Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:02-CV-2462-P.
July 28, 2004
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Now before the Court is Defendant J.P. Morgan Chase Co.'s Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on May 4, 2004. Plaintiff filed his Response on May 24, 2004, and Defendant filed its Reply on June 4, 2004. After considering the parties' arguments and briefing, and the applicable law, the Court GRANTS Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.
I. Factual Background
Plaintiff was hired by Defendant, J.P. Morgan Chase Co. ("Defendant"), as a Senior Technical Analyst in its Benefits Payment Group on November 7, 2000. App. to Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. at 6. In this capacity, Plaintiff was supervised by Melinda Beyer and Michael Blaser. Id. at p. 8. Beyer and Bleyser, in turn, reported to Richard Motte, the Senior Technical Officer in charge of the Benefits Payment Group. Id. Plaintiff subscribes to the religious beliefs and is a practicing member of the Institute of Divine Metaphysical Research. App. to Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. A at 3. According to Plaintiff, "Motte on several occasions indicated disdain for my religious beliefs." Id. at 3-4.
In addition to several harassing comments allegedly made by Motte, Plaintiff claims that Motte also gave him an unfair performance evaluation. Id. at 4. Subsequently, on June 3, 2002, Plaintiff sent a letter to William Harrison, Corporate Executive Officer for Defendant, and Sheila Sentino, Defendants' Senior Vice President of Employee Relations, complaining of what he believed to be religious discrimination. Id. Plaintiff claims that, after he sent the letter, Motte confronted him about not getting approval for vacation days he had taken. Id. Plaintiff insisted that he had obtained prior approval, and informed Motte that he believed Motte was again discriminating against him on the basis of his religious beliefs. Id. On July 21, 2002, Plaintiff sent a memo to Motte concerning Defendant's alleged failure to accurately report the work he was performing. In this memo, Plaintiff complained of "harassment and retaliation," but he did not specifically complain of religious discrimination. Id. at 4-5.
Defendant claims that Plaintiff began to have performance problems as early as 2001, and that Plaintiff repeatedly failed to follow departmental procedures. App. to Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. at 141-43. As a result, Plaintiff was issued a written warning on September 24, 2001. Id. at 141. In addition, Defendant claims that his poor performance was the basis for the performance appraisal that Plaintiff thought was "unfair." Id. at 90-98. Defendant further contends that Plaintiff's performance did not improve, and that he also exhibited gross insubordination to Beyer and Motte. Id. at 115-17, 144-53, 155-56. Consequently, on July 31, 2002, Plaintiff was issued a final written warning. Id. at 144-45. Defendant claims that the "last straw" incident occurred during the weekend of August 30 — September 1, 2002. Plaintiff was the on-call senior technical analyst that weekend, and was responsible for fixing any technical problems that might occur over the weekend. Id. at 67-68. Defendant maintains that Plaintiff received a service call that weekend, but failed to fix the problem, and refused to work on the problem. Id. at 134-336, 157-62. As a result of his alleged insubordination, Motte recommended Plaintiff's termination. Id. at 162. Plaintiff was officially terminated from his employment on September 12, 2002.
II. Procedural History
Prior to his termination, on August 30, 2002, Plaintiff went to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), and completed a Charge Questionnaire. Plaintiff attached to the Charge Questionnaire his objections to the final written warning that he received, as well as the letter he sent to Harrison and Sentino, complaining of religious discrimination. On September 17, 2002, after his termination, Plaintiff filed a formal Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC, complaining of discriminatory treatment and termination on the basis of his religion. Subsequently, on October 22, 2002, Plaintiff sent a letter to the EEOC investigator assigned to his case, noting that "[i]n . . . the charge of discrimination you prepared, you did not include my claims for retaliation and a hostile work environment." App. to Pl.'s Resp., Ex. F. In order to rectify the situation, Plaintiff filed a second Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC on October 23, 2002, alleging that, "[i]n retaliation [against my complaints of religious harassment and discrimination], I was subjected to a hostile work environment. . . ." Id., Ex. G.
Plaintiff filed his Original Complaint in this Court on November 12, 2002, asserting claims for religious discrimination, as well as claims for retaliatory hostile work environment and retaliatory termination for complaining about religious discrimination. On November 17, 2003, the Court issued an Order granting Plaintiff's counsel's Motion to Withdraw. In his Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff's new counsel states: "At the time the undersigned counsel was retained, the deadline for amending pleadings had passed. Plaintiff points this out because the only cause of action which plaintiff currently intends to pursue is for wrongful termination based on retaliation for having made complaints of religious discrimination." Pl.'s Resp., p. 1. Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims for religious discrimination and retaliatory treatment are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. In addition, for the reasons stated below, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED with respect to Plaintiff's remaining retaliatory termination claim.
III. Discussion
As a condition precedent to bringing a Title VII claim, a plaintiff must exhaust his available administrative remedies by first pursuing the appropriate claim with the EEOC. "Courts have no jurisdiction to hear Title VII claims to which the aggrieved party has not exhausted administrative remedies." National Ass'n of Govern. Emp. v. City Pub. Serv., 40 F.3d 698, 711 (5th Cir. 1994) ( citing Tolbert v. United States, 916 F.2d 245, 247-48 (5th Cir. 1990) (per curiam)). This requirement serves the dual purposes of affording the EEOC and the employer an opportunity to settle the dispute through conciliation, and giving the employer some warning as to the conduct about which the employee is aggrieved. See generally Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974); Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455, 466 (5th Cir. 1970).
Once a Title VII complaint is filed, however, the Court's inquiry is not limited only to the exact charge previously brought before the EEOC. See Young v. City of Houston, 906 F.2d 177, 179 (5th Cir. 1990). Rather, the scope of inquiry encompasses "discrimination like or related to allegations contained in the [EEOC] charge and growing out of such allegation during the pendency of the case before the [EEOC]." National Ass'n of Govern. Emp., 40 F.3d at 711 ( quoting Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455, 466 (5th Cir. 1970)); see also Hebert v. Monsanto Co., 682 F.2d 1111, 1133 (5th Cir. 1982). Courts have interpreted the "like or related" language to permit claims that could "reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination." See generally Thomas v. Texas Dep't of Crim. Justice, 220 F.3d 389, 395 (5th Cir. 2000); Young, 906 F.2d at 179; Sabrah v. Lucent Technologies, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17906, *5 (N.D. Tex. 1998). The Fifth Circuit has held that retaliation which occurs as a result of filing an EEOC charge can be included in a Title VII case in district court without filing a new charge. See Gupta v. East Texas State University, 654 F.2d 411, 414 (5th Cir. 1981); McCray v. DPC Industries, Inc., 942 F. Supp. 288, 294-95 (E.D. Tex. 1996) (citations omitted). However, a retaliation claim arising prior to the filing of an EEOC charge may only be included if it was a part of the original charge. See McCray, 942 F. Supp. at 295; see also Steffen v. Meridian Life Ins. Co., 859 F.2d 534 (7th Cir. 1988).
a. Plaintiff Failed to Include a Claim for Retaliatory Termination in His Charges of Discrimination.
In this case, both of Plaintiff's Charges of Discrimination were filed after his termination on September 12, 2002. As such, Plaintiff's retaliatory termination claim arose prior to the filing of both Charges, and Plaintiff would have had to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to this claim. However, Plaintiff's first Charge of Discrimination, filed on September 17, 2002, alleged only religious discrimination. In addition, although Plaintiff's second Charge of Discrimination, filed on October 23, 2002, expressly complained of retaliation, it was devoid of any mention of his termination. Rather, the only retaliation complained of was a "hostile work environment." Thus, based on the allegations made in his two Charges of Discrimination filed with the EEOC, Plaintiff has not exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to a claim for retaliatory termination.
Relying on Gupta v. East Texas State University, 654 F.2d 411 (5th Cir. 1981) and its progeny, Plaintiff argues that he is not required to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to his retaliatory termination claim because his original Charge Questionnaire was completed prior to his termination. Plaintiff's reliance on Gupta is misplaced.
If Plaintiff had filed a charge of discrimination prior to his termination, then Gupta would apply, and Plaintiff would not necessarily have to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to his retaliatory termination claim. However, the Fifth Circuit has made abundantly clear that a "[charge] questionnaire is not the same as an EEOC charge [of discrimination]," and that a questionnaire does not fulfill the notification requirements of the EEOC. McCray, 942 F. Supp. at 294-95 (citations omitted). Thus, the fact that Plaintiff completed a Charge Questionnaire prior to his termination is largely irrelevant. It is undisputed that Plaintiff did not file his Charge of Discrimination until after his termination. As a result, under Gupta and McRay, Plaintiff is required to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to a claim for retaliatory termination.
Plaintiff maintains that, although an investigation into his second Charge was never conducted, "it is clear that any reasonable investigation would have included an investigation into retaliatory discharge." Pl.'s Resp. at p. 6. Given the allegations contained in the second Charge, however, the Court does not agree. In his second Charge, filed over one month after his termination, Plaintiff's lone complaint is that he was subjected to a hostile work environment in retaliation for his complaints of religious discrimination. Nowhere in the Charge itself or the Charge Questionnaire does Plaintiff even suggest that his termination was also a retaliatory action. As such, the Court does not believe that an investigation into Plaintiff's termination would reasonably grow out of Plaintiff's complaints of a hostile work environment.
b. Plaintiff's Retaliatory Termination Claim Does Not Reasonably Grow Out of the Materials He Filed with the EEOC.
Plaintiff maintains, however, that the Court's inquiry should not be limited only to the two Charges of Discrimination. Rather, in addition to the two Charges, Plaintiff points out that he also (1) completed two Charge Questionnaires, (2) attached three documents to his first Charge Questionnaire, and (3) wrote a letter to the EEOC Investigator on October 22, 2003. Taken collectively, Plaintiff argues that a claim for retaliatory termination could reasonably be expected to grow out of these materials. Upon closer inspection of these materials, however, the Court disagrees. Neither of the Charge Questionnaires completed by Plaintiff expressly mention his termination. In fact, the first Questionnaire, completed on August 30, 2002, pre-dated Plaintiff's termination. The second Questionnaire, completed on October 23, 2002, mentions retaliation and a hostile work environment, but contains no reference or complaint about Plaintiff's termination. Plaintiff also attached three documents to his first Charge Questionnaire — (1) an e-mail sent to Melinda Beyer, (2) an e-mail sent to Richard Motte, and (3) a letter sent to David Harrison and Sandy Sentino. All three of these documents pre-dated Plaintiff's termination. Moreover, in the three documents attached, there is only one broad, vague allegation that "the positions taken by Melinda Beyer regarding my work performance are intended [sic] for harassment and/or retaliatory means. . . ." Pl.'s App., Ex. B at 9. The e-mail to Bridget Boyle merely complains about the events giving rise to Plaintiff's Final Written Warning, and mentions neither religious discrimination nor retaliation. See Pl.'s App. at 15-16. In fact, of the three documents, Plaintiff's June 3, 2002 letter to Harrison and Sentino is the only one that expressly mentions religious discrimination, but it also makes no reference to any retaliation. See Pl.'s App. at 11-12, 17-18.
Plaintiff's letter to the EEOC investigator is the strongest evidence that he intended to pursue a claim for retaliation. However, even this letter is ambiguous as to the type of retaliation claim Plaintiff sought to assert. In the letter, Plaintiff states that the investigator "did not include [his] claims for retaliation and hostile work environment" in the first Charge of Discrimination, and that he "should have at least checked the retaliation box." Pl.'s App., Ex. F at 20. However, Plaintiff also states in the letter that his claims of retaliation were set forth in the three documents attached to his first Charge Questionnaire. As discussed supra, all three of those documents pre-dated his termination, and could not have encompassed a claim for retaliatory termination. Most damaging to Plaintiff's argument, a second Charge of Discrimination was filed the day after Plaintiff sent his letter to the EEOC investigator. To the extent that Plaintiff was not clear in his letter as to what claims of retaliation were left out of his first Charge, Plaintiff was absolutely clear about his claims in the second Charge: "In retaliation, I was subjected to a hostile work environment. . . ." Pl.'s App., Ex. E at 19. Again, Plaintiff makes no mention of his termination in connection with his claims of retaliation. The Court finds that, even if it was to examine all of his filings collectively, a claim for retaliatory termination does not reasonably grow out of those materials, and Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.
IV. Conclusion
Plaintiff has abandoned his claims for religious discrimination and retaliatory hostile work environment, and those claims are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. In addition, for the reasons stated supra, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to his Title VII claim for retaliatory termination, and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED.
It is so ordered.