of plaintiff's termination, nor did it address plaintiff's non-compliance with the requirement that notice be sent by personal delivery or certified mail. The court credited plaintiff's testimony that he and his family left in December because of the odor in the apartment. The court did not address the contested issue of the alleged late return of the keys.
The court dismissed defendant's counterclaim for damage to the apartment based on a lack of proof, finding that there was no document stating the amount of the set-off against the security deposit and ruling that the deposit was "due back in full."
There was testimony about documents that would show how much the set-off against the security deposit was but I have now looked through these documents three times. I don't have it here. All I have is testimony. I don't have a number to be able to give a set-off. So the security deposit would be due back in full.Apparently based on this finding, the court did not decide the issue whether plaintiff caused damage to the apartment that necessitated repairs and cleaning. The court acknowledged Perry's testimony, but stated it was unsure of the "frame of reference" of his testimony, and ultimately found it did not "sway the court."
Defendant appeals from the dismissal of his counterclaim.
II.
We exercise limited review of a trial court's fact-finding in a non-jury case. Seidman v. Clifton Sav. Bank, S.L.A., 205 N.J. 150, 169 (2011). We are bound by a trial court's findings of fact when they are supported by "adequate, substantial, credible evidence." Ibid. (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998)). "Deference is especially appropriate when the evidence is largely testimonial and involves questions of credibility." Ibid. (quoting Cesare, supra, 154 N.J. at 412). We will only disturb the court's fact findings if "they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice." Ibid. However, the trial court must articulate the reasons for its decision, so that we may conduct appropriate review. Curtis v. Finneran, 83 N.J. 563, 569-70 (1980); R. 1:7-4(a) (requiring court in non-jury trial to "find the facts and state its conclusions of law thereon"). We review the court's legal conclusions de novo. Manalapan Realty v. Manalapan Twp. Comm., 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).
We reverse the court's conclusion that plaintiff gave effective notice of his termination of the tenancy through the memorandum line of the November 25 rent check. Plaintiff did not comply with the terms of the lease, which required him to sign the notice "in person upon receipt by the Landlord," or send it by certified mail. We recognize that substantial compliance with this provision may suffice. Our Supreme Court has held that a landlord's substantial compliance with the requirements of a notice to quit was effective, Harry's Village, Inc. v. Egg Harbor Twp., 89 N.J. 576, 587 (1982), and our law is generally more protective of a tenant's rights than the landlord's. Cmt. Realty Mgmt. v. Harris, 155 N.J. 212, 226-27 (1998). Substantial compliance here can be established by proof that defendant received actual notice of plaintiff's intentions.
The court apparently rejected defendant's claim that the language on the memorandum line was "nebulous," finding that the language was "fairly clear." We do not disagree. However, that finding is not enough. It is certainly conceivable that a party may overlook a notation, however clear in its meaning, on the memorandum line of a check. The court was required to find that defendant had actual notice. While there is certainly circumstantial evidence to support such a finding — including defendant's admission that he personally endorsed the check — the finding is for the trial court to make. We remand for the court to determine whether defendant had actual notice of plaintiff's intent to terminate.
The trial court was also obliged to address defendant's claim that plaintiff failed to return the keys at the end of the tenancy, thereby prolonging his term according to the lease. As noted, plaintiff contended he tried to arrange the return of the keys, but defendant refused to respond to him.
We are also constrained to reverse the dismissal of defendant's damage counterclaim. The court erred in concluding that defendant failed to present evidence of the cost of repairs. Defendant included receipts for the reconstruction of the storm windows plaintiff allegedly damaged. See Penbara v. Straczynski, 347 N.J. Super. 155, 162 (App. Div. 2002) (hearsay receipts are admissible in Small Claims Division as proof of damage to carpet in landlord-tenant dispute). Defendant also included workslips describing the repairs performed, which supported his claim for labor costs.
Since defendant presented evidence to support his damage claim, it was incumbent upon the trial court to address the disputed issues of fact regarding whether plaintiff caused damage and whether defendant reasonably incurred the alleged cleaning and repair costs. The court must also ascertain whether defendant complied with his obligation to provide plaintiff a timely itemization of the deductions, see N.J.S.A. 46:8-21.1, or was excused from doing so.
However, a new trial is necessary on this issue as the trial court precluded plaintiff from presenting evidence in rebuttal. On remand, assuming an appropriate foundation is laid, plaintiff should be permitted to introduce into evidence the video recording he allegedly made during the walk-through. See R. 1:2-2 (describing requirements for the appropriate handling and preservation of a video-recording introduced into evidence).
Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION